Which divisions reached Berlin. Battle for Berlin. Unknown War

Capture of Berlin

Military-political situation in Europe by mid-April 1945

It was April of the last year of the world war. Military operations covered a significant part of German territory: Soviet troops attacked from the east, and allied troops from the west. Real conditions were created for the complete and final defeat of the Wehrmacht.

The strategic position of the Soviet Armed Forces by this time had improved even more. Carrying out a great international mission, during the winter-spring offensive they completed the liberation of Poland, Hungary, a large part of Czechoslovakia, completed the liquidation of the enemy in East Prussia, captured Eastern Pomerania and Silesia, occupied the capital of Austria, Vienna, and reached the southern regions of Germany.

The troops of the Leningrad Front, in cooperation with the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, continued to block the enemy’s Courland grouping. The armies of the 3rd and part of the forces of the 2nd Belorussian Front destroyed the remnants of the Nazi troops on the Zemland Peninsula, in the area southeast of Danzig and north of Gdynia. The main forces of the 2nd Belorussian Front, after regrouping in a new direction, reached the coast of the Baltic Sea west of Gdynia and the Oder - from its mouth to the city of Schwedt, replacing the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front here.

In the central sector of the Soviet-German front, troops of the 1st Belorussian Front fought on the left bank of the Oder River to expand previously occupied bridgeheads, especially the Küstrinsky one, the largest of them. The main group of front forces was located 60-70 km from the capital of Nazi Germany. The armies of the right wing of the 1st Ukrainian Front reached the Neisse River. Their distance from Berlin was 140-150 km. Formations of the left wing of the front reached the Czechoslovak border. Thus, Soviet troops reached the approaches to the German capital and were ready to deliver the final blow to the enemy.

Berlin was not only a political stronghold of fascism, but also one of the largest centers of the country's military industry. The main forces of the Wehrmacht were concentrated in the Berlin direction. That is why their defeat and the capture of the capital of Germany should have led to a victorious end to the war in Europe.

By mid-April, the troops of the Western Allies crossed the Rhine and completed the liquidation of the Ruhr enemy group. Dealing the main blow to Dresden, they sought to dismember the opposing enemy troops and meet with the Soviet army at the turn of the Elbe River.

By this time, fascist Germany was in complete political isolation, because its only ally, militaristic Japan, was unable to exert any influence on the course of events in Europe. The internal situation of the Reich also testified to the approaching inevitable collapse. The loss of raw materials from previously occupied countries (with the exception of some areas of Czechoslovakia) led to a further decline in industrial production in Germany. Disorganization throughout the German economy led to a sharp drop in military production: military output in March 1945 decreased by 65 percent compared to July 1944. Difficulties in replenishing the Wehrmacht with personnel increased. Even having called up another contingent born in 1929, that is, 16-17 year old boys, into the army, the Nazis were unable to make up for the losses suffered in the winter of 1944-1945. However, due to the fact that the length of the Soviet-German front was significantly reduced, the fascist German command was able to concentrate large forces in the threatened areas. In addition, in the first half of April, part of the forces and assets from the western front and reserve were transferred to the east, and by the beginning of the Berlin operation on Soviet-German front There were 214 divisions, including 34 tank and 15 motorized, and 14 brigades. Only 60 divisions remained against the American-British forces, including 5 tank divisions. At this time, the Nazis still had certain reserves of weapons and ammunition, which made it possible for the fascist command to put up stubborn resistance on the Soviet-German front in the last month of the war.

The essence of the strategic plan of the Wehrmacht High Command was to maintain defenses in the east at all costs, hold back the advance of the Soviet Army, and in the meantime try to conclude a separate peace with the United States and England. Hitler's leadership put forward the slogan: “It is better to surrender Berlin to the Anglo-Saxons than to let the Russians into it.” Special instructions from the National Socialist Party on April 3 stated: “The war is decided not in the West, but in the East... Our gaze must be turned only to the East, regardless of what happens in the West. Holding the Eastern Front is a prerequisite for a turning point in the war.”

In the Berlin direction, troops of the Vistula and Center army groups, consisting of the 3rd Panzer, 9th Field, 4th Panzer and 17th Armies, under the command of Generals H. Manteuffel, T. Busse, F. Gräser, occupied the defense and V. Hasse. They had 48 infantry, 6 tank and 9 motorized divisions, 37 separate infantry regiments, 98 separate infantry battalions, as well as a large number of separate artillery and special units and formations. The distribution of these forces along the front was uneven. Thus, 7 infantry divisions, 13 separate regiments, several separate battalions and personnel of two officer schools defended in front of the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front on a 120-kilometer sector. Most of these forces and assets were located in the Stettin direction. In front of the 1st Belorussian Front, in a zone up to 175 km wide, 23 divisions, as well as a significant number of individual brigades, regiments and battalions, occupied the defense. The densest grouping was created by the enemy against the Kyustrin bridgehead, where 14 divisions were concentrated in an area 44 km wide, including 5 motorized and a tank.

The operational density of his forces in this sector was one division per 3 km of front. Here, on 1 km of the front there were 60 guns and mortars, as well as 17 tanks and assault guns. In Berlin itself, more than 200 Volkssturm battalions were formed, and the total number of the garrison exceeded 200 thousand people.

In the 390 km wide zone of the 1st Ukrainian Front there were 25 enemy divisions, of which 7 were operational reserves. The main forces of the defending troops were concentrated in the Forst, Penzig sector, where the operational density was one division per 10 km, more than 10 guns and mortars, as well as up to 3 tanks and assault guns per 1 km of front.

In the Berlin area, the German command had up to 2 thousand combat aircraft, including 70 percent fighters (of which 120 Me-262 jets). In addition to fighter aircraft, about 600 anti-aircraft guns were used to cover the city. In total, there were 200 anti-aircraft batteries in the offensive zone of the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts.

The enemy's main operational reserves were located northeast of Berlin and in the Cottbus area. Their distance from the front line did not exceed 30 km. In the rear of Army Groups Vistula and Center, strategic reserves consisting of eight divisions were hastily formed. The close location of not only operational, but also strategic reserves indicated the enemy’s intention to use them to fight for the tactical defense zone.

A deeply layered defense was prepared in the Berlin direction, the construction of which began in January 1945. The pace of work was accelerated due to the withdrawal of Soviet troops on the Oder and Neisse, as well as the creation of an immediate threat to the central regions of Germany and its capital. Prisoners of war and foreign workers were herded into the construction of defensive structures, and the local population was involved.

The basis of the defense of the fascist German troops was the Oder-Neissen defensive line and the Berlin defensive region. The Oder-Neissen line consisted of three stripes, between which there were intermediate and cut-off positions in the most important directions. The total depth of this boundary reached 20-40 km. The front edge of the main defense line ran along the left bank of the Oder and Neisse rivers, with the exception of the areas of Frankfurt, Guben, Forst and Muskau, where the enemy continued to hold small bridgeheads on the right bank. Populated areas were turned into strong strongholds. Using locks on the Oder River and numerous canals, the Nazis prepared a number of areas for flooding. A second defense line was created 10-20 km from the front line. It was the most equipped in engineering terms at the Seelow (Seelow) Heights - in front of the Kustrin bridgehead. The third stripe was located 20-40 km from the front edge of the main stripe. Like the second, it consisted of powerful resistance units connected to each other by one or two trenches and communication passages.

During the construction of the Oder-Neissen defensive line, the fascist German command paid special attention to the organization of anti-tank defense, which was based on a combination of artillery fire, assault guns and tanks with engineering barriers, dense mining of tank-accessible areas and the mandatory use of such natural obstacles as rivers, canals and lakes. To combat tanks, it was planned to use anti-aircraft artillery of the Berlin defensive region on a large scale. Numerous minefields were created not only in front of the front edge of the defensive lines, but also in the depths. The average mining density in the most important directions reached 2 thousand mines per 1 km. In front of the first trench, and in the depths of the defense at the intersection of roads and along their sides, there were tank destroyers armed with faust cartridges.

By the beginning of the offensive of the Soviet troops, the enemy had fully prepared the Berlin defensive area, which included three ring contours, prepared for a stubborn defense. The external defensive circuit ran along rivers, canals and lakes 25-40 km from the center of the capital. It was based on large settlements, turned into centers of resistance. The internal defensive contour, which was considered the main defense line of the fortified area, ran along the outskirts of the suburbs. All strong points and positions were interconnected by fire. Numerous anti-tank obstacles and barbed wire barriers were erected on the streets. The total depth of defense on this perimeter was 6 km. The third - the city bypass ran along the circular railway. All streets leading to the center of Berlin were blocked with barricades, bridges were prepared to be blown up.

For ease of defense management, the city was divided into nine sectors. The central sector, which covered the main state and administrative institutions, including the Reichstag and the Imperial Chancellery, was most carefully prepared. Trenches for artillery, tanks and assault guns were dug in the streets and squares, and numerous reinforced concrete fire structures were prepared. All defensive positions were connected to each other by communication passages. For covert maneuvers, the metro was widely used, the total length of its lines reached 80 km. If we take into account that the defensive structures were occupied in advance by the troops of the Berlin garrison, the number of which was constantly increasing due to the arriving reinforcements, then it was clear that a stubborn and intense struggle lay ahead for Berlin.

The order on preparing the defense of Berlin, issued on March 9, said: “Defend the capital to the last man and to the last cartridge... The enemy cannot be given a moment of peace, he must be weakened and bled dry in a dense network of strongholds, defensive nodes and nests of resistance. Every house lost or every strong point lost must be immediately returned by counterattack... Berlin can decide the outcome of the war.”

In preparation for repelling the offensive of the Soviet army, the Nazi command carried out a number of measures to strengthen the organizational strength of its troops. Using strategic reserves, spare parts and military educational institutions, it restored the strength and technical equipment of almost all divisions. The number of infantry companies by mid-April was increased to 100 people. General G. Heinrici, who was considered a major defense specialist in the Wehrmacht, was appointed commander of the Vistula Army Group instead of Himmler. The commander of Army Group Center, F. Scherner, was awarded the rank of field marshal on April 8. New boss of the General Staff of the Ground Forces, General G. Krebs, according to Nazi military experts, was the best expert on the Soviet army, since before the war he was an assistant military attache in Moscow.

On April 15, Hitler made a special appeal to the soldiers of the Eastern Front. He called for repelling the offensive of the Soviet army at all costs. Hitler demanded that anyone who dared to retreat or give the order to retreat be shot on the spot. The calls were accompanied by threats against the families of those soldiers and officers who would surrender to Soviet troops.

Instead of stopping the senseless bloodshed and accepting unconditional surrender, which would meet the interests of the German nation, Hitler's leadership tried to push back its inevitable end with brutal repressions. W. Keitel and M. Bormann issued an order to protect every settlement to the last person, and to punish the slightest instability with the death penalty.

The Soviet Armed Forces were faced with the task of delivering the final blow to Nazi Germany in order to force it to unconditionally surrender.

Preparation for the Berlin operation

The military-political situation that had developed by April required the Soviet command to prepare and conduct an operation to decisively defeat the Berlin group and capture the German capital in the shortest possible time. Only a successful solution to this problem could thwart the plans of the fascist leadership to prolong the war. It was necessary to take into account the fact that every extra day gave the enemy the opportunity to improve the defense in engineering terms and strengthen the Berlin group of troops at the expense of other fronts and sectors, as well as new formations. And this would significantly complicate the overcoming of enemy defenses and would lead to increased losses on the part of the advancing fronts. Breaking through the enemy's powerful defenses, defeating his large forces and quickly capturing Berlin necessitated the creation of strong strike forces and the use of the most expedient and decisive methods of conducting combat operations.

Taking these factors into account, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command attracted troops of three fronts for the Berlin operation - the 2nd and 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian, a total of 21 combined arms, 4 tank, 3 air armies, 10 separate tank and mechanized, as well as 4 cavalry corps. In addition, it was planned to use part of the forces of the Baltic Fleet, the 18th Air Army of Long-Range Aviation, the country's Air Defense Forces and the Dnieper Military Flotilla, operationally subordinate to the 1st Belorussian Front. Polish troops, consisting of two armies, tank and air corps, two breakthrough artillery divisions and a separate mortar brigade with a total number of 185 thousand soldiers and officers, were also preparing for the final operation to defeat Nazi Germany. They were armed with 3 thousand guns and mortars, 508 tanks and self-propelled artillery units, and 320 aircraft.

As a result of all the activities, a strong group of troops was concentrated in the Berlin direction, superior to the enemy. The creation of such a group testified to the enormous capabilities of the Soviet socialist state, which by the end of the war had powerful Armed Forces, its military-economic advantages, and the art of strategic leadership.

The idea of ​​the Berlin operation was developed during the winter offensive of the Soviet troops. Having comprehensively analyzed the military-political situation in Europe, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command determined the purpose of the operation and reviewed the plans prepared at the front headquarters. The final plan of the operation was approved in early April at an extended meeting of the Headquarters with the participation of members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, members of the State Defense Committee and commanders of the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian Fronts. The plan for the Berlin operation was the result of the collective creativity of Headquarters, the General Staff, commanders, staffs and military councils of the fronts.

The goal of the operation was to quickly defeat the main forces of Army Groups Vistula and Center, capture Berlin and, reaching the Elbe River, unite with the troops of the Western Allies. This was supposed to deprive Nazi Germany of the possibility of further organized resistance and force it to unconditional surrender.

The completion of the defeat of the Nazi troops was supposed to be carried out jointly with the Western allies, an agreement in principle with whom on coordinating actions was reached at the Crimean Conference. The plan for the offensive on the Western Front was outlined in Eisenhower's message to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Armed Forces on March 28. In a reply message dated April 1, J.V. Stalin wrote: “Your plan for dissecting German forces by combining Soviet troops with your troops completely coincides with the plan of the Soviet High Command.” Next, he informed the allied command that Soviet troops would take Berlin, allocating part of their forces for this purpose, and reported the approximate date for the start of the offensive.

The plan of the Soviet command was to break through the enemy’s defenses along the Oder and Neisse with powerful blows from troops on three fronts and, developing an offensive in depth, to encircle the main group of fascist German troops in the Berlin direction with its simultaneous dismemberment into several parts and the subsequent destruction of each of them . In the future, Soviet troops were supposed to reach the Elbe.

In accordance with the plan of the operation, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command assigned specific tasks to the fronts.

The commander of the 1st Belorussian Front was ordered to prepare and conduct an operation with the goal of capturing the capital of Germany and reaching the Elbe River no later than the 12th-15th day of the operation. The front was supposed to deliver three strikes: the main one - directly on Berlin from the Küstrin bridgehead and two auxiliary strikes - north and south of Berlin. Tank armies were required to be introduced after breaking through the defense to develop success by bypassing Berlin from the north and northeast. Considering the important role of the front in the upcoming operation, Headquarters reinforced it with eight breakthrough artillery divisions and a combined arms army.

The 1st Ukrainian Front was supposed to defeat the enemy group in the Cottbus area and south of Berlin, and no later than the 10-12th day of the operation to capture the lines of Belitz, Wittenberg and further along the Elbe River to Dresden. The front was ordered to launch two strikes: the main one in the general direction of Spremberg and the auxiliary one towards Dresden. On the left wing, the front troops had to go on a tough defense. To strengthen the strike force, two combined arms armies from the 3rd Belorussian Front (28th and 31st), as well as seven breakthrough artillery divisions, were transferred to the front. Both tank armies were to be deployed in the direction of the main attack after the defense was broken through. In addition, at a meeting at Headquarters, the commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front received an oral instruction from the Supreme Commander-in-Chief to provide in the frontal operation plan for the possibility of turning tank armies to the north after breaking through the Niessen defensive line to strike Berlin from the south.

The troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front were tasked with crossing the Oder, defeating the enemy's Stettin group and, no later than the 12th-15th day of the operation, capturing the Anklam, Waren, Wittenberg line. Under favorable conditions, they were supposed to, acting as part of their forces from behind the right wing of the 1st Belorussian Front, collapse the enemy’s defenses along the left bank of the Oder. The coast of the Baltic Sea, from the mouth of the Vistula to Altdamm, was ordered to be firmly covered by part of the front forces.

The start of the offensive by the troops of the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts was scheduled for April 16. Four days later the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front were supposed to go on the offensive.

Thus, the main efforts of the three fronts were directed primarily at crushing the enemy defenses, and then at encircling and dismembering the main forces of the Nazis defending in the Berlin direction. The encirclement of the enemy group was supposed to be carried out by bypassing Berlin from the north and northwest by troops of the 1st Belorussian Front, and from the south and southwest by troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front. Its dissection was ensured by a strike by two combined arms armies of the 1st Belorussian Front in the general direction of Brandenburg. Direct capture of the German capital was entrusted to the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front. 1st Ukrainian Front, advancing in the north westward, and part of the forces to Dresden, was supposed to defeat the Nazi troops south of Berlin, isolate the main forces of Army Group Center and thereby ensure the offensive of the 1st Belorussian Front from the south; in addition, he had to be ready to directly assist the 1st Belorussian Front in capturing the capital of Nazi Germany.

The troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front had to cut off the 3rd German Tank Army from Army Group Center and destroy it, thereby ensuring the advance of the 1st Belorussian Front from the north. The Red Banner Baltic Fleet was tasked with covering the coastal flank of the 2nd Belorussian Front, ensuring a blockade of the enemy's Courland group, and disrupting its sea communications. In accordance with the tasks received, Soviet troops began direct preparations for the operation in early April.

The commander of the 1st Belorussian Front, Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov, decided to deliver the main blow with the forces of five combined arms (47th Army, 3rd with the 9th Tank Corps and 5th Shock Corps, 8th Guards and 3rd army) and two tank armies (1st and 2nd Guards) from a bridgehead west of Küstrin. On the first day of the operation, the combined arms armies of the first echelon of the main strike group were supposed to break through two strips of the Oder defensive line in three sections with a total length of over 24 km. It was especially important to capture the second line of enemy defense, the front edge of which ran along the Zelovsky Heights. In the future, it was planned to develop a rapid attack on Berlin from the east, and bypass it with tank armies from the northwest and south. On the sixth day of the operation, it was planned to completely capture the capital of Nazi Germany and reach the eastern shore of Lake Havel. The 47th Army, advancing on the right flank of the strike group, was supposed to bypass Berlin from the north and reach the Elbe on the 11th day of the operation. To increase the efforts of the strike group, it was planned to use the second echelon of the front - the 3rd Army; The 7th Guards Cavalry Corps was in reserve.

The auxiliary strikes prescribed by the Headquarters to ensure the advance of the main strike group were planned to be delivered: on the right - by the forces of the 61st Army and the 1st Army of the Polish Army in the general direction of Eberswalde, Sandau; on the left - troops of the 69th and 33rd armies together with the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps on Furstenwalde, Brandenburg. The latter had first of all to cut off the main forces of the enemy’s 9th Army from Berlin.

The tank armies were planned to be brought into battle at a depth of 6-9 km after the combined arms armies captured strongholds on the Seelow Heights. The main task of the 2nd Guards Tank Army was to bypass Berlin from the north and northeast and capture its northwestern part. The 1st Guards Tank Army, reinforced by the 11th Tank Corps, was given the task of striking Berlin from the east and capturing its eastern and then southern suburbs. By making such a decision, the front commander sought to strengthen the power of the strike in the main direction, speed up the breakthrough of enemy defenses and prevent the withdrawal of the main forces of the 9th Army to Berlin.

Setting the tank armies the task of capturing Berlin inevitably led to a limitation of their maneuverability and striking power. Thus, when bypassing the city from the south, the 1st Guards Tank Army had to maneuver in close proximity to the internal perimeter of the Berlin defensive area, where the possibilities for this were very limited, and sometimes completely excluded.

Operating in the zone of the 1st Belorussian Front, the Dnieper military flotilla under the command of Rear Admiral V.V. Grigoriev was tasked with two brigades of river ships to assist the troops of the 5th Shock and 8th Guards Armies in crossing the Oder and breaking through enemy defenses on the Kyustrinsky bridgehead. The third brigade was supposed to assist the troops of the 33rd Army in the Fürstenberg area and provide mine defense for waterways.

The commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front, Marshal of the Soviet Union I. S. Konev, decided to deliver the main blow with the forces of the 3rd Guards (with the 25th Tank Corps), the 13th and 5th Guards (with the 4th Guards Tank Corps) combined arms , 3rd and 4th Guards Tank Armies from the Triebel area in the general direction of Spremberg. They were supposed to break through the enemy’s defenses in the Forst-Muskau sector, 27 km long, and defeat his troops in the Cottbus area and south of Berlin. Part of the forces of the main group planned to strike Berlin from the south. In the direction of the main attack, it was also planned to use the second echelon of the front - the 28th and 31st armies, which were supposed to arrive by April 20-22.

The auxiliary strike was planned to be delivered by the forces of the 2nd Army of the Polish Army together with the 1st Polish Tank Corps and the right flank of the 52nd Army in cooperation with the 7th Guards Mechanized Corps in the general direction of Dresden with the task of ensuring the actions of the strike force from the south. The front reserve was the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps, which was intended for use in the 52nd Army zone.

The general situation in the front zone was more favorable for the actions of tank armies, since the enemy’s defenses in this direction were less deep than in the zone of the 1st Belorussian Front, and between the Spree River and the outer contour of the Berlin defensive region, he essentially had no there were prepared lines. In this regard, the commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front decided to bring both tank armies into battle on the second day of the operation, after the combined arms formations reached the left bank of the Spree. They were supposed to develop a rapid offensive in the north-western direction, on the sixth day of the operation, advanced detachments would capture the areas of Rathenow, Brandenburg, Dessau and create conditions for encircling the Berlin group of Nazi troops. In addition, it was planned that one corps of the 3rd Guards Tank Army would attack Berlin directly from the south.

During the preparation of the operation, the front commander clarified his decision on the use of tank armies. Keeping the main idea of ​​the decision - introducing them into battle on the second day of the operation, he ordered the army commanders to be ready to introduce the advanced detachments of the first echelon corps on the first day, together with the infantry, complete the breakthrough of the enemy’s main defense line and seize a bridgehead on the Spree River. One of the most important tasks of the forward detachments was to disrupt the systematic withdrawal of enemy troops from the line of the Neisse River to the Spree River. Tank and mechanized corps assigned to combined arms armies were to be used as their mobile groups.

The commander of the 2nd Belorussian Front, Marshal of the Soviet Union K.K. Rokossovsky, decided to deliver the main blow in the Altdamm, Nipperwiese sector with the forces of the 65th, 70th and 49th Armies, 1st, 8th and 3rd Guards Tank, 8th Mechanized and 3rd th Guards Cavalry Corps in the general direction of Neustrelitz. During the first five days, the strike force had to force both channels of the Oder and completely break through the Oder defensive line. With the introduction of mobile formations into the battle, the front forces had to develop an offensive in the northwestern and western directions in order to cut off the main forces of the 3rd German Tank Army from Berlin. The troops of the 19th and the main forces of the 2nd Shock Army were given the task of firmly holding the occupied lines. Part of the forces of the 2nd Shock Army was planned to assist the 65th Army in capturing the city of Stettin, and subsequently develop an attack on Forbein.

The separate tank, mechanized and cavalry corps that were part of the front during the period of crossing the Oder and the capture of bridgeheads on its left bank by combined arms formations were to remain directly subordinate to the front commander, who retained the right to determine the moment of their entry into battle. Then they were resubordinated to the commanders of the combined arms armies and had to develop the offensive in the directions of the main attacks of these armies.

In preparing the offensive, the front commanders sought to create powerful strike groups. In the 1st Belorussian Front, 55 percent of rifle divisions, 61 percent of guns and mortars, 79 percent of tanks and self-propelled artillery units were concentrated in the direction of the main attack on a section of 44 km (25 percent of the total length of the front line). In the 1st Ukrainian Front, 48 percent of rifle divisions, 75 percent of guns and mortars, 73 percent of tanks and self-propelled artillery units were concentrated on a section of 51 km (only 13 percent of the front line). This massing of forces and assets made it possible to create high operational densities and achieve decisive superiority over the enemy.

The concentration of significant forces and assets on the directions of the main attacks made it possible to create a deep formation of troops. The fronts had powerful echelons for developing success, strong second echelons and reserves, which ensured the build-up of forces during the operation and its development at a high pace. In order to create powerful strike forces, combined-arms armies received stripes ranging from 8 to 17 km wide. Only the 3rd Guards Army of the 1st Ukrainian Front advanced in a zone 28 km wide. The combined arms armies of the shock groupings of the 2nd and 1st Belorussian Fronts broke through enemy defenses in areas of 4-7 km, and in the 1st Ukrainian Front - 8-10 km. To ensure maximum strength of the initial strike, the operational formations of most combined arms armies were single-echelon, while the battle formations of corps and divisions were formed, as a rule, in two and sometimes three echelons. Rifle divisions operating in the directions of the main attacks usually received offensive zones up to 2 km wide in the 1st Belorussian Front and up to 3 km in the 1st Ukrainian Front.

The operational formation of tank armies for entry into battle, except for the 1st Guards, was in two echelons. The mechanized corps was allocated to the second echelon. The 1st Guards Tank Army had all three corps in one echelon, and a separate Guards tank brigade and a separate tank regiment were assigned to the reserve. The battle formations of tank and mechanized corps were also built in two echelons. The density of tanks for direct infantry support in the armies of shock groupings was different and reached: in the 1st Belorussian - 20 - 44, in the 1st Ukrainian - 10 - 14 and in the 2nd Belorussian - 7 - 35 tanks and self-propelled artillery units per 1 km front.

When planning an artillery offensive in the Berlin operation, it was typical to mass artillery even more than before in the directions of the main attacks, create high densities during the period of artillery preparation, and provide continuous fire support for troops throughout the entire offensive.

The largest artillery grouping was created in the 1st Belorussian Front, which made it possible to concentrate about 300 guns and mortars on 1 km of the breakthrough area. The front command believed that with the existing density of artillery, the enemy’s defenses would be reliably suppressed during a 30-minute artillery preparation. Support for infantry and tank attacks to a depth of 2 km was to be carried out by a double, and to a depth of 4 km by a single fire shaft. It was planned to provide combat support for rifle and tank units and formations in depth by consistent concentration of fire in the most important directions.

In order to achieve surprise in the attack of the main strike group, it was decided to launch an attack by infantry and direct support tanks 1.5-2 hours before dawn. To illuminate the terrain ahead and blind the enemy in the offensive zones of the 3rd and 5th shock, 8th Guards and 69th armies, it was planned to use 143 searchlight installations, which were supposed to simultaneously turn on the light at the start of the infantry attack.

A strong artillery group was also created in the 1st Ukrainian Front. In accordance with the upcoming tasks, the front command regrouped the artillery and concentrated about 270 guns and mortars on 1 km of the breakthrough area. Due to the fact that the offensive of the front troops began with crossing a water barrier, the total duration of artillery preparation was planned to be 145 minutes: 40 minutes - artillery preparation before crossing the river, 60 minutes - ensuring the crossing and 45-minute artillery preparation for the attack of infantry and tanks across the river. Given the closed nature of the terrain, support for the attack by infantry and tanks was planned to be carried out, as a rule, by the method of sequential concentration of fire.

