Changes in the diplomatic system If 1749 was a tense year, rich in various clashes, 1750 seemed to promise only joy for France: everyone was looking for an alliance with it. The prospects that opened up for Prussia were not so rosy; every day her isolation

RUSSIAN PEOPLES' FRIENDSHIP UNIVERSITY

Department of Theory and History of International Relations

ABSTRACT ON THE TOPIC:

“Innovations of Peter I in the management of foreign policy affairs”

Completed by a 1st year student, group GMB-13

Volikova A.A.

Teacher:

Shpakovskaya M.A.

MOSCOW, 2015

Introduction

Chapter 1. Diplomacy before Peter (in the 17th century)

Chapter 2. Prerequisites and origins of the foreign policy of Peter I

Chapter 3. The Grand Embassy and preparations for war

Chapter 4. Peter's foreign policy during the Northern War

Chapter 5. Peter's foreign policy after the Peace of Nystad

Conclusion

Bibliography:

Introduction

Peter the Great is considered one of the most outstanding rulers of the Russian state. His dream and main goal was to bring Russia into the category of great powers and establish extensive ties with Europe. Therefore, foreign policy occupies an exceptional place in his activities. This policy was accompanied by war throughout almost the entire reign of Peter. Of the 35 years that Peter spent on the throne, the state of complete peace lasted less than a year. Of course, the quiet successes of diplomacy could not compete with the loud glory of Russian cannons; its actions could not cause such a wide resonance among the population. However, she had no less influence on the emergence of Russia in the world. Like the founding of the regular army, navy and other institutions of state power, Peter the Great created a new Russian diplomacy, in no way lagging behind the diplomacy of such recognized powers as France and England, which had much more experience, developing over centuries. Even in the previous century in England, T. Hobbes created his famous theory of the social contract. The science of international law emerged. But then Peter comes to power, and less than 10 years after the start of his reign, Russian ambassadors, well educated and versed in all the intricacies of international relations, operate in all European capitals. Respect and recognition do not immediately come to them, but gradually, especially after the Battle of Poltava, they begin to have a significant influence on international relations in all directions.

The diplomacy of Peter the Great is associated with an expression that first appeared in 1769 in “Letters on Russia” by Francesco Algoroti, where he wrote that Peter cut a window to Europe for Russia. These words most accurately express the image of Peter’s foreign policy.

Military strategy and diplomacy are not only inextricably linked, but also constitute forms of one process of struggle. It is almost impossible to separate them, especially since the top leadership in both war and diplomacy was in the hands of one person - Peter the Great. We combine them into the concept of “foreign policy,” and this essay is dedicated to the innovations brought by Peter to this activity.

Chapter 1. Diplomacy before Peter (in the 17th century)

What was the international position of the Moscow state in the 17th century? They often write about major successes in foreign policy under the first Romanovs. Of course, after the end of the Time of Troubles and the expulsion of the Swedish and Polish invaders, Russia’s position on the map of Europe strengthened and its international ties strengthened. But at its core, its diplomacy remained extremely inflexible and ineffective. A special diplomatic department - the Ambassadorial Prikaz - existed in Russia since the 16th century, but its methods of work were as primitive as all the activities of the clumsy Moscow state mechanism.

Russian diplomatic protocol at that time was a mixture of Byzantine, Tatar and Old Moscow customs. Basically it boiled down to the exaltation of the “Tsar of All Rus'” over all other monarchs. Foreign diplomats, who were treated very arrogantly, as “unclean”, were demanded to honor him as a protege of God and the most powerful sovereign on earth, and this despite the fact that in the register of European rulers of the Treaty of Versailles of 1648, the Russian Tsar was in penultimate place in terms of significance - after him only the Prince of Transylvania appeared. Naturally, such absurd claims on the part of the Russians could only cause ridicule and rejection from European envoys. Approximately the same feeling was evoked by the rare Moscow ambassadors at European courts (Russia did not have permanent diplomatic representatives abroad at that time), dressed in long-skirted caftans of Asian cut and tall fur hats. According to the French historian K. Grunwald, Russia in the 17th century was judged to be under the influence of a fanatical, intolerant Orthodox clergy and a greedy, ignorant nobility. No one has heard about her successes in the military, administrative and even cultural fields. The memoirs of the Duke of Sully, a diplomat of Henry IV, say this: “... the Russians belong to Asia as much as to Europe, and they should be considered as a barbarian people, classified as countries like Turkey, although for five hundred years they have been among Christian states » Molchanov N.N. Diplomacy of Peter the Great / N.N.Molchanov - M.: International Relations, 1984. P.28.

If the West understood Russia poorly, then Russia understood the state of international relations in Europe even worse. Russian foreign policy in the 17th century was of a purely regional nature. Permanent political ties were maintained only with neighbors: Poland, Turkey and Sweden. Of course, we cannot talk about complete diplomatic isolation of Russia. Trade relations developed with geographically distant countries such as Holland and England. But conducting extensive trade with Russia, they often dictated their terms to it. The dependence of the Moscow state on the import of such vital goods as metal, gunpowder and firearms grew more and more and became dangerous. While Europe was moving along the path of technological progress in military affairs, Russia could not independently dress and arm the army, and the absence of a fleet caused enormous damage to it. Political weakness and inexperience often turned her into a helpless object of the most primitive diplomatic blackmail. Molchanov N.N. Diplomacy of Peter the Great / N.N.Molchanov - M.: International Relations, 1984. P.30.

There were also outstanding personalities at this time who understood the need for Russia to join European international relations. These include primarily A.F. Ordin-Nashchokin. He dreamed that the Ambassadorial Prikaz would be “the eye of all great Russia”, and that diplomacy would be handled by “immaculate and chosen people,” but so far he had only to try in vain to ensure that the Ambassadorial Prikaz was relieved of the responsibility... to control the collections from taverns. Meanwhile, this talented statesman had a foreign policy plan that in many ways anticipated the essence of Peter’s diplomacy. It consisted of creating a coalition against Sweden in order to take Livonia from it and gain access to the sea. To do this, it was necessary to make peace with Turkey and even enter into an alliance with Poland - that is, to make a rather sharp turn in foreign policy. In the end, this idea was partially realized - an alliance was concluded with Poland, which, weakening, began to need support from Turkey. This happened during the reign of Princess Sophia, when Ordin-Nashchokin had already left government activities.

Instead, the “Westernizer” Prince V.V. comes to the forefront in foreign policy activities. Golitsyn. Although in European historiography he enjoyed a reputation as a talented diplomat, his diplomacy did not in any way strengthen the international positions of the Moscow state. The first foreign policy event under him was Moscow’s confirmation of all existing treaties, including the Treaty of Kardis with Sweden, which cut off Russia from the Baltic (that is, in fact, the rejection of the country’s main foreign policy objectives - the return of ancestral Russian lands and the struggle for access to the sea) . The signing of the “eternal peace” with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1686 can hardly be considered a major success - although Kiev was returned to Russia “forever”, Right Bank Ukraine and Belarus also remained “forever” within the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. In addition, Russia was obliged to pay large compensation and go on a campaign against Crimea, being completely unprepared for this. As a result, the two Crimean campaigns undertaken by Golitsyn turned out to be a complete failure. The Nerchinsk Treaty with China was also unsuccessful: Russia was forced to abandon the vast lands of the Amur region and permanently liquidate the Russian settlements that existed there.

In total, this is the political legacy left to Peter by previous statesmen. We will not dwell on his confrontation with Sophia for power, but rather consider how his childhood and youth passed in the village of Preobrazhenskoye and the German settlement, which left an undoubted imprint on all his future activities, including foreign policy.

Chapter 2. Prerequisites and origins of the foreign policy of Peter I

peter foreign policy war

Having an enthusiastic and restless nature, Peter found many activities since childhood. By adulthood, he had mastered a total of 14 crafts - from blacksmithing to shipbuilding. He was also very interested in military affairs. Peter's peers were “amusing” companies, trained in real military affairs - with not at all amusing cannon fire and pistol shooting, which sometimes ended in tears. The amusing companies would later be transformed into the Preobrazhensky and Semenovsky regiments and would become the armed support of the young tsar.

