Conflict with China 1969 Daman Peninsula. Damansky Island: conflict with China

On the night of March 2, 1969, a Soviet-Chinese border conflict began on Damansky Island. At the cost of the lives of 58 Soviet soldiers and officers, they managed to stop a major war between the two states.

The deterioration of Soviet-Chinese relations, which began after the death of Stalin and Khrushchev’s condemnation of the cult of personality, resulted in an actual confrontation between the two world powers in Asia. Mao Zedong's claims to China's leadership in the socialist world, harsh policies towards Kazakhs and Uyghurs living in China, and China's attempts to contest a number of border territories from the USSR have extremely strained relations between the powers. In the mid-60s. The Soviet command is consistently increasing troop groups in Transbaikalia and the Far East, taking all possible measures in case of a possible conflict with China. In the Trans-Baikal Military District and on the territory of Mongolia, tank and combined arms armies were additionally deployed, and fortified areas were developed along the border. Since the summer of 1968, provocations from the Chinese side have become more frequent, becoming almost constant on the Ussuri River in the area of ​​​​the Damansky island (less than 1 sq. km in area). In January 1969, the General Staff of the Chinese Army developed an operation to capture the disputed territory.

2nd border outpost of the 57th Iman border detachment “Nizhne-Mikhailovka”. 1969

On the night of March 2, 1969, 300 Chinese soldiers occupied the island and set up firing positions on it. In the morning, Soviet border guards discovered the intruders, apparently having determined their number, approximately one platoon (30 people), in an armored personnel carrier and two cars, headed to the island to expel the uninvited guests to their territory. The border guards advanced in three groups. At about 11 o'clock, the Chinese fired small arms at the first of them, consisting of two officers and 5 soldiers, while simultaneously opening fire with guns and mortars on the other two. Help was hastily called.

After a long firefight, Soviet border guards drove the enemy out of Damansky, with 32 border guards killed and another 14 wounded. A maneuver group led by the commander of the Iman border detachment, Lieutenant Colonel Democrat Leonov, hastily moved to the combat area. Its vanguard consisted of 45 border guards in 4 armored personnel carriers. As a reserve, this group was covered by about 80 soldiers from the sergeant school. By March 12, units of the 135th Pacific Red Banner Motorized Rifle Division were pulled up to Damansky: motorized rifle and artillery regiments, a separate tank battalion and a division of Grad multiple launch rocket systems. On the morning of March 15, the Chinese, supported by tanks and artillery, launched an attack on Damansky. During the counterattack by a tank platoon, the commander of the Iman detachment, Leonov, was killed. Soviet soldiers were unable to return the destroyed T-62 due to constant Chinese shelling. An attempt to destroy it with mortars was unsuccessful, and the tank fell through the ice. (subsequently, the Chinese were able to pull it to their shores and now it stands in the Beijing military museum). In this situation, the commander of the 135th division gave the order to unleash fire from howitzers, mortars and Grad launchers on Damansky and adjacent Chinese territory. After the fire raid, the island was occupied by motorized riflemen in armored personnel carriers.

The losses of Soviet troops in this attack amounted to 4 combat vehicles and 16 people killed and wounded, and a total of 58 killed and 94 wounded. Four participants in the Daman battles: the head of the Nizhne-Mikhailovka outpost, senior lieutenant Ivan Strelnikov, the head of the Iman border detachment, Lieutenant Colonel Democrat Leonov, the head of the Kulebyakina Sopki border outpost, Vitaly Bubenin, and Sergeant Yuri Babansky, were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Strelnikov and Leonov – posthumously. The Chinese lost, according to various estimates, from 500 to 700 people.

But tension on the border remained for about a year. During the summer of 1969, our border guards had to open fire more than three hundred times. Damansky Island soon de facto ceded to the PRC. The de jure border line along the fairway of the Ussuri River was fixed only in 1991, and it was finally fixed in October 2004, when the President of the Russian Federation signed a decree on the transfer of part of the Greater Ussuri Island to China.

The beginning and development of the border confrontation between the USSR and the PRC in 1949-1969.