In the 2nd Belorussian Front, the main artillery forces were also concentrated in breakthrough areas, where the density reached over 230 guns and mortars per 1 km. The artillery offensive was planned in the armies, which was explained by the different conditions for crossing the Oder. The duration of artillery preparation was set at 45-60 minutes.

Strong regimental, divisional, corps and army artillery groups were created in the armies of the shock groupings of the 2nd and 1st Belorussian Fronts. In the 1st Ukrainian Front, instead of corps groups, each army group separated corps subgroups from its composition. According to his command, this allowed army commanders to have large artillery assets at their disposal for maneuver during the operation.

At the fronts, a significant amount of artillery was allocated for direct fire and ensuring the introduction of mobile formations into battle. Thus, only in the 13th Army of the 1st Ukrainian Front, which was advancing in a 10-kilometer zone, 457 guns were allocated for direct fire. To ensure the entry into battle of the tank armies of the 1st Belorussian Front, it was planned to bring in a total of 2,250 guns and mortars.

The enemy's large air force and the proximity of its airfields to the front line placed high demands on the reliable provision of ground forces against air strikes. By the beginning of the operation, the three fronts and corps of the country's Air Defense Forces, which were supposed to cover front-line installations, had 3,275 fighters, 5,151 anti-aircraft guns and 2,976 anti-aircraft machine guns. The organization of air defense was based on the principle of the massive use of forces and means to reliably support the combat formations of ground forces in the directions of the main attacks. Covering the most important rear facilities, especially crossings across the Oder, was entrusted to the country's Air Defense Forces.

The main aviation forces of the fronts were planned to be used massively to support the offensive of strike groups. Its tasks included conducting aerial reconnaissance, covering ground troops from enemy air strikes, ensuring a breakthrough of defenses and introducing mobile troops into battle, and fighting enemy reserves.

The most important task of the 4th Air Army of the 2nd Belorussian Front was to ensure the crossing of the Oder River. In addition, it was entrusted with accompanying the infantry advance during the fighting in the depths of enemy defenses, since the crossing of artillery, which usually performed this task, could take considerable time. The peculiarity of the preliminary aviation training planned in the 2nd Belorussian Front was that it was supposed to be carried out over three nights before the start of the operation. Direct aviation training was planned to be carried out two hours before the troops went on the offensive.

The 16th Air Army of the 1st Belorussian Front had to, while maintaining air superiority, reliably cover the front troops and crossings, and at night, during the period of artillery preparation, with Po-2 aircraft, strike at enemy headquarters, communications centers and artillery positions. Assisting the front forces in breaking through the defense at night was assigned to the 18th Air Army (Il-4 aircraft). With the start of the offensive, attack aircraft and bombers had to concentrate their main efforts on the Nazi strongholds and resistance centers, conduct reconnaissance to the Elbe River and on the flanks of the strike groups. As part of the 1st Belorussian Front, Polish aviation was active, supporting the 1st Army of the Polish Army.

The 2nd Air Army of the 1st Ukrainian Front was supposed to, before crossing the Neisse River, install a smoke screen in the offensive zone of the strike force and on its flanks, and during the period of crossing the river and advancing on its left bank, deliver massive attacks on enemy battle formations located directly at the front line, as well as at its control points and resistance centers in the depths of the defense.

Thus, the combat use of aviation on the fronts was planned taking into account the specific situation in the zone of each front and the nature of the tasks that the ground forces had to solve.

An important place was given to engineering support. The main tasks of the engineering troops were to establish crossings and prepare bridgeheads for the offensive, as well as assist the troops during the operation. Thus, in the zone of the 1st Belorussian Front, 25 bridges were built across the Oder and 40 ferry crossings were prepared. In the 1st Ukrainian Front, for the successful crossing of the Neisse, 2440 sapper wooden boats, 750 linear meters of assault bridges and more than 1000 meters of wooden bridge elements for loads from 16 to 60 tons were prepared.

One of the features of the Berlin operation was the short duration of its immediate preparation period - only 13-15 days. In such a short period of time, it was necessary to carry out a large number of very diverse and very complex measures to prepare troops and headquarters for the offensive. Particularly difficult was the numerous regroupings of troops taking part in the East Pomeranian and Upper Silesian operations. After their completion, it became possible to concentrate the main forces in the Berlin direction.

The largest was the regrouping of troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front, the main forces of which were deployed 180 degrees and transferred 250-300 km within 6-9 days. “It was a complex maneuver of the troops of an entire front,” recalled Marshal K.K. Rokossovsky, “the likes of which were not seen throughout the entire Great Patriotic War.” The transfer of troops and military equipment was carried out by rail, by road, and for some rifle formations - by a combined method, sometimes even on foot. In order to ensure secrecy, movement was most often carried out at night.

In the combat training of troops, the main attention was paid to putting together units, practicing interaction between branches of the military, training them to overcome water obstacles and actions in populated areas. All combat training was carried out in an environment as close as possible to the upcoming events, and taking into account the accumulated experience. The front headquarters developed and sent instructions to the troops on organizing and conducting offensive combat in large German cities. Special memos were also sent out, summarizing the experience of fighting for populated areas.

Command and staff exercises were conducted at the fronts with the headquarters of rifle corps and divisions, as well as artillery, tank and aviation units and formations. Joint reconnaissance was carried out with representatives of all branches of the military, mutual familiarization with tasks was carried out, signals were determined and communication was organized between the interaction of supporting assets with combined arms armies, a procedure was established for clearing routes when introducing mobile groups into a breakthrough and securing their flanks.

An important event was the solution of problems of operational camouflage, which pursued the goal of ensuring operational-tactical surprise of the offensive. For example, by simulating the concentration of three tank corps and two combined arms armies with a large number of transport means in the zone of the 2nd Shock Army, the command of the 2nd Belorussian Front misled the enemy regarding the direction of the main attack. In the 1st Belorussian Front, a plan of measures was developed and successfully implemented to create the impression that in the central direction the troops were switching to a long-term defense, and preparations for the offensive were being carried out on the flanks. As a result, the German command did not risk dramatically strengthening the central section of the front by weakening the flanks. Operational camouflage measures were also carried out in the 1st Ukrainian Front. When the regrouping of his troops to the right wing began, numerous mock-ups of various types of military equipment and radio stations were installed in areas where the tank armies were previously concentrated, which continued their work according to the previously defined regime until the start of the offensive.

Along with measures to disinform the enemy, much attention was paid to the fight against fascist intelligence. State security agencies protected Soviet troops from penetration by enemy agents and supplied front commands with intelligence information about the enemy.

The short time frame for preparing the operation determined the particularly intense nature of the work in the rear, since it was necessary to create the necessary reserves of various materials. In the 2nd Belorussian Front alone, during the preparation period for the operation, 127.3 thousand tons of cargo had to be transported, and the rear units of the front at the same time had to allocate more than a thousand trucks to support troop regroupings.

Great difficulties in the work of the rear were also observed on other fronts. To facilitate the work of motor transport, supply stations were brought as close as possible and transshipment bases were organized at points for transshipment of wagons onto the Western European gauge.

Careful organization of the supply of supplies and strict control of the military councils over the work of the rear services made it possible to provide the troops with everything they needed. By the beginning of the operation, the fronts had on average: 2.2-4.5 rounds of ammunition for the main types, 9.5 rounds of high-octane gasoline, 4.1 rounds of motor gasoline, and 5 rounds of diesel fuel. The equipment and weapons were well prepared, combat and transport vehicles were transferred to spring-summer operation.

The main task of party political work was to ensure high morale and offensive impulse among personnel. At the same time, the need was taken into account to prepare soldiers to overcome great difficulties, to warn them both from underestimating and from overestimating the enemy’s forces. The consciousness of the soldiers had to be firmly captured by the idea that the defeat of the enemy's Berlin group and the capture of its capital was the decisive and final act, ensuring complete victory over German fascism. On the eve of the Berlin operation, instilling a feeling of hatred towards the enemy acquired a particularly clear focus. An article published in Pravda on April 14 once again outlined the Communist Party's view on this complex issue. It said: “The Red Army, fulfilling its great liberation mission, is fighting for the liquidation of the Hitlerite army, the Hitlerite state, the Hitlerite government, but it has never set and does not set as its goal the extermination of the German people.”

In connection with the 75th anniversary of the birth of V.I. Lenin, propaganda of Lenin’s ideas about the defense of the socialist Fatherland and the international mission of the Soviet soldier was launched among the troops. The Main Political Directorate, in a special directive to military councils and political agencies, gave specific instructions on preparations for this significant date. In all units and formations of the fronts, a series of lectures was given to personnel on the topics: “Under the banner of Lenin”, “Lenin is the great organizer of the Soviet state”, “Lenin is the inspirer of the defense of the socialist Fatherland”. Propagandists and agitators emphasized Lenin’s behest about the danger of underestimating the enemy’s forces and the importance of iron military discipline.

During previous operations, the fronts received significant reinforcements, mainly from the recently liberated areas of the USSR. Being long time cut off from the life of their country, they were exposed to fascist propaganda, which in every possible way inflated the myth that Germany had special secret weapons that would be used at the right moment. Similar propaganda continued during the preparation for the Berlin operation. Enemy aircraft continuously dropped leaflets at the location of the Soviet troops, the content of which was aimed at instilling in the souls of insufficiently ideologically seasoned soldiers uncertainty about the success of the upcoming offensive actions. One of these leaflets said: “You are not far from Berlin, but you will not be in Berlin. In Berlin, every house will be an impregnable fortress. Every German will fight against you." But this is what was written about in another leaflet: “We were also near Moscow and Stalingrad, but they were not taken. You won’t even take Berlin, but you’ll get such a blow here that you won’t even be able to pick up any bones. Our Fuhrer has huge human reserves and secret weapons, which he saved in order to completely destroy the Red Army on German soil.”

Before the start of offensive operations, it was necessary, using various forms of educational work among personnel, to instill in the minds of soldiers, sergeants and officers firm confidence in the complete success of the planned operation. Commanders, political workers, party and Komsomol activists, being among the soldiers, persistently explained to them that a situation had developed on the Soviet-German front when the balance of forces had radically changed in favor of the Soviet Union. Army propagandists and agitators on numerous examples showed how much the power of the Soviet rear had increased, which on an ever-increasing scale supplied the fronts with human reserves, weapons, military equipment, equipment and food.

All this was brought to the consciousness of the soldiers through various forms of party political work. The most common thing in those days was the organization of short rallies. Such forms of work as group and individual conversations with soldiers and sergeants, reports and lectures for officers, and short meetings on organizational and methodological issues of educational work were also widely used.

For the unit agitators, the political directorate of the 1st Belorussian Front published a number of thematic developments over the course of several days: “The victory of the Red Army is the victory of the Soviet socialist system”, “The closer our victory is, the higher our vigilance should be, the stronger our blows to to the enemy." A member of the Military Council of the 1st Ukrainian Front, General K. V. Krainyukov recalled: “We called on the soldiers to prepare as best as possible for the final battles, to attack decisively and swiftly, to save our dear Soviet people, driven away to fascist hard labor and to death camps, to save humanity from the brown plague."

The political departments of the fronts and the political departments of the armies published a large number of leaflets, the content of which was very diverse: patriotic appeals to soldiers, appeals, advice on the use of military equipment. A significant part of these materials was published not only in Russian, but also in other languages ​​of the peoples of the USSR.

The success of the operation had to be determined by the high moral and combat qualities of soldiers, sergeants and officers, military skill, the ability to apply in battle and fully use the entrusted military equipment and weapons. That is why serious attention was paid to the combat training of troops, putting together units and units. Officers of political departments, together with commanders, carefully selected people for assault battalions and took part in their preparation for offensive battles. The assault battalions were reinforced by communists and Komsomol members.

Taking into account the experience of previous hostilities, leaflets were issued in large quantities for personnel with a brief summary of what every soldier participating in breaking through a heavily fortified, deeply echeloned enemy defense needed to know, and they summarized the positive and negative points from the experience of combat operations front troops during the capture of Poznan, Schneidemühl and other large cities. Among the leaflets published in the 1st Belorussian Front were: “Memo to an infantry soldier for fighting in a large city”, “Memo to the crew of a heavy machine gun operating as part of an assault group in street battles in a large city”, “Memo to the crew of a tank fighting in large city as part of an assault group”, “Memo to a sapper on storming enemy cities”, etc. The political department of the 1st Ukrainian Front published 350 thousand leaflets, which told how to cross large rivers, fight in the forest, in large city.

The Soviet command knew that the Nazis intended to widely use Faust cartridges to fight tanks. Therefore, during the preparation for the operation, the task was set and then solved - not only to familiarize soldiers with the tactical and technical data of Faustpatrons, but also to train them in the use of these weapons against Nazi troops, using captured reserves. The Komsomol members became the skirmishers in mastering the Faustpatrons. Groups of volunteers were created in the units to study this type of weapon. And this was very important for ensuring the advancement of tanks, since on their own they could not conduct a successful fight against the Faustians hiding in basements, around the corners of buildings, etc. The infantrymen, sitting on the armor of tanks, had to detect and destroy them in a timely manner.

In the last days before the operation, the influx of applications from soldiers asking to be accepted into the party increased sharply. In the 1st Belorussian Front alone, on the night of April 16 alone, over 2 thousand applications were submitted to party organizations. From March 15 to April 15, over 17 thousand soldiers were accepted into the ranks of the CPSU on three fronts. In total, by the beginning of the operation, they included 723 thousand members and candidates for party membership and 433 thousand Komsomol members.

Party-political work was characterized by high efficiency: soldiers were informed about the situation on all sectors of the Soviet-German front, about the successes of the Soviet troops, and about the importance of the upcoming operation. Commanders of units and formations spoke at seminars and meetings, at meetings of party and Komsomol activists. At party and Komsomol meetings held in all parts, communists and Komsomol members committed themselves to be the first to go on the attack. The troops had prepared red flags in advance to hoist them on the main administrative buildings of Berlin. On the eve of the offensive, special appeals from the military councils of the fronts were published, which called on the soldiers to honorably fulfill the task set by the party, the Supreme High Command and the Soviet people. One of the leaflets published on the eve of the offensive featured a map of Germany and the following text: “Look, comrade! 70 kilometers separate you from Berlin. This is 8 times less than from the Vistula to the Oder. Today the Motherland expects new exploits from you. One more powerful blow - and the capital of Nazi Germany will fall. Glory to whoever breaks into Berlin first! Glory to the one who will hoist our Victory Banner over the enemy capital!”

As a result of the enormous political work carried out in preparation for the operation, the order of the Supreme High Command to “hoist the Victory Banner over Berlin” was brought to the consciousness of every soldier and officer. This idea took possession of all the soldiers and caused an unprecedented surge in the troops.

The defeat of the Berlin group of Nazi troops. Capture of Berlin

Before the start of the operation, reconnaissance in force was carried out in the zones of the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts. To this end, on April 14, after a 15-20-minute fire raid, reinforced rifle battalions from the divisions of the first echelon of combined arms armies began to operate in the direction of the main attack of the 1st Belorussian Front. Then, in a number of areas, regiments of the first echelons were brought into battle. During the two-day battles, they managed to penetrate the enemy’s defenses and capture separate sections of the first and second trenches, and in some directions advance up to 5 km. The integrity of the enemy defense was broken. In addition, in a number of places, the front troops overcame the zone of the most dense minefields, which should have facilitated the subsequent offensive of the main forces. Based on an assessment of the results of the battle, the front command decided to reduce the duration of artillery preparation for the attack of the main forces from 30 to 20-25 minutes.

In the zone of the 1st Ukrainian Front, reconnaissance in force was carried out on the night of April 16 by reinforced rifle companies. It was established that the enemy was firmly in defensive positions directly along the left bank of the Neisse. The front commander decided not to make changes to the developed plan.

On the morning of April 16, the main forces of the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts went on the offensive. At 5 o'clock Moscow time, two hours before dawn, artillery preparation began in the 1st Belorussian Front. In the zone of the 5th Shock Army, ships and floating batteries of the Dnieper Flotilla took part in it. The force of the artillery fire was enormous. If during the entire first day of the operation the artillery of the 1st Belorussian Front spent 1,236 thousand shells, which amounted to almost 2.5 thousand railway cars, then during the artillery preparation - 500 thousand shells and mines, or 1 thousand cars. Night bombers of the 16th and 4th Air Armies attacked enemy headquarters, artillery firing positions, as well as the third and fourth trenches of the main defense line.

After the final salvo of rocket artillery, the troops of the 3rd and 5th shock, 8th Guards, and 69th armies, commanded by generals V.I. Kuznetsov, N.E. Berzarin, V.I. Chuikov, moved forward, V. Ya. Kolpakchi. With the start of the attack, powerful searchlights located in the zone of these armies directed their beams towards the enemy. The 1st Army of the Polish Army, the 47th and 33rd Armies of Generals S.G. Poplavsky, F.I. Perkhorovich, V.D. Tsvetaev went on the offensive at 6:15. Bombers of the 18th Air Army under the command of Air Chief Marshal A.E. Golovanov struck the second defense line. With dawn, the aviation of the 16th Air Army of General S.I. Rudenko intensified the fighting, which on the first day of the operation carried out 5,342 combat sorties and shot down 165 German aircraft. In total, during the first 24 hours, pilots of the 16th, 4th and 18th Air Armies flew over 6,550 sorties and dropped over 1,500 tons of bombs on enemy control points, resistance centers and reserves.

As a result of powerful artillery preparation and air strikes, the enemy suffered great damage. Therefore, for the first one and a half to two hours, the offensive of the Soviet troops developed successfully. However, soon the Nazis, relying on a strong, engineering-developed second line of defense, put up fierce resistance. Intense fighting broke out along the entire front. Soviet troops sought to overcome the enemy's stubbornness at all costs, acting assertively and energetically. In the center of the 3rd Shock Army, the greatest success was achieved by the 32nd Rifle Corps under the command of General D.S. Zherebin. He advanced 8 km and reached the second line of defense. On the left flank of the army, the 301st Infantry Division, commanded by Colonel V.S. Antonov, took an important enemy stronghold and the Verbig railway station. In the battles for it, soldiers of the 1054th Infantry Regiment, commanded by Colonel H.N. Radaev, distinguished themselves. The Komsomol organizer of the 1st battalion, Lieutenant G. A. Avakyan, with one machine gunner, made his way to the building where the Nazis were holed up. Throwing grenades at them, the brave warriors destroyed 56 fascists and captured 14. Lieutenant Avakyan was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

To increase the tempo of the offensive in the zone of the 3rd Shock Army, the 9th Tank Corps of General I. F. Kirichenko was brought into battle at 10 o’clock. Although this increased the force of the attack, the advance of the troops was still slow. It became clear to the front command that combined arms armies were not able to quickly break through enemy defenses to the depth planned for introducing tank armies into battle. What was especially dangerous was that the infantry could not capture the tactically very important Zelovsky heights, along which the front edge of the second defensive line passed. This natural boundary dominated the entire area, had steep slopes and in all respects was a serious obstacle on the way to the capital of Germany. The Seelow Heights were considered by the Wehrmacht command as the key to the entire defense in the Berlin direction. “By 13 o’clock,” recalled Marshal G.K. Zhukov, “I clearly understood that the enemy’s fire defense system here had basically survived, and in the battle formation in which we launched the attack and were conducting the offensive, we would not be able to take the Zelovsky Heights.” . Therefore, Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov decided to introduce tank armies into battle and, through joint efforts, complete the breakthrough of the tactical defense zone.

In the afternoon, the 1st Guards Tank Army of General M.E. Katukov was the first to enter the battle. By the end of the day, all three of its corps were fighting in the zone of the 8th Guards Army. However, on this day it was not possible to break through the defenses on the Seelow Heights. The first day of the operation was also difficult for the 2nd Guards Tank Army of General S.I. Bogdanov. In the afternoon, the army received orders from the commander to overtake the infantry battle formations and strike at Bernau. By 19:00, its formations reached the line of the advanced units of the 3rd and 5th shock armies, but, having encountered fierce enemy resistance, they could not advance further.

The course of the struggle on the first day of the operation showed that the Nazis were striving to hold the Seelow Heights at any cost: by the end of the day, the fascist command brought forward the reserves of the Vistula Army Group to reinforce the troops defending the second line of defense. The fighting was extremely stubborn. During the second day of the battle, the Nazis repeatedly launched violent counterattacks. However, the 8th Guards Army of General V.I. Chuikov, who fought here, persistently moved forward. Soldiers of all branches of the military showed massive heroism. The 172nd Guards Rifle Regiment of the 57th Guards Rifle Division fought courageously. During the assault on the heights covering Zelov, the 3rd battalion under the command of Captain N.N. Chusovsky especially distinguished itself. Having repelled an enemy counterattack, the battalion broke into the Seelow Heights, and then, after a heavy street battle, cleared the southeastern outskirts of the city of Seelow. In these battles, the battalion commander not only led the units, but also, drawing the fighters along with him, personally destroyed four Nazis in hand-to-hand combat. Many soldiers and officers of the battalion were awarded orders and medals, and Captain Chusovskoy was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Zelov was taken by the troops of the 4th Guards Rifle Corps under General V. A. Glazunov, in cooperation with part of the forces of the 11th Guards Tank Corps under Colonel A. Kh. Babajanyan.

As a result of fierce and stubborn battles, by the end of April 17, the troops of the front’s strike group had broken through the second defensive line and two intermediate positions. Attempts by the fascist German command to stop the advance of Soviet troops by bringing four divisions from the reserve into battle were unsuccessful. Bombers of the 16th and 18th Air Armies attacked enemy reserves day and night, delaying their advance to the line of hostilities. On April 16 and 17, the offensive was supported by ships of the Dnieper military flotilla. They fired until the ground forces moved beyond the firing range of the naval artillery. Soviet troops persistently rushed towards Berlin.

The front troops also had to overcome stubborn resistance, striking on the flanks. The troops of the 61st Army of General P. A. Belov, who launched the offensive on April 17, crossed the Oder by the end of the day and captured a bridgehead on its left bank. By this time, formations of the 1st Army of the Polish Army crossed the Oder and broke through the first position of the main defense line. In the Frankfurt area, troops of the 69th and 33rd armies advanced from 2 to 6 km.

On the third day, heavy fighting continued deep in the enemy defenses. The Nazis brought almost all of their operational reserves into the battle. The exceptionally fierce nature of the struggle affected the pace of advance of the Soviet troops. By the end of the day, their main forces had covered another 3-6 km and reached the approaches to the third defensive line. Formations of both tank armies, together with infantrymen, artillerymen and sappers, continuously stormed enemy positions for three days. Difficult terrain and strong enemy anti-tank defenses did not allow the tankers to break away from the infantry. The front's mobile forces have not yet received operational space to conduct rapid maneuvering operations in the Berlin direction.

In the 8th Guards Army zone, the Nazis offered the most stubborn resistance along the highway running west from Seelow, on both sides of which they installed about 200 anti-aircraft guns.

The slow advance of the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front posed, in the opinion of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, the implementation of the plan to encircle the enemy's Berlin group at risk. As early as April 17, Headquarters demanded that the front commander ensure a more energetic offensive by the troops under his command. At the same time, she gave instructions to the commanders of the 1st Ukrainian and 2nd Belorussian Fronts to facilitate the offensive of the 1st Belorussian Front. The 2nd Belorussian Front (after crossing the Oder) received, in addition, the task no later than April 22 with the main forces to develop an offensive to the southwest, striking bypassing Berlin from the north, in order to, in cooperation with the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front, complete encirclement of the Berlin group.

In pursuance of the instructions of the Headquarters, the commander of the 1st Belorussian Front demanded that the troops increase the pace of the offensive, bring up artillery, including high-power artillery, to the first echelon of troops at a distance of 2-3 km, which was supposed to facilitate closer interaction with infantry and tanks. Particular attention was paid to the massing of artillery in decisive directions. To support the advancing armies, the front commander ordered the more decisive use of aviation.

As a result of the measures taken, the troops of the strike group broke through the third defensive line by the end of April 19 and in four days advanced to a depth of 30 km, gaining the opportunity to develop an offensive towards Berlin and bypassing it from the north. In breaking through the enemy's defenses, the aviation of the 16th Air Army provided great assistance to the ground forces. Despite unfavorable meteorological conditions, during this time she made about 14.7 thousand sorties and shot down 474 enemy aircraft. In the battles near Berlin, Major I.N. Kozhedub increased the number of enemy aircraft shot down to 62. The famous pilot was awarded a high award - the third Gold Star. In just four days, in the zone of the 1st Belorussian Front, Soviet aviation carried out up to 17 thousand sorties.

The troops of the 1st Belorussian Front spent four days breaking through the Oder defensive line. During this time, the enemy suffered great damage: 9 divisions from the first operational echelon and a division: the second echelon lost up to 80 percent of their personnel and almost all military equipment, and 6 divisions advanced from the reserve, and up to 80 different battalions sent from the depths, - over 50 percent. However, the front troops also suffered significant losses and advanced more slowly than planned. This was due primarily to the difficult conditions of the situation. The deep construction of the enemy’s defense, occupied in advance by troops, its large saturation with anti-tank weapons, the high density of artillery fire, especially anti-tank and anti-aircraft, continuous counterattacks and the reinforcement of troops with reserves - all this required maximum effort from the Soviet troops.

Due to the fact that the front’s strike group launched an offensive from a small bridgehead and in a relatively narrow zone limited by water obstacles and wooded and swampy areas, the Soviet troops were constrained in maneuver and could not quickly expand the breakthrough zone. In addition, the crossings and rear roads were extremely congested, which made it extremely difficult to bring new forces into the battle from the depths. The pace of the offensive of the combined arms armies was significantly influenced by the fact that the enemy defenses were not reliably suppressed during artillery preparation. This especially concerned the second defensive line, which ran along the Zelovsky Heights, where the enemy withdrew part of the forces from the first line and brought up reserves from the depths. It did not have much impact on the pace of the offensive and the introduction of tank armies into the battle to complete the breakthrough of the defense. Such use of tank armies was not provided for by the operation plan, so their interaction with combined arms formations, aviation and artillery had to be organized during combat operations.

The offensive of the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front developed successfully. On April 16, at 6:15 a.m., artillery preparation began, during which the reinforced battalions of the first echelon divisions advanced directly to the Neisse River and, after transferring artillery fire, under the cover of a smoke screen placed on a 390-kilometer front, began crossing the river. The personnel of the forward units were transported along assault bridges built during the period of artillery preparation and using improvised means. A small number of escort guns and mortars were transported along with the infantry. Since the bridges were not yet ready, some of the field artillery had to be waded using ropes. At 7:50 am, the first echelons of bombers from the 2nd Air Army attacked enemy resistance centers and command posts.