As war games became more complex, Peter's interest in advanced military equipment, combat tactics and command and control grew, which necessarily forced him to turn to specialists, who were mostly foreigners. They all lived in the German settlement in Moscow on the banks of the Yauza River. Diplomatic missions and merchant offices of a number of European countries were also located here. In total, about three thousand foreigners V.I. Buganov lived in this Western European microcosm during Peter’s youth. Peter the Great and his time. - M.: Nauka, 1989. P.7.

Peter's close acquaintance with foreign specialists and the German settlement dates back to 1688, when the Dutchman F. Timmerman began teaching him mathematics, geometry, fortification, and artillery. He instilled in Peter an interest in maritime affairs, which completely captured the tsar, becoming the basis for the gradual formation of a policy of transforming Russia into a powerful maritime power. Other teachers of Peter from the German settlement were generals P. Gordon, F. Ya. Lefort, Dutch diplomats N. Witsen and I. Keller, businessmen Hartmann, Gutman, Mons and others.

Peter's visit to the German settlement was not limited to teaching the exact sciences. During conversations with his foreign teacher friends, questions were raised about the role of the monarch in the destinies of the nation, problems of economic development of European countries and international relations. The idea expressed by his interlocutors took root in Peter’s mind that those countries that have access to the seas and conduct active foreign trade - England, Holland, Spain - are rich and powerful. The Russian reality of that era, against the backdrop of the picture of Western Europe he compiled from the stories of foreigners, looked wretched and archaic. Awareness of Russia's backwardness led the tsar to the conclusion that the path to its revival lay through its transformation into a great maritime power.

Issues of international affairs occupied a significant place in conversations at feasts in the German Settlement. And understanding European politics of that time was quite difficult. The era of French dominance in Europe, accompanied by continuous wars, reached its apogee by the mid-80s of the 17th century. In response to the expansionist policy of Louis XIV's France, the countries of Western Europe, united in the League of Augsburg, began hostilities in 1688. The head of the coalition, consisting of Austria, England, Holland and Spain, was William III of Orange, who in the eyes of Peter became the personification of the ideal of a monarch as a statesman. Russia's traditionally friendly relations with Holland, as well as a gradual understanding of the reasons why France constantly supported Turkey, Russia's worst enemy, became a logical addition to Peter's benevolent attitude towards the anti-French coalition. According to the Dutch ambassador Keller, Peter expressed a desire “to take part in actions against the French or to support enterprises against them at sea.” Of course, the dreamy aspirations of young Peter were far from the real state of affairs, since Russia not only did not have a navy, but did not even have large river vessels, which his teachers did not fail to remind him of. Thus, from the lessons of diplomacy, Peter came to the conclusion that Russia’s unenviable international position and its relative isolation from European politics are due to Russia’s lack of a powerful navy and merchant fleet. In general, it can be noted that the course of diplomacy taken by the tsar in the German Settlement and the Ambassadorial Prikaz helped him form a correct idea of ​​​​the international relations of the European continent at the end of the 17th century in Bobylev V.S. Foreign policy of Russia in the era of Peter I: Monograph. - M.: Publishing house UDN, 1990. P.11-13.

True, for a long time, even after the overthrow of Sophia, Peter was not at all interested in state affairs, preferring to engage in crafts and all kinds of amusements (which is worth the idea of ​​the “All-Drunken Council”). Participation in diplomatic and other ceremonies tired him extremely. IN. Klyuchevsky writes: “This powerful man... was embarrassed and lost in the solemn atmosphere, breathed heavily, blushed and sweated when he had an audience... listen to pompous nonsense from the envoy who introduced himself.” It is also said that one day a Persian ambassador arrived in Moscow and expected an official reception by the king. However, he did not want to break away from building the ship near Pereyaslavl. The heads of government had to convince Peter for a long time to return to Moscow and receive the ambassador, but the tsar willingly agreed to visit him only when he learned that the ambassador had brought him a lion and lioness as a gift - he could not wait to look at the strange animals. He will always treat diplomatic protocol with disdain. Peter did not take a real part in diplomacy for the reason that he realized the weakness of the state, in which diplomacy did not have a strong support. To find it, he first reached out to foreigners who were best prepared to conduct international affairs, since knowledge of languages ​​and European life gave them a huge advantage. But it was not worth relying entirely on foreigners in foreign policy, if only because the interests of Russia were alien to them, and this would play a cruel joke on Peter more than once. Franz Lefort and Patrick Gordon are successful exceptions for Russia. It was necessary to find comrades-in-arms in his homeland, and Peter takes assistants from everywhere, regardless of their origin and rank. They had a lot to teach and educate N.N. Molchanov. Diplomacy of Peter the Great / N.N.Molchanov - M.: International Relations, 1984. P.46-47.

After the overthrow of Sophia, diplomacy directed by L.K. Naryshkin, Peter's uncle, was not very active. In those years, she was mostly involved in Little Russian affairs. After the conclusion of the “eternal peace,” Polish magnates did not abandon plans to seize Left Bank Ukraine. At the same time, Poland demanded that Moscow continue military operations against Crimea, diverting Turkish forces to itself. But Peter himself was interested in campaigning in the south as a test of his new army, which emerged from the “amusing” companies. He had long wanted to visit Western Europe to get acquainted with its achievements, but he had to come there as a winner in order to stand on an equal footing with the European sovereigns. Ibid., p.54. (p.54) With these goals, he makes his first Azov campaign (1694-1695), which, however, ended unsuccessfully. After this, Peter shows himself as a person capable of learning from his mistakes, and carefully prepares his second campaign. A.S. Shein was appointed its commander, and General Gordon was appointed assistant to this not very experienced governor. F. Lefort was put in command of the not yet existing fleet. The construction of ships began at a rapid pace, and foreign shipbuilding specialists were invited from everywhere. On May 3, 1696, the newborn navy, consisting of two large ships, 23 galleys and 4 fire ships, set off. It is believed that he did not even have to engage in battle with the Turkish squadron - the Turks were so amazed by the appearance of Russian galleys at the mouth of the Don that they hastened to withdraw their fleet from there before they weighed anchor. Left without reinforcements from the sea, Azov capitulated. The capture of Azov is Russia's first triumph over its previously invincible enemy, Turkey. However, access to the Black Sea was never found.

The news of the victory at Azov, as American historian Robert Massey writes, aroused “surprise and respect” in Europe. The Russian diplomat could now afford to speak a new language. Nikitin, for example, demanded in his speech that henceforth the old names of Polish kings as “rulers of Kyiv and Smolensk” should not be used in Polish papers, because according to the agreement, both Kyiv and Smolensk were Russian possessions. The senators complied with this requirement. And Peter, realizing that Azov was just the beginning, continued to intensively create a navy. In 2 years, 52 ships had to be built - an unprecedented undertaking in terms of means and time frame. The transformation of Russia into a maritime power began. It was necessary to teach the Russians everything that foreigners could do. And this is the meaning of Peter’s rapprochement with Europe: it was not about simple imitation, but about using the technical achievements of Europe to strengthen the Russian national cause. And in November 1696, an order followed for young nobles to go abroad to study maritime affairs and shipbuilding. For disobedience, the royal order provided for the deprivation of all their rights and lands. However, there were also volunteers. Among them is the future famous diplomat of Peter the Great’s times, P.A. Tolstoy, who was then already over 50 Molchanov N.N. Diplomacy of Peter the Great/N.N.Molchanov - M.: International Relations, 1984. P.59-62.