By the time the People's Republic of China was formed, the issue of the border line between the USSR and China was not raised at the official level. In accordance with the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, Mutual Assistance (1950), the Soviet-Chinese border, before the start of the revision of bilateral relations, was the border of good neighborliness, where active ties were maintained between the population of the border areas, lively trade was conducted, and cultural exchange was established. Cooperation agreements were concluded in a number of border areas, including the “Agreement on the procedure for navigation along the border rivers Amur, Ussuri, Argun, Sungacha, and Lake Khanka and on the establishment of a navigation situation on these waterways” (1951), on forestry , about joint fight against forest fires in border areas, etc. Within the framework of these agreements, the actually protected border line was not questioned.
In the early 50s. The USSR handed over topographic maps to the PRC indicating the entire border line. There were no comments from the Chinese side regarding the border line. During the years when Soviet-Chinese relations were on the rise, and China’s economic development and security largely depended on the USSR, border issues were not raised at the official level.
But already from the second half of the 50s. Difficulties began to appear in relations between the USSR and the PRC. In 1957 Under the motto of the Maoist campaign “let a hundred flowers bloom and a hundred schools compete,” there was dissatisfaction with the USSR’s policy towards China, including in the form of claims to certain areas under the jurisdiction of the USSR. An interesting fact is that, in general, the positions of circles whose opinions differed from the official policy of the CCP were subject to significant criticism, but their vision of the territorial border problem was not affected.
Another evidence of the existence of differences in the border issue was the so-called “cartographic aggression”, which was carried out already in the 50s. In maps, textbooks and atlases, the borders of China include territories under the actual jurisdiction of the USSR and other countries. In the “Atlas of the Provinces of the People's Republic of China,” which was published in Beijing in 1953, an area in the Pamirs and several areas in the eastern area, including two islands near Khabarovsk, were designated as Chinese territories.
In 1956-1959. cases of border violations by Chinese citizens are becoming more frequent, but then these issues were resolved successfully at the level of local authorities. The general tone of bilateral relations remained favorable.
In the mid-50s. The USSR invited China to resolve border issues. However, due to events in Poland and Hungary, this initiative was not developed.
Until 1960, the issue of the border was no longer raised at the interstate level. However, at the moment when the issue of the Soviet-Chinese border again appeared on the agenda, relations between the two countries were no longer so smooth. In the late 50s, early 60s. arises whole line prerequisites for the deterioration of relations between the USSR and China.
China's unilateral military-political actions, carried out without consultation with the USSR, put the Soviet Union, as an ally of the PRC, in a very difficult position. Such actions primarily include the provocation against India (1959) and the incident in the Taiwan Strait (1958). During the same period, China's desire to gain a leading place in the international communist and labor movement, as well as to get rid of the tutelage of the CPSU, intensified.
In addition, starting with the 20th Congress of the CPSU (1956), ideological differences began to grow between the two countries. Later, on their basis, the CPC accused the CPSU of revisionism and restoration of capitalist relations. The Chinese leadership reacted negatively to the condemnation of Stalin's personality cult. Personal enmity between Khrushchev N.S. and Mao Zedong also played a role in the deterioration of bilateral relations.
Some foreign authors note the Chinese leadership's dissatisfaction with Soviet influence in Manchuria and especially in Xinjiang.
Let us recall that one of the first results of the flaring conflict between the CPSU and the CPC was the unexpected withdrawal of Soviet specialists from China in 1960. Almost simultaneously, the first episode on the border occurred, which showed the existence of disagreements between the USSR and China on the issue of the border line and the ownership of those or other areas. We are talking about an incident in 1960 when Chinese herders were grazing livestock in territory under Soviet jurisdiction, in the area of ​​the Buz-Aigyr pass in Kyrgyzstan. When the Soviet border guards arrived, the shepherds declared that they were on the territory of the People's Republic of China. It later turned out that they were acting on a directive from the authorities of their province.