The battalions of the first echelon, quickly capturing bridgeheads on the left bank of the river, provided conditions for building bridges and crossing the main forces. The sappers of one of the units of the 15th Guards Separate Motorized Assault Engineer Battalion showed exceptional dedication. Overcoming barriers on the left bank of the Neisse River, they discovered property for the assault bridge, guarded by enemy soldiers. Having killed the guards, the sappers quickly built an assault bridge, along which the infantry of the 15th Guards Rifle Division began to cross. For their courage and courage, the commander of the 34th Guards Rifle Corps, General G.V. Baklanov, awarded the entire personnel of the unit (22 people) the Order of Glory. Pontoon bridges on light inflatable boats were erected after 50 minutes, bridges for loads up to 30 tons - after 2 hours, and bridges on rigid supports for loads up to 60 tons - within 4 - 5 hours. In addition to them, ferries were used to ferry tanks in direct infantry support. In total, 133 crossings were equipped in the direction of the main attack. The first echelon of the main attack group completed the crossing of the Neisse an hour later, during which the artillery fired continuously at the enemy defenses. She then concentrated her attacks on enemy strongholds, preparing an attack on the opposite bank.

At 8:40 a.m., troops of the 13th Army, as well as the 3rd and 5th Guards Armies, began breaking through the main defensive line. The fighting on the left bank of the Neisse became fierce. The Nazis launched fierce counterattacks, trying to eliminate the bridgeheads captured by Soviet troops. Already on the first day of the operation, the fascist command threw up to three tank divisions and a tank destroyer brigade into battle from its reserve.

In order to quickly complete the breakthrough of the enemy's defense, the front commander used the 25th and 4th Guards Tank Corps of Generals E.I. Fominykh and P.P. Poluboyarov, as well as forward detachments of tank and mechanized corps of the 3rd and 4th Guards Tank Corps armies. Working closely together, combined arms and tank formations by the end of the day broke through the main line of defense on a 26 km front and advanced to a depth of 13 km.

The next day, the main forces of both tank armies were brought into battle. Soviet troops repelled all enemy counterattacks and completed the breakthrough of the second line of its defense. In two days, the troops of the front’s strike group advanced 15-20 km. Part of the enemy forces began to retreat across the Spree River. To support the combat operations of the tank armies, most of the forces of the 2nd Air Army were brought in. Attack aircraft destroyed the enemy's firepower and manpower, and bomber aircraft attacked his reserves.

In the Dresden direction, troops of the 2nd Army of the Polish Army under the command of General K. K. Sverchevsky and the 52nd Army of General K. A. Koroteev after the entry into battle of the 1st Polish Tank and 7th Guards Mechanized Corps under the command of Generals I. K. Kimbara and I.P. Korchagina also completed the breakthrough of the tactical defense zone and, in two days of fighting, advanced up to 20 km in some areas.

The successful offensive of the 1st Ukrainian Front created for the enemy the threat of a deep bypass of his Berlin group from the south. The Nazis concentrated their efforts to delay the advance of Soviet troops at the turn of the Spree River. They also sent the reserves of Army Group Center and the withdrawn troops of the 4th Tank Army here. However, the enemy's attempts to change the course of the battle were unsuccessful.

In pursuance of the instructions of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, on the night of April 18, the front commander assigned the 3rd and 4th Guards Tank Armies under the command of Generals P. S. Rybalko and D. D. Lelyushenko the task of reaching the Spree, crossing it on the move and developing the offensive directly to Berlin from the south. The combined arms armies were ordered to carry out previously assigned tasks. The front's Military Council drew special attention to the commanders of the tank armies to the need for rapid and maneuverable actions. In the directive, the front commander emphasized: “In the main direction, use a tank fist to push forward more boldly and decisively. Bypass cities and large populated areas and not get involved in protracted frontal battles. I demand that you firmly understand that the success of tank armies depends on bold maneuver and swiftness in action.” On the morning of April 18, the 3rd and 4th Guards Tank Armies reached the Spree. They, together with the 13th Army, crossed it on the move, broke through the third defensive line on a 10-kilometer section and captured a bridgehead north and south of Spremberg, where their main forces concentrated. On April 18, troops of the 5th Guards Army with the 4th Guards Tank Corps and in cooperation with the 6th Guards Mechanized Corps crossed the Spree south of the city. On this day, the planes of the 9th Guards Fighter Aviation Division, three times Hero of the Soviet Union, Colonel A.I. Pokryshkin, covered the troops of the 3rd and 4th Guards Tank, 13th and 5th Guards Armies, which crossed the Spree. During the day, in 13 air battles, the division pilots shot down 18 enemy aircraft. Thus, favorable conditions for a successful offensive were created in the zone of action of the front’s strike group.

Front troops operating in the Dresden direction repelled strong enemy counterattacks. On this day, the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps under the command of General V.K. Baranov was brought into battle here.

In three days, the armies of the 1st Ukrainian Front advanced up to 30 km in the direction of the main attack. Significant assistance to the ground forces was provided by the 2nd Air Army of General S.A. Krasovsky, which during these days carried out 7517 sorties and shot down 155 enemy aircraft in 138 air battles.

While the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian Fronts were conducting intense combat operations to break through the Oder-Neissen defensive line, the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front were completing preparations for crossing the Oder. In the lower reaches, the bed of this river is divided into two branches (Ost- and West-Oder), therefore, the front troops had to overcome two water obstacles in succession. In order to create the best conditions for the main forces for the offensive, which was scheduled for April 20, the front commander decided on April 18 and 19 to cross the Ost-Oder River with the advanced units, destroy the enemy’s military outposts in the interfluve and ensure that the front’s attack group formations would occupy an advantageous starting position.

On April 18, simultaneously in the zones of the 65th, 70th and 49th armies under the command of generals P.I. Batov, V.S. Popov and I.T. Grishin, rifle regiments of the first echelon divisions on improvised and light crossing means, under the cover of artillery fire and smoke screens crossed the Ost-Oder, in a number of areas overcame the enemy defenses in the interfluve and reached the bank of the West Oder River. On April 19, the units that crossed continued to destroy enemy units in the interfluve, concentrating on the dams on the right bank of this river. Substantial assistance to the ground troops was provided by the aviation of the 4th Air Army of General K. A. Vershinin. It suppressed and destroyed enemy strongholds and firing points.

By active operations in the Oder interfluve, the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front had a significant impact on the course of the Berlin operation. Having overcome the swampy floodplain of the Oder, they took an advantageous starting position for crossing the West Oder, as well as breaking through the enemy defenses along its left bank, in the area from Stettin to Schwedt, which did not allow the fascist command to transfer formations of the 3rd Tank Army to the 1st Tank Army. Belorussian Front.

Thus, by April 20, generally favorable conditions had developed in the zones of all three fronts for the continuation of the operation. The troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front developed the offensive most successfully. During the breakthrough of the defense along the Neisse and Spree, they defeated the enemy reserves, entered the operational space and rushed to Berlin, covering the right wing of the Frankfurt-Guben group of Nazi troops, which included part of the 4th Panzer and the main forces of the 9th Field Armies. In solving this problem, the main role was assigned to tank armies. On April 19, they advanced 30-50 km in a northwestern direction, reached the area of ​​Lübbenau, Luckau and cut off the communications of the 9th Army. All enemy attempts to break through from the areas of Cottbus and Spremberg to the crossings of the Spree and reach the rear of the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front were unsuccessful. The troops of the 3rd and 5th Guards Armies under the command of Generals V.N. Gordov and A.S. Zhadov, moving west, reliably covered the communications of the tank armies, which allowed the tankers the very next day, without encountering serious resistance, to overcome more 45-60 km and reach the approaches to Berlin; The 13th Army of General N.P. Pukhov advanced 30 km.

The rapid offensive of the 3rd and 4th Guards Tank, as well as the 13th Armies, by the end of April 20, led to the cutting off of Army Group Vistula from Army Group Center, and enemy troops in the areas of Cottbus and Spremberg found themselves semi-encircled. A commotion began in the highest circles of the Wehrmacht when they learned that Soviet tanks had reached the Wünsdorf area (10 km south of Zossen). The headquarters of the operational leadership of the armed forces and the general staff of the ground forces hastily left Zossen and moved to Wansee (Potsdam region), and some departments and services were transferred by plane to Southern Germany. In the diary of the Wehrmacht Supreme Command for April 20, the following entry was made: “For the highest command authorities, the last act of the dramatic death of the German armed forces begins... Everything is done in a hurry, since you can already hear Russian tanks firing from cannons in the distance... I'm in a depressed mood."

The rapid development of the operation made a quick meeting of Soviet and American-British troops realistic. At the end of April 20, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command sent a directive to the commanders of the 1st and 2nd Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts, as well as the commanders of the Air Force, armored and mechanized forces of the Soviet Army. It stated that it was necessary to establish signs and signals for mutual identification. By agreement with the allied command, the commander of the tank and combined arms armies was ordered to determine a temporary tactical demarcation line between the Soviet and American-British units in order to avoid mixing of troops.

Continuing the offensive in the northwestern direction, the tank armies of the 1st Ukrainian Front by the end of April 21 overcame enemy resistance in individual strong points and came close to the outer perimeter of the Berlin defensive area. Considering the upcoming nature of the fighting in such a large city as Berlin, the commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front decided to strengthen the 3rd Guards Tank Army of General P. S. Rybalko with the 10th Artillery Corps, the 25th Breakthrough Artillery Division, the 23rd Anti-Aircraft Division artillery division and 2nd Fighter Aviation Corps. In addition, two rifle divisions of the 28th Army of General A. A. Luchinsky, brought into the battle from the second echelon of the front, were transported by motor transport.

On the morning of April 22, the 3rd Guards Tank Army, having deployed all three corps in the first echelon, began an attack on enemy fortifications. Army troops broke through the outer defensive perimeter of the Berlin region and by the end of the day they began fighting on the southern outskirts of the German capital. The troops of the 1st Belorussian Front had broken into its northeastern outskirts the day before.

The action is to the left of the 4th Guards Tank Army of the General Army. By the end of April 22, D. Lelyushenko also broke through the outer defensive contour and, having reached the Zarmund-Belits line, took an advantageous position to connect with the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front and, together with them, complete the encirclement of the entire Berlin enemy group. Its 5th Guards Mechanized Corps, together with the troops of the 13th and 5th Guards Armies, had by this time reached the line of Belitz, Treuenbritzen, Tsana. As a result, the path to Berlin for enemy reserves from the west and southwest was closed. In Treuenbritzen, tank crews of the 4th Guards Tank Army rescued from fascist captivity about 1,600 prisoners of war of various nationalities: British, Americans and Norwegians, including the former commander of the Norwegian army, General O. Ryge. A few days later, soldiers of the same army liberated from a concentration camp (in the suburbs of Berlin) the former Prime Minister of France E. Herriot, a famous statesman who back in the 20s advocated Franco-Soviet rapprochement.

Taking advantage of the success of the tankers, the troops of the 13th and 5th Guards Armies quickly advanced westward. In an effort to slow down the attack force of the 1st Ukrainian Front on Berlin, the fascist command launched a counterattack on April 18 from the Gorlitsa area against the troops of the 52nd Army. Having created a significant superiority in forces in this direction, the enemy tried to reach the rear of the front’s strike group. Fierce fighting broke out here on April 19-23. The enemy managed to penetrate the location of Soviet and then Polish troops to a depth of 20 km. To help the troops of the 2nd Army of the Polish Army and the 52nd Army, part of the forces of the 5th Guards Army, the 4th Guards Tank Corps were transferred and up to four aviation corps were redirected. As a result, the enemy suffered great damage, and by the end of April 24, his advance was suspended.

While formations of the 1st Ukrainian Front carried out a rapid maneuver to bypass the German capital from the south, the strike force of the 1st Belorussian Front attacked directly on Berlin from the east. After breaking through the Oder line, the front troops, overcoming stubborn enemy resistance, moved forward. On April 20, at 13:50, the long-range artillery of the 79th Rifle Corps of the 3rd Shock Army fired the first two salvos at the fascist capital, and then systematic shelling began. By the end of April 21, the 3rd and 5th Shock Armies, as well as the 2nd Guards Tank Army, had already overcome the resistance on the outer perimeter of the Berlin defensive area and reached the northeastern outskirts of the city. By the morning of April 22, the 9th Guards Tank Corps of the 2nd Guards Tank Army reached the Havel River, on the northwestern outskirts of the capital, and, in cooperation with units of the 47th Army, began crossing it. The 1st Guards Tank and 8th Guards Armies also advanced successfully, and by April 21 they had reached the outer defensive perimeter. On the morning of the next day, the main forces of the front's strike group were already fighting with the enemy directly in Berlin.

By the end of April 22, Soviet troops had created the conditions to complete the encirclement and dissection of the entire Berlin enemy group. The distance between the advanced units of the 47th, 2nd Guards Tank Army, advancing from the northeast, and the 4th Guards Tank Army was 40 km, and between the left flank of the 8th Guards and the right flank of the 3rd Guards Tank Army - no more than 12 km. The headquarters of the Supreme High Command, having assessed the current situation, demanded that the front commanders complete the encirclement of the main forces of the 9th Field Army by the end of April 24 and prevent its withdrawal to Berlin or to the west. In order to ensure the timely and accurate implementation of the instructions of the Headquarters, the commander of the 1st Belorussian Front introduced his second echelon into the battle - the 3rd Army under the command of General A.V. Gorbatov and the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps of General V.V. Kryukov. In cooperation with the troops of the right wing of the 1st Ukrainian Front, they were supposed to cut off the main forces of the enemy’s 9th Army from the capital and encircle them southeast of the city. The troops of the 47th Army and the 9th Guards Tank Corps were ordered to speed up the offensive and, no later than April 24-25, complete the encirclement of the entire enemy group in the Berlin direction. In connection with the advance of the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front to the southern outskirts of Berlin, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command on the night of April 23 established a new demarcation line for it with the 1st Belorussian Front: from Lübben to the northwest to the Anhalt station in Berlin.

The Nazis made desperate efforts to prevent their capital from being encircled. On the afternoon of April 22, the last operational meeting was held in the Imperial Chancellery, which was attended by W. Keitel, A. Jodl, M. Bormann, G. Krebs and others. Hitler agreed with Jodl's proposal to remove all troops from the Western Front and throw them into the battle for Berlin. In this regard, the 12th Army of General W. Wenck, which occupied defensive positions on the Elbe, was ordered to turn its front to the east and advance to Potsdam and Berlin to join the 9th Army. At the same time, an army group under the command of SS General F. Steiner, which operated north of the capital, was supposed to strike the flank of a group of Soviet troops that was encircling it from the north and northwest.

To organize the offensive of the 12th Army, Field Marshal Keitel was sent to its headquarters. Completely ignoring the actual state of affairs, the German command hoped that this army would attack from the west, and Steiner’s army group from the north, to prevent the complete encirclement of the city. The 12th Army, turning its front to the east, on April 24 began operations against the troops of the 4th Guards Tank and 13th Armies, which were occupying defenses at the Belitz-Tröyenbritzen line. The German 9th Army was ordered to withdraw west to link up with the 12th Army south of Berlin.

On April 23 and 24, fighting in all directions became particularly fierce. Although the pace of advance of the Soviet troops slowed down somewhat, the Nazis were unable to stop them. The intention of the fascist command to prevent the encirclement and dismemberment of their group was thwarted. Already on April 24, the troops of the 8th Guards and 1st Guards Tank Armies of the 1st Belorussian Front linked up with the 3rd Guards Tank and 28th Armies of the 1st Ukrainian Front southeast of Berlin. As a result, the main forces of the 9th and part of the forces of the enemy's 4th Tank Army were cut off from the city and surrounded. The next day after the connection west of Berlin, in the Ketzin area, the 4th Guards Tank Army of the 1st Ukrainian Front with the troops of the 2nd Guards Tank and 47th Armies of the 1st Belorussian Front, the Berlin enemy group itself was surrounded.

On April 25, a meeting between Soviet and American troops took place. On this day, in the Torgau area, units of the 58th Guards Rifle Division of the 5th Guards Army crossed the Elbe and established contact with the 69th Infantry Division of the 1st American Army that had arrived here. Germany found itself divided into two parts.

The situation in the Dresden direction also changed significantly. The counterattack of the Görlitz enemy group by April 25 was finally thwarted by the stubborn and active defense of the 2nd Army of the Polish Army and the 52nd Army. To strengthen them, the defense line of the 52nd Army was narrowed, and to the left of it, formations of the 31st Army, which had arrived at the front under the command of General P. G. Shafranov, deployed. The released rifle corps of the 52nd Army was used in the area of ​​its active operations.

Thus, in just ten days, Soviet troops overcame the enemy’s powerful defenses along the Oder and Neisse, encircled and dismembered his group in the Berlin direction and created the conditions for its complete liquidation.

In connection with the successful maneuver to encircle the Berlin group by troops of the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian Fronts, there was no longer a need to bypass Berlin from the north with the forces of the 2nd Belorussian Front. As a result, already on April 23, Headquarters ordered him to develop the offensive in accordance with the original operation plan, that is, in the western and northwestern directions, and with part of his forces to strike bypassing Stettin from the west.

The offensive of the main forces of the 2nd Belorussian Front began on April 20 with the crossing of the West Oder River. Thick morning fog and smoke sharply limited the actions of Soviet aviation. However, after 9 o'clock visibility improved somewhat and air support increased for ground forces. The greatest success during the first day of the operation was achieved in the zone of the 65th Army under the command of General P.I. Batov. By evening, it captured several small bridgeheads on the left bank of the river, transporting there 31 rifle battalions, part of the artillery and 15 self-propelled artillery units. The troops of the 70th Army under the command of General V.S. Popov also operated successfully. 12 rifle battalions were transported to the bridgehead they captured. The crossing of the West Oder by the troops of the 49th Army of General I. T. Grishin turned out to be less successful: only on the second day they managed to capture a small bridgehead.

In the following days, front troops fought intense battles to expand bridgeheads, repelled enemy counterattacks, and also continued to cross their troops to the left bank of the Oder. By the end of April 25, formations of the 65th and 70th armies completed the breakthrough of the main defense line. In six days of fighting they advanced 20-22 km. The 49th Army, taking advantage of the success of its neighbors, on the morning of April 26, crossed the West Oder with its main forces along the crossings of the 70th Army and by the end of the day had advanced 10-12 km. On the same day, in the zone of the 65th Army, troops of the 2nd Shock Army of General I. I. Fedyuninsky began crossing to the left bank of the West Oder. As a result of the actions of the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front, the 3rd German Tank Army was shackled, which deprived the Nazi command of the opportunity to use its forces for operations directly in the Berlin direction.

At the end of April, the Soviet command focused all its attention on Berlin. Before its assault, party-political work unfolded with renewed vigor among the troops. Back on April 23, the Military Council of the 1st Belorussian Front addressed an appeal to the soldiers, which said: “Before you, Soviet heroes, is Berlin. You must take Berlin, and take it as quickly as possible, so as not to give the enemy time to come to his senses. For the honor of our Motherland forward! To Berlin!" In conclusion, the Military Council expressed full confidence that the glorious warriors would fulfill the task entrusted to them with honor. Political workers, party and Komsomol organizations used any respite in the battles to familiarize everyone with this document. Army newspapers called on the soldiers: “Forward, for complete victory over the enemy!”, “Let us hoist the banner of our victory over Berlin!”

During the operation, employees of the Main Political Directorate negotiated almost daily with members of the military councils and heads of political departments of the fronts, listened to their reports, and gave specific instructions and advice. The Main Political Directorate demanded that the soldiers be made aware that in Berlin they were fighting for the future of their Motherland, of all peace-loving humanity.

In newspapers, on billboards installed along the route of movement of Soviet troops, on guns, and vehicles there were inscriptions: “Comrades! Berlin's defenses have been breached! The desired hour of victory is near. Forward, comrades, forward!”, “One more effort, and victory is won!”, “The long-awaited hour has come! We are at the walls of Berlin!

And the Soviet soldiers intensified their attacks. Even wounded soldiers did not leave the battlefield. Thus, in the 65th Army, more than two thousand soldiers refused to be evacuated to the rear. Soldiers and commanders applied daily for admission to the party. For example, in the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front, 11,776 soldiers were accepted into the party in April alone.

In this situation, special care was taken to further increase the command staff's sense of responsibility for carrying out combat missions, to ensure that officers did not lose control of the battle for a minute. All available forms, methods and means of party political work supported the initiative of the soldiers, their resourcefulness and audacity in battle. Party and Komsomol organizations helped commanders timely concentrate efforts where success was expected, and the communists were the first to rush into attacks and drag their non-party comrades along with them. “What kind of fortitude and desire to win it was necessary to have in order to reach the goal through a devastating barrage of fire, stone and reinforced concrete barriers, overcoming numerous “surprises”, fire bags and traps, engaging in hand-to-hand combat,” recalls a member of the Military Council 1- of the Belorussian Front, General K. F. Telegin. - But everyone wanted to live. But this is how the Soviet man was brought up - the common good, the happiness of his people, the glory of the Motherland are more valuable to him than anything personal, more valuable than life itself.”

The headquarters of the Supreme High Command issued a directive that demanded a humane attitude towards those ordinary members of the National Socialist Party who were loyal to the Soviet army, the creation of local administrations everywhere, and the appointment of burgomasters in cities.

When solving the problem of capturing Berlin, the Soviet command understood that they could not underestimate the Frankfurt-Guben group, which Hitler intended to use to relieve the blockade of his capital. As a result, along with increasing efforts to defeat the Berlin garrison, the Headquarters considered it necessary to immediately begin eliminating the troops surrounded southeast of Berlin.

The Frankfurt-Guben group consisted of up to 200 thousand people. It was armed with over 2 thousand guns, more than 300 tanks and assault guns. The forested and swampy area it occupies is about 1500 square meters. km was very convenient for defense. Considering the composition of the enemy group, the Soviet command involved the 3rd, 69th and 33rd Armies and the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps of the 1st Belorussian Front, the 3rd Guards and 28th Armies, as well as the Rifle Corps of the 13th Army in its liquidation 1st Ukrainian Front. The actions of ground troops were supported by seven air corps. Soviet troops outnumbered the enemy in men by 1.4 times, and in artillery by 3.7 times. Since the bulk Soviet tanks at this time it was fighting directly in Berlin, the forces of the parties were equal in number.

In order to prevent a breakthrough of the blocked enemy group in the western direction, the troops of the 28th and part of the forces of the 3rd Guards Army of the 1st Ukrainian Front went on the defensive. On the paths of a probable enemy attack, they prepared three defensive lines, laid mines and created rubble.

On the morning of April 26, Soviet troops launched an offensive against the encircled group, trying to dissect and destroy it piece by piece. The enemy not only put up stubborn resistance, but also made repeated attempts to break through to the west. Thus, units of two infantry, two motorized and tank divisions struck at the junction of the 28th and 3rd Guards armies. Having created a significant superiority in forces, the Nazis broke through the defenses in a narrow area and began to move west. During fierce battles, Soviet troops closed the neck of the breakthrough, and the part that broke through was surrounded in the Barut area and almost completely liquidated. Aviation provided great assistance to the ground forces, which during the day carried out about 500 sorties, destroying enemy manpower and equipment.

In the following days, fascist German troops again tried to connect with the 12th Army, which in turn sought to overcome the defenses of the troops of the 4th Guards Tank and 13th armies operating on the outer front of the encirclement. However, all enemy attacks during April 27-28 were repelled. Considering the likelihood of new attempts by the enemy to break through to the west, the command of the 1st Ukrainian Front strengthened the defense of the 28th and 3rd Guards Armies and concentrated its reserves in the areas of Zossen, Luckenwalde, and Jüterbog.

At the same time (April 26-28), troops of the 1st Belorussian Front were pushing back the encircled enemy group from the east. Fearing complete liquidation, the Nazis again tried to break out of the encirclement on the night of April 29. By dawn, at the cost of heavy losses, they managed to break through the main defensive line of Soviet troops at the junction of two fronts - in the area west of Wendisch-Buchholz. On the second line of defense, their advance was stopped. But the enemy, despite heavy losses, stubbornly rushed to the west. In the second half of April 29, up to 45 thousand fascist soldiers resumed attacks on the sector of the 3rd Guards Rifle Corps of the 28th Army, broke through its defenses and formed a corridor up to 2 km wide. Through it they began to retreat to Luckenwalde. The German 12th Army attacked from the west in the same direction. There was a threat of a union between two enemy groups. By the end of April 29, Soviet troops with decisive actions stopped the enemy’s advance at the Sperenberg-Kummersdorf line (12 km east of Luckenwalde). His troops were dismembered and surrounded in three separate areas. Nevertheless, the breakthrough of large enemy forces into the Kummersdorf area led to the fact that the communications of the 3rd and 4th Guards Tank Armies, as well as the 28th Armies, were cut off. The distance between the advanced units of the breakthrough group and the enemy 12th Army advancing from the west was reduced to 30 km.

Particularly intense fighting broke out on April 30. Ignoring losses, the Nazis continued their offensive and advanced 10 km to the west within a day. By the end of the day, a significant part of the troops that had broken through was eliminated. However, one of the groups (numbering up to 20 thousand people) on the night of May 1 managed to break through at the junction of the 13th and 4th Guards Tank Armies and reached the Belitsa area, now only 3-4 km separated it from the 12th Army . To prevent these troops from further advancing westward, the commander of the 4th Guards Tank Army promoted two tank brigades, a mechanized brigade, a light artillery brigade, and a motorcycle regiment. During the fierce battles, the 1st Guards Assault Aviation Corps provided great assistance to the ground troops.

By the end of the day, the main part of the enemy's Frankfurt-Guben group was eliminated. All hopes of the fascist command for the unblockade of Berlin collapsed. Soviet troops captured 120 thousand soldiers and officers, captured more than 300 tanks and assault guns, over 1,500 field guns, 17,600 vehicles and a lot of various military equipment. The enemy lost 60 thousand people in killed alone. Only small scattered groups of the enemy managed to penetrate through the forest and escape to the west. Part of the troops of the 12th Army that survived the defeat retreated to the left bank of the Elbe along bridges built by American troops and surrendered to them.

In the Dresden direction, the fascist German command did not abandon its intention to break through the defenses of Soviet troops in the Bautzen area and go to the rear of the strike group of the 1st Ukrainian Front. Having regrouped their troops, the Nazis launched an offensive with four divisions on the morning of April 26. Despite heavy losses, the enemy did not reach the goal and his advance was stopped. Stubborn fighting continued here until April 30, but there was no significant change in the position of the parties. The Nazis, having exhausted their offensive capabilities, went on the defensive in this direction.

Thus, thanks to stubborn and active defense, Soviet troops not only thwarted the enemy’s plan to go behind the strike group of the 1st Ukrainian Front, but also captured bridgeheads on the Elbe in the Meissen and Riesa area, which later served as a favorable starting area for an attack on Prague.