Chapter 3. The Grand Embassy and preparations for war

The Great Embassy of 1697-1698 is one of the most significant enterprises in the history of Russian diplomacy. The unusualness of the event itself was expressed, first of all, in the fact that for the first time a Russian ruler went to Europe. Moreover, according to the documents, Peter rode not as a king, but as a sergeant of the Preobrazhensky regiment, Pyotr Mikhailov. The official purpose of the Grand Embassy is to attract new allies to the next war against Turkey. However, it was clearly in no hurry to complete it. First of all, Peter went to study Europe and learn from Europeans. But the widespread opinion that Peter would rather work as an ax in the Dutch shipyards than engage in diplomacy has no basis, and this is proven by the agreements he reached.

There is no need to describe the route of the Grand Embassy, ​​which changed along the way, and its location in each country. Peter never found any allies against Turkey and was forced to restructure his foreign policy from a southern to a northern direction. The reorientation of Russia's foreign policy was made not only under the pressure of the current international situation. Peter's careful study of European economic relations during the Grand Embassy convinced him that only access to the Baltic Sea would give Russia direct access to Europe, while the southern seas could not open this exit to Peter. It should also be noted that the task of acquiring a reliable and convenient access to the Baltic Sea was put on the agenda of Russian foreign policy long before Peter, approximately from the end of the 15th century in V.S. Bobylev. Foreign policy of Russia in the era of Peter I: Monograph. - M.: Publishing house UDN, 1990. P.22.

So, the plan for an alliance against Sweden and gaining access to the Baltic Sea surfaced again. A coalition of Denmark, Prussia and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth against Sweden was already taking shape, and they wanted to involve Russia in it. However, Peter was in no hurry to fight with Sweden then, realizing his military lack of competitiveness. Then, despite his political inexperience, he showed himself as an inventive diplomat: in order to avoid hostility from Sweden and at the same time not to spoil relations with Prussia, Peter, during negotiations with the Elector, proposed not to include an article on the alliance in the written text, but to agree on it orally , securing it only with a verbal promise. He motivated this by the fact that the only guarantee of either written or oral contracts is the conscience of the partners, and only God can judge for their non-compliance. In order to finally eliminate suspicions on the part of Sweden, Peter in 1699 confirms the Treaty of Kardis, refusing, however, to swear on the cross History of diplomacy, volume 1/Edited by V.P. Potemkin. - M.: State socio-economic publishing house, 1941. P.267. Now all that remained was to pacify Turkey and its ally, the Crimean Khanate, so that they would not have to fight in two directions. At first, this task was entrusted to P.B. Voznitsyn, a diplomat of the old type, who even in his clothes preserved the traditions of the old Moscow house. At the same time, he had both flexibility and firmness to get out of difficult situations. He managed to retain Azov for Russia during peace negotiations with Turkey. Later, the embassy of E.I. Ukrainian was sent to Constantinople, announcing its arrival in a very unusual way: the frigate “Fortress”, on which the embassy arrived, positioned itself right next to the Sultan’s palace and fired a “welcome” cannon salvo, thereby causing a commotion in the Turkish capital. Such a show of force was a well-planned diplomatic action by Peter and might not have affected the outcome of the negotiations. Molchanov N.N. Diplomacy of Peter the Great / N.N.Molchanov - M.: International Relations, 1984. P.147. It is also known that Ukraintsev did not skimp on bribes, and even bribed the Sultan’s harem. On August 8, 1700, the Peace of Constantinople was concluded (formally a truce for 30 years), according to which Russia confirmed its right to Azov and Taganrog, stopped the annual sending of “funerals” (essentially tribute) to the Crimean Khan and interrupted official diplomatic relations with him. Thus, the shameful relic of the Tatar-Mongol yoke was put to an end. The demands of Kerch and freedom of Russian trade, however, met a decisive rebuff from the Turks. Denmark and Saxony, which had already entered into a war with Sweden, hurried Russia in every possible way, and in order to quickly conclude peace with Turkey, V.S. Bobylev had to abandon these demands. Foreign policy of Russia in the era of Peter I: Monograph. - M.: Publishing house UDN, 1990. P.21.

So, what were the achievements of this period of development of Peter’s foreign policy? The Grand Embassy became a milestone from which the process of comprehensive (and especially diplomatic) rapprochement with Europe begins. It was after this that Moscow began to become one of the centers of European diplomacy; something like a permanent diplomatic corps, consisting of foreign residents, was formed here. But permanent Russian diplomatic missions are also beginning to be formed in foreign countries. Already in 1699, A.A. Matveev was sent to Holland with the rank of “ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary”, and in 1701 he was appointed “minister” in Vienna. At the same time, Russian consuls appeared in many European countries to protect the country's trade interests.

The Ambassadorial Prikaz underwent significant restructuring. Much of his work had to be broken on the fly. This was reflected, for example, in the decree on “theologies”. We are talking about the abolition of the tradition, according to which, before the title of the sovereign, a lengthy statement of the essence of the deity, his omnipotence and power was written in documents. Peter replaced this set of words with a short formula: “sovereign by the grace of God,” thereby beginning to banish meaningless rituals from the practice of diplomacy. Soon after this, the Old Moscow ceremony of receiving ambassadors with the formation of troops, etc. N.N. Molchanov was cancelled. Diplomacy of Peter the Great / N.N.Molchanov - M.: International Relations, 1984. P.136. A system of instructions for ambassadors, developed personally by Peter, appears, including an official order of a protocol nature and a secret order in the form of questions and answers, containing detailed instructions on the substance of the upcoming negotiations. These documents are characterized by a greater degree of independence of the ambassador.

It is worth saying that it was not immediately that Western orders took root in Russian diplomacy. The old Moscow rituals still adhered to the new shell. In 1708, the ministers of Louis XIV spoke very disapprovingly of the Russian ambassadors at court, who “sought nothing for their benefit from the king and only made proud requests” (link) Peter himself did not always adhere to the new regulations. As before, he is contemptuous of diplomatic etiquette: when receiving ambassadors, for example, he does not have with him “neither a hat nor anything else to cover his head,” apparently so as not to take off his hat when pronouncing an alien title. At the same time, he conducts negotiations personally and delves into all the details, carefully studies the documents, and signs V.I. Buganov himself. Peter the Great and his time. - M.: Nauka, 1989. P.85.

Chapter 4. Peter's foreign policy during the Northern War

The day after receiving news of peace with the Porte, on August 9, 1700, war was declared on Sweden, which radically changed the life of the country. In fact, at the very beginning, Russia found itself without allies: the sudden appearance of a Swedish army under the walls of Copenhagen on August 8 forced Denmark to sign a separate Peace of Travendal with King Charles XII. Augustus II, the Saxon elector, having learned about this, hastened to withdraw his troops that were already besieging Riga, thereby focusing the attention of Charles XII on Russia, whose troops suffered a crushing defeat near Narva in 1700, which exposed shortcomings in military training and material support of the Russian army . This was not only a military, but also a diplomatic failure. Russia's international prestige, which had just begun to strengthen, again fell to its lowest level. This affected, first of all, the attitude towards Russian diplomats in European countries, who began to be openly mocked and even insulted (the sensational case of A.A. Matveev, beaten and imprisoned for debts in England) Bobylev V.S. Foreign policy of Russia in the era of Peter I: Monograph. - M.: Publishing house UDN, 1990. P.26. Peter's attempts to find new allies or at least mediators in peace negotiations in such a situation made no sense. Therefore, in 1701-1703, when Charles, having decided that he was finished with Russia, returned to the conquest of Poland, in Russia at that time an unprecedented campaign was unfolding to reorganize and rearm the army - the fleet continued to be intensively built, defensive structures were strengthened, Due to a shortage of copper, church bells are melted down for cannons. All segments of the population are involved in the work History of diplomacy, volume 1/Edited by V.P. Potemkin. - M.: State socio-economic publishing house, 1941. P.268. During this period, Peter was no longer relying on foreign officers and military specialists, who betrayed him at Narva, almost immediately surrendering to everyone. Taught by his experience with Denmark, he also strengthens the Russian-Saxon alliance with an agreement signed at the Exchange in February 1701. According to it, Augustus II, in exchange for financial and military assistance, pledged not to conclude a separate peace with Sweden. Thus, Peter gained time, tying Charles XII for a long time in the fight with the experienced Saxon army. At some point, a threat arose from Turkey, which clearly decided to take advantage of Russia’s unenviable position, but its claims were stopped by the deft diplomatic maneuver of the Russian ambassadors, when the fact of negotiations with Charles XII on the exchange of prisoners of war was presented to the Turks in such a light as if these were peace negotiations . All these measures bore fruit, preparing the ground for the turning point Poltava victory. Diplomacy also contributed to the preparation of the victory: almost all the time the main Russian diplomatic figures - Chancellors G.I. Golovkin, P.P. Shafirov were with the army V.E. Vozgrin. Russia and European countries during the Northern War (history of diplomatic relations in 1697-1710) - L., 1986. P.143.