On this occasion, the foreign ministries of China and the USSR sent each other several notes and made oral statements, in which for the first time since the founding of the PRC, a different understanding of the border line with the Soviet Union was revealed at the official, diplomatic level. The parties never came to an agreement, but in 1960, at a press conference in Kathmandu, Zhou Enlai, when asked about the presence of unidentified areas on the Soviet-Chinese border, answered the following: “There are minor discrepancies on the maps... it is very easy to resolve peacefully.”
However, in the autumn of 1960, systematic visits of Chinese citizens to the islands on the border rivers of the Far East, under Soviet control, began for the purpose of conducting economic activities (mowing grass, collecting brushwood). They told the Soviet border guards that they were on Chinese territory. The reaction of Soviet border guards to incidents has changed. If previously they ignored the trades of Chinese peasants in a number of territories under Soviet jurisdiction, then, starting in 1960, they tried to suppress violations. It should be noted that during the demarcation of the border in the 80-90s. most of these islands, including o. Damansky, legally transferred to the PRC.
In the current situation, the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee decided to create an interdepartmental commission consisting of specialists from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the KGB and the Ministry of Defense, whose task was to select and study treaty acts on the border with the PRC. The commission identified 13 areas where there were discrepancies in the maps of the parties and 12 where the distribution of islands was not carried out.
The border line itself was not clearly marked on the ground, because Of the 141 border signs, 40 were preserved in their original form, 77 were in a destroyed state, and 24 were missing altogether. It was also noted that the description of the boundary in treaty acts is often general in nature, and many treaty maps are drawn up on a small scale at a primitive level. In general, according to the conclusion of the commission, it was noted that the entire border line with the PRC, except for the section in the Pamirs south of the Uz-Bel pass, was determined by treaties. In the case of border negotiations, the commission proposed drawing the border not along the banks of rivers, but along the line of the middle of the main fairway on navigable rivers and along the line of the middle of the river on non-navigable rivers, and not as it was indicated by the red line on the map attached to the Beijing Treaty, according to which the border ran along the Chinese coast. Fortune telling with Tarot cards, available online at gadanieonlinetaro.ru, will help you find out your fate.
Systematic violations of the protected border line by Chinese citizens in the 1960s and demonstrative conduct of economic activities were probably intended to consolidate the so-called “status status” in practice. Moreover, the statistics of violations showed that from 1960 to 1964 their number grew rapidly, and in the second half of the 60s the incidents became more acute.
Thus, in 1960 the number of violations was about 100, in 1962 there were already about 5 thousand. In 1963, more than 100 thousand Chinese civilians and military personnel took part in illegally crossing the Soviet-Chinese border.
As the situation on the Soviet-Chinese border deteriorated, the exchange of notes and oral statements continued, in which the parties constantly blamed each other. The Soviet side expressed its dissatisfaction with the violation of the border by Chinese citizens; Chinese documents, as a rule, stated that Soviet border guards did not allow economic activity to be carried out where it had been carried out previously or declared that a particular area belonged to the territory of the PRC. Despite the increase in the number of incidents at the borders, the matter did not reach wide publicity. Relations between the Soviet Union and China have not yet moved from polemics to open confrontation. This is evidenced by reviews of the Chinese and Soviet central press for 1962-1963.
In 1963, the parties agreed to hold consultations to clarify the border line. They began on February 25, 1964. Negotiations were held at the level of deputy foreign ministers. The Soviet delegation was headed by Colonel General P.I. Zyryanov, commander of the country’s border troops. The Chinese delegation was headed by acting. Head of the Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China Zeng Yongquan. Negotiations continued until August 22 of the same year. During the meeting, different approaches of the parties to the problem of border settlement were revealed.
The Chinese position in the negotiations boiled down to three points, which the Chinese side invariably insisted on:

• Only contracts should serve as the basis for negotiations.
• Negotiations must consider the entire border, and not just individual sections.
• As a result of negotiations, a new agreement must be concluded with reference to existing agreements, which should be qualified as unequal.

Soviet border guards are preparing to drive out Chinese intruders. January 1969

The Chinese reacted quite sharply to tactics of this kind. They expressed bewilderment at how the historical border line was determined: “What do you mean by a historically formed border line? Do you mean the line that developed in the 16th or 19th century, or the line that developed a minute before your speech?” The head of the Chinese delegation, Zeng Yongquan, commented on it as follows: “In those areas where you have not crossed the border line defined by the treaties, you apparently will not object to acting in accordance with the treaties, but in those areas where you have crossed the boundary line defined by the treaties border line, you will insist that the issue be resolved in accordance with the "actually guarded line." the Soviet side sent troops wherever they pleased.
At the same time, the Chinese side emphasized that, by abandoning the “big register”, it must return back what was “captured” by Russia and the Soviet Union in addition to it. It sounded like this: “You should know that we do not require you to give up 1,540 thousand sq. km of Chinese territory seized by Tsarist Russia. We have shown maximum generosity and good will. Apart from this territory seized from China, you will not be able to to seize another inch of Chinese territory."
The Chinese side, moreover, insisted on recognizing the Russian-Chinese treaties that defined the border as unequal. It was indicated that these agreements were concluded during a period of China’s weakness and as a result more than 1,500 thousand square meters were rejected. km. Chinese territory in favor of Russia, including 1 million square meters. km. in Primorye and Amur region and 0.5 million sq. km. in Central Asia. Thus, according to the Aigun Treaty, 600 thousand square meters passed to Russia. km., according to Beijing 400 thousand sq. m. km., along Chuguchaksky more than 440 thousand square meters. km., in St. Petersburg more than 70 thousand sq. m. km. The Chinese side also insisted that in the 1920s. Soviet Russia renounced all unequal treaties, and since the border treaties with Russia were viewed in the PRC as unequal, the Chinese delegation more than once stated that it had the right to recognize their insignificance.
At the same time, it was stipulated that recognition of the treaties as unequal would not lead to new territorial claims. However, Soviet experts saw a trap in such a proposal. The Chinese have repeatedly emphasized that although the treaties are unequal in nature, given the nature of relations between socialist states, China will not demand the return of these lands, but is only seeking recognition of the “unequal rights” of the Russian-Chinese treaties. The problem was that China could in the future declare the Soviet Union a non-socialist state, which happened after some time, and therefore recognize the agreements as void and, thus, raise the question of ownership of 1,500 thousand square meters. km.
On the issue of the “inequality” of Russian-Chinese treaties, both delegations were repeatedly drawn into unjustified polemics, which took a lot of time and did not bring practical results. It is natural that in the end the Soviet side rejected this point.
Nevertheless, the Chinese were ready to recognize the Russian-Chinese treaties of the 19th century as the basis for negotiations. But at the same time, they argued that the Soviet Union did not comply with these agreements and was “biting into” Chinese territory.
The Chinese side insisted that the Soviet Union recognize the disputed areas and demanded that troops, including border troops, be withdrawn from there after their designation. The total area of ​​the “disputed areas” was approximately 40 thousand square meters. km., incl. 28 thousand sq. km. in the Pamirs. The total length of the “disputed” sections of the border line exceeded half the length of the border between the USSR and the PRC and mainly ran along the Amur and Ussuri rivers. Representatives of the USSR argued that we could only talk about clarifying the border line (demarcation) in some areas and did not recognize the existence of “disputed areas.”
During the negotiations, it was possible to reach a certain compromise on the eastern section of the border, 4,200 km long, but with the exception of the issue of two islands (Bolshoy Ussuriysky and Tarabarov). In April 1964, the parties exchanged topographic maps indicating their understanding of the border line and created a working group, after which they began to directly consider the border line. As a result of studying Chinese maps and comparing them with Soviet ones, it was found that there are discrepancies in drawing the border line on these maps in 22 areas, of which 17 are located on the western part of the Soviet-Chinese border (now the Central Asian republics of the former USSR) and 5 areas on eastern part of the border. These areas approximately coincided with the areas that the interdepartmental commission indicated in its note in 1960. Chinese maps indicated 3 more areas that did not appear in the commission’s materials, including a fairly large area in the area of ​​the Bedel Pass (Kyrgyzstan), as well as islands near Khabarovsk. The greatest discrepancies were identified in the Pamir section.