Meanwhile, the struggle in Berlin reached its climax. The garrison, continuously increasing due to the involvement of the city population and retreating military units, already numbered 300 thousand people. It was armed with 3 thousand guns and mortars, 250 tanks. By the end of April 25, the enemy occupied the territory of the capital along with its suburbs with a total area of ​​325 square meters. km. The eastern and southeastern outskirts of Berlin were most fortified. The streets and alleys were crossed by strong barricades. Everything was adapted to the defense, even destroyed buildings. The city's underground structures were widely used: bomb shelters, metro stations and tunnels, drainage collectors and other objects. Reinforced concrete bunkers were built, the largest ones for 300-1000 people each, as well as a large number of reinforced concrete caps.

By April 26, troops of the 47th Army, 3rd and 5th Shock, 8th Guards Combined Arms, 2nd and 1st Guards Tank Armies of the 1st Belorussian Front, as well as 3rd and 4th Guards Tank Armies and part of the forces of the 28th Army of the 1st Ukrainian Front. In total, they included about 464 thousand people, over 12.7 thousand guns and mortars of all calibers, up to 2.1 thousand rocket artillery installations, about 1,500 tanks and self-propelled artillery installations.

The Soviet command abandoned an offensive along the entire circumference of the city, as this could lead to excessive dispersal of forces and a slowdown in the pace of advance, but concentrated efforts on individual directions. Thanks to this unique tactic of “driving” deep wedges into the enemy’s position, his defense was dismembered into separate parts, and troop control was paralyzed. Similar method actions increased the pace of the offensive and ultimately led to effective results.

Taking into account the experience of previous battles for large populated areas, the Soviet command ordered the creation of assault detachments in each division as part of reinforced battalions or companies. Each such detachment, in addition to infantry, included artillery, tanks, self-propelled artillery units, sappers, and often flamethrowers. It was intended for action in any one direction, which usually included one street, or for the assault of a large object. To capture smaller objects, assault groups consisting of a rifle squad to a platoon, reinforced with 2-4 guns, 1-2 tanks or self-propelled artillery units, as well as sappers and flamethrowers, were allocated from the same detachments.

The start of operations by assault detachments and groups, as a rule, was preceded by a short but powerful artillery preparation. Before attacking a fortified building, the assault force was usually divided into two groups. One of them, under the cover of tank and artillery fire, burst into the building, blocked the exits from the basements, which served as shelter for the Nazis during the artillery barrage, and then destroyed them with grenades and bottles of flammable liquid. The second group cleared the upper floors of machine gunners and snipers.

The specific conditions of combat operations in a large city determined a number of features in the use of military branches. Thus, artillery destruction groups were created in divisions and corps, and long-range groups were created in combined arms armies. A significant part of the artillery was used for direct fire. The experience of previous battles has shown that tanks and self-propelled artillery can only advance if they work closely with the infantry and under its cover. Attempts to use tanks independently led to heavy losses from artillery fire and faustpatrons. Due to the fact that Berlin was shrouded in smoke during the assault, the massive use of bomber aircraft was often difficult. Therefore, the main forces of bomber and attack aircraft were used to destroy the Frankfurt-Guben group, and fighter aircraft carried out an air blockade of Hitler’s capital. The aircraft carried out the most powerful strikes on military targets in the city on April 25 and on the night of April 26. The 16th and 18th Air Armies carried out three massive strikes, involving 2,049 aircraft.

After the Soviet troops captured the airfields in Tempelhof and Gatow, the Nazis tried to use Charlottenburgstrasse to land their planes. However, these enemy calculations were also thwarted by the actions of the pilots of the 16th Air Army, who continuously patrolled over this area. Attempts by the Nazis to drop supplies to the encircled troops by parachute were also unsuccessful. Most of the enemy transport aircraft were shot down by anti-aircraft artillery and aircraft as they approached Berlin. Thus, after April 28, the Berlin garrison could no longer receive any effective assistance from outside. The fighting in the city did not stop day or night. By the end of April 26, Soviet troops had cut off the Potsdam enemy group from Berlin. The next day, formations of both fronts penetrated deeply into the enemy’s defenses and began fighting in the central sector of the capital. As a result of the concentric offensive of the Soviet troops, by the end of April 27, the enemy group was compressed into a narrow zone (it reached 16 km from east to west). Due to the fact that its width was only 2-3 km, the entire territory occupied by the enemy was under the continuous influence of fire weapons of the Soviet troops. The fascist German command sought to provide assistance to the Berlin group by any means possible. “Our troops on the Elbe,” noted the OKB diary, “turned their backs on the Americans in order to alleviate the situation of the defenders of Berlin with their offensive from the outside.” However, by the end of April 28, the encircled group was divided into three parts. By this time, attempts by the Wehrmacht command to assist the Berlin garrison with external attacks had completely failed. The political and moral state of the fascist troops fell sharply.

On this day, Hitler subordinated the general staff of the ground forces to the chief of staff of the operational leadership, hoping to restore the integrity of command and control. Instead of General G. Heinrici, accused of unwillingness to provide assistance to the encircled Berlin, General K. Student was appointed commander of Army Group Vistula.

After April 28, the struggle continued unabated. Now it flared up in the area of ​​the Reichstag, battles for which began on April 29 by troops of the 3rd Shock Army. The Reichstag garrison, consisting of 1 thousand soldiers and officers, was armed with a large number of guns, machine guns and faust cartridges. Deep ditches were dug around the building, various barriers were erected, and machine gun and artillery firing points were equipped.

The task of capturing the Reichstag building was assigned to the 79th Rifle Corps of General S.N. Perevertkin. Having captured the Moltke Bridge on the night of April 29, units of the corps on April 30, by 4 o'clock, captured a large resistance center - the house where the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Nazi Germany and the Swiss Embassy were located, and went directly to the Reichstag. Only in the evening, after repeated attacks by the 150th and 171st rifle divisions of General V.M. Shatilov and Colonel A.I. Negoda, soldiers of the 756th, 674th and 380th rifle regiments, commanded by Colonel F.M. Zinchenko, Lieutenant Colonel A D. Plekhodanov and the chief of staff of the regiment, Major V. D. Shatalin, burst into the building. The soldiers, sergeants and officers of the battalions of captains S.A. Neustroev and V.I. Davydov, senior lieutenant K.Ya. Samsonov, as well as individual groups of Major M.M. covered themselves with unfading glory. Bondar, captain V.N. Makov and others.

Together with rifle units, the valiant tankmen of the 23rd Tank Brigade stormed the Reichstag. The commanders of the tank battalions, Major I.L. Yartsev and Captain S.V. Krasovsky, the commander of the tank company, Senior Lieutenant P.E. Nuzhdin, the commander of the tank platoon, Lieutenant A.K. Romanov, and the assistant commander of the reconnaissance platoon, Senior Sergeant N.V. .

The Nazis put up fierce resistance. Hand-to-hand fighting broke out on the stairs and in the corridors. The assault units, meter by meter, room by room, cleared the Reichstag building of fascists. The fighting continued until the morning of May 1, and individual groups of the enemy, holed up in basement compartments, capitulated only on the night of May 2.

Early in the morning of May 1, on the pediment of the Reichstag, near the sculptural group, the Red Banner, presented to the commander of the 150th Infantry Division by the Military Council of the 3rd Shock Army, was already waving. It was erected by scouts of the 756th Infantry Regiment of the 150th Infantry Division M.A. Egorov and M.V. Kantaria, led by the deputy battalion commander for political affairs, Lieutenant A.P. Berest, with the support of company machine gunners I.Ya. Syanov. This Banner symbolically embodied all the banners and flags that, during the most fierce battles, were hoisted by the groups of Captain V.N. Makov, Lieutenant R. Koshkarbaev, Major M.M. Bondar and many other soldiers. From the main entrance of the Reichstag to the roof, their heroic path was marked with red banners, flags and flags, as if now merging into a single Banner of Victory. It was a triumph of victory, a triumph of the courage and heroism of Soviet soldiers, the greatness of the feat of the Soviet Armed Forces and the entire Soviet people.

“And when the red banner, hoisted by the hands of Soviet soldiers, soared over the Reichstag,” said L. I. Brezhnev, “it was not only the banner of our military victory. This was the immortal banner of October; it was the great banner of Lenin; it was the invincible banner of socialism - a bright symbol of hope, a symbol of freedom and happiness of all peoples!”

On April 30, Hitler's troops in Berlin were actually divided into four isolated units of different composition, and command and control of the troops was paralyzed. The last hopes of the fascist German command for the liberation of the Berlin garrison by the forces of Wenck, Steiner and Busse were dissipated. Panic began among the fascist leadership. To evade responsibility for the atrocities committed, Hitler committed suicide on April 30. In order to hide this from the army, fascist radio reported that the Fuhrer had been killed at the front near Berlin. On the same day, in Schleswig-Holstein, Hitler's successor, Grand Admiral Doenitz, appointed a “provisional imperial government”, which, as subsequent events showed, tried to reach contact with the United States and England on an anti-Soviet basis.

However, the days of Nazi Germany were already numbered. The position of the Berlin group by the end of April 30 became catastrophic. At 3 o'clock on May 1, the chief of the general staff of the German ground forces, General Krebs, by agreement with the Soviet command, crossed the front line in Berlin and was received by the commander of the 8th Guards Army, General V.I. Chuikov. Krebs reported Hitler's suicide, and also conveyed a list of members of the new imperial government and a proposal from Goebbels and Bormann for a temporary cessation of hostilities in the capital in order to prepare the conditions for peace negotiations between Germany and the USSR. However, this document said nothing about surrender. This was the last attempt by the fascist leaders to split the anti-Hitler coalition. But the Soviet command figured out this enemy plan too.

Krebs' message was reported through Marshal G.K. Zhukov to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. The answer was extremely short: to force the Berlin garrison to immediately and unconditionally capitulate. The negotiations did not affect the intensity of the fighting in Berlin. Soviet troops continued to actively advance, striving for complete capture of the enemy capital, and the Nazis offered stubborn resistance. At 18:00 it became known that the fascist leaders rejected the demand for unconditional surrender. By doing this, they once again demonstrated their complete indifference to the fate of millions of ordinary Germans.

The Soviet command gave the troops the order to complete the liquidation of the enemy group in Berlin as soon as possible. Within half an hour, all the artillery hit the enemy. Fighting continued throughout the night. When the remnants of the garrison were dismembered into isolated groups, the Nazis realized that resistance was useless. On the night of May 2, the commander of the defense of Berlin, General G. Weidling, announced to the Soviet command the surrender of the 56th Tank Corps, subordinate directly to him. At 6 o'clock, having crossed the front line in the 8th Guards Army, he surrendered. At the suggestion of the Soviet command, Weidling signed an order for the Berlin garrison to stop resistance and lay down their arms. Somewhat later, a similar order on behalf of the “provisional imperial government” was signed by Goebbels’ first deputy, G. Fritsche. Due to the fact that the control of Hitler's troops in Berlin was paralyzed, the orders of Weidling and Fritsche could not be communicated to all units and formations. Therefore, from the morning of May 2, individual enemy groups continued to resist and even tried to break out of the city to the west. Only after the order was announced on the radio did mass surrender begin. By 15:00 the enemy had completely ceased resistance in Berlin. On this day alone, Soviet troops captured up to 135 thousand people in the city area.

The given figures convincingly indicate that the Nazi leadership attracted considerable forces to defend its capital. Soviet troops fought against a large enemy group, and not against the civilian population, as some bourgeois falsifiers claim. The battles for Berlin were fierce and, as Hitler’s general E. Butlar wrote after the war, “cost great losses not only to the Germans, but also to the Russians...”.

During the operation, millions of Germans became convinced from their own experience of the humane attitude of the Soviet army towards civilians. Fierce fighting continued on the streets of Berlin, and Soviet soldiers shared hot food with children, women and the elderly. By the end of May, the entire population of Berlin had been issued food cards and food distribution was organized. Even though these standards were still small, the residents of the capital received more food than recently under Hitler. Before the artillery salvoes had died down, work began on establishing the city's economy. Under the leadership of military engineers and technicians, Soviet soldiers, together with the population, restored the metro by the beginning of June, and trams were launched. The city received water, gas, electricity. Life was returning to normal. The intoxication of Goebbels's propaganda about the monstrous atrocities that the Soviet army allegedly inflicted on the Germans began to dissipate. “The innumerable noble deeds of the Soviet people will never be forgotten, who, while still holding a rifle in one hand, were already sharing a piece of bread with the other, helping our people overcome the terrible consequences of the war unleashed by the Hitler clique and take the destinies of the country into their own hands, clearing the way for those enslaved and enslaved by imperialism and fascism to the German working class...” - this is how the Minister of National Defense of the GDR, General G. Hoffmann, assessed the actions of Soviet soldiers 30 years later.

Simultaneously with the end of hostilities in Berlin, the troops of the right wing of the 1st Ukrainian Front began to regroup in the Prague direction to complete the task of completing the liberation of Czechoslovakia, and the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front moved westward and by May 7 reached the Elbe on a wide front .

During the assault on Berlin, a successful offensive by the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front was launched in Western Pomerania and Mecklenburg. By the end of May 2, they reached the coast of the Baltic Sea, and the next day, having advanced to the line of Wismar, Schwerin, and the Elbe River, they established contact with the 2nd British Army. The liberation of the islands of Wollin, Usedom and Rügen ended the offensive operation of the 2nd Belorussian Front. Even at the final stage of the operation, front troops entered into operational-tactical cooperation with the Red Banner Baltic Fleet: fleet aviation provided effective support to ground forces advancing in the coastal direction, especially in the battles for the Swinemünde naval base. The amphibious assault landing on the Danish island of Bornholm disarmed and captured the Nazi troops stationed there.

The defeat of the enemy's Berlin group by the Soviet army and the capture of Berlin were the final act in the fight against Nazi Germany. With the fall of the capital, it lost all possibility of waging an organized armed struggle and soon capitulated.

The Soviet people and their Armed Forces, under the leadership of the Communist Party, won a world-historical victory.

During the Berlin operation, Soviet troops defeated 70 infantry, 12 tank, 11 motorized divisions and most of the Wehrmacht aviation. About 480 thousand soldiers and officers were captured, up to 11 thousand guns and mortars, more than 1.5 thousand tanks and assault guns, as well as 4.5 thousand aircraft were captured as trophies.

Together with Soviet soldiers, soldiers and officers of the Polish Army took an active part in the defeat of this group. Both Polish armies operated in the first operational echelon of the Soviet fronts, 12.5 thousand Polish soldiers took part in the assault on Berlin. They hoisted their national banner above the Brandenburg Gate next to the victorious Soviet Red Banner. It was a triumph of the Soviet-Polish military partnership.

The Berlin operation is one of the largest operations of the Second World War. It was characterized by exceptionally high intensity of struggle on both sides. Poisoned by false propaganda and intimidated by cruel repressions, the fascist troops resisted with extraordinary tenacity. The degree of fierceness of the fighting is also evidenced by the large losses of Soviet troops. From April 16 to May 8, they lost more than 102 thousand people. Meanwhile, American-British troops along the entire Western Front lost 260 thousand people during 1945.

As in previous battles, in the Berlin operation, Soviet soldiers showed high combat skill, courage and mass heroism. More than 600 people were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov was awarded the third, and Marshals of the Soviet Union I.S. Konev and K.K. Rokossovsky the second Gold Star medal. The second Gold Star medal was awarded to V. I. Andrianov, S. E. Artemenko, P. I. Batov, T. Ya. Begeldinov, D. A. Dragunsky, A. N. Efimov, S. I. Kretov, M. V. Kuznetsov, I. X. Mikhailichenko, M. P. Odintsov, V. S. Petrov, P. A. Plotnikov, V. I. Popkov, A. I. Rodimtsev, V. G. Ryazanov, E. Y. Savitsky, V. V. Senko, Z. K. Slyusarenko, N. G. Stolyarov, E. P. Fedorov, M. G. Fomichev. 187 units and formations received the names Berlin. From the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian Fronts alone, 1,141 thousand soldiers were awarded orders and medals, many units and formations were awarded orders of the Soviet Union, and 1,082 thousand participants in the assault were awarded the medal “For the Capture of Berlin,” established in honor of this historical victory.

The Berlin operation made a significant contribution to the theory and practice of Soviet military art. It was prepared and carried out on the basis of comprehensive consideration and creative use of the rich experience of the Soviet Armed Forces accumulated during the war. At the same time, the military art of the Soviet troops in this operation has a number of features.

The operation was prepared in a short time, and its main goals - encircling and destroying the main enemy group and capturing Berlin - were achieved in 16-17 days. Noting this feature, Marshal A. M. Vasilevsky wrote: “The pace of preparation and implementation of final operations indicates that the Soviet military economy and the Armed Forces had reached a level by 1945 that made it possible to do what would previously have seemed a miracle.”

The limited preparation time for such a major operation required new, more effective forms and methods of work from commanders and staffs of all levels. Not only in fronts and armies, but also in corps and divisions, a parallel method of work of commanders and staffs was usually used. At all command and staff levels, the rule developed in previous operations was strictly observed to provide the troops with as much time as possible for their immediate preparation for combat operations.

The Berlin operation is distinguished by the clarity of its strategic plan, which was fully consistent with the assigned tasks and the peculiarities of the current situation. It is a classic example of an offensive by a group of fronts carried out with such a decisive goal. During this operation, Soviet troops surrounded and eliminated the largest group of enemy troops in the history of wars.

The simultaneous offensive of three fronts in a 300-kilometer zone with the delivery of six strikes pinned down the enemy’s reserves, contributed to the disorganization of his command, and in a number of cases made it possible to achieve operational-tactical surprise.

Soviet military art in the Berlin operation was characterized by the decisive massing of forces and means in the directions of the main attacks, the creation of high densities of suppression means and deep echeloning of combat formations of troops, which ensured a relatively quick breakthrough of the enemy’s defenses, the subsequent encirclement and destruction of his main forces and the preservation of overall superiority over enemy throughout the entire operation.

The Berlin operation is very instructive in its experience of the varied combat use of armored and mechanized forces. It involved 4 tank armies, 10 separate tank and mechanized corps, 16 separate tank and self-propelled artillery brigades, as well as more than 80 separate tank and self-propelled artillery regiments. The operation once again clearly demonstrated the feasibility of not only tactical, but also operational massing of armored and mechanized troops in the most important areas. The creation of powerful success development echelons in the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts (each included two tank armies) is the most important prerequisite for the successful conduct of the entire operation, which once again confirmed that tank armies and corps, when used correctly, are the main a means of developing success.

The combat use of artillery in the operation was characterized by its skillful massing in the directions of the main attacks, the creation of artillery groups at all organizational levels - from regiment to army, centralized planning of an artillery offensive, wide maneuver of artillery, including large artillery formations, sustainable fire superiority over the enemy .

The art of the Soviet command in using aviation was manifested primarily in its massing and close interaction with ground forces, to support which the main efforts of all air armies, including long-range aviation, were directed. In the Berlin operation, Soviet aviation firmly maintained air supremacy. In 1,317 air battles, 1,132 enemy aircraft were shot down. The defeat of the main forces of the 6th Air Fleet and the Reich Air Fleet was completed in the first five days of the operation, and subsequently the rest of the aviation was finished off. In the Berlin operation, Soviet aviation destroyed the enemy's defensive structures, destroyed and suppressed its firepower and manpower. Working closely with combined arms formations, it struck the enemy day and night, bombarded his troops on the roads and on the battlefield, when moving them out of the depths and when leaving encirclement, and disrupted control. The use of the Air Force was characterized by centralization of its control, timely relocation, and continuous increase in efforts in solving basic tasks. Ultimately, the combat use of aviation in the Berlin operation most fully expressed the essence of that form of warfare, which during the war was called an air offensive.

In the operation under consideration, the art of organizing interaction was further improved. The foundations of strategic interaction were laid even during the development of its concept through careful coordination of the actions of the fronts and branches of the Armed Forces in the interests of successfully solving the main operational-strategic tasks. As a rule, the interaction between the fronts within the framework of the strategic operation was stable.

The Berlin operation provided interesting experience in the use of the Dnieper military flotilla. The skillfully executed maneuver from the Western Bug and Pripyat to the Oder deserves attention. In difficult hydrographic conditions, the flotilla completed a more than 500-kilometer journey in 20 days. Some of the flotilla's ships were transported by rail over distances exceeding 800 km. And this took place in conditions when on the route of their movement there were 75 operational and destroyed crossings, railway and highway bridges, locks and other hydraulic structures, and in 48 places it was necessary to clear the shipping channel. In close operational-tactical cooperation with ground forces, the ships of the flotilla solved various tasks. They took part in artillery preparation, assisted the advancing troops in crossing water barriers and actively participated in the battles for Berlin on the Spree River.

Political bodies showed great skill in ensuring the combat activities of troops. The intense and purposeful work of commanders, political agencies, party and Komsomol organizations ensured an exceptionally high morale and offensive impulse among all soldiers and contributed to the solution of the historical task - the victorious end of the war with Nazi Germany.

The successful conduct of one of the last operations of the Second World War in Europe was also ensured by the high level of strategic leadership and the military leadership of the commanders of the fronts and armies. Unlike most previous strategic operations, where coordination of the actions of the fronts was entrusted to representatives of the Headquarters, in the Berlin operation the overall command of the troops was carried out directly by the Supreme High Command. Headquarters and the General Staff showed particularly high skill and flexibility in the leadership of the Soviet Armed Forces. They promptly set tasks for the fronts and branches of the Armed Forces, clarified them during the offensive depending on changes in the situation, organized and supported operational-strategic interaction, skillfully used strategic reserves, and continuously replenished the troops with personnel, weapons and military equipment.

Evidence of the high level of Soviet military art and the skill of military leaders in the Berlin operation was the successful solution to the complex problem of logistics support for troops. The limited preparation time for the operation and the large expenditure of material resources, due to the nature of the hostilities, required great tension in the work of the rear agencies of all levels. Suffice it to say that during the operation, troops on three fronts consumed over 7,200 wagons of ammunition and from 2-2.5 (diesel fuel) to 7-10 (aviation gasoline) front-line fuel refills. The successful solution of logistics support was achieved mainly due to the sharp approach of material supplies to the troops and the widespread use of road transport to transport the necessary supplies. Even during the period of preparation for the operation, more material was transported by road than by rail. Thus, 238.4 thousand tons of ammunition, fuel and lubricants were delivered to the 1st Belorussian Front by rail, and 333.4 thousand tons were delivered by road transport of the front and armies.

Military topographers made a great contribution to ensuring the combat operations of troops. The military topographic service promptly and completely provided the troops with topographic and special maps, prepared initial geodetic data for artillery fire, took an active part in deciphering aerial photographs, and determined the coordinates of targets. Only the troops and headquarters of the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts were issued 6.1 million copies of maps, 15 thousand aerial photographs were deciphered, the coordinates of about 1.6 thousand support and artillery networks were determined, and 400 artillery batteries were geodetic referenced. In order to support combat operations in Berlin, the topographic service of the 1st Belorussian Front prepared a relief plan of the city, which turned out to be of great help to the headquarters in preparing and conducting the operation.

The Berlin operation went down in history as the victorious crown of the difficult and glorious path that those led Communist Party Soviet Armed Forces. The operation was carried out with full satisfaction of the needs of the fronts with military equipment, weapons and logistics. The heroic rear provided its soldiers with everything that was necessary for the final defeat of the enemy. This is one of the clearest and most convincing evidence of the high organization and power of the economy of the Soviet socialist state.

The main staircase to the Reichstag. There are 15 victory rings on the barrel of a broken anti-aircraft gun. In 1954, the damaged Reichstag dome was demolished because it could spontaneously collapse. In 1995, work began on the construction of a new dome. Today, to take a walk in the new glass dome, tourists line up no less than the line that once was at the Lenin Mausoleum.

In February 1945, Hitler declared Berlin a fortress, and already in April, Nazi propaganda declared that Festung Berlin was the culmination of the fighting on the eastern front and should become a mighty bastion against which a furious wave of Soviet troops would crash. Soviet historiography liked this statement about “Fortress Berlin” so much that it enthusiastically picked it up, multiplied it and formed the basis of the official version of the storming of the capital of the Third Reich. But this is propaganda and pathos, and real picture looked a little different.

Theoretically, the assault on Berlin could take place from two opposite directions: from the West - by the Allied forces and from the east - by the Red Army. This option was the most inconvenient for the Germans, because it would require dispersing troops in different directions. However, in the hands of the German leadership there was a top secret Allied plan - "Eclipse" ("Iclipse" - eclipse). According to this plan, all of Germany had already been divided in advance by the leadership of the USSR, England and the USA into occupation zones. The clear boundaries on the map indicated that Berlin was falling into the Soviet zone and that the Americans were to stop at the Elbe. Based on the captured plan, the German command could have strengthened its positions on the Oder with troops from the west, but this was not done adequately. Contrary to the popular version, the troops of Wenck's 12th A did not actually turn their backs on the Americans and did not completely expose their defenses in the west, until the Fuhrer's order of April 22, 1945. Keitel recalled: “For several days in a row, Heinrici insistently demanded that Steiner’s SS tank group and, in particular, Holste’s corps be subordinated to him to cover the southern flank. Jodl was categorically against it, rightly objecting to Heinrici that he could not ensure the protection of his flanks due to the rear cover of Wenck’s army.” But these are particularities, and the most blatant example of Hitler’s tactical recklessness is the transfer of the bulk of troops from the Ardennes not to the Oder, where the fate of Berlin and Germany was decided, but to a secondary site in Hungary. The looming threat to Berlin was simply ignored.

The total area of ​​Berlin was 88,000 hectares. The length from west to east is up to 45 km, from north to south - more than 38 km. Only 15 percent was built up, the rest of the space was occupied by parks and gardens. The city was divided into 20 districts, of which 14 were external. The inner part of the capital was most densely built up. The districts were divided among themselves by large parks (Tiergarten, Jungfernheide, Treptower Park and others) with a total area of ​​131.2 hectares. The Spree River flows through Berlin from southeast to northwest. There was a developed network of canals, especially in the northwestern and southern parts of the city, often with stone banks.

The general layout of the city was distinguished by straight lines. The streets, intersecting at right angles, formed many squares. The average width of the streets is 20-30 m. The buildings are stone and concrete, the average height is 4-5 floors. By the beginning of the storm, a significant portion of the buildings had been destroyed by bombing. The city had up to 30 train stations and dozens of factories. The largest industrial enterprises were located in the outer regions. The ring railway passed through the city.

The length of metro lines is up to 80 km. Subway lines were shallow, often going outside and running along overpasses. At the beginning of the war, 4.5 million people lived in Berlin, but massive bombing carried out by the Allies in 1943 forced an evacuation, reducing the population to 2.5 million. The exact number of civilians in the capital at the start of urban fighting is impossible to determine. Many Berliners evacuated to the east of the city returned home as the Soviet army approached, and there were also many refugees in the capital. On the eve of the battle for Berlin, the authorities did not call on the local population to evacuate, since the country was already overcrowded with millions of refugees. Nevertheless, everyone who was not employed in production or in the Volkssturm could freely leave. The number of civilian population in different sources ranges from 1.2 million to 3.5 million people. Probably the most accurate figure is around 3 million.