The brilliant Poltava “Victoria” changed the ideas of European states about Russia. If after the Azov campaign there was more condescending curiosity than recognition towards the new Russia, and after the defeat at Narva only contempt remained, then underestimation of its strengths and disbelief in its capabilities are now a thing of the past. The international situation as a whole has also turned upside down. The confrontation between virtually only two powers - Russia and Sweden - turned into a pan-European war, in which everyone wanted to get their share of the inheritance of Sweden, torn apart by contradictions. Augustus II was restored in Poland (previously replaced by Charles XII's protege S. Leszczynski), Denmark again joined the northern coalition, and Prussia entered the war. However, this did not make the attitude towards Russia more friendly. On the contrary, even more complicating factors appeared - fear of an unexpectedly strengthened power and the desire to take advantage of its newfound power for one’s own purposes. It was impossible to eradicate hostility, but it could be reduced through patient diplomacy. From now on, old Moscow relics become unforgivable. The clumsy Ambassadorial Prikaz and “home-grown” ambassadors with techniques developed on the fly no longer satisfied the needs of the state in a difficult international situation History of diplomacy, volume 1/Edited by V.P. Potemkin. - M.: State socio-economic publishing house, 1941. P.268. At the very beginning of the 18th century, under Peter, a “camping Ambassadorial Office” arose, to which all the functions of the old Order were gradually transferred. In 1716, following the example of Sweden, a collegial system of governance was introduced, and in 1720, instead of the Ambassadorial Order, the College of Foreign Affairs was established. Its chapter included the already mentioned G.I. Golovkin and P.P. Shafirov. Their duties were “to compose letters to foreign sovereigns, rescripts to ministers, resolutions, declarations and other papers of great importance and secrets.” The colleague’s work was carried out under the direct control of the tsar himself. When discussing particularly important state affairs, he “deigns to be present at the board as a high person.” Speaking about Peter’s new political thinking, it is also worth adding that on the issue of choosing the head of a foreign state, Peter adhered to a rather advanced position of sovereignty at that time. To the question of the Prussian king about whom he would like to see on the Polish throne, he replied: “Whoever, without the help of others, remains by his own strength, should be recognized.” History of Russian foreign policy. XVIII century (from the Northern War to the Russian wars against Napoleon). - M.: International relations, 1998. P.7.

The last period of the Northern War was a time of intense struggle of Russian diplomacy to achieve a victorious peace, the main obstacle to which was the anti-Russian policy of England. Hostile to Russia's assertion in the Baltic states, she achieved a split in the Northern Alliance, disrupted the Åland Congress, and tried to put together a coalition to deprive Russia of its acquisitions. In this situation, the activities of Russian diplomacy were entirely subordinated to the task of thwarting the plans of the British ruling circles and preventing European powers from acting against Russia. Russian diplomacy used exceptionally skillfully for this purpose the war of Spain against England, France, and Austria. The flexible policy of Peter’s government towards those countries that England intended to direct against Russia also played a significant role in this. Successfully using the contradictions between the Western European powers, Russian diplomacy was able to neutralize most of them, thus leaving England completely alone to solve the problem of “pacifying” Russia, which was clearly beyond its power. In its activities, Russian diplomacy relied on the successes of the young Baltic fleet and army. The brilliant victory at Grenham and the landings of 1719, 1720 and 1721. finally undermined Sweden's ability to resist and showed the inability of the English fleet to change the outcome of the Northern War. On August 30, 1721, peace with Sweden was signed in Nystadt. The significance of the Peace of Nystadt for Russia is difficult to overestimate - for almost two centuries the country persistently, but unsuccessfully sought safe access to the sea shores, and now it finally gets access to the Baltic coast Bobylev V.S. Foreign policy of Russia in the era of Peter I: Monograph. - M.: Publishing house UDN, 1990. P.130.

Chapter 5. Peter's foreign policy after the Peace of Nystad

The victory in the Northern War and the adoption of the imperial title marked fundamentally important changes in the international position of Russia. As a result of the Northern War, Russia entered the “concert” of the great European powers. From a country that occupied a noticeable but by no means leading position in Europe, maintaining lively contacts mainly with neighboring states, Russia is becoming an influential power, on whose position the solution of the most important European issues depends. A series of dynastic marriages with German princes, weak but well connected, cemented Russia's established influence on European politics.

The fruitful results of political cooperation with Spain in the last years of the Northern War pointed out to the Russian government the need to strengthen relations with Madrid, which acted as a counterweight to England. The establishment of diplomatic relations with him in 1723 played a positive role in the establishment of political and trade ties between Russia and Spain. An important place in Russian foreign policy after the Peace of Nystadt was occupied by the task of maintaining friendly relations with Poland and strengthening Russian influence in it. “Eternal Peace,” despite a number of difficulties, showed its effectiveness both in the fight against Turkey at the end of the 17th century, and in the fight against Sweden during the Northern War Bobylev V.S. Foreign policy of Russia in the era of Peter I: Monograph. - M.: Publishing house UDN, 1990. P.134.

However, the geographical range of Peter's foreign policy was not limited only to the European powers. As soon as the “northern question” was resolved, his eyes again turned to the east and south. Peter showed great interest in Iran, through which the transit trade route to India passed. However, the strengthening of Russia in this direction caused aggression on the part of Turkey, which moved its troops to Transcaucasia. Peter did not intend to go to war with the Ottoman Empire. In 1724, the Russian government concluded the Treaty of Constantinople with the Ottoman Empire, according to which the Sultan recognized Russia's acquisitions in the Caspian region, and Russia recognized the rights of the Ottoman Empire to Western Transcaucasia. The Caspian campaign, although it did not bring liberation to the peoples of Transcaucasia from the yoke of Iranian feudal lords, nevertheless had a positive significance. He contributed to the growth of Russia's political influence in Transcaucasia and the establishment of closer economic ties with the peoples who inhabited it. Another consequence is to ensure the security of Russia's southern borders.

Conclusion

So, in the first quarter of the 18th century, Russian diplomacy, renewed by Peter the Great, became an important factor in international relations. The strength of Peter's foreign policy was that he focused on one problem, subordinating all the efforts of diplomacy to it and relegating others to the background, without trying to cover everything at once. This distinguishes the foreign policy of Peter the Great from the wavering and indecisive policies of his predecessors. There was no such firmness in pursuing a certain line in the policies of his immediate successors.

Another distinctive feature of Russian foreign policy under Peter is its high activity. Almost continuous wars were aimed at solving the main national problem - gaining access to the sea. Without this, it would have been impossible to overcome the economic and technical backwardness of the country and to eliminate the blockade by the Western powers and Turkey. Peter sought to strengthen Russia’s international authority as much as possible. It was a time of European expansion, and in the current situation Russia had to either lose its sovereignty or become a great power. And Peter's government successfully completed this task. It is unfair to talk only about Peter’s personal merits in this field. Colossal work was carried out by outstanding Russian ambassadors abroad - P.A. Tolstoy, A.A. Matveev, A.I. Osterman, V. Stepanov and others, whose names are not so well known. They successfully resisted the old, highly experienced diplomatic services of Europe, defending the interests of the country to the last. Russia was forced to literally “knock out” its place in the sun, as the rise of a new politically active and strong power encountered fear of competition and loss of a privileged position on the part of some states. And she knocked him out, relying on the army and diplomacy.