Based on the results of the review of the maps in Moscow, it was concluded that it was possible to hold negotiations not on individual sections, as previously assumed, but along the entire border, as the Chinese delegation insisted. This approach became possible because along most of the length of the border line there were no vital differences in the border. Along the longest line that required clarification—the river border in the Far East—the parties had the same understanding that the border had to run along the main fairway. In this regard, the delegation was given additional instructions to confirm the border line in areas where the parties understand it equally. As part of this approach, the parties were able to come to an understanding on the entire eastern section of the border, with the exception of the issue of the Kazakevichev channel.
When the Soviet delegation proposed to record the results of clarifying the border in the eastern section, leaving the issue of the Kazakevichev Channel for later, the Chinese side agreed to this option. However, the Soviet leadership showed integrity in this matter. General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee N.S. Khrushchev insisted on the position of “either all or nothing.”
Mao’s statement, made during negotiations in the open press on a territorial register of 1.5 million square meters, also did not help achieve agreement. km.
As a result of the consultations, no agreements were reached. After their end, which never continued, border incidents resumed. Since October 1964 to March 1965 the Soviet-Chinese border was violated 36 times with the participation of 150 Chinese civilians and military personnel, and in 15 days of April 1965. the border was violated 12 times involving more than 500 Chinese civilians and military personnel. Number of violations of the Soviet-Chinese border in 1967 noted approximately 2 thousand times. At the height of the Cultural Revolution of 1966-1969, Chinese border guards and Red Guard detachments rammed Soviet patrol ships, tried to seize patrols, and started fights with Soviet border guards.
According to some Chinese data, from October 15, 1964 to March 15, 1969, the number of border conflicts amounted to 4,189 cases. At the same time, border violations on the Chinese side were, as a rule, provocative and well-organized. Chinese leaders openly spoke about the possibility of military action. The Chinese press continued to criticize the Soviet leadership. The entire domestic and foreign policy of the Soviet Union was attacked, which was defined as a policy of revisionism, hegemonism and social-imperialism, and was placed on a par with American imperialism. Any actions of the USSR in the international arena, covered in the Chinese press, were subjected to a series of harsh attacks and were considered hostile to the PRC.
Tensions also intensified because a number of islands on the Ussuri River, located on the Chinese side of the main channel, were under the actual control of Soviet border troops, and the Chinese side, asserting their belonging to the PRC, indicated its presence on them by demonstrably conducting economic activities and the presence of its own people there. border patrols. The Soviet side quite often motivated its presence on the Chinese side of the fairway by the presence of a “red line” on the map of the Beijing Boundary Treaty of 1860, where it marked the line of the border and river sections and ran along the Chinese bank. In addition, until a formal agreement was reached and delimitation was made, the USSR continued to extend its jurisdiction to the “historically established and actually protected” border line
In general, with the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, relations between the two states acquired a character rarely encountered before in the practice of international relations. Provocations against the USSR occurred not only on the border. There were illegal detentions of Soviet civil courts "Svirsk" and "Komsomolets of Ukraine", provocations of Chinese citizens on Red Square and at the American embassy in Moscow, as well as at the Soviet embassy in Beijing.
In comparison with the 50s, two significant features of the situation on the border in the 60s. became, firstly, military construction, and secondly, continuous incidents.
The peak of confrontation was 1969. Beginning on March 2, clashes took place between Soviet border guards and Chinese military personnel on the Ussuri River on Damansky Island (Zhenbaodao). Before this, clashes between Soviet and Chinese border guards also took place, however, they rarely went beyond hand-to-hand combat and did not lead to casualties. But during the fighting on March 2, 31 Soviet border guards were killed and 14 people were injured. From the Chinese side, approximately 300 people took part in this action. There was the use of artillery and mortars, as well as heavy machine guns and anti-tank guns. The Chinese military also suffered heavy losses. The fighting continued on March 14-15. Only after the Soviet side used the Grad multiple launch rocket systems, which covered Chinese territory over 20 square meters. km. in depth and caused serious losses to the Chinese armed forces clashes on the island. Damansky stopped. To the notes of protest and the Statement of the Soviet government, the leadership of the PRC responded in the usual style, that the USSR must recognize the unequal nature of the treaties defining the border between the USSR and the PRC and called the USSR an aggressor that “encroached” on Chinese territory. Participants in the fighting on the Chinese side were viewed as heroes in their homeland.