Commandant of the Defense of Berlin, Lieutenant General Helmut Reimann (in a trench)

In the winter of 1945, the tasks of the Berlin defense headquarters were concurrently carried out by the headquarters of Wehrkeis III - 3rd Corps District, and only in March did Berlin finally have its own defense headquarters. As commander of the defense of the capital, General Bruno Ritter von Haonschild was replaced by Lieutenant General Helmut Reimann, his chief of staff was Oberst Hans Refior, the head of the operational department was Major Sprotte, the chief of supplies was Major Weiss, the chief of artillery was Oberstleutnanat Plateau, the chief of communications was Oberstleutnant Ericke, Chief of Engineering Support - Oberst Lobeck. Propaganda Minister Goebbels received the post of Reich Commissioner for Defense of Berlin. Strained relations immediately developed between Goebbels and Reimann, because Dr. Joseph unsuccessfully tried to subjugate the military command. General Reiman repelled the civil minister's attempts to command, but made himself an influential enemy. On March 9, 1945, a plan for the defense of Berlin finally appeared. The author of the very vague 35-page plan was Major Sprott. It was envisaged that the city would be divided into 9 sectors named from “A” to “H” and diverging clockwise from the ninth, central sector “Citadel”, where government buildings were located. The citadel was supposed to be covered by two defense areas "Ost" - around Alexanderplatz and "West" - around the so-called Kni (Ernst-Reuther-Platz area). Oberst Lobeck was entrusted with the difficult task of carrying out defensive engineering work under the direction of the Reich Defense Commissioner. Quickly realizing that one engineering battalion could not build much, the command consulted with Goebbels and received assistance from 2 Volkssturm battalions, specially trained for construction work, and most importantly, workers from the civil construction organization "Todt" and the Reichsarneitsdienst (Labor Service). The latter turned out to be the most valuable help because they were the only ones who had the required equipment. Military engineers and engineering units were sent to sector commanders for specific work.

Fortification work in the Berlin direction began back in February 1945, when a Soviet breakthrough to the capital was looming. However, contrary to all logic, fortification activities were soon curtailed! Hitler decided that since the Red Army did not dare to march on the weakly defended capital, the Soviet troops were completely exhausted and would not be able to carry out large-scale operations in the near future. While the Soviets were intensively building up their strike forces, the OKW and OKH leadership remained in blissful inaction, expressing solidarity with the Fuhrer. Engineering and defense work was restarted only at the very end of March, when the main human and material potential was already involved in the Battle of the Oder, where the German front in the east finally collapsed.

To build a large-scale fortification system around and inside one of the largest cities in Europe, a clear organization and understanding of who is in charge of the construction, who is responsible for the planning and who is building was required. There was complete chaos in this matter. Formally, the defense of Berlin was the responsibility of the Commissar of Defense of Reich and part-time the Commissar of Defense of Berlin and at the same time the Minister of Information and Propaganda - a civilian, Dr. Goebbels, but in reality the defense of the capital was up to the military, who was represented by the military commandant of Berlin, General Reimann. The general rightly believed that since it was he who would lead the defense, it was he who should be responsible for the construction of fortifications, on which he would have to fight tomorrow. Goebbels had a different opinion. Here a dangerous dualism of influences arose. The ambitious Goebbels was too zealous about his position and tried too actively to dominate the army. The army men, seeing the complete incompetence of the Minister of Propaganda, tried to protect their independence from civilian encroachments. They already had a gloomy example when SS Reichsführer Himmler decided to command Army Group Vistula from January 24, 1945, and this despite the fact that Reichsführer cannot be called civilian. When collapse was imminent, on March 20, 1945, Himmler urgently handed over the reins of the army group to Colonel General Gotthard Heinrici and happily washed his hands of it. In Berlin the stakes were higher. A paradoxical situation arose - 10 kilometers from Berlin, the military could build anything they wanted, but mostly on their own. And inside the 10-kilometer zone and in the capital itself, construction was subordinated to Goebbels. The irony is that Goebbels had to build reserve positions precisely for the military, with whom he was not particularly willing to consult. As a result, fortifications around and in the capital itself were built completely incompetently, without the slightest understanding of tactical requirements, and their poor quality is worthy of special mention. Moreover, materials and personnel from combat units were taken for useless construction, but the military was involved as workers, and not as the main customer. For example, many anti-tank obstacles were erected around the city, which were of little use or even interfered with the movement of their own troops, and therefore required their destruction.

The Nazis optimistically planned to recruit up to 100,000 people for defensive work, but in reality the daily number barely reached 30,000 and only once reached 70,000. In Berlin, enterprises that also required workers continued to operate until the last moment. In addition, it was necessary to provide daily transportation for tens of thousands of workers involved in the construction of defensive lines. The railway around the capital was overloaded, subjected to powerful air raids and operated intermittently. When the work site was far from the railroad tracks, people had to be transported by buses and trucks, but there was no gasoline for this. To overcome the situation, local residents of nearby settlements were involved in the construction of remote borders, but they could not always provide the required number of workers for large-scale work. In the beginning, excavators were used for excavation work, but fuel shortages quickly forced the abandonment of mechanized labor. Most workers generally had to bring their own tools. The shortage of entrenching tools forced the authorities to publish desperate calls in newspapers for the population to help with shovels and picks. And the population showed amazing affection for their shovels and did not want to give them up. Desperate haste and a shortage of building materials soon forced people to abandon the construction of reinforced concrete structures. Mines and barbed wire were available in very limited quantities. In any case, there was no longer any energy or time left for large-scale work.

The defenders of Berlin also had problems with ammunition. At the beginning of the urban fighting in Berlin there were three large ammunition depots - the March warehouse in the Volkspark Hasenheide (southern sector of Berlin), the Mars warehouse in Grunewald Park on Teufelssee (western sector) and the Monika warehouse in the Volkspark Jungfernheide (northwestern sector). When the fighting began, these warehouses were 80% full. A small amount of ammunition was stored in a warehouse in the Tiergarten park area. When the threat of a Soviet breakthrough from the north arose, two-thirds of the Monica warehouse's supplies were transported by horse-drawn transport to the Mars warehouse. However, on April 25, disaster struck - the Marta and Mars warehouses fell to the Soviet troops. Initially, there was confusion among the defense leadership about the warehouses; for example, the chief of artillery at Reiman’s headquarters had not even heard of them. Reiman's main mistake was that instead of many small warehouses in the city itself, they organized three large warehouses in the outer sectors, where they quickly fell to the enemy. Perhaps Reiman was afraid that his superiors would take away the ammunition from him in favor of other troops and therefore did not advertise this issue even at his headquarters, preferring to stock up outside the city, away from the eyes of his superiors. Reiman had something to fear - he was already deprived of troops and robbed like a stick. Later, the warehouses would probably go to the 56th Tank Corps when it retreated to the city. On April 22, 1945, Hitler removed Reimann from his post as commander of the Berlin Defense Region, which added to the general confusion. As a result, the entire defense of Berlin took place in conditions of a severe shortage of ammunition among its defenders.

The defenders also couldn’t boast of food. In the Berlin area there were civilian food warehouses and Wehrmacht warehouses. However, the command was unable to establish the correct distribution of supplies under the current conditions. This once again confirms the very low level of organization and planning for the defense of Berlin. For example, on the southern bank of the Teltow Canal there was a large food warehouse near Klein-Machnow, behind the outer defensive perimeter. When the first Soviet tank broke into the warehouse area and stopped literally a few hundred meters away, Volksturmists from the opposite northern shore immediately visited the guards. Even under the enemy’s nose, the warehouse guards vigilantly and fearlessly drove away the ever-hungry Volkssturmists, because they did not have the appropriate invoice. However, the enemy did not get even a crumb - at the last moment the warehouse was set on fire.

A sufficient supply of food was accumulated in civilian warehouses so that the population could feed itself autonomously for several months. However, the supply of the population was quickly disrupted, since most of the food warehouses were located outside the city and quickly fell into the hands of Soviet troops. However, the distribution of the meager food remaining within the city continued even during urban battles. It got to the point that in the last days of the defense of Berlin, the defenders were starving.

On April 2, 1945, OKH head Jodl ordered General Max Pemsel to urgently fly to Berlin. However, due to bad weather, he arrived only on April 12 and learned that it was the day before that they wanted to appoint him commander of the defense of Berlin, but he was late. And Pemzel was happy. In Normandy, he headed the headquarters of the 7th Army and was well versed in fortification. Leaving the capital, the general assessed the Berlin fortifications simply: “extremely useless and ridiculous!” The same is said in the report of General Serov dated April 23, 1945, prepared for Stalin. Soviet experts stated that within a radius of 10-15 km from Berlin there are no serious fortifications, and in general, they are incomparably weaker than those that the Red Army had to overcome when storming other cities. It was under these conditions that the German garrison needed to repel an attack from two Soviet fronts...

However, what was the Berlin garrison that stood guard over the capital of the Reich and Adolf Hitler personally? But he didn’t represent anything. Before the withdrawal of 56 TK to Berlin from the Seelow Heights, there was practically no organized defense of the city. The commander of the 56th TC, Lieutenant General Helmut Weidling, saw the following: “Already on April 24, I was convinced that defending Berlin was impossible and from a military point of view was pointless, since the German command did not have sufficient forces for this, moreover, by April 24, the German command did not have a single regular formation at its disposal in Berlin, for with the exception of the Gross Deutschland security regiment and the SS brigade guarding the Imperial Chancellery.

All defense was entrusted to units of the Volkssturm, police, fire department personnel, personnel of various rear units and service levels."

Moreover, defense was impossible not only numerically, but also organizationally: “It was clear to me that the current organization, i.e., division into 9 sections, was unsuitable for a long period of time, since all nine commanders of sections (sectors) did not even have staffed and cobbled together headquarters.”(Weidling).

The Berlin Volksstrum learns how to use Faustpatrons. Not every Volkssturmist has undergone such training, and most saw how this weapon fires only in battle with Soviet tanks.

In fact, the entire defense structure of more than two million Berlin was based on the pitiful remnants of the 56th Panzer Corps. On April 16, 1945, on the eve of the Berlin operation, the entire corps numbered up to 50,000 people, including the rear. As a result of bloody battles on the out-of-town defensive lines, the corps suffered huge losses and retreated to the capital greatly weakened.

By the beginning of the fighting in the city itself, the 56th TK had:

18.Panzergrenadier-Division - 4000 people

"Muncheberg" Panzer Division - up to 200 people, artillery and 4 tanks

9. Fallschimjager Division - 4000 people (on entering Berlin, the division consisted of about 500 people, and was replenished to 4000)

20. Panzergrenadier Division - 800-1200 Human

11. SS "Nordland" Panzergrenadier Division - 3500-4000 people

Total: 13,000 - 15,000 people.

Armored personnel carrier SdKfz 250/1 of the company commander of the Swedish volunteers of the SS Nordland division, Hauptsturmfuhrer Hans-Gosta Pehrsson. The car was hit on the night of May 1-2, 1945, when it participated in an attempt to escape from Berlin across the Weidendamer Bridge and further along Friedrichstrasse, where it was captured. To the right of the car lies the dead driver - Unterscharführer Ragnar Johansson. Hauptsturmführer Pehrsson himself was wounded, but managed to escape and hide in a residential building, where he spent two days in a closet. Then he went outside and met a woman who promised to help him with civilian clothes. However, instead of help, she brought with her conscientious soldiers and Pehrsson was captured. Fortunately for him, he had already changed his SS jacket for a Wehrmacht jacket. Soon Pehrson escaped from Soviet captivity, took refuge in a residential building and got hold of civilian clothes. After some time, he met his Unterscharfuhrer Erik Wallin (SS-Unterscharfuhrer Erik Wallin) and together with him made his way into the British occupation zone, from where they made their way home to Sweden. Hauptsturmführer Pehrsson returned to his homeland with the Iron Cross 1st and 2nd class and 5 wounds.

SS-Unterscharführer Ragnar Johansson

Thus, at first glance, the capital was defended by 13,000-15,000 regular army troops. However, this is on paper, but in reality the picture was depressing. For example, 20 Panzergrenadier Divizion already on April 24, 1945 consisted of 80% Volkssturmists and only 20% military. Can 800-1200 people be called a division? And if 80% of them are old people and children, then what kind of regular army formation is this? But in Berlin, such metamorphoses happened at every step: formally a division was fighting, but in reality it was a small group of military personnel or a bunch of untrained children and old people. 20 Panzergrenadier Divizion, due to its weakness, was sent to the 5th sector to positions along the Teltow Canal to meet Wenck's 12 A.

In the 9. Fallschirmjager Division the situation was no better. All over the world, airborne troops have always been considered the elite. And according to documents, a division of elite airborne troops fought in Berlin. A terrifying picture. But in reality, 500 battle-worn paratroopers were urgently relieved by whom, it’s not hard to guess. This is the elite and this is the division...

The 11th Volunteer Division "Nordland" remained the most combat-ready formation. Paradoxically, it was foreigners who played a significant role in the defense of Berlin.

As part of the 56th TC, the remnants of the 408th Volks-Artillerie-Korps (408th People's Artillery Corps) also departed to Berlin; the numerical strength that reached the capital is not exactly known, but it is so small that Weidling did not even mention it among his troops . 60% of the guns that ended up in Berlin had almost no ammunition. Initially 408. Volks-Artillerie-Korps consisted of 4 light artillery battalions, two heavy artillery battalions with captured 152mm guns and one howitzer battalion with four howitzers.

In the foreground is a deceased SS Hauptsturmführer, next to him is an FG-42 Model II airborne rifle and an airborne helmet. The photo was taken at the intersection of Chaussestrasse (ahead) and Oranienburgerstrasse (right), near the Oranienburger Tor metro station.

It is more difficult to determine the remaining forces in the garrison. During interrogation, Weidling testified that when his corps entered the city: “All defense was entrusted to units of the Volkssturm, police, fire department personnel, personnel of various rear units and service levels.”. Weidling did not have an accurate idea of ​​these forces, which were unsuitable for combat: “I think that Volkssturm units, police units, fire departments, anti-aircraft units numbered up to 90,000 people, in addition to the rear units serving them.

In addition, there were Volkssturm units of the second category, i.e. those who joined the ranks of the defenders already during the battles and as certain enterprises were closed".

90,000 children-elderly-firefighting-rear troops, not counting their rear, look simply grotesque and do not fit in with other sources. And this is against the backdrop of a meager number of troops of the 56th Tank Corps. Such a suspicious discrepancy with other assessments raises serious doubts about the reliability of Weidling’s words, or rather those who compiled the interrogation report. And the interrogation was conducted by Comrade Trusov, head of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the 1st Belorussian Front. The same front that could not take Berlin in the promised 6 days; systematically missed the deadlines for the offensive; failed not only the capture, but even the exit to the outskirts of Berlin for Lenin’s birthday, and yet on April 22, a red flag should have been flying over Berlin for a day already; failed to crush the remnants of the garrison by the May 1st holiday. With all this, the average daily losses of the Red Army in the Berlin operation were the highest in the entire war, although Comrade Trusov stated that the front command had a complete understanding of the enemy and his forces in advance. On May 2, Soviet troops finally captured Berlin, but three times later than promised. How can you justify yourself to Stalin? This is probably why the idea of ​​overestimating the enemy’s strength was born. However, at the expense of whom? Regular formations are easy to account for and verify, but the Volkssturm leaves an unlimited field for maneuver - here you can attribute as much as you like and say that civilians simply fled, not wanting to experience the hospitality of Soviet captivity. It is worth especially noting that by that time the Red Army had developed the practice of colossally overestimating German losses, which sometimes became the reason for the corresponding proceedings. In the end, Weidling did not sign the interrogation report with a lawyer, if he signed it at all. But Weidling did not emerge from Soviet captivity alive... Helmut Weidling died in the second building of the Vladimir prison.

defenders of Berlin...

Let's look at the Volkssturm in more detail. Before Weidling, the defense of Berlin was commanded by Lieutenant General Helmut Reimann (not counting two precocious generals) and under him the recruitment of the militia took place. Reimann quite reasonably believed that he would need 200,000 trained military personnel to defend the capital, but only 60,000 Volkstrumists were available, of which 92 battalions were formed. The Germans joked that those who were taken to the Volkssturm already those who can walk more can walk. There is only a grain of joke in this joke (*Hitler's decree about VS). The combat value of this “army” was below any criticism. As the commander of the Bergewald infantry division, Lieutenant General V. Reitel, noted: “The Volkssturm is great in concept, but its military significance is very insignificant. The age of the people, their poor military training and the almost complete lack of weapons play a role here.”

Propaganda. In short pants against Soviet tanks, and grandpa will cover you if he doesn’t lose his glasses.

Formally, General Reiman had at his disposal 42,095 rifles, 773 submachine guns, 1,953 light machine guns, 263 heavy machine guns, and a small number of field guns and mortars. However, the use of this motley arsenal could be very limited. Reiman stated the armament of his militia as follows: “Their weapons were produced in all the countries that Germany fought with or against: Italy, Russia, France, Czechoslovakia, Belgium, Holland, Norway and England. Finding ammunition for no less than fifteen different types of rifles and ten types of machine guns was practically impossible. a lost cause." Those who had Italian rifles turned out to be the luckiest, because they received up to 20 rounds of ammunition per person. The shortage of ammunition reached the point that it was necessary to adjust Greek cartridges for Italian rifles. And going into battle with non-standard, customized cartridges against the regular Soviet army is not the best prospect for untrained old people and children. On the first day of the Soviet offensive, each Volkssturmist with a rifle carried an average of five rounds of ammunition. There were enough Faust cartridges, but they could not compensate for the lack of other weapons and the lack of military training. The combat value of the Volkssturm was so low that regular units, severely exhausted by battles, often simply disdained to be replenished at the expense of the militia: “When the question arose about replenishing my division at the expense of the Volkssturm, I refused it. The Volkssturmists would have reduced the combat effectiveness of my division and would have introduced even more unpleasant diversity into its already rather motley composition.”(Lieutenant General Reitel). But that's not all. Weidling testified during interrogation that the Volkssturm had to be replenished with people as various enterprises were closed. With the signal "Clausewitz Muster" another 52,841 militia could be called up within 6 hours. But what should we arm them with and where can we get cartridges for our rich collection of foreign weapons? As a result, the Volkssturm was divided into two categories: those who had at least some weapons - Volkssturm I and those who did not have them at all - Volkssturm II. Of the 60,000 child-elderly militias, only one third were considered armed - about 20.000 . The remaining 40,000 unarmed militia could not fight and seriously replenish losses. If the Soviet army had good reserves, and, in extreme cases, could throw transporters into battle, then the militia could not afford this. They already went into battle with only five rounds of ammunition, having in their mighty reserve 40,000 unarmed old men and children. Having honestly shot his meager “ammunition”, the Volkssturmist could not borrow cartridges from his fellow soldier - their rifles were different.

Militia battalions were formed not according to the military scheme, but according to party districts, so the quantitative composition of the motley battalions could differ greatly. Battalions could be divided into companies. The commanders were untrained party members or reservists. Not a single battalion had its own headquarters. It is noteworthy that the Volkssturm did not even receive allowances, did not have field kitchens, and had to find its own food. Even during the battles, the Volkssturmists ate what the locals served them. When the battles took place away from the place of residence of the Volksturmists, they had to eat whatever God provided, that is, from hand to mouth. They also did not have their own transport or means of communication. The situation was further aggravated by the fact that formally the entire leadership of the Volkssturm was in the hands of the party and only after the code signal “Clausewitz”, which meant the beginning of the assault on the city, the militias were to come under the direct subordination of General Reimann.

A dead German soldier on the steps of the Reich Chancellery. Please note that he is not wearing shoes, and his feet are tied with a rope and a stick. Boxes with German awards are scattered on the steps. There are several different Soviet propaganda photographs of this site known. It is possible that the deceased was placed there for the sake of a “successful” shot. There were practically no battles for the Reich Chancellery itself. In its basements there was a hospital with approximately 500 seriously wounded SS soldiers, as well as a bomb shelter with many civilian women and children, who were then subjected to abuse by the Red Army. The Soviet military occupation power soon demolished the Reich Chancellery building and used the stone blocks of decorative cladding to build a monument to itself in Berlin.

All military training of the Volkssturmists consisted of classes on weekends from approximately 17.00 to 19.00. During the classes, Volksturm became familiar with the design of small arms and Panzerfausts, but practice firing happened extremely rarely and not for everyone. Sometimes three-day courses were practiced in SA camps. In general, the preparation of the militia left much to be desired.

Initially, it was intended to use the Volkssturm in the rear against small enemy breakthroughs or a small enemy that had infiltrated through the defenses, to localize paratroopers, to guard rear positions and protect fortified buildings. There was nothing for them to do on the front line. When the battles moved to the territory of the Reich, the Volkssturm were forced to begin to be deployed on the front line, first as auxiliary units, and then in the clearly uncharacteristic role of front line defense. In Berlin, the unarmed Volkssturm II had to remain behind the front line occupied by the poorly armed Volkssturm I and wait until someone was killed before taking its weapon. A grim prospect for children and the elderly. However, this was the case in some sectors.

If the average militiaman shoots once per minute, the battle will not last long. It is not difficult to imagine with what accuracy untrained children and old people shot their cartridges. When given the opportunity, these “5-minute soldiers” simply deserted or surrendered without a fight.

On April 25, 1945, providing Stalin with Serov’s report dated April 23, 1945, Beria made an annex that demonstrated the combat effectiveness of the Volkssturm. Thus, the German defensive line 8 km from Berlin was held by the Volkssturm, recruited in February 1945 from men 45 years of age and older. For 2-3 people without military training there was one rifle and 75 rounds of ammunition. The Germans had the dubious pleasure of watching for an hour and a half as units of the 2nd Guards. The TA were preparing to attack, but the militia did not fire a single artillery or mortar shot. All that the Volkssturm opposed to the Soviet tank army were a few single rifle shots and short bursts from a machine gun.

After the battles, the Soviet 5th Shock Army assessed their opponents as follows: “In Berlin, the enemy did not have field troops, much less full-fledged personnel divisions. The bulk of his troops were special battalions, schools, police detachments and Volkssturm battalions. This affected the tactics of his actions and significantly weakened the defense of Berlin.”.

The commander of the Vistula Army Group, Generaloberst Heinrici, and the Minister of Armaments, Speer, perfectly understood the drama and hopelessness of the situation. From a military point of view, defending in a large city with many canals and strong buildings would be much easier than on the outskirts of the countryside. However, this tactic would lead to enormous senseless suffering for the residents of the capital of more than two million. Based on this, Heinrici decided to withdraw as many troops as possible from Berlin to practically unprepared positions, even before the start of fighting in the city. This meant that troops would have to be sacrificed, but with the same outcome of the battle, the suffering of millions of citizens could be avoided and destruction could be minimized. The leadership of Army Group Vistula believed that with such a giveaway game, the first Soviet tanks would reach the Reich Chancellery by April 22. Heinrici even tried to prevent the withdrawal of the forces of Theodor Busse's 9th Army to the capital, and supposedly in order to save the LVI Panzer Corps proposed to send it to the south. On April 22, 1945, the 56th Tank Corps received an order from the 9th Army to join it south of the capital. German generals were clearly withdrawing their troops from Berlin. Hitler ordered Weidling to lead the corps to Berlin, however, Weidling wanted to go south. Only after the Fuhrer's order was duplicated on April 23 did the 56th TC begin to retreat to the capital. Soon, Field Marshal Keitel demoted Hanritsi for sabotage and invited him, as an honest general, to shoot himself, but the traitor Heinrici met old age safely, and Keitel was hanged by the victors.

Frey radar in Tiergarten. In the background is the Victory Column in honor of the victory in the Franco-Prussian War of 1871. Between this column and the Brandenburg Gate on the East-West highway there was an improvised runway, the construction of which was prevented by Speer.

On the afternoon of April 18, General Reimann was shocked by an order from the Reich Chancellery to transfer all available troops to Busse's 9th Army to strengthen the second line of defense of Berlin. The order was duplicated by a telephone call from Goebbels. As a result, 30 militia battalions and an air defense unit left the city. Later, these formations practically never retreated to Berlin. This was such a serious blow to the Volkssturm, which could at least somehow defend the capital, that Lieutenant General Reiman said: “Tell Goebbels that all possibilities for defending the capital of the Reich have been exhausted. The Berliners are defenseless.”. On April 19, 24,000 Volkssturm remained in Berlin with a huge shortage of weapons. Although the Volkssturm could be replenished numerically by the beginning of urban battles, the number of armed soldiers remained unchanged.

Given the acute shortage of weapons and ammunition in the capital, Minister of Arms and Ammunition Speer tried to make his contribution to the defense of “Fortress Berlin.” When Reimann tried to equip an airstrip in the city center, between the Brandenburg Gate and the Victory Column, Speer began to oppose him in every possible way. It is noteworthy that the Ministry of Arms and Ammunition, as well as Speer's Berlin apartment, were located on Pariserplatz just outside the Brandenburg Gate. The Minister of Armaments summoned General Reiman and scolded him under the ridiculous pretext that during the construction of the runway, bronze street pillars were being demolished and trees were being cut down at a distance of 30 meters on each side of the roadway. The discouraged general tried to explain that this was necessary for landing transport planes. However, Speer said that Reiman has no right to touch the pillars. The showdown reached Hitler. The Fuhrer allowed the pillars to be demolished, but forbade the cutting of trees so that the appearance of the center of the capital would not be damaged. But Speer did not let up and through his efforts the pillars remained unshakably in place. With the start of urban fighting, the Minister of Armaments was no longer in the capital (as were most of the militias) and the pillars were finally removed. It was on this strip that, already in the midst of street fighting, on the evening of April 27, Hana Reich's Fi-156 plane landed, delivering General Ritter von Greim. The Führer summoned von Greim to appoint him as commander of the Luftwaffe in place of Goering. At the same time, Grime was wounded in the leg, and the plane was severely damaged. Soon, on a specially arrived Arado-96 training aircraft, Reitsch and von Greim flew out of Berlin right in front of the Red Army soldiers. The same airstrip brought meager air supplies to besieged Berlin. In addition to the epic with the runway, the architect Speer also prevented the bridges from being blown up. Of the 248 bridges in Berlin, only 120 were blown up and 9 were damaged.

One of the last photographs of Hitler. To the left of the Fuhrer is the head of the Hitler Youth, Reichsjugendfuhrer Arthur Axmann, who issued the order to use children in the battles for Berlin.