The fruits of Peter's foreign policy began to be felt not so much during the life of Peter the Great himself, but after it. The basis, foundation, source and cause of all Russia's foreign policy successes during the eighteenth century was the transformative activity of the beginning of the century, and the emperors who ruled after Peter enjoyed the foreign policy legacy left to them for a long time. We can say that Peter, first intuitively and then consciously, expressed national needs and energetically accelerated what was dictated by the objective course of history. So Peter the Great can confidently be called a true innovator - not only in foreign policy, but in all areas of life of the Russian state.

Bibliography

1. Bobylev V.S. Foreign policy of Russia in the era of Peter I: Monograph. - M.: Publishing house UDN, 1990. - 168 p.

2. Buganov V.I. Peter the Great and his time. - M.: Nauka, 1989. - 192 p.

3. Vozgrin V.E. Russia and European countries during the Northern War (history of diplomatic relations in 1697-1710) - L., 1986.

4. History of diplomacy, volume 1/Edited by V.P. Potemkin. - M.: State socio-economic publishing house, 1941. - 566 p.

5. History of Russian foreign policy. XVIII century (from the Northern War to the Russian wars against Napoleon). - M.: International Relations, 1998. - 304 p.

6. Molchanov N.N. Diplomacy of Peter the Great / N.N.Molchanov - M.: International Relations, 1984. - 437 p.

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Plan:

The Great Embassy of Peter (but it is not included in the questions)

Outstanding diplomats - comrades-in-arms of Peter

Peter's diplomatic reforms

1) A special place in the study of not only Peter’s diplomatic innovations, but also, in general, all of his reforms, is the Great Embassy of 1697-1688. It is impossible to imagine whether such things would have happened if it had not taken place. But since history does not tolerate the subjunctive mood, this event cannot but be analyzed. N.N. Molchanov wrote that “in the history of diplomacy it is difficult to find such a significant event as the Russian Grand Embassy to Western Europe of 1697-1698.” It is also worth mentioning the words of Robert Massey “He [Peter] went to Europe with the determination to lead his country along the Western path... in a certain sense the effect was mutual... For all three - Peter, Russia and Europe - the Grand Embassy was a turning point." In fact, the question of the goals of the embassy is also a kind of bone of contention for historical scholarship. Duma clerk Emelyan Ukraintsev declared the official goal to be “confirmation of ancient friendship and love for causes common to all Christianity, to weaken the enemies of the cross of the Lord, Saltan of Tours, Khan of Crimea and all Busurman hordes.” The following goals were unofficial, for example, from the point of view of Doctor of Philosophy Konstantin Dolgov: firstly, to see political life in Europe, secondly, to find allies and, thirdly, to study maritime affairs. Following the testimony of P.P. Shafirov, these also include the desire to “organize your state following the example of European countries in a political, especially military order” and “by your example to encourage your subjects to travel to foreign lands in order to perceive good morals and knowledge of languages ​​there.” . However, V. O. Klyuchevsky wrote that Peter did not want to peer into the political and social order of the countries of the Western world: “Having arrived in Western Europe, he, first of all, ran into the workshop of its civilization and did not want to go anywhere further, at least remained an absent-minded, indifferent spectator when he was shown other aspects of Western European life.” Be that as it may, the embassy failed to achieve its official goal: the alliance against the Ottoman Porte was not concluded, as Europe was preparing for the War of the Spanish Succession. But, at the same time, this circumstance allowed Peter to think about the possibilities of war against Sweden. It is also worth mentioning that Peter, despite his inexperience, more than once showed diplomatic prudence, ingenuity and caution during meetings with European monarchs.

Speaking about the distinctive features of the Great Embassy, ​​it is necessary to note the fact that for the first time the Russian Tsar himself went to Europe, incognito, with the rank of sergeant of the Preobrazhensky Regiment, Peter Mikhailov. In total, the embassy included about 250 people. They brought with them money, food, and, of course, the tried and tested means of Moscow diplomacy - sable skins for gifts. It was headed by three great ambassadors who were appointed by order of December 6, 1696: Franz Yakovlevich Lefort, Fyodor Alekseevich Golovin and Prokofy Bogdanovich Voznitsyn.

2) The first of them, although he was the official head of the embassy, ​​was in fact only engaged in translating the king’s speeches. Only the splendor of the retinue Lefort significantly superior to other ambassadors. His contribution was that the idea of ​​the Great Embassy first came to his mind.

The true leader of the embassy, ​​in addition to Peter himself, was the second ambassador - Golovin. He was known for concluding the Treaty of Nerchinsk with China in 1689, for which he was awarded the title of boyar and the rank of General-Krieg Commissioner. In 1699, together with Peter I, Golovin conducted secret negotiations on concluding treaties with Saxony and Denmark. Subsequently, Peter ordered a medal to be knocked out in his honor and made him the first person in Russia to be awarded the newly established Order of St. Andrew the First-Called. It should be noted that, on the advice of Golovin, Peter I issued a manifesto, according to which foreign specialists were invited to Russia and it was allowed to profess any religion. Also, not without Golovin’s participation, permanent Russian missions abroad were created.

Regarding the third great ambassador, viz. P.B.Voznitsyna, then it should be mentioned that he served in the diplomatic field during the times of Tsars Alexei Mikhailovich and Fyodor Alekseevich, traveled to Vienna in 1668, was ambassador to Constantinople, that is, at the time of the Great Embassy he was already an experienced diplomat. This is probably why he was instructed to defend the interests of Russia at the Karlowitz Congress regarding peace negotiations with the Ottoman Empire, which he “safely” failed due to diplomatic miscalculations. He managed to conclude only a two-year truce. V.S. Bobylev wrote: “The defiant maximalism of the Russian representative at the negotiations and his diplomatic “tact” towards the Turks, expressed in congratulating them on the Christian holiday of the Nativity of Christ, put the conference on the brink of breakdown.” As a result of the failure at the conference, Voznitsyn forever lost his former influence, despite the fact that for some time he remained to serve in the embassy order with the rank of Duma adviser.

We must not forget about another prominent participant in the embassy, ​​who was Pyotr Shafirov, which, according to one version, was picked up by Peter in a shop at the market. In 1691 he began serving as a translator of the Ambassadorial Prikaz. After the Great Embassy, ​​Peter I began to give him important assignments, making him one of his closest assistants. Shafirov took part in negotiations with a number of countries, for example, in 1701 he participated in the conclusion of an agreement between Russia and Poland on joint actions against Sweden. From 1703 he was the secret secretary of Chancellor Golovin. From 1706 he managed the Ambassadorial Prikaz, and it was under his jurisdiction that, in the absence of the Tsar, negotiations with foreign ambassadors were carried out during the Northern War. His diplomatic abilities were especially evident during the unsuccessful Prut campaign of 1711. Showing remarkable cunning and using bribes, Shafirov managed to ease the terms of the peace treaty. He became vice-president of the College of Foreign Affairs after its establishment. In 1730 Shafirov was appointed ambassador to Iran, where he spent 2 years. In 1734 he also participated in the signing of the Anglo-Russian trade treaty. He is also known for writing the first Russian essay on international law in 1717.