After the Volkssturm, the second largest category were firefighters, transport workers and all kinds of official authorities and institutions. They account for about 18,000 people. On April 19, this category consisted of 1,713 police officers, 1,215 members of the Hitler Youth and RAD and Todt workers, about 15,000 military logistics personnel. At the same time, the Hitler Youth was a different story. On April 22, 1945, Goebbels stated in his last printed address to the people: “A fourteen-year-old boy crawling with his grenade launcher behind a destroyed wall on a scorched street means more to the nation than ten intellectuals trying to prove that our chances are zero.” This phrase did not go unnoticed by the leader of the Hitler Youth, Arthur Axmann. Under his strict leadership, this National Socialist teenage organization was also preparing to go through the crucible of battles. When Axmann told Weidling that he had given the order to use children in battles, instead of gratitude he was met with obscene expressions containing the semantic message to let the children go home. The ashamed Axmann promised to withdraw the order, but not all the children who had already left for position received it. Near the bridge in Pichelsdorf, the Hitler Youth experienced the full might of the Soviet army.

One of these Volkssturmist children in Berlin was 15-year-old Adolf Martin Bormann, the son of Martin Bormann, Hitler’s deputy in the party and personal secretary. The boy received his first name in honor of his godfather, Adolf Hitler. It is noteworthy that Martin-Adolf celebrated his fifteenth birthday just two days before the start of the Battle of Berlin. When the battle for the city was coming to a tragic end, Borman Sr. ordered the adjutant to kill his son so that he would not be captured and become an object of insults and bullying. The adjutant disobeyed his superior and after the war, Martin Adolf became a Catholic priest and then a teacher of theology.

The Berlin garrison also included the SS security regiment "Gross Deutschland" (9 companies). However, after the fighting near Bloomberg, in the highway area northeast of the capital, only 40 survivors of the entire regiment, that is, out of about 1,000 people, returned to the city.

Brigadeführer Wilhelm Mohnke, commandant of the Citadel. On April 6, 1941, on the first day of the Yugoslav campaign, he was wounded during an air raid and lost a foot, but remained in service. To escape severe pain in his leg, he became addicted to morphine. Frequent pain and morphinism affected his character. After one heated conversation with the head of the officer department of the SS personnel service, he lost his position and was sent to the psychiatric ward of a military hospital in Würzburg. Soon Mohnke returned to service and made a career, receiving 6 very honorable awards and becoming a Brigadefuhrer on January 30, 1945. He spent 10 years in Soviet captivity and was in solitary confinement until 1949. Released on October 10, 1955. Died at the age of 90 on August 6, 2001 in the town of Damp, near Eckenförde, Schleswig-Holstein.

And finally, the central 9th ​​sector "Citadel", was defended by SS Kampfgruppe Mohnke numbering about 2000 people. The defense of the Citadel was led by Colonel Seifert, but the government area inside the Citadel was under the responsibility of SS Brigadeführer Wilhelm Mohnke, whom Hitler personally appointed to this position. The government area included the Reich Chancellery, the Fuhrer's bunker, the Reichstag and adjacent buildings. Mohnke reported directly to Hitler and Weidling could not order him. Kampfgruppe Mohnke was urgently created on April 26, 1945 from scattered units and rear SS units:

remnants of the two-battalion security regiment of the Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler division (LSSAH Wach Regiment), commander Sturmbannfuhrer Kaschula

training battalion from the same division (Panzer-Grenadier-Ersatz- & Ausbildungs-Bataillon 1 "LSSAH" from Spreenhagenn 25 km southeast of Berlin), commander Obersturmbannfuhrer Klingemeier. The day before, part of the 12 companies of the training base in Spreenhagen left as part of the "Falke" regiment to the 9th Busse Army. The remainder of the personnel was sent to Berlin and included in the Anhalt regiment.

Hitler Security Company (Fuhrer-Begleit-Kompanie), commander of Hitler's adjutant Sturmbannfuhrer Otto Gunsche

Himmler's Security Battalion (Reichsfuhrer SS Begleit Battalion), commander Sturmbannfuhrer Franz Schadle

Brigadeführer Mohnke brought the scattered and small SS forces into two regiments.

1st Regiment "Anhalt" of Kampfgruppe "Mohnke", named after the commander of Standartenfuhrer Gunther Anhalt (SS-Standartenfuhrer Gunther Anhalt). When Anhalt died, on 04/30/45 the regiment was renamed after the name of the new commander - “Wal” (SS-Sturmbannfuhrer Kurt Wahl). The regiment consisted of two battalions, manned by personnel from the Wachbataillon Reichskanzlei, Ersatz- und Ausbildungsbataillon "LSSAH", Fuhrerbegleit-Kompanie, Begleit-Kompanie "RFSS".

The regiment fought in the following positions:
1st battalion - railway station on Friedrichsstrasse, along the Spree, Reichstag, Siegesallee lines
2nd Battalion - Moltkestrasse, Tiergarten, Potsdamer Pltatz.

2nd Regiment "Falke" of Kampfgruppe "Mohnke". Formed from disparate rear authorities.
Fought in the following positions: Potsdamer Platz, Leipzigstrasse, Ministry of the Air Force, Friedrichstrasse Railway Station.

Sometimes Soviet and Western sources mention the Charlemagne division among the defenders of Berlin. The word "division" sounds proud and implies quite a lot of soldiers. This needs to be dealt with. After bloody battles in Pomerania, out of about 7,500 people of the 33rd Grenadier Division of French volunteers "Charlemagne" (33. Waffen-Grenadier-Division der SS Charlemagne (franzosische Nr. 1), approximately 1,100 survived. They were gathered in Macklenburg for replenishment and reorganization, but After the brutal unsuccessful battles, the will to fight was so low that the volunteers were released from their oath. However, about 700 people decided to fight to the end. After the reorganization, one two-battalion regiment remained - Waffen-Grenadier der SS "Charlemagne". ". 400 people who no longer wanted to fight were taken to Baubataillon (construction battalion) and used for earthworks. On the night of April 23-24, 1945, Hitler received an order from the Reich Chancellery to use all available transport and immediately report to Berlin. Personal order of the Fuhrer addressed to this to a small weakened unit, was in itself an extremely unusual thing. The division commander, SS Brigadeführer Krukenberg, urgently formed a storm battalion (Franzosisches freiwilligen-sturmbataillon der SS "Charlemagne") from the combat-ready units of the 57th Grenadier Battalion and the 6th Company of the 68th Grenadier Battalion. , to these were added units of the division training school (Kampfschule). Henri Fenet became the battalion commander. The assault battalion departed in 9 trucks and two light vehicles. However, two trucks were never able to reach their destination, so only 300-330 people arrived in Berlin. This was the last reinforcement to reach the capital by land before the city was surrounded by Soviet troops. At the Olympic Stadium, the storm battalion was immediately reorganized into 4 rifle companies of 60-70 people each and subordinated to the Panzer-Grenadier Division "Nordland" (11. SS-Frw.Panzer-Gren.Division "Nordland"). Weidling immediately removed the commander of this division, SS Brigadeführer Ziegler, who was in no hurry to arrive at Weidling's disposal and replaced him with the decisive Krukenberg. Highly motivated French volunteers made an invaluable contribution to the defense of the city - they accounted for about 92 destroyed Soviet tanks out of 108 destroyed in the Nordland division's sector. We can say that these soldiers found themselves in right time in the right place, despite the fact that they suffered huge losses in a hopeless battle. On May 2, 1945, near the Potsdam train station, about 30 surviving people from Charlemagne were captured by the Soviets.

After Charlemagne, the last meager reinforcements arrived on the night of April 26th. Naval school cadets from Rostock, in the amount of one battalion of three companies, were transported to Berlin by transport planes. The battalion "Grossadmiral Donitz" of Commander Kuhlmann was placed at the disposal of Brigadeführer Mohnke. The sailors took up defensive positions in the park near the Foreign Ministry building on Wilhelmstrasse.

Formation began on February 22, 1945 Panzer-Kompanie (bodenstandig) "Berlin"(special tank company "Berlin"). The company consisted of damaged tanks whose engines or chassis could not be repaired, but were suitable for use as bunkers. In two days, by February 24, 1945, the company received 10 Pz V and 12 Pz IV. The crew at fixed firing points was reduced by two people, to the commander, gunner and loader. Soon the company was reinforced with several pillboxes with turrets from Panther tanks. It was the so-called Panther Turm, which was already in service and used in the West, in particular on the Gothic Line. The bunker consisted of a Panther tower (sometimes specially made for such a bunker, and a concrete or metal section under the tower, dug into the ground. The bunker was usually installed at major intersections and could be connected by an underground passage to the basement of a neighboring building.

Flakturm. In front of the tower, two torn-up ISs froze in a surprisingly symmetrical manner. Berlin's three anti-aircraft towers were powerful centers of defense.

In Berlin there was the 1st Air Defense Division "Berlin" (1."Berlin" Flak Division), as well as units of the 17th and 23rd Air Defense Divisions. In April 1945, anti-aircraft units consisted of 24 12.8-cm guns, 48 ​​10.5-cm guns, 270 8.8-mm guns, 249 2-cm and 3.7-cm guns. From November 1944, in searchlight units, all enlisted men were replaced by women, and prisoners of war, mostly Soviet, were used in auxiliary roles, as ammunition carriers and loaders. At the beginning of April 1945, almost all anti-aircraft artillery was consolidated into anti-aircraft strike groups and withdrawn from the city to the outer defensive perimeter, where it was used mainly to combat ground targets. There are three anti-aircraft towers left in the city - in the Zoo, Humboldhain, Friedrichshain and two heavy anti-aircraft batteries in Temelhof and on Eberswaldstrasse. By the end of April 25, the Germans had 17 partially combat-ready batteries, including turret batteries. By the end of April 28, 6 anti-aircraft batteries survived, containing 18 guns and 3 more separate guns. By the end of April 30, Berlin had 3 combat-ready heavy batteries (13 guns).

At the same time, anti-aircraft towers served as bomb shelters for thousands of civilians. There were also artistic treasures, in particular Schliemann's gold from Troy and the famous figurine of Nefertiti.

The defenders of Berlin received unexpected help during the assault on the city. April 24-25, 1945 Heeres-Sturmartillerie-Brigade 249 under the command of Hauptmann Herbert Jaschke, received 31 new self-propelled guns from the Berlin Alkett plant in Spandau. That same day, the brigade was ordered to move west to the Krampnitz area to participate in the attack against the Americans on the Elbe. However, a counterattack on the Allies occurred before the arrival of Heeres-Sturmartillerie-Brigade 249, so the brigade remained in Berlin, near the Brandenburg Gate. In the capital, the brigade fought in the area of ​​Frankfurterallee, Landsbergstrasse, Alexanderplatz. On April 29, 1945, the fighting moved to the area of ​​the Higher Technical School, where the brigade command post was located. On April 30, only 9 StuG remained in the brigade, which fought their way back to Berliner Strasse. After the fall of Berlin, 3 surviving self-propelled guns and several trucks managed to escape from the city and reach Spandau, where the last self-propelled guns were knocked out. The remnants of the brigade were divided into two groups. A group led by commander Hauptmann Jaschke came out to the Americans and surrendered, and the second group was destroyed by Soviet troops.

The city's defense was strengthened by 6 anti-tank and 15 artillery divisions.

In the matter of the size of the Berlin garrison, the testimony of the chief of the operational department of the headquarters of the 56th Panzer Corps, Siegfried Knappe, plays a huge role: "The report [...] states that other units in Berlin were equivalent to two to three divisions and that the Waffen SS were equivalent to half a division. All together, according to the report, about four to five divisions consisting of 60,000 men with 50-60 tanks ".

In the early 1950s, the American Command in Europe asked former German military personnel to compile an analysis of the defense of Berlin. This document comes to the same numbers - 60,000 people and 50-60 tanks.

In general, despite all the differences, figures from most independent sources converge on a common indicator. There were definitely not 200,000 defenders in Berlin, much less 300,000.

The commander of the 3rd Guards Tank Army, Marshal of the Armored Forces P. Rybalko, stated directly: “If the Cottbus group [of the enemy] had united with the Berlin one, it would have been a second Budapest. If in Berlin we had 80 thousand people [of the enemy], then this number would then have increased to 200,000 and it would not have taken us 10 days to solve the problem of capturing Berlin.".

For comparison, the Soviet army involved the city itself in the assault 464,000 people and 1,500 tanks and self-propelled guns.

footnotes and comments

1 Cornelius Ryan -- last fight-- M., Tsentrpoligraf, 2003

3 April 22, 1945 Hitler removed Lieutenant General Reimann from the post of commander of the defense of Berlin for defeatist sentiments. It was rumored that Goebbels had a hand in this, who, trying to expand his influence, invited Reiman to move to his command post. Reimann rejected the Reich Minister's proposal under the obviously far-fetched pretext that if two leaders of the capital's defense were at the same command post, then there was a danger that an accidental explosion could decapitate the entire defense. As Reiman later noted, the anti-aircraft tower in the Zoo could in fact withstand a direct hit from almost any bomb. Instead of Reimann, Hitler appointed Colonel Keeter (Ernst Kaeter), whom he immediately promoted to major general. Before this, Keeter was the chief of staff of the army’s political department and thereby earned the confidence of the leader. However, in the evening the Fuhrer took command of the defense of Berlin, in which he was to be assisted by his adjutant Erich Barenfanger, who was urgently promoted to the rank of major general. And finally, on April 23, Hitler entrusted the defense of the capital and practically his life to the commander of the 56th TC, Lieutenant General Helmut Weidling.

4 Fisher D., Read A. -- The Fall of Berlin. London -- Hutchinson, 1992, p. 336

5 http://www.antonybeevor.com/Berlin/berlin-authorcuts.htm (GARF 9401/2/95 pp.304-310)

6 Beevor E. - The Fall of Berlin. 1945

7 Ilya Moshchansky. Tankmaster, No. 5/2000

sources

V. Keitel -- 12 steps to the scaffold... -- "Phoenix", 2000

Antonio J Munoz -- Forgotten Legions: Obscure Combat Formations of the Waffen-SS-- Paladin Press, November 1991

Gottfried Tornau, Franz Kurowski -- Sturmartillerie (Gebundene Ausgabe)-- Maximilian-Verl., 1965

History of the Second World War 1939-1945-- M., Military Publishing House 1975

Antony Beevor's website (http://www.antonybeevor.com/Berlin/berlin-authorcuts.htm)

Dr. S. Hart & Dr. R. Hart -- German Tanks of World War II -- ,1998

Fisher D., Read A. -- The Fall of Berlin. London-- Hutchinson, 1992, p. 336

de La Maziere, Christian -- The Captive Dreamer

Littlejohn, David -- Foreign Legions of the Third Reich

Tony le Tissier -- With Our Backs to Berlin-- Sutton Publishing, May 1, 2001

Robert Michulec -- Armor Bettles on the Eastern Front- Concord, 1999

The German Defense of Berlin--U.S. Army European Command. Historical Division, 1953

Antonio J Munoz -- Forgotten Legions: Obscure Combat Formations of the Waffen-SS; Kurowski, Franz and Tornau, Gottfried -- Sturmartillerie

Peter Antill - Berlin 1945- Osprey, 2005

Helmut Altner -- Berlin Dance of Death-- Casemate, April 1, 2002

Tony Le Tissier -- With Our Backs to Berlin-- Sutton Publishing; New edition, July 16, 2005

Thorolf Hillblad, Erik Wallin -- Twilight of the Gods: A Swedish Waffen-SS Volunteer's Experiences with the 11th SS-Panzergrenadier Division Nordland, Eastern Front 1944-45-- Helion and Company Ltd., May 2004

Wilhelm Willemar, Oberst a.D. -- THE GERMAN DEFENSE OF BERLIN-- Historical Division, HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE, 1953

Reichsgesetztblatt 1944, I / Hans-Adolf Jacobsen. 1939-1945. Der Zweite Weltkrieg in Chronik und Documenten. 3.durchgesehene und erganzte Auflage. Wehr-und-Wissen Verlagsgesselschaft. Darmstadt, 1959 / World War II: Two views. — M.: Mysl, 1995
(http://militera.lib.ru/)

The assault on Berlin was the final part of the offensive operation of 1945, at the end of which the Red Army captured the capital of Germany, Berlin, with the fall of which the Second World War ended. This operation began on April 25 and ended on May 2.

The beginning of the assault on Berlin

At 12 noon in 1945, the Red Army closed its ring around Berlin. It is worth noting that the main striking force in the assault was the 1st Ukrainian Front and the 1st Belorussian Front. The Nazis were firmly entrenched in their capital, with approximately 325 square kilometers. The entire length of the front line was a little more than 100 km.

Organization for the Defense of the German Capital

The total number of allied formations was 200 thousand people, about 3 thousand guns and 300 tanks. The visible advantage of the Allies did not help to instantly take the city, since its defenses were well prepared. It was built on the principle of heavy fire, resistance centers and strongholds. The total number of defense sectors in Berlin was 8 around the circumference and one central, not far from the “Wolf Bed” (where the leader of the Nazis, A. Hitler, was located).

In addition to a well-thought-out defense, additional difficulties during the assault on the capital were created by its stone buildings with thick walls. The buildings were not destroyed by small-caliber guns. Therefore, snipers and infantry put up fierce resistance. Residential buildings turned into huge multi-story pillboxes with machine guns, and there were a large number of barricades and anti-tank hedgehogs on the streets.

The metro played a special role in the defense of the city. The Germans knew well and took advantage of underground passages to move troops unnoticed. Therefore, it often happened that the attackers were attacked from behind, as a result of which many allies died.

Berlin was also well protected from air attacks. Almost every bombing raid by Soviet pilots was not without casualties. Anti-aircraft guns The Germans were located in the very center of the city, which made it possible to protect any extreme point of the capital.

The wide streets of the city turned into narrow ones to prevent the enemy from taking advantage of their numerical advantage. The Nazis especially tried to defend the Spree River, which actually became one fortress. Soviet troops broke through this section with difficulty, but could not advance further, because the main strike and assault force - tanks - were helpless in the narrow streets of Berlin. They became easy prey for the Nazis. Soviet troops suffered significant losses of equipment after the breakthrough of the Spree River - about 60 tanks were disabled.

On April 27, Soviet troops managed to break through the first line of defense of the city, and they came close to the center of the capital. Under Nazi control there was a small zone 2-3 kilometers wide and 16 kilometers long. Allied troops actively bombed this area, but the Germans continued to fiercely resist: they made fruitless forays (obviously out of helplessness in understanding their fate). Adolf Hitler ordered that even boys be armed (“Hitler Jugents”). The children fought bravely, but due to inexperience and artillery fire, many of them died.

The shooting went on day and night. Soviet troops destroyed everything in their path: the buildings in which German units and equipment were located were not taken prisoner.

By the evening of April 28, the Allied troops were in the Reichstag area. The Nazis stubbornly did not want to give up the administrative building and at night they dropped a landing party of naval school cadets. In the history books, this operation, if you can call it that, was the last operation of the Luftwaffe.

From April 29 to 30, thanks to the desperate actions of Captain Neustroev and Lieutenant Samonov, Soviet troops under their command captured the Moltke Bridge, and at dawn, with a desperate assault, they managed to take possession of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. After capturing these key positions, the path to the Reichstag opened.

The first assault by the Red Army was unsuccessful (the landing played a role, thanks to which the number of defenders increased to 5 thousand people) and the allies suffered heavy losses. It was not possible to break through the defense with tanks, because at the entrance the Nazis dug a ditch filled with water, and at that time there was no large-caliber artillery near the Reichstag that could make a hole in the wall.

Soviet commanders decided to gather everyone into one garrison and attack frontally. On the evening of April 30, sappers managed to make a hole in the wall, and a group of Soviet soldiers broke into the building. The assault on the Reichstag took place simultaneously in two directions: they stormed the main entrance and the gap in the wall. Late in the evening at 22:00, Soviet soldiers under the command of Major General V. Shatilov managed to completely take possession of the first floor of the building. Now all the Nazis were doomed, because there was no longer any way to retreat. All the defenders of the Reichstag were divided into two groups - some settled in the basement, while others occupied the upper floors. The operation to destroy the remaining Nazis ended on the morning of May 1, when Soviet troops raised a red flag over the Reichstag.

Negotiation

The initiator of the negotiations was German side, they asked for a ceasefire late in the evening of April 30. The representative from the Soviet soldiers was General Chuikov; General Krebs arrived from the Nazi side, who spoke about the details of Hitler’s death. Adolf Hitler committed suicide with a pistol shot in the mouth, and Eva Braun followed his example. J. Goebbels, faithful until the end of his life, also shot himself. During the negotiations, Krebs read out the will of the Nazi leader, which told about the life of the Aryan leader and the reasons for the start of the war.

The request for peace was immediately delivered to Zhukov, and from him it went to Stalin, who demanded only unconditional surrender. Such demands did not satisfy the Nazis, and at 18:00 on May 1, Soviet troops resumed the assault with redoubled force. In addition to the cleansing by the infantry, constant artillery fire was carried out on the city blocks.

Surrender of Nazi Germany

Active military operations on the part of the Soviet troops led to the fact that only Tiergarten and some part of the government quarter remained under German control. In this place there was a bunker in which A. Hitler and his immediate circle took refuge.

The Soviet troops attacked in two directions - from the north and south. On the first of May, an important event occurred at the other end of the city - two key defense centers of the capital surrendered: the Spandau citadel and the Zoo tower, where all the German air defense was located.

On May 2, Soviet troops managed to flood the Berlin metro, thus cutting off the possibility of secretly transporting troops anywhere in the city. True, there were also casualties on the part of the civilian population who were in the metro at the time it was flooded with water. Modern scientists have not yet calculated the number of victims of this disaster.

Some say that between 50 and 15 thousand civilians and wounded were killed. The most objective figure can be considered approximately 100 people, because there were mainly military personnel in the tunnels, and the water did not spread through the metro very quickly, so many had a chance to escape. Later, documents stated that the water level did not exceed half a meter. Therefore, the debate about the atrocities of Soviet soldiers eventually ceased.

On the night of May 1st to 2nd, the radio station of the 1st Belorussian Front received a message in Russian, where the Germans persistently asked for a ceasefire and reported that they had sent a group of envoys to the Potsdam Bridge. A German officer came to the appointed place and reported on behalf of General Weidling that the German side was ready to stop resistance. As proof of his intentions to end the war, General Weidling surrendered early in the morning of May 2nd. Already at 7 am he agreed to sign a document of complete surrender. With the help of loudspeaker installations, they began to spread it throughout the city. As soon as the news of surrender reached the German soldiers, they immediately stopped resistance and surrendered.

Curiously, some units continued to resist and did not want to surrender. They decided to break through to the western part of Berlin, but were almost completely destroyed by superior forces of Soviet soldiers. The Germans chose the path to the breakthrough in the suburb of Pandau, where two bridges across the Havel River remained intact. At that time, the bridges were under the control of the Hitler Youth, who, despite the capitulation, continued to hold their positions. It is worth noting that not only soldiers took part in the breakthrough; among them there were also civilians who were afraid of Goebbels’ propaganda about the alleged atrocities of Soviet soldiers. The refugees managed to break through to the Havel Bridge, but Soviet soldiers were waiting for them there, who began the full-scale destruction of German units.

Completion of the assault on Berlin

“At one point the shooting stopped, we didn’t understand what was happening or what was going on. On May 2 at 10 o'clock we saw white sheets everywhere hanging from the windows of the Reichstag, from the Chancellery building. As if on cue, the Germans came out to surrender. With the pedantry characteristic of the Germans, the columns were divided into generals, officers and ordinary soldiers. Finally, it’s all over,” - memories of A. Bessarab, one of the participants in the storming of the Reichstag.

The last pockets of resistance were suppressed until May 7. Some Germans still managed to break through and cross the Elbe, but these were only a few. The Germans, fleeing the “atrocities of Soviet soldiers,” tried with all their might to get into the area of ​​occupation of American units. They believed that they would surrender to people who would adhere to the laws of military morality.

Results of the capture of Berlin

The result of the capture of Berlin was the further advance of Soviet troops towards the Elbe, where they managed to connect with their allies - the Americans and the British. After the fall of the capital, Germany lost a vital center of resistance, and there was only one thing left for it - complete surrender. After the successful completion of the operation to capture Berlin, Soviet troops easily defeated the last enemy groups in Czechoslovakia and Austria.

Number of victims

It is difficult to give an exact figure, since a large number of German and Soviet soldiers died under the ruins of the city, in the metro and simply went missing. Some scientists put the number at 125 thousand out of 2 million Berliners. It is known that a significantly smaller number of civilians and soldiers died from the weapons of Soviet soldiers. Even before the arrival of the Red Army, famine began in Berlin, caused by severe devastation from the bombing carried out by the Americans. They continued the bombing until April 20.

A. Orlov, Doctor of Historical Sciences noted: “history knows no examples of such a short time Such an excellently fortified city was taken. Berlin was taken in 5 days! Can you imagine it? It took Soviet troops exactly 5 days to break the last center of German resistance.”

As for losses among Soviet equipment, it lost 46 combat vehicles. This is approximately 23% of the equipment available at that time. Among the tank losses, the losses here were insignificant, just some tanks got stuck in anti-tank hedgehogs or ditches, but over time they were returned to service.

The local population suffered no less than the city: they were forced by their own Germans to dig ditches, old people and teenagers were enrolled in resistance units. Accurate data on civilian casualties has not been preserved. The only thing that is known is that at the time the assault operation began, there were approximately 3 million civilians in the capital (including 500 thousand “Ostarbeiters”).

Thus, the operation to capture Berlin has no analogues in world history. After all, the capital of Germany was taken between April 23 and May 2.

Capture of Berlin, 1945

The assault on Berlin is the final part of the Berlin offensive operation of 1945, during which the Red Army captured the capital of Nazi Germany. The operation lasted from April 25 to May 2.

Storm of Berlin

At 12 o'clock in the morning on April 25, the 6th Guards Mechanized Corps of the 4th Guards Tank Army of the 1st Ukrainian Front crossed the Havel River and connected with units of the 328th Division of the 47th Army of the 1st Belorussian Front, thereby closing the encirclement ring around Berlin .

By the end of April 25, the Berlin garrison defended an area of ​​about 327 km². The total length of the front of Soviet troops in Berlin was about 100 km.

The Berlin group, according to the Soviet command, numbered about 200 thousand soldiers and officers, 3 thousand guns and 250 tanks, including the Volkssturm - the people's militia. The city's defense was carefully thought out and well prepared. It was based on a system of strong fire, strong points and resistance centers. Nine defense sectors were created in Berlin - eight around the circumference and one in the center. The closer to the city center, the denser the defense became. Massive stone buildings with thick walls gave it particular strength. The windows and doors of many buildings were sealed and turned into embrasures for firing. In total, the city had up to 400 reinforced concrete long-term structures - multi-story bunkers (up to 6 floors) and pillboxes equipped with guns (including anti-aircraft) and machine guns. The streets were blocked by powerful barricades up to four meters thick. The defenders had a large number of faustpatrons, which in the context of street battles turned out to be a formidable anti-tank weapon. Of no small importance in the German defense system were underground structures, including the metro, which were widely used by the enemy for covert maneuver of troops, as well as for sheltering them from artillery and bomb attacks.