In general, I am convinced that if we imagine Peter playing the main role in the play of his diplomatic reforms, it turns out that his close fellow diplomats were also far from minor characters. Only thanks to those who served him faithfully (not always only, unfortunately), a platform for transformation could be created. In this regard, before moving directly to the analysis of the changes themselves, it is worth recalling such Peter’s diplomats as P.A. Tolstoy And A.A.Matveev, who were no less significant persons than the above-mentioned great ambassadors and Shafirov. Tolstoy in 1702-1714. was the first permanent ambassador of Russia to Turkey. He is also known for the fact that in 1717 he returned Tsarevich Alexei to Russia. At the same time, he did not disdain such methods of persuasion as flattery, threats, blackmail, and bribery of those close to him. As for A.A. Matveev, the fact that in 1699 he was already “ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary” in Holland, thus becoming the first permanent diplomatic representative of Russia abroad, says a lot. Also, as a result of an incident that happened to him in 1708 in England and which went down in the history of international law (he was detained for non-payment of taxes), legislative guarantees of the rights and privileges of diplomatic representatives took place. In 1709, England adopted a law “On the preservation of the privileges of ambassadors and public ministers,” known as the “Statute of Anne,” which remains in force to this day. G.I. Golovkin, A.I. Osterman, B.I. Kurakin, V.L. Dolgorukov, I.I. Neplyuev also became notable diplomats during Peter’s reign.

In general, initially, diplomats of the Peter the Great era were extremely picky about the ceremony, although they themselves sometimes treated foreign ambassadors with less than due respect. Remnants of the past of the 17th century and lack of experience often prevented Peter’s diplomats from successfully solving foreign policy problems. For example, they rarely responded in writing, because they were afraid of being bound by it. However, the new generation of diplomats, which grew up in the second half of Peter's reign, fully met all the trends of the era. Their functions became more complicated, for example, they had to wage a literary struggle against political sentiments harmful to Russia, which was, of course, not an easy task and required a certain level of education. At the same time, Russian diplomats skillfully interfered in the internal affairs of other states through the now classic method of bribery.

3) Along with the gradual cultivation of a qualitatively new generation of Peter’s diplomats, there was an equally progressive transformation of the outdated Ambassadorial Prikaz into the main foreign policy department of a new model - Collegium of Foreign Affairs. After Peter the Great established, in essence, a new concept of diplomacy, namely the establishment of diplomatic relations with all sovereign countries, the clumsy Order obviously required reorganization. In 1712, Peter made the first orders about the College, which he initially wanted to call “political,” and instructed residents at foreign courts to draw up detailed descriptions of the institutions of the countries in which they were located. Thus, V.L. Dolgorukov, the ambassador in Copenhagen, was ordered to send “the entire economy of the Danish state, namely... how many collegiums, what is the position of each, how many people are in each collegium, what is the salary to whom, what are the ranks among themselves. .." On December 11, 1717, Peter issued a decree “On the staff of the Collegiums and the time of their opening,” according to which the collegiums were to be headed by presidents and vice-presidents, advisers and assessors. G.I. Golovkin and P.P. Shafirov became president and vice-president of the Collegium of Foreign Affairs. It finally took shape by 1720, when Peter sent the President the “Decree on the Collegium of Foreign Affairs” signed by him. Its structure took place on the basis of the Ambassadorial Prikaz and the Ambassadorial Office, which in 1716 was transformed into the Ambassadorial College.

The Collegium’s jurisdiction included “all foreign and embassy affairs and transfers with all surrounding states, and the arrivals of ambassadors and envoys, and the arrivals of couriers and other foreigners.” Being a collegial body, the main foreign policy department was divided into a governing body, which was Presence– a meeting of 8 members of the Board, who met for meetings, as a rule, four times a week, and the executive – Office, which in turn was divided into two sections: the first - secret expedition, which dealt with foreign policy issues and was divided into four small expeditions according to the linguistic principle, the second - public expedition, who was in charge of the economic and financial affairs of the Collegium and its personnel. Members of the Collegium also included: secret chancellery adviser A.I. Osterman, chancellery adviser V.V. Stepanov, head of the Public Expedition Gorokhov and his three assessors P. Kurbatov, M. Larionov and M. Shafirov. The responsibility of the president was the execution of the highest decrees, while the duties of the office of advisers included “composing letters to foreign sovereigns, rescripts to ministers and resolutions, and declarations, etc., which are subject to great secrecy and importance.” The central apparatus of the department consisted of 142 people, 78 were supposed to be abroad. These were ambassadors, ministers, consuls, copyists, secretaries, translators, students and priests.

Under Peter, they were established diplomatic missions(for example, in Austria, England, Holland, France) and consulates(in Bordeaux and Cadiz). Diplomatic agents and auditors were sent to Amsterdam, Danzig and Braunschweig, temporary missions- to China and Bukhara, and a special representative was appointed to the Kalmyk khans. The distinction between mission and embassy was not made until the 19th century.

The students were also members of the College itself. In order to train young people, foreign languages ​​were taught under her, and this was reflected in the Table of Ranks with the introduction of the rank of cadet. It should be noted that Peter paid great attention to the selection of personnel for the Collegium, he even personally signed appointments to positions. Peter I also sought to introduce elements of cameralistics into Russia and sent the most capable young people to study abroad. Upon entering the service, candidates had to pass a strict exam. All this, of course, helped Peter improve the qualifications of the administrative apparatus of the diplomatic service system.

Peter preferred to appoint Russians to diplomatic positions, but foreigners were also often appointed, although he distrusted them. The diplomatic service became a state service and, therefore, important in its significance and high in position. Officials of the College of Foreign Affairs devoted all their time to service and lived mainly only on salaries, the size of which depended on rank and length of service, and most of them did not have serfs. Thus, Peter managed to create a staff of employees who were fully interested in effective work.

In conclusion, it is worth noting that as a result of significant changes in the diplomatic service system and the military victories that followed thanks to them, Peter the Great achieved truly significant results: firstly, Russia has successfully joined the European diplomatic system, Secondly, became an active factor in the European balance, Thirdly, the main foreign policy department began to meet “world standards” and fourthly, a new generation of diplomats has grown up, no less skilled and educated than their European colleagues.

Prerequisites for the development of the diplomatic qualities of Peter I. Foreign economic relations in pre-Petrine Russia. Diplomatic institutions and methods of diplomatic work under Peter I. Northern War, Battle of Poltava. Gangut Agreement, Nishtad Peace.

MINISTRY OF EDUCATION AND SCIENCE OF UKRAINE

Kharkov National Pedagogical University named after. G.S. Frying pans

Institute of Postgraduate Education

Department of Historical Disciplines

Exchange ratebot

on the topic of: " Petr Ikato diplomat"

Performed: 2nd year student

KhNPU named after G.S. Frying pans IPO

speciality

"Pedagogy and methodology

secondary education. Story"

Medvedeva A.N.

Etcverified: teacher

departments of historical disciplines

Trubchaninov N.A.

Kharkov 2009 r.

Content

• Section I. Prerequisites for the development of the diplomatic qualities of Peter I
• 1.1 Brief biography of Peter I
• 1.2 The state of foreign economic relations in pre-Petrine Russia
• Section II. Foreign policy during the reign of Peter I
• 2.1 Diplomatic institutions and methods of diplomatic work under Peter I
• 2.2 Peter I as a diplomat
• 2.3 Azov campaigns
• 2.4 "Grand Embassy"
• 2.5 Beginning of the Northern War
• 2.6 Battle of Poltava
• 2.7 Second stage of the Northern War. Prut campaign
• 2.8 Gangut Agreement, Peace of Nystad
• Results of the Northern War
• Conclusion. Results of the diplomatic activities of Peter I
• List of references used

Introduction. The concept of "diplomacy". The role of diplomatic relations in the development of states.

Diplomacy is designed to provide state representatives with the conditions to enter into regular discussions and negotiations with representatives of other countries. Its task is to promote the interests of the state and resolve emerging problems through normal diplomatic channels and informal connections. Diplomacy is a set of practical activities, techniques and methods of a non-military nature, applied taking into account specific conditions and the nature of the tasks being solved. Its implementation is the task of heads of state and government, ministers of foreign affairs, diplomatic missions abroad, etc.

The very concept of “diplomacy” is associated with the art of negotiating and searching for mutually acceptable solutions in order to prevent or resolve international conflicts, expand and deepen interstate and international cooperation. The task of diplomacy is to regulate economic, political and other relations between states. Diplomats develop and establish agreements on trade, customs duties, transport, mail and telegraph, currency payments, etc.

The main means of implementing relations between states in the world community is foreign policy. Foreign policy refers to the general course of a state in international affairs. It is designed to regulate the relations of a given state with other states and peoples on the basis of a certain set of generally accepted principles and in accordance with its national interests and goals, carried out by various means and methods. Foreign policy is closely connected with the internal policy of the state. From this point of view, its main task is to ensure the most favorable international conditions for achieving the goals and interests of the state. The most important function of foreign policy is the prevention of wars, aggression and various types of conflicts between states.

Foreign policy is the activity of the state in the international arena, regulating relations with other subjects of foreign policy activity: states, foreign parties and other public organizations, world and regional international organizations. Foreign policy is based on the economic, demographic, military, scientific, technical and cultural potential of the state; the combination of the latter determines the foreign policy capabilities of the state in certain areas, the hierarchy of priorities in setting and implementing foreign policy goals. The geopolitical position of a state has historically dominated the state's choice of partners and the development of relationships with its opponents.

The main means of implementing foreign policy is diplomacy. Diplomacy dates back to the earliest history of mankind, although the first permanent missions began to be established from the end of the 15th century. In Russia, the Ambassadorial Prikaz, whose task was to establish and maintain connections with other states, was created in the 6th century. Gradually it was transformed into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The foreign policy of most states in various eras has been largely determined by what is now called national interest.

National interests are manifested in feelings of sympathy towards members of one’s national community, which are different from feelings towards other nationalities. The desire to maintain common life may not be realized, but since it exists, national interests serve to preserve the national community as a whole.

National interests are one of the driving forces of behavior and activity of an individual, nationality, nation, society or state. During periods of social and political transformations, the clash of national interests manifests itself with particular force in the political sphere. It is here that the element of comparing people of different nationalities, a given national group with another, clearly appears. National interests are present in many forms of struggle and cooperation between people. Often they acquire the appearance of a legal institution only as a result of implementation in political forms - the state, the rule of law, etc. An attempt to infringe on national interests is perceived as an attack on the vital foundations of the relevant national groups or communities, as well as states.

National interests have rarely appeared in history in their pure form. They were clothed in one or another ethical-religious (ideological) clothing and were realized during religious wars and national liberation movements. The ideology raised private national interests to the level of “general.”

Often, state interests are contrasted with national and public interests (the interests of civil society). Often, while recognizing their interrelation, they still consider it appropriate to define them within the framework of the dichotomy “national interest - state interest.”

The main component of national interest is the imperative of self-preservation of the state. The contours and external packaging of national interest are largely determined by the ideal that reflects the values ​​of a given society, but still this ideal itself is unthinkable without the fundamental imperative of self-preservation. There is a certain set of critical parameters, the violation of which gives reason to say that the state is not able to defend its sovereignty and independence. When developing national interests and making certain foreign policy decisions on their basis, state leaders take into account objective economic, political, geographical and other factors, internal political interests, political maneuvers of various socio-political forces, interest groups, organizations, etc. Possible reactions to these decisions in the international arena on the part of those states that they, in one way or another, affect are also taken into account.

Thus, the main determining force of foreign policy activity is national or state interest. But the very concept of national interest is permeated with value norms and ideological content. This is especially true of misunderstood and misdefined national interests. In the formulation of both categories of interests and in the formation of a foreign policy strategy designed to implement them, the system of value orientations, attitudes, principles and beliefs of government officials - their perception of the world around them and assessment of the place of their country among the rest of the states that make up the world community - is of no small importance.

The state ensures its interests by all means at its disposal: political, ideological, economic, diplomatic, military. The last resort is the threat or actual use of force, up to and including a declaration of war.

The organization of diplomatic activity is inseparable from the foreign policy function of the state. The emergence of statehood, even in such “unenlightened” times as the 9th-10th centuries on the territory of Kievan Rus, inevitably presupposes from the very first steps of ancient Rus in the international arena the existence of certain organizational foreign policy principles, specific diplomatic means, methods, forms, techniques, characteristic not only the level of development of a given state, but also, to a certain extent, the international practice of its time.

During the period of transition from the primitive communal system to the early class society, at the stage of “military democracy,” wars arose as a social phenomenon, and the foundations of the state diplomatic service were laid. The diplomatic activity of “military-democratic” public formations, and later of class states, originates as a means of consolidating the results of military enterprises, creating various international political combinations for further campaigns of conquest or for defense against dangerous rivals.

The origin of the diplomatic system of ancient Rus' is, first of all, the content of diplomatic negotiations and diplomatic agreements, the expansion of the range and degree of significance of the political issues raised in them; the involvement of an increasing number of states and peoples in the sphere of diplomatic activity of Rus'; the emergence and development of the embassy service.

The origin of the state of Kievan Rus was the forced alliance of peaceful Slavs and warlike Russians. The Slavic tribes lived in small communities and were often subject to raids by the cruel Rus. As a result, the Slavs submitted, and a new state was formed with its center in Kyiv. The first prince of Kyiv was the Varangian Rurik.

Speaking about the international diplomatic relations of Ancient Rus', the following trends can be noted. The most powerful state formations were Kievan Rus, Byzantium and Khazaria. There was no stability in the relationship between them. Rus' was either at war with Byzantium or allied, and both powers sought to attract all the Khazars, or at least part of them, to their side.

Mainly, the aspirations of states were to expand borders and subjugate other peoples for the purpose of enrichment.

The most important consequence for Kievan Rus was the adoption of Christianity. The people have long been in need of a more peaceful faith, which replaced cruel paganism and united the Russian people.

Actually, diplomatic relations in most cases were determined by wars, and issues were resolved by victory. The truth remained with the stronger.

Among the diplomatic missions, one can note the relations of Princess Olga with Byzantium and Germany, and the military campaigns of her son Svyatoslav. After his death, Kievan Rus began to turn into a quiet and calm power, where Christian teaching gained more and more supporters.

Svyatoslav was replaced by his son Yaropolk, and then his half-brother Vladimir seized power. Despite the cruelty and unprincipledness of Vladimir, historical memory associates his image not with personal qualities and political successes, but with a more significant act - the choice of faith that inspired the life of the people. In fact, having extended his power to almost all Slavic-Russian lands, Vladimir inevitably had to adhere to some kind of, as they would say today, “nationwide” political program, which, according to the conditions of that time, was expressed in a religious form.

The military and political consequences of choosing faith were very great. The choice made not only gave Vladimir a strong ally - Byzantium, but also reconciled him with the population of his own capital.

So, Vladimir followed the path outlined by the “wisest of people,” Princess Olga, who chose Orthodoxy. Having set foot on this path, throwing off the oppression of the merchant capital of the Rachdonites, Rus' came to the baptism of 988. The power of preaching Orthodoxy was in the political moderation of the Byzantine Empire, and in the sincerity of the Patriarchs of Constantinople, and in the charm of the Greek liturgy (church service). Byzantium wanted friendship from Rus' and an end to senseless raids on the Black Sea coast. Greek theologians did not spice up the preaching of Orthodoxy with crafty political intricacies. It also turned out to be important that Orthodoxy did not preach the idea of ​​predestination. And therefore, responsibility for sins committed of one’s own free will fell on the sinner. This was understandable and acceptable to the pagans.

On the eve of his death, in 1015, Vladimir was faced with the acute problem of managing the conquered lands. Therefore, under Vladimir, a system of distributing inheritance to close relatives, as a rule, sons, was created, and later, under Yaroslav, strengthened.

The Grand Duke of Kyiv Vladimir had twelve sons. We will note only those who took part in subsequent events. The son of Vladimir and Rogneda Yaroslav reigned in Novgorod, his brother Mstislav reigned in Tmutarakan. Vladimir’s favorite children were his sons from a Bulgarian woman: Boris and little Gleb. Vladimir hated his eldest son and legal heir Svyatopolk.