A network of radar observation posts was deployed around the city. Berlin had strong air defense, which was provided by the 1st Anti-Aircraft Division. Its main forces were located on three huge concrete structures - the Zoobunker in Tiergarten, Humboldthain and Friedrichshain. The division was armed with 128-, 88- and 20-mm anti-aircraft guns.

The center of Berlin, cut by canals and the Spree River, was especially strongly fortified, effectively becoming one huge fortress. Having superiority in men and equipment, the Red Army could not fully exploit its advantages in urban areas. First of all, this concerned aviation. The ramming force of any offensive - tanks, once on narrow city streets, became an excellent target. Therefore, in street battles, the 8th Guards Army of General V.I. Chuikov used the experience of assault groups proven in the Battle of Stalingrad: a rifle platoon or company was assigned 2-3 tanks, a self-propelled gun, a sapper unit, signalmen and artillery. The actions of assault troops, as a rule, were preceded by a short but powerful artillery preparation.

By April 26, six armies of the 1st Belorussian Front (47 A; 3, 5 Ud. A; 8 Guards A; 1, 2 Guards TA) and three armies of the 1st Ukrainian Front (28, 3 , 4th Guards TA).

By April 27, as a result of the actions of the armies of two fronts that had deeply advanced to the center of Berlin, the enemy group stretched out in a narrow strip from east to west - sixteen kilometers long and two or three, in some places five kilometers wide.

The fighting took place both morning and night. Breaking through to the center of Berlin, Soviet soldiers crashed through houses in tanks, knocking the Nazis out of the ruins. By April 28, only the central part remained in the hands of the city’s defenders, which was under fire from all sides by Soviet artillery.

Allied refusal to storm Berlin

Roosevelt and Churchill, Eisenhower and Montgomery believed that they, as the Western allies of the USSR, had the opportunity to take Berlin.

At the end of 1943, US President Franklin Roosevelt, on board the battleship Iowa, set the military task:

We must get to Berlin. The US must get Berlin. The Soviets could take territory to the east.

Winston Churchill also considered Berlin a prime target:

Soviet Russia became a mortal threat to the free world. We must immediately create a united front against its rapid advance. This front in Europe should go as far to the East as possible. The main and true goal of the Anglo-American armies is Berlin.

Churchill, from post-war memoirs.

And at the end of March - beginning of April 1945 he insisted:

I... attach even greater importance to the entry into Berlin... I consider it extremely important that we meet the Russians as far as possible in the East.

Churchill, from correspondence with the British and American command.

According to Field Marshal Montgomery, Berlin could have been captured in the early autumn of 1944. Trying to convince the commander-in-chief of the need to storm Berlin, Montgomery wrote to him on September 18, 1944:

I think that the best object of attack is the Ruhr, and then to Berlin by the northern route... since time is of the utmost importance, we must decide that it is necessary to go to Berlin and end the war;

everything else should play a secondary role.

However, after the unsuccessful landing operation of September 1944, called “Market Garden”, in which, in addition to the British, American and Polish parachute formations and units also participated, Montgomery admitted:

Berlin was lost to us when we failed to develop a good operational plan in August 1944, after victory in Normandy.

Subsequently, the allies of the USSR abandoned plans to storm and capture Berlin. Historian John Fuller calls Eisenhower's decision to abandon the capture of Berlin one of the strangest in military history.

Despite a large number of guesses, the exact reasons for the abandonment of the assault have not yet been clarified.

Capture of the Reichstag

By the evening of April 28, units of the 3rd Shock Army of the 1st Belorussian Front reached the Reichstag area. That same night, a landing force consisting of cadets from the Rostock Naval School was dropped by parachute to support the Reichstag garrison. This was the last significant Luftwaffe operation in the skies over Berlin.

Basically, the Reichstag and the Reich Chancellery were defended by SS troops: units of the SS Nordland division, the French Fene battalion from the Charlemagne SS division, the Latvian battalion of the 15th SS Grenadier Division (Latvian No. 1), as well as Adolf Hitler’s SS personal guard units (their there were, according to some sources, about 600-900 people).

According to the combat log of the 150th Infantry Division, at 14:25 on April 30, 1945, Lieutenant Rakhimzhan Koshkarbaev and Private Grigory Bulatov were the first to hoist the flag on the stairs of the main entrance of the Reichstag.

On the evening of April 30, through a hole in the northwestern wall of the Reichstag made by sappers of the 171st division, a group of Soviet soldiers broke into the building. Almost simultaneously, soldiers of the 150th Infantry Division stormed it from the main entrance. This passage to the infantry was pierced by the cannons of Alexander Bessarab.

The tanks of the 23rd Tank Brigade, the 85th Tank Regiment and the 88th Heavy Tank Regiment provided great assistance during the assault. So, for example, in the morning several tanks of the 88th Guards Heavy Tank Regiment, having crossed the Spree along the surviving Moltke Bridge, took up firing positions on the Kronprinzenufer embankment. At 13:00 the tanks opened direct fire on the Reichstag, participating in the general artillery preparation that preceded the assault. At 18:30, the tanks supported the second assault on the Reichstag with their fire, and only with the start of fighting inside the building did they stop shelling.

On April 30, 1945, at 21:45, units of the 150th Infantry Division under the command of Major General V.M. Shatilov and the 171st Infantry Division under the command of Colonel A.I. Negoda captured the first floor of the Reichstag building.

Having lost the upper floors, the Nazis took refuge in the basement and continued to resist. They hoped to break out of the encirclement by cutting off the Soviet soldiers in the Reichstag from the main forces.

In the early morning of May 1, the assault flag of the 150th Infantry Division was raised over the Reichstag, but the battle for the Reichstag continued all day and only on the night of May 2 did the Reichstag garrison capitulate.

Negotiations between Chuikov and Krebs

Late in the evening of April 30, the German side requested a ceasefire for negotiations. On May 1, at about 03:30 at night, the Chief of the General Staff of the German Ground Forces, General Krebs, arrived at the headquarters of the 8th Guards Army of General Chuikov, reporting Hitler’s suicide and reading out his will. Krebs conveyed to Chuikov a proposal from the new German government to conclude a truce.

The message was immediately transmitted to Zhukov, who himself called Moscow. Stalin confirmed his categorical demand for unconditional surrender. On May 1 at 18:00, the new German government rejected the demand for unconditional surrender, and Soviet troops resumed their assault on the city with renewed vigor. A massive attack was carried out on the areas of Berlin still in enemy hands using all available artillery.

End of fighting and surrender

On the night of May 1, the Berlin metro was flooded - the 2nd assault engineer brigade under the 8th Army of General V.I. Chuikov blew up a tunnel running under the Landwehr Canal in the Trebbiner Strasse area in order to finally suppress stubborn pockets of enemy resistance that stopped offensive of the 29th Guards Rifle Corps under General G.I. Khetagurov.

Thus, in the area of ​​the Anhalt station, the enemy widely used tunnels, entrances and exits of the metro to maneuver manpower and deliver unexpected attacks on our units. Three-day attempts by units of the 29th Guards Rifle Corps to destroy the enemy in the metro or drive him out of there were unsuccessful. Then it was decided to flood the tunnels, blowing up the lintels and floors of the metro in the section running under the Teltow Canal. On the night of May 1, the explosion of 1800 kg of explosives placed on trestles under the subway ceiling created a large gap into which water poured from the canal. As a result of the flooding of the tunnel, the enemy was forced to flee quickly, suffering significant losses. The collapse of tunnels and sewers of underground urban facilities in order to prevent the maneuver of enemy personnel underground was widely carried out in other parts of the city. Nikolai Ivanovich Nikoforov, reserve colonel, candidate of historical sciences, deputy head of the research institute (military history) of the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces for scientific work

The explosion led to the destruction of the tunnel and its subsequent filling with water along a 25-kilometer section. Water rushed into the tunnels, where a large number of civilians were sheltering, hospitals for the wounded were located, and the headquarters of the German defense units were located.

Subsequently, the fact of the destruction and flooding of the metro was covered in Soviet propaganda exclusively as one of the last ominous orders of Hitler and his entourage, and was intensely exaggerated (both in fiction and in documentaries) as a symbol of the senseless death throes of the Third Reich. At the same time, thousands of deaths were reported, which was also an extreme exaggeration.

Information about the number of victims... varies - from fifty to fifteen thousand people... The data that about a hundred people died under water seems more reliable. Of course, there were many thousands of people in the tunnels, including the wounded, children, women and old people, but the water did not spread through the underground communications too quickly. Moreover, it spread underground in various directions. Of course, the picture of advancing water caused genuine horror in people. And some of the wounded, as well as drunken soldiers, as well as civilians, became its inevitable victims. But talking about thousands of deaths would be a gross exaggeration. In most places the water barely reached a depth of one and a half meters, and the inhabitants of the tunnels had enough time to evacuate themselves and save the numerous wounded who were in the “hospital cars” near the Stadtmitte station. It is likely that many of the dead, whose bodies were subsequently brought to the surface, actually died not from water, but from wounds and illnesses even before the destruction of the tunnel.

Antony Beevor, The Fall of Berlin. 1945." Ch. 25.

By May 1, only the Tiergarten and the government quarter remained in German hands. The imperial chancellery was located here, in the courtyard of which there was a bunker at Hitler's headquarters.

On May 1, units of the 1st Shock Army, advancing from the north, south of the Reichstag joined forces with units of the 8th Guards Army, advancing from the south. On the same day, two important defense centers of Berlin surrendered: the Spandau citadel and the anti-aircraft tower of the Zoo (“Zoobunker” is a huge reinforced concrete fortress with anti-aircraft batteries on the towers and an extensive underground bomb shelter).

At one o'clock in the morning on May 2, the radio stations of the 1st Belorussian Front received a message in Russian: “We ask you to cease fire. We are sending envoys to the Potsdam Bridge.” A German officer who arrived at the appointed place, on behalf of the commander of the defense of Berlin, General Weidling, announced the readiness of the Berlin garrison to stop resistance. At 6 a.m. on May 2, Artillery General Weidling, accompanied by three German generals, crossed the front line and surrendered. An hour later, while at the headquarters of the 8th Guards Army, he wrote a surrender order, which was duplicated and, with the help of loudspeaker installations and radio, delivered to enemy units defending in the center of Berlin. As this order was communicated to the defenders, resistance in the city ceased. By the end of the day, the troops of the 8th Guards Army cleared the central part of the city from the enemy.

Individual German units that did not want to surrender tried to break through to the west, but for the most part were destroyed or scattered. The main direction of the breakthrough was the western Berlin suburb of Spandau, where two bridges across the Havel River remained intact. They were defended by members of the Hitler Youth, who were able to sit on the bridges until the surrender on May 2. The breakthrough began on the night of May 2. Parts of the Berlin garrison and civilian refugees, frightened by Goebbels's propaganda about the atrocities of the Red Army, entered the breakthrough because they did not want to surrender. One of the groups under the command of the commander of the 1st (Berlin) Anti-Aircraft Division, Major General Otto Sydow, was able to infiltrate Spandau through the metro tunnels from the Zoo area. In the area of ​​the exhibition hall on the Mazurenallee, it linked up with German units retreating from Kurfürstendamm. The units of the Red Army and the Polish Army stationed in this area did not engage in battle with the retreating Nazi units, apparently due to the exhaustion of the troops in previous battles. The systematic destruction of the retreating units began in the area of ​​the bridges over the Havel and continued throughout the flight towards the Elbe.

On May 2 at 10 o'clock in the morning everything suddenly became quiet, the fire stopped. And everyone realized that something had happened. We saw white sheets that had been “thrown away” in the Reichstag, the Chancellery building and the Royal Opera House and cellars that had not yet been taken. Entire columns fell from there. A column passed ahead of us, where there were generals, colonels, then soldiers behind them. We walked for probably three hours.

Alexander Bessarab, participant in the Battle of Berlin and the capture of the Reichstag.

The last remnants of German units were destroyed or captured by May 7. Units managed to break into the Elbe crossing area, which until May 7 was held by units of General Wenck’s 12th Army, and joined the German units and refugees who managed to cross into the zone of occupation of the American army.

Some of the surviving SS units defending the Reich Chancellery, led by SS Brigadeführer Wilhelm Mohnke, attempted to break through to the north on the night of May 2, but were destroyed or captured on the afternoon of May 2. Mohnke himself was captured by the Soviets, from which he was released as an unpardoned war criminal in 1955.

Results of the operation

Soviet troops defeated the Berlin group of enemy troops and stormed the capital of Germany, Berlin. Developing a further offensive, they reached the Elbe River, where they linked up with American and British troops. With the fall of Berlin and the loss of vital areas, Germany lost the opportunity for organized resistance and soon capitulated. With the completion of the Berlin operation, favorable conditions were created for encircling and destroying the last large enemy groups on the territory of Austria and Czechoslovakia.

The losses of the German armed forces in killed and wounded are not known with certainty. Of approximately 2 million Berliners, about 125,000 died. The city was heavily damaged by bombing even before the arrival of Soviet troops. The bombing continued during the battles near Berlin - the last American bombing on April 20 (Adolph Hitler's birthday) led to food problems. The destruction intensified as a result of Soviet artillery attacks.

Tank losses

According to the TsAMO of the Russian Federation, the 2nd Guards Tank Army under the command of Colonel General S.I. Bogdanov, during street fighting in Berlin from April 22 to May 2, 1945, irretrievably lost 52 T-34s, 31 M4A2 Shermans, 4 IS- 2, 4 ISU-122, 5 SU-100, 2 SU-85, 6 SU-76, which amounted to 16% of the total number of combat vehicles before the start of the Berlin operation. It should be taken into account that the tank crews of the 2nd Army operated without sufficient rifle cover and, according to combat reports, in some cases the tank crews were combing houses. The 3rd Guards Tank Army under the command of General P. S. Rybalko, during the battles in Berlin from April 23 to May 2, 1945, irretrievably lost 99 tanks and 15 self-propelled guns, which amounted to 23% of the combat vehicles available at the beginning of the Berlin operation.

The 4th Guards Tank Army under the command of General D. D. Lelyushenko found itself involved in street battles on the outskirts of Berlin from April 23 to May 2, 1945, only partially and irretrievably lost 46 combat vehicles. At the same time, a significant part of the armored vehicles were lost after being hit by Faust cartridges.

On the eve of the Berlin operation, the 2nd Guards Tank Army tested various anti-cumulative screens, both solid and made of steel rod. In all cases, they ended in the destruction of the screen and burning through the armor. As A.V. Isaev notes:

Mass installation of screens on tanks and self-propelled guns advancing on Berlin would be a waste of time and effort. Shielding the tanks would only worsen the conditions for tank landings to land on them. ... The tanks were not shielded not because inert thinking got in the way or because there were no decisions from the command. Shielding was not widely used in the last battles of the war due to its experimentally proven insignificant effectiveness.

Criticism of the operation

From a military point of view, there was no need to storm Berlin... It was enough to encircle the city, and it would have surrendered in a week or two. Germany would inevitably capitulate. And during the assault, on the very eve of victory, in street battles, we killed at least a hundred thousand soldiers. And what kind of people they were - golden, how much they had all gone through, and everyone thought: tomorrow I will see my wife and children...

Situation of the civilian population

A significant part of Berlin, even before the assault, was destroyed as a result of British-American air raids, from which the population hid in basements and bomb shelters. There were not enough bomb shelters and therefore they were constantly overcrowded. In Berlin by that time, in addition to the three million local population (consisting mainly of women, old people and children), there were up to three hundred thousand foreign workers, including “ostarbeiters”, most of whom were forcibly taken to Germany. Entry into bomb shelters and basements was prohibited for them.

Although the war had long been lost for Germany, Hitler ordered resistance to the last. Thousands of teenagers and old people were drafted into the Volkssturm. Since the beginning of March, on the orders of Reich Commissioner Goebbels, responsible for the defense of Berlin, tens of thousands of civilians, mostly women, were sent to dig anti-tank ditches around the German capital. Civilians who violated government orders even in the last days of the war faced execution.

There is no exact information about the number of civilian casualties. Different sources indicate different numbers of people who died directly during the Battle of Berlin. Even decades after the war, previously unknown mass graves are found during construction work.

After the capture of Berlin, the civilian population faced the threat of starvation, but the Soviet command organized the distribution of rations to civilians, which saved many Berliners from starvation.

STORM OF BERLIN

The last operation of the Great Patriotic War, upon closer examination, turns into a real tangle of mysteries and contradictions, and the threads from this tangle stretch both into the distant future and into the past. Within the framework of historical alternatives, we need to consider several basic issues. Was it necessary to storm Berlin at all? If it is still necessary, then when and how should it be done? To find answers to these questions, we will have to consider the background of the assault, and this consideration will begin not at Stalin’s Headquarters, but at the headquarters of General Eisenhower.

The fact is that of all the big three, Winston Churchill thought more about politics and the post-war structure of Europe than Roosevelt and Stalin combined. It was he who constantly rushed around with various ideas that contradicted the preliminary agreements. Either he wanted to land in the Balkans in order to cut off the Red Army’s path to Central Europe, or he wanted to capture Berlin... This is something worth talking about. At Churchill's instigation, Field Marshal Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, began to consider

options for a rapid rush of British troops to Berlin, although plans for such operations were not seriously developed. And there was no one to command the rapid rush. The British commander, Field Marshal Montgomery, was known for his pathological methodicalness and complete inability to make swift decisions and actions. Now, if Churchill had decided to talk to the American General Patton, then, you see, history could have taken a different path. By the way, here is another possible alternative for you - an attempt by the Allies to capture Berlin.

However, the commander-in-chief of the Allied forces in Europe, General Eisenhower, refused to even consider such adventures. However, rumors about the intentions of the British could well have reached Stalin, and then his reaction would have been completely easy to predict. Let's take Berlin! Alas, the former seminarian was not organically capable of anything more reasonable. After this, the next question inevitably arose: how to take it? And here we are simply forced to consider in more detail the events immediately preceding the Berlin operation, or more precisely, the Vistula-Oder operation of the Red Army.

This operation is remarkable in many respects. First of all, few people thought about it, but the possibility cannot be ruled out that it was the course of the battles between the Vistula and Oder rivers and their results that once and for all discouraged the Allies from getting involved with the Soviet Union. It is not for nothing that the Anglo-American warriors based all their subsequent calculations solely on the use of some kind of miracle weapon that would help them defeat the damned Bolsheviks, but at the same time they did not even mention starting a conventional war. The Vistula-Oder operation showed in all its splendor the real power of the Red Army and its main striking force - tank troops. Moreover, the fact that during the operation the commanders, to put it delicately, did not shine with fresh ideas, made its results especially convincing. It was a monstrous force that crushed the vaunted Wehrmacht like a road roller crushing a rag doll.

Since the events of 1945 had several opportunities to turn onto an alternative track, we are simply forced to abandon the usual chapter structure: introduction and then alternative. Now we will highlight alternative scenarios in italics, since we will have to return to reality again and again.

The strategic situation before the start of the Vistula-Oder operation was crystal clear. The Red Army had three bridgeheads across the Vistula, and attacks were to be expected from them. In any case, the famous German historian and former general Tippelskirch writes that the German command foresaw this, but simply did not have enough strength to parry these attacks. I don’t know, I don’t know... If you remember the Battle of Stalingrad, the places where decisive blows would be delivered and the prospect of encircling Paulus’s army were also completely obvious, but for some reason none of the German generals had an insight. But about “not enough” Tippel-Skirch is absolutely right. Although even here he cannot resist telling a fable about the “tenfold” superiority of the Red Army in manpower. Apparently, the general had certain problems with arithmetic - a common disease of beaten commanders. If our generals in 1941 counted the Germans as having “three times as many tanks,” now it is the Germans’ turn to engage in multiplication and division. The number of German troops at Tippel-Skirch was well known, and if you believe his calculations, it turns out that everything that the Red Army had on the Eastern Front was collected against the unfortunate Army Group “A”. A heated scientific dispute even broke out between Tippelskirch and General von Buttlar: was our army 10 or 11 times superior to theirs?

In tanks, we had a sevenfold superiority, what was, was. But who is to blame for this? Who prevented the Germans from developing their industry at full speed? I have already written more than once that such excuses are simply pathetic evasions. This is the art of a commander, to concentrate superior forces in a decisive place at a decisive moment. And if the state and industry can give it these superior forces, this fact only speaks of the advantages of this state and that one should not try to fight with it.

However, not everything is clean with our history. Just look at the statement of the Military Encyclopedia about the 500-kilometer depth of the German defensive structures between the Vistula and Oder. It immediately becomes clear why they did not have enough tanks: all of Germany was digging trenches and trenches day and night. True, if you believe the map placed in the same second volume of the SVE, with all the efforts between the Vistula and Oder it is impossible to measure more than 350 kilometers of distance. Maybe our General Staff measured the distance from the lower reaches of the Oder to the upper reaches of the Vistula? Then it may turn out even more.

But distances played a role in this operation. During World War II, the maximum depth of operations was determined by the presence or absence of a supply system for the advancing troops. But even the Americans, who had a simply fantastic amount of vehicles, could not afford to go beyond certain limits. For example, the Germans have written more than once that it was supply problems that ultimately destroyed Paulus’s army at Stalingrad and the German troops in the North Caucasus. The most curious thing is that in this case they are not so wrong. It was the Americans who could afford to send supplies for the XIV Air Force to China along a risky route through the Himalayas, spending four tons of gasoline to deliver a fifth to General Chennall's planes. But not more! Even they could not supply the advancing armies of Patton and Bradley in this way. Therefore, almost all armies, after a breakthrough of about 500 kilometers, were forced to stop to regroup and pull up their rear, even if there was no enemy resistance in principle.

However, let’s return to January 1945 on the banks of the Vistula. For one reason or another, the Soviet offensive began on January 12. The 1st Belorussian Front of Marshal Zhukov launched strikes from the Magnushevsky and Pulawy bridgeheads, and the 1st Ukrainian Front of Marshal Konev - one, but much more powerful, from the Sandomierz bridgehead. The force of this blow can be easily imagined if we remember that 8 combined arms and 2 tank armies, as well as 3 separate tank corps, took part in it. It is pleasant and easy to describe such operations. There are no sophisticated maneuvers, no subtle plans in them. The main idea can be characterized in two words: pace and power!

The troops of Marshal Konev were the first to go on the offensive, and the Sandomierz-Silesian operation began. The breakthrough was carried out within a 40-kilometer strip by the forces of three armies. The front troops had a deep operational formation, but at the same time, in the breakthrough sector, even in the first zone, Konev created an overwhelming superiority over the enemy. In total, almost 12,000 guns and more than 1,400 tanks were concentrated on the Sandomierz bridgehead, and all this force fell on the German XLVIII Panzer Corps. After a powerful artillery barrage, the infantry went on the attack, and within a couple of hours the enemy’s main line of defense was broken through. In the afternoon, the 3rd and 4th Guards Tank Armies were thrown into battle, and the German defense simply fell apart.

Where were the German reserves at this time? Here we have Hitler to thank. Almost all the generals write that, at his request, the reserves were located close to the front line, so they came under artillery fire and bomb attacks and were pretty battered by the time they should have gone into battle. But only Guderian reveals another little secret. Army Group A had only 12 tank and mechanized divisions at its disposal. However, they were all evenly distributed along the front line. The Germans did not create a single shock fist. Who ordered this? Not known. However, Guderian, apparently retaining some shreds of honesty, in this case does not try to blame Hitler, from which we can conclude that either the German General Staff or someone in the High Command tried.

Two days later, the 1st Ukrainian Front went on the offensive. And here we are faced with the first of the mysteries of the Vistula-Oder operation. The configuration of the front simply suggested the idea of ​​encircling the LVI tank and XL1I army corps of the Germans, who were already in the bag, with simultaneous attacks from the Magnushevsky and Sandomierz bridgeheads. Another small alternative. However, this did not happen. Why? Maybe, after all, stories about, to put it mildly, not better relations between Zhukov and Konev are not without grounds? After all, both fronts did not even try to create another cauldron, but rushed together to the west, as if not noticing each other. Moreover, Zhukov's 69th Army, with a blow from the Pulawy bridgehead, threw the Germans out of the cauldron, which could have arisen by itself, even against the will of the commanders. What was the point of the offensive from a tiny patch of the Puławy bridgehead is not clear, because this offensive had no tactical or operational significance. Although, on the other hand, both commanders were not seen making brilliant decisions, and no matter how hard A. Isaev tries to promote Zhukov, if you carefully read everything he wrote, Isaev’s books prove the complete mediocrity of the marshals.

Organized German resistance ceased on the second day of fighting, and the offensive entered the pursuit stage. This may also partly explain the abandonment of attempts to create an encirclement ring. Why waste time on cunning maneuvers if you can use the second advantage of tank forces - striking power? But even this had to be used skillfully. The heavy roller of a tank army may well turn into a thin pancake all the divisions that find themselves in its path, you just need to aim it correctly and ensure the possibility of linear and non-stop movement. But our generals constantly had problems with this. By the way, straightforwardness still had a right to exist. If we compare the composition of the German 9th Army, which took the main blow, at the beginning of January and the end of the same month, it turns out that not a single one of the originally listed divisions remained in it. Everything that came under the frontal attack of Zhukov and Konev died.

Hitler, naturally, blamed his generals for everything and began feverishly shuffling the commanders of armies and corps. The first to fly from his post was the commander of Army Group A, General Oberst Harpe, followed by other generals. It seems that in January 1945, all the commanders of the army groups and armies operating in Poland were replaced, but it was impossible to correct the situation.

The offensive of the 1st Belorussian Front began on January 14 and at first did not develop so successfully. The advance on the first day of the offensive was no more than 3 kilometers, but then the Germans simply could not stand it. As we already mentioned, they did not have enough forces on the front line or reserves. After the destruction of the main forces of the 9th Army, Zhukov’s tanks also rushed further. Finally, our tankers stopped looking up to the infantry divisions and began to act independently. They were 30-50 kilometers ahead of the infantry divisions, at times this gap could reach 100 kilometers, and then the actions of Guderian and Rommel are immediately remembered.

Our historians somehow do not notice this, but the same Guderian admits that around September 19, the German front in Poland ceased to exist, as it did last year in Belarus. The task set by the operation plan to reach the line Zychlin - Lodz - Radomsko - Częstochowa - Miechów was completed on the sixth day instead of the twelfth as planned. At the same time, the line of advance of both fronts gradually deviated north into Pomerania. If you look at the map, you can see some parallels with Operation Gelb. In the same way, a large group of enemy troops located in East Prussia was cut off. The only difference was that the Germans did not line up on the parade ground to lay down their arms in an organized manner, but tried to fight back.