Fierce feuds began between Vladimir's sons. As a result, the confrontation between Kyiv Svyatopolk and Novgorod Yaroslav ended in victory for the latter.

In 1036, Yaroslav took power over all of Russia. The unity of the state was achieved on the basis of an agreement between Novgorod, Kiev and Chernigov. In addition, the city of Rostov had already been annexed to Kievan Rus. It was this agreement - a compromise based on the recognition by certain regions of Rus' of the supreme power of the Grand Duke of Kyiv - that brought long-awaited peace to the country. This was the greatest achievement of Yaroslav, nicknamed the Wise.

Unfortunately, every compromise is good for a certain moment, and it cannot ensure a reliable future for the state. This future largely depends on the right choice of friends. Yaroslav maintained relations with the Varangians and was ready for friendship with Poland, but, unfortunately, neither he nor his entourage had any sympathy for Byzantium. The deterioration of relations between Kiev and Constantinople in the 30-40s of the 11th century occurred against the background of a sharp aggravation of contradictions between the Orthodox East and the Catholic West. The religious confrontation between Rome and Constantinople ended with the final split of the Christian Church into Western (Roman Catholic) and Eastern (Greek Orthodox) in 1054.

Meanwhile, the anti-Greek sentiments of Yaroslav and his entourage, largely caused by the desire to free the Kyiv metropolis from the tutelage of the Patriarch of Constantinople, resulted in a military conflict. In 1043, the Russian fleet, led by Yaroslav's son Vladimir and governor Vyshata, moved to Constantinople. The chronicler reports that a “great storm” destroyed the Russian ships. But, probably, the cause of the death of the Russian fleet was again “Greek fire”. In any case, the Russians fleeing on the shore were beaten and captured by the armored cavalry of the Byzantines. Vladimir and part of his squad managed to return to Rus', and the governor Vyshata was captured and released by the Greeks only three years later. The Byzantines blinded many Russian prisoners. This failure forced Yaroslav to stop his active foreign policy directed against the Greeks.

After the death of Yaroslav the Wise in 1054, Izyaslav reigned in Kyiv.

At that time, considerable changes occurred not only in Western Europe and Byzantium, but also in the Great Steppe. Muslim propaganda, which had penetrated the Pecheneg nomads since the 9th century, was doing its job. True, it was opposed by the propaganda of Christians, but the supporters of Christianity were defeated by the Pechenegs, the majority of whom spoke in favor of accepting Islam. As a result, the Pechenegs became the worst enemies of all Christian countries. The Asia Minor regions of the Byzantine Empire were captured by the Seljuks, sometimes reaching the city of Nicaea and the Bosporus Strait, and on the Balkan Peninsula the Greeks were pressed by the Pechenegs. From the second half of the 11th century, the complete conquest of the entire Asia Minor by the Seljuk Turkmens became a real threat to the Byzantine Empire.

At the same period, the Cumans, or Cumans, named so because of their straw-colored hair (straw - chaff), entered the historical scene of Eastern Europe. By the middle of the 11th century, they captured almost the entire territory of modern Kazakhstan, crossed the lower reaches of the Volga and appeared in the southern Russian steppes. Blue-eyed, fair-haired Cumans in Rus' began to be called Polovtsy.

After the death of Yaroslav the Wise, Prince Vsevolod tried to establish contacts with the Polovtsians, but to no avail. Constant skirmishes between Russians and Polovtsians ended with the fact that in September 1068 the Polovtsians set out on a large campaign against Russian land.

On November 1, 1068, Prince Svyatoslav Yaroslavich, having only 3 thousand Russian warriors, completely defeated 12 thousand Polovtsians in the battle on the Snovi River. The Polovtsy did not pose any more danger to the existence of Rus'.

Moving on to more recent times, we can say that in the Middle Ages Christianity and the papacy played a large role in European international relations. The Catholic Church tried to subjugate all states. The Roman Empire directed its activities in three directions. Firstly, for the possession of all political secular power in Europe. The monarch is the governor of Rome, his every step must be coordinated with Rome. Secondly, to expand their power with fire and sword in new countries and regions: in Muslim countries and, to a greater extent, in Eastern Europe (Russia). And thirdly, the organization of crusades.

In the XIII - XV centuries. papal influence is weakening in Europe due to the strengthening of monarchies. Cities that support strong government power are growing stronger. The Church, in an attempt to adapt to new conditions, is satisfied Ecumenical Church Councils, where disputes between states were resolved. At councils (according to the plan of the church), the word of the pope is the law (arbiter). The councils lasted a very long time. Council of Basil 1431 - 1449: dispute between Poland and Lithuania about borders, dispute between England and France, Burgundy and Austria. In the practice of international relations, cathedrals did not become an instrument of peace in Europe. Fierce competition for the pope's favor continued. National-state trends were growing rapidly. Numerous disputes and disagreements were resolved through armed clashes.

The border of the “Catholic” period can be considered the Thirty Years' War, which took place in the period 1618 - 1648. The end of this war eliminated the role of the papacy, which had previously played a leading role in European international relations. The Peace of Westphalia of 1648 laid the foundations for international relations of modern times. The main theses of international law were established as follows: firstly, the subject of international relations is a sovereign national state. Secondly, states are viewed as an institution of secular power. Thirdly, all states are sovereign and independent; all states are equal.

After the Peace of Westphalia, it became customary to keep permanent residents at foreign courts. For the first time in historical practice, interstate borders were redrawn and clearly defined. Thanks to this, coalitions and interstate alliances began to emerge, which gradually began to acquire importance.

The papacy lost its importance as a supranational power. States in foreign policy began to be guided by their own interests and ambitions.

The course of historical development required the resolution of problems of international relations. During this period there is theory of European balance, which was developed in the works of Machiavelli. It proposed a balance of power between the five Italian states. The theory of European balance will eventually be accepted by all of Europe, and it will work, according to Kissinger, until the present time. The theory of European balance is the basis of most international unions, coalitions, and states.

The essence of the theory of European balance is that all countries should group in such a way as to prevent wars and disagreements, aggression, and interstate conflicts.

In the XVII - XVIII centuries. the theory of European equilibrium played a particularly important role. During this period, the process of formation of state borders took place, which was facilitated by national processes. The theory of European containment allowed any state time to accumulate internal forces and carry out political and socio-economic reforms. Moreover, the aggression of countries that had accumulated strength thanks to the theory of European balance was curbed thanks to the same theory. From the XVII century. A number of different political and military blocs, coalitions, and alliances emerge in Europe. This system of alliances and coalitions determined the type of diplomacy: secret diplomacy, intelligence, espionage.

The most important aspect of the theory of European equilibrium was the development of the world colonial system. In the XVII - XVIII centuries. the balance of power in Europe depended on the possession of colonies: the power and influence of the state increased as new lands were captured; the struggle for colonies became a primary factor in the rivalry of world powers.

The European balance of power after the Thirty Years' War was of a pan-European nature. Europe after the Thirty Years' War, in the second half of the 17th century. Holland becomes a superpower, where an intensive process of capitalist development is underway. Second half of the 17th century. this is a period of almost continuous wars for the Spanish Netherlands (now Belgium), as a result of which Holland loses its position.

Beginning of the XVIII century. - notable for the intensification of French foreign policy (Louis XIV), which was launching a large-scale campaign for the Spanish inheritance.

In the XVIII century. In the northern part of Europe, Sweden seizes Russian territories. This led to an intensification of Russian foreign policy. She enters into an agreement with Turkey and Poland, concentrates internal resources, which results in the Northern War. In the middle of the XVIII century. Prussia is strengthening, which led to territorial growth. Prussian aggression was stopped by the joint actions of Russia, Austria, England and Sweden. One of the leading roles during this period was played by the great Russian Tsar, commander and diplomat Peter I.

1. B.A. Rybakov "History of the USSR from ancient times to the end of the 18th century." - M.: Nauka, 1983 - 162 pp.