But here a new portion of incomprehensible moments begins. The 1st Belorussian Front finally turns north and, instead of moving towards Berlin, breaks into Pomerania. There is a formal explanation for this. The Germans created a shock (allegedly) group here that threatened the flank of the front, and it was necessary to defeat it first. But even General Routh himself, who commanded this parody offensive, honestly writes that he had no forces. Do you catch the subtlety? Not “not enough,” but “none at all.” His own words: “10 divisions with 70 tanks.” Against such a background, even the newly formed Clausewitz tank division, which had, scary to think, as many as 12 tanks and 20 self-propelled guns, looks menacing. There is one good example of the effectiveness of such counterattacks. Tippel-Skirch and von Buttlar write about the attempt of the German 4th Army to jump out of East Prussia. But look carefully at all our publications, starting with the same old SVE and ending with the completely modern issues of Front-line Illustration. There is not a word about this “breakthrough” anywhere. It is not reflected on any map. History, as we have said more than once, loves evil things. In 1941, the Germans did not even suspect that they were participating in the great tank battle of Rovno and Brody, and in 1945, Zhukov and Rokossovsky, without even noticing it, repelled the attack of General Hossbach’s divisions. So such an explanation should be considered precisely as formal.

As a last resort, the German command renamed Army Group Center to Army Group North, and Army Group A was given the name Army Group Center. But even this did not help stop the Soviet tanks.

Meanwhile, the all-crushing wave of Soviet tanks continued to roll towards the Oder. The 1st Belorussian Front crossed the Warta River, bypassed the city of Poznan, which was declared another “festung,” and continued the offensive, although now only the 1st Guards Tank Army remained its vanguard. By the way, here is an excerpt from the memoirs of the commander of the 1st Guards Tank Army, which best characterizes the change in the views of Soviet commanders and the doctrine of the Red Army: “On the fifth day of the offensive, the 11th Guards Corps of A. Kh. Babajanyan, having fought about 200 kilometers, approached the Warta River - the sixth line of German defense. In the place where Gusakovsky’s advanced brigade reached, the Varta flowed strictly north. Then, near the city of Kolo, it turned sharply to the west and, having reached the Poznan meridian, again headed north. I ordered Babajanyan and Dremov to bypass the enemy reserves concentrated in the eastern knee of the river and take the Poznan-Warsaw highway in pincers. Having crossed the Warta and leaving the German group on the flank across the river, both corps rushed to Poznan. Under these conditions, the enemy group was doomed to inaction. She could no longer prevent the further advance of our troops.”

Notice the end of the quote. If only our tank generals had acted like this in 1944, without getting involved in the destruction of every isolated strong point!

Already on January 22-23, the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front reached the Oder and crossed it in a number of areas. But this front also lost one of its tank armies, which had to turn south to decide the outcome of the battles in Silesia and around Krakow. By February 3, the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front also reached the Oder in the Küstrin area. They also crossed the river and created a small bridgehead. The Oder also did not become a serious obstacle for Katukov’s tankers.

This is what the army commander wrote: “The brigade commanders decided to cross the river together. They pulled self-propelled guns, rocket launchers and all other artillery to the shore. After a massive fire strike on enemy positions on the opposite bank, chains of motorized riflemen descended onto the ice. Having quickly crossed the river, they, with the support of artillery from the eastern bank, knocked down small barriers of the Nazis and captured a bridgehead 5 kilometers along the front and 4 kilometers in depth. Motorized rifle battalions reached the Reitwein - Wooden line.

Having received a message that Gusakovsky and Fedorovich crossed the Oder, I ordered A. Kh. Babajanyan to transfer all the forces of the corps to help the forward detachments, establish crossings and expand the bridgehead. But only seven tanks from Gusakovsky’s brigade managed to cross the ferry crossing to the bridgehead. The fact is that I received a new order: the army was transferred to Eastern Pomerania, to the area north of the city of Landsberg (Gurovo-Ilawecke). She was given a new task.”

This ended the Vistula-Oder operation, which became one of the largest in scope during the entire war. As we have already said, it fully demonstrated the qualities of tank forces that Fuller, Liddell-Hart, Tukhachevsky and others dreamed of before the war. Mobility allowed tanks to cover distances unimaginable for foot armies, and firepower and armor made resistance attempts by rear units and modest reserves collected from the pine forest pointless. The steel roller crushed everything that came in its way. The infantry could only reap the benefits of the victories of the tankers and engage in the elimination of scattered centers of resistance such as Poznan, Schneidemühl and the like. The main issue remained providing the advancing tank corps with all the necessary supplies and, first of all, fuel.

This is where we come to the most interesting issue of the Vistula-Oder operation, its alternative option. Was it possible, without stopping, to continue the offensive further directly towards Berlin? After all, this would allow us to avoid bloody battles for the Seelow Heights and protracted battles in the city itself. Alas, a rather categorical answer should be given here: “No!” First of all, during the operation, Soviet troops advanced deep into enemy territory to a distance of about 400 kilometers, which was the limit for the army supply systems of that time. Even the Wehrmacht, in the ideal conditions of the blitzkriegs of 1940-1941, made stops in such cases to put the troops in order and tighten up the rear. And the rear services of the Red Army, unfortunately, even at the very end of the war did not at all resemble a well-oiled machine. Moreover, as we have seen, the offensive has lost its penetrating power. Two tank armies were diverted to other directions, and the two that reached the Oder suffered some losses and, accordingly, did not have the same strength. Therefore, to make a leap another 100 kilometers and start fighting in Berlin itself was clearly beyond their capabilities.

And yet one “but” remains. Reading Katukov’s memoirs, it is impossible to escape the impression that his army and the army of General Badanov, after crossing the Oder, could have advanced a little further. After all, the width of the Seelow Heights is small, no more than 10 kilometers. At that time, there was simply no one to defend this line. Let me remind you that the 9th Army, which occupied this section of the front, the Germans had to form anew, all its divisions to the last were killed on the Vistula, and it could not provide any serious resistance. In fact, it is impossible to find anything like this in the history of war: in three weeks the composition of the entire army completely changed!

Therefore, if generals Katukov and Badanov had advanced only 15-20 kilometers further, even later handing over their sectors to the approaching infantry armies, we would have had a full-fledged bridgehead at our disposal, and not the Kyustrin patch, and the Germans would have lost their main line of defense. By the way, Zhukov understood all this, because in an order dated February 4 he demanded that the 5th Shock Army expand the bridgehead to 20 kilometers along the front and to 10 kilometers in depth. The task was made easier by the fact that the command of the German troops at the Oder line was entrusted to the great commander Heinrich Himmler. In addition, it was during these days that Hitler launched the Balaton operation, after which the Panzerwaffe finally ceased to exist. But the main thing was done - the last remnants of German tank units and formations were tied up on another sector of the front, and the Germans could not oppose anything to the 1st and 2nd Guards Tank Armies.

If the Seelow Heights had been occupied by an attack on the move, the Germans simply had nothing with which to repel them. The state of the German troops at that moment is best characterized by the same Guderian: “On January 26, Hitler ordered the formation of a tank destroyer division. The name of this new compound sounded beautiful and promising. But there was nothing more. In reality, this formation should have consisted of companies of scooters under the command of brave lieutenants; The crews of these companies armed with Faustpatrons were supposed to destroy G-34s and heavy Russian tanks. The division was brought into battle in squadrons. It was a pity for the brave soldiers!” Apparently, the Fuhrer was greatly impressed by the actions of the Soviet tank armies if he gave such an order. But such improvised formations were, as they say, “one toe for the Soviet armies.” We will not even consider the German attempts to recapture the Seelow Heights, we will simply give a small excerpt from the list of the 9th Army on January 26, that is, after the end of the Vistula-Oder operation: 608th Special Division Headquarters; remnants of the 19th Panzer Division; remnants of the 25th Panzer Division; Well, there are some other little things there.

That is, the Soviet command had a real opportunity to occupy the Seelow Heights and freely obtain an excellent starting position for the subsequent assault on Berlin and avoid the colossal problems and losses that took place in reality. In addition, the opportunity arose after regrouping to strike directly at Berlin instead of a large-scale operation to encircle the capital of the Reich. Probably, in this case the war would have ended a month and a half earlier. It seems like a little, but still it’s thousands of soldiers’ lives.

After this, we come to the second fork in the spring of 1945 - the Berlin offensive operation of the Red Army. What was she? A golden exclamation point that crowned the most difficult war in the history of our country? Or a bloody blot that casts a dark shadow over the entire victory? Like any grandiose historical event, the assault and capture of Berlin cannot be assessed unambiguously.

Everyone understood the importance of the Küstrin bridgehead, even the Fuhrer. He therefore ordered General Busse's revived 9th Army to eliminate him. In February and March, Busse carried out a series of attacks, but their only result was the loss of 35,000 people, whom he never received again. During these attacks, one of the Vlasov divisions particularly distinguished itself, and Heinrich Himmler awarded the Iron Crosses to these warriors. Of course, there was no point in expecting that Hitler himself would reward the traitors. Thus, even before the start of the decisive battles, the German forces in the main direction were weakened. After this, Busse decided to hold the city of Küstrin itself, which blocked the direct road to Berlin, at any cost. It separated two Soviet bridgeheads, at Reitwein and Kienitz, and was a real bone in the throat of the 1st Belorussian Front. However, the Germans did not succeed in this either; on March 30, the city fell. The Soviet armies consolidated the bridgehead and could calmly prepare a decisive offensive.

But it didn’t work out calmly. Here we will completely unwittingly have to enter into a small polemic with A. Isaev, or more precisely, with his book “Georgy Zhukov. The King's Last Argument." By the way, a very interesting name. Without a doubt, the enlightened public knows the historical roots of this curious phrase, although for some reason the author did not consider it possible to decipher them, at least in the preface. But I do not exclude at all the possibility that he also knows the beautiful-sounding Latin original “Ultima ratio regis”, and he may well know that this inscription was on the barrels of the cannons of the most Christian kings of France, Louis, with rather large numbers. So whose gun should we consider Marshal Zhukov to be?

However, certain doubts still arise. When you criticize and expose others, you should be more precise yourself. The simplest example. Isaev writes that Zhukov’s troops were the first to reach the Oder, although in fact Konev was a couple of days ahead of him. And so on. By the way, Zhukov himself was never an artilleryman, so where is the connection here? On the other hand, this motto perfectly describes Zhukov’s manner of communicating with the outside world, so the name is quite appropriate.

However, we digress a little, let’s return to the events at the Seelow Heights. The roots of Zhukov’s more than controversial decisions should still be sought in his hostile relationship with Konev and his desire to please Stalin. To talk about some kind of socialist competition to take the Reichstag, of course, is stupid, here I agree 150 percent with Isaev. But there was rivalry, and in addition to completely natural reasons (jealousy of a neighbor’s successes has always existed and will remain forever and ever), there was another one, artificially introduced. I don’t know for what purpose Stalin tried to pit the two marshals against each other before the start of the decisive offensive, but he did it. Let us turn to the memoirs of Zhukov himself, in which he describes the meetings at Headquarters preceding the Berlin operation:

"He's right there<Сталин>said to Marshal I. S. Konev:

“In the event of stubborn enemy resistance on the eastern approaches to Berlin, which will certainly happen, and a possible delay in the offensive of the 1st Belorussian Front, the 1st Ukrainian Front should be ready to strike with tank armies from the south towards Berlin.”

There are misconceptions that

The 3rd and 4th Guards Tank Armies were introduced into the battle for Berlin, allegedly not by the decision of J.V. Stalin, but on the initiative of the commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front. In order to restore the truth, I will quote the words of Marshal I. S. Konev on this issue, which he said at a meeting of the senior command staff of the central group of forces on February 18, 1946, when everything was still so fresh in memory:

“When, at about 24 hours on April 16, I reported that the offensive was going well, Comrade Stalin gave the following instructions: “It’s going hard at Zhukov, turn Rybalko and Lelyushenko to Zehlendorf, remember how we agreed at Headquarters.”

Therefore, the maneuver that Rybalko and Lelyushenko performed is a direct order from Comrade Stalin. Consequently, all fabrications on this issue should be excluded from our literature.”

That is, the notorious race was organized by order from above. What, after Stalin’s direct order to turn the tank armies to Berlin, will Konev voluntarily give up the opportunity to be the first to capture the same Reichstag? In addition, there was another race with an imaginary opponent. But the assumption that the Soviet command was in a hurry to capture Berlin before the Allies should be discarded. After all, the plan of the operation provided for the encirclement of Berlin. Will the British or Americans really begin to fight their way to Berlin, breaking through the positions of Soviet troops?! Well, this is complete nonsense, you must agree. But we will return to the question of the storming of Berlin later.

Let us remember: Stalin had every reason to expect that the assault on Berlin would not be delayed. The Red Army had an overwhelming superiority in manpower and equipment. As usual, one should not believe either the SVE, which writes about a two- or four-fold superiority, or the memoirs of German generals, which tell tales of a twenty-fold superiority. The truth, as always, lies in the middle.

But there are many nuances that are quite capable of changing these ratios. As already noted, the entire first part of the German 9th Army, defending in the Berlin direction, died during the Vistula-Oder operation, and in front of the 1st Belorussian Front in March there were motley formations hastily assembled everywhere. By the beginning of the Berlin operation, the composition of the army had changed again, and again entirely! 9th Army December 31, 1944, January 26, March 1 and April 12, 1945 - these are four completely different armies! You yourself understand that in such a situation there can be no talk of any normal interaction of compounds. And so it happened.

The operation plan developed by Headquarters was very optimistic. On the very first day, it was planned to break through the German defenses on the Seelow Heights and introduce the 1st and 2nd Guards Tank Armies into the breakthrough. Berlin was scheduled to be taken on the sixth day of the operation, and by the eleventh day the 3rd Shock Army was heading to the Elbe to meet with the Americans.

Marshal Konev's 1st Ukrainian Front attacked in the direction of Brandenburg, Rathenow and Dessau. In the same way, immediately after the breakthrough of the German defense, the 3rd and 4th tank armies entered the operational space. Moreover, it was initially assumed that one of the corps of General Rybalko’s 3rd Guards Tank Army was supposed to attack Berlin from the south. But there was an option in which both Konev’s tank armies could be sent to Berlin.

Moreover, this is written by SVE, and if Isaev intended to refute a certain myth, then it was necessary to do this in more detail.

Solved an auxiliary, but very important problem

2nd Belorussian Front of Marshal Rokossovsky. He was supposed to advance in the Stettin-Swedge area and defeat the German 3rd Tank Army, which, naturally, would not allow it to move its forces to help Berlin.

The offensive began early in the morning of April 16. After a 30-minute artillery barrage, 140 powerful anti-aircraft searchlights were turned on, which were supposed to blind the Germans. It looked very nice in the movie Deliverance, but in reality it did more harm than good. A word from Marshal Chuikov: “I must say that at the time when we admired the power and efficiency of the searchlights at the training ground, none of us could accurately predict what it would look like in a combat situation. It is difficult for me to judge the situation on other sectors of the front. But in the zone of our 8th Guards Army, I saw how powerful beams of light from searchlights rested on a swirling curtain of burning, smoke and dust raised above the enemy’s positions. Even searchlights could not penetrate this curtain, and it was difficult for us to observe the battlefield. As luck would have it, the wind was also blowing in the opposite direction. As a result, height 81.5, where the command post was located, was soon shrouded in impenetrable darkness. Then we stopped seeing anything at all, relying only on radiotelephone communications and messengers to control the troops.”

The infantry and some tanks advanced about 2 kilometers, after which the offensive stalled. The artillery strike was carried out on the first line of defense that the Germans had left, and now the Soviet troops had to storm the heights themselves, which were almost untouched by the artillery barrage.

“German prisoners could also see huge columns of Soviet equipment waiting for the troops of Chuikov’s 8th Guards Army and Berzarin’s 5th Shock Army to open the way to the west for them. However, there was very little progress that day. At his observation post, Zhukov began to lose patience. He urged the commanders on, threatening to remove them from their positions and send them to a penal company. General Chuikov also got it. Its units were stuck in a swamp in front of German positions located on a hill.”

And then Zhukov makes the most controversial of his decisions. Isaev is trying to present the matter as if all changes in strategic plans were made by both Zhukov and Konev according to own initiative. Well, don't! All these changes were made only after consultation with Headquarters and approval by Stalin. The front commander could decide where and how to use the corps subordinate to him, but he could never turn several armies in a different direction! Actually, Zhukov himself writes about this, and, if you believe this passage, he is misleading Stalin just in case.

Zhukov: “At 15 o’clock I called Headquarters and reported that we had broken through the first and second positions of the enemy’s defense, the front troops advanced up to six kilometers, but met serious resistance at the line of the Seelow Heights, where, apparently, the enemy’s defenses had mostly survived. To strengthen the impact of the combined arms armies, I brought both tank armies into the battle. I believe that by the end of the day tomorrow we will break through the enemy’s defenses.”

His troops did not advance 6 kilometers and did not break through the second line of defense. This is where the January delay before the Seelow Heights came back to haunt us! Moreover, in the same conversation, Stalin thinks out loud about whether it is worth turning Konev’s army towards Berlin. Note that Zhukov writes about all this, not Konev. And the marshal decides to break through the defenses at any cost, throwing the tank armies of Katukov and Bogdanov into battle. Apparently, Zhukov did not learn the lessons of the Battle of Kursk. Tank formations can break through prepared defenses, but only at the cost of absolutely monstrous losses, especially since the German anti-tank weapon-45 was better than the Soviet weapon-43.

General Katukov writes: “The rest of the day did not bring joyful messages. With great difficulty, suffering heavy losses, the tankers bit into the enemy’s defenses and did not advance beyond the positions occupied by the infantry. It wasn’t easy for V.I. Chuikov’s rifle divisions, with whom the tank corps commanders worked closely.”

On the same day, a second conversation took place with Stalin, in which Zhukov promised to break through the defenses on the Seelow Heights at any cost, and immediately the Headquarters encouraged him, informing him of the order for Konev to attack Berlin from the south, and Rokossovsky from the north. I repeat once again, in order not to be biased, I am presenting all this exclusively based on the memoirs of Zhukov himself. Actually, strictly speaking, it turns out that Headquarters approved Zhukov’s decision and thus absolved him of some of the blame.

One way or another, in the afternoon of April 16, a tank battle began, which continued the next day. All this was very reminiscent of Montgomery’s actions at El Alamein, when he pushed through the German front in the same way. He didn’t break through, but rather pushed through. Only on April 19, the Germans could not withstand the onslaught and began to retreat to Berlin. During these days, according to German data, more than 700 Soviet tanks were burned. Whether this is true or not - the question remains open. But even the book “The Classification of Secrecy Has Been Removed” reports that during the Berlin Operation the Red Army lost about 2000 tanks. That is, during the assault on the Seelow Heights, Zhukov gave a textbook example of the improper use of tanks.

Reluctantly, he is forced to admit: “The offensive of the 1st Ukrainian Front developed at a faster pace from the very first day. As expected, the enemy’s defenses in the direction of his attack were weak, which made it possible to bring both tank armies into action there on the morning of April 17. On the very first day they advanced 20-25 kilometers, crossed the Spree River and on the morning of April 19 began to advance to Zossen and Luckenwalde.”

And now it is simply absolutely necessary to say a few words about what Konev supposedly had to do, linking his main forces to the solution of this task, so that, God forbid, they would not decide to attack Berlin. It's about on the liquidation of the so-called Frankfurt-Guben enemy group. What was she like? These were the remnants of the once again defeated 9th Army, which was joined by separate units

4th Tank Army. Dedicating the forces of an entire front to destroy them was, to put it mildly, unreasonable. In addition, Busse saw a categorical order from General: to hold the front on the Oder. Of course, at that time Konev could not have known about this order, but he saw very well that the Germans were not trying to move towards Berlin. Later, Busse received a new order: to retreat west to join the 12th Army of General Wenck in order to liberate Berlin. I highly recommend paying attention to this interesting formulation. That is, General Busse did not have the strength at his disposal to somehow really threaten Konev’s front; one could not even dream of a breakthrough to Berlin in such conditions. He had no order to retreat to Berlin, and everyone knew very well what they did with those who violated orders in the last days of the Reich’s existence. For example, General Weidling, commander of the LVI Tank Corps, who suffered the main blow of Zhukov, was sentenced to death for not holding his position, but, however, he was also pardoned. Did Theodor Busse need such adventures? His path to Berlin was blocked only by the 40th Rifle Corps of the 3rd Army, but this was enough. So Konev correctly decided not to fight the ghosts, allocated a couple of corps to block the German group stuck in the forests and lakes, and went to Berlin.

At 12 noon on April 25, west of Berlin, the advanced units of the 4th Guards Tank Army of the 1st Ukrainian Front met with units of the 47th Army of the 1st Belorussian Front. On the same day, another significant event occurred. An hour and a half later, on the Elbe, the 34th Guards Corps of General Baklanov of the 5th Guards Army met with American troops.

It is here that we get another historical fork in the road. There was no longer any danger of the Western Allies reaching Berlin. The breakthrough of German troops to the capital also looked like a complete chimera. So was it necessary to storm the city? It was quite possible to limit ourselves to what Hitler intended to do with Leningrad: a tight blockade, constant artillery shelling and air bombing. Well, the situation with the latter was not very good; Soviet aviation did not have the ability to deliver powerful strikes due to the lack of strategic bombers. But the artillery of the Red Army has always been the subject of envy and hatred of both enemies and allies. Moreover, April 20 was marked by an artillery strike on Berlin, delivered by long-range artillery of the 79th Rifle Corps of the 3rd Shock Army. The Red Army gave the Fuhrer a birthday present.

But in this case we will be forced to give a negative answer. It was necessary to storm Berlin, although not at all for the reasons that were voiced

Soviet historiography. It's just that the process of slowly strangling such a huge city would take too long. Civilian casualties? Sorry, this is war, and it was not the Soviet army that invaded Germany in 1941, but quite the opposite. After all, the Germans themselves came up with the concept of "Kriegsraison" - "Military necessity" which always and unconditionally prevails over "Kriegsmanier" - "Method of warfare."

The strangulation of Berlin led to an unjustifiable prolongation of the war, because Hitler should not have even dreamed of any surrender, unless his own guards would have crushed him in the bunker like a rat... And it is likely that there would have been protests from the Western allies about “unjustified sacrifices” " Of course, one could remind them about the bombings of Hamburg and Dresden, but there was no point in starting political discussions. Not the time and not the place. That is, an assault!

But with the assault, not everything is clear either. It began on April 20, 1945 (by the way, Hitler’s birthday), the artillery of the 1st Belorussian Front opened fire on the city center. After the war, our historians claimed that our guns dropped more explosives on the city than Allied heavy bombers. Zhukov writes: “11 thousand guns of different calibers opened simultaneous fire at certain intervals. From April 21 to May 2, one million eight hundred thousand artillery shots were fired at Berlin. In total, more than 36 thousand tons of metal were rained down on enemy defenses in the city.”

The Germans did not have a single chance to defend the capital of the Reich. The garrison of the city by this time consisted of approximately 45,000 soldiers from scattered, battered units and approximately 40,000 of all sorts of rabble from the Volkssturm, police, and so on. The main force of the garrison was considered to be the LVI Corps of General Weidling: Panzer Division "Munchenberg" (formed on March 8, 1945!), 9th Parachute Division, 18th and 20th Panzer Grenadiers, 11th SS Panzer " Norland" and the 503rd heavy tank battalion. Everything would be great if at least one of these divisions had more than 400 soldiers. By the way, it was the first two divisions that defended the Seelow Heights, so their condition is not at all difficult to imagine.

Well, purely for educational purposes, we will list others who had to save the capital of the Third Reich. French volunteer assault battalion "Charlemagne"; a naval battalion sent by Grand Admiral Doenitz; 15th Lithuanian fusilier battalion; 57th Fortress Regiment; 1st Anti-Aircraft Division "Berlin", Hitler's personal guard; the Hitler Youth regiment, hastily formed from Berlin boys and had nothing to do with the SS division of the same name. Oddly enough, Himmler’s personal guards were also stuck there. That's all...

They were opposed by approximately one and a half million seasoned soldiers of the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts. For the first time, the Germans had every right to talk about the enemy’s tenfold superiority. There is probably no point in describing in detail the course of the battles for the city, since this has been done in several works

A. Isaev, although everyone preaches one simple truth: Berlin was taken by Zhukov, once again by Zhukov and again by Zhukov. And the rest were just present.

In reality, of course, everything was more complicated. Let's start with the fact that the race to Berlin did take place. As proof, I will cite two orders given two hours apart. Let the participants in the events speak for themselves, and the reader can draw his own conclusions.

BATTLE ORDER OF THE COMMANDER OF THE 1ST UKRAINIAN FRONT TO THE COMMANDER OF THE 3RD AND 4TH GUARDS TANK ARMIES ON THE NECESSITY TO ENTER BERLIN BEFORE THE TROOPS

1ST BELARUSIAN FRONT

Marshal Zhukov's troops are 10 km from the eastern outskirts of Berlin. I order you to be the first to break into Berlin tonight. Deliver the execution.

Krainyukov

RF. F. 236. Op. 2712. D. 359. L. 36. Original.

BATTLE ORDER FROM THE COMMANDER OF THE 1ST BELARUSIAN FRONT TO THE COMMANDER OF THE 2ND GUARDS TANK ARMY WITH THE DEMAND TO BE THE FIRST TO BREAK INTO BERLIN

The 2nd Guards Tank Army is entrusted with the historical task of being the first to break into Berlin and hoist the Victory Banner. I personally instruct you to organize the execution.

Send one of the best brigades from each corps to Berlin and give them the task: no later than 4 o’clock in the morning on April 21, 1945, break through to the outskirts of Berlin at any cost and immediately report to Comrade Stalin and advertise in the press.

RF. F. 233. Op. 2307. D. 193. L. 88. Original.

Moreover, note that Zhukov perfectly understands the importance of the report “on the authorities” and newspaper PR. It is interesting that General Lelyushenko in his memoirs slightly corrected Konev’s order, cutting out the word “first” from it, or the editors did it for him.

Meanwhile, the fever of changing commanders could not stop in the German command. On April 22, Hitler removes General Reimann, replacing him with Colonel Ernst Keter, promoting him first to major general and then to lieutenant general in one day. On the same day, he gives the order to shoot the commander of the LVI tank corps, General Weidling, who failed to hold the line of defense on the Oder, and immediately cancels his order. After this, the Fuhrer decides to personally take command of the Berlin garrison, and then appoints Weidling to this position. This series of events clearly shows that the Fuhrer's headquarters has simply turned into a madhouse. Despite the complexity of the situation at the height of the battle for Moscow, with the panic that arose in the Soviet capital (it happened, it happened!), our command did not reach such insanity.

Weidding divided the city into eight defensive sectors to make the defense easier to manage. However, nothing could stop the Soviet troops. On April 23, Chuikov's 8th Guards Army crossed the Spree and, with the support of General Katukov's 1st Guards Tank Army, began to advance in the direction of Neukölln. On April 24, General Berzarin’s 5th Shock Army also crossed the Spree in the Treptower Park area. The remnants of the LVI Panzer Corps, still partly commanded by Weidling, attempted to counterattack but were simply destroyed. On the same day, after a powerful artillery barrage - 650 guns per kilometer! Never before in history has such a density of artillery been seen! - Soviet troops launched a decisive offensive. By evening Treptower Park was busy.