It should be noted that formally the Chinese side had good reasons to claim Fr. Damansky (Zhenbaodao) and a number of other islands, because they were on the Chinese side of the main fairway, which, according to international law, is accepted as the border line on border rivers. However, the Chinese side knew that this and other islands had been under the jurisdiction of the USSR for many years. The Chinese side also knew that the Soviet Union, in principle, did not object to the transfer of these islands to China. As further negotiations showed, the issue of ownership of the islands was resolved, and in the conditions of confrontation, the actions of the PRC in relation to these islands were aimed at aggravating the situation and could be considered provocative, which indicates that the initiator of the bloodshed was the Chinese side.
Regarding events on the island. Damansky there is a version that they were deliberately provoked by the Chinese armed forces on the orders of Lin Biao, in order to strengthen his position at the 1st Congress and increase the role of the PLA in Chinese politics.
On March 29, the Soviet government made a statement in a harsh tone, in which it proposed resuming negotiations that began in 1964. In this document, the PRC leadership was asked to refrain from actions on the border that could cause complications, and to resolve differences that had arisen in a calm atmosphere. In conclusion, it was noted that “attempts to talk with the Soviet Union, with the Soviet people, in the language of weapons will meet with firm resistance.” At the IX Congress of the CPC, in his speech, Marshal Lin Biao said that the proposals of the Soviet government of March 29 would be considered and a response would be given to them. At the same time, it was said that “Our party and government (CCP) have always advocated and advocate for resolving these issues through diplomatic channels through negotiations in order to resolve them on a fair and rational basis.” On April 11, the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs again sent a note to the Chinese Foreign Ministry, in which it was proposed to resume consultations between plenipotentiary representatives of the governments of the People's Republic of China and the USSR "in ... the very near future." The response was received in May 1969. It again contained allegations that Fr. Damansky (Zhenbao Dao) is Chinese territory, and the incidents in Ussuri were deliberately provoked by the Soviet side. At the same time, it was confirmed that the PRC opposes the use of military force, and it was proposed to agree on the place and date of negotiations through diplomatic channels. These Soviet and Chinese statements indicated that both sides were trying to present themselves as victims of aggression and absolve themselves of responsibility for the bloodshed.
Despite the formal readiness to resume the negotiation process and reduce the level of tension, incidents at the border did not stop until the end of the summer of 1969, and speeches at party meetings and in the press of both countries sounded increasingly harsh. During July and the first half of August, there were more than 488 cases of border violations and armed incidents involving 2.5 thousand Chinese citizens. On July 8, Chinese border guards attacked Soviet rivermen on the island. Goldinsky. On August 13, in the Kazakh SSR in the Semipalatinsk region in the area of ​​Lake Zhalanashkol, the largest armed incident since the March events occurred with casualties on both sides. Only after this the parties managed to agree on a meeting at a fairly high level.
On September 11, 1969, the head of the Soviet government, A.N. Kosygin, visited the PRC and met with the Premier of the State Council of the PRC, Zhou Enlai. The result of the “meeting at the airport” was an agreement on further negotiations on the border, starting from October 19, 1969, as well as on the implementation of a number of measures in order to normalize the situation on the border. During the conversation, which lasted 3.5 hours, issues were also discussed about the exchange of ambassadors (instead of chargé d'affaires), the intensification of trade relations and the normalization of interstate relations.
The heads of government also agreed that any threat of the use of force should be excluded during the negotiations.
As a result, Soviet border guards were instructed to guard the borders on rivers up to the middle of the fairway. They were also charged with maintaining normal relations with the border troops and the PRC authorities; consider all border issues through consultations in a spirit of goodwill and taking into account the mutual interests of the population of the border areas of both countries in the field of economic activities.
Despite the fact that the situation on the border has stabilized, no significant progress has been achieved in relations between the two states, and border settlement issues remain open.

O. Damansky became the site of an armed confrontation between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. The Daman conflict is another indicator of human irresponsibility and cynicism. Calm had not yet reigned in the world after the Second World War, and pockets of armed confrontation arose here and there. And before coming face to face, the USSR and China actively participated in various confrontations that did not directly concern them.

Background

After the Second Opium War ended, countries such as France, Russia and Great Britain were able to sign treaties with China on favorable terms. Thus, in 1860, Russia supported the Beijing Treaty; according to its terms, a border was drawn along the Chinese bank of the Amur, and Chinese peasants did not have the right to use it.

For a long time, the countries maintained friendly relations. The frontier population was small, so there was no conflict over who owned the deserted river islands.

In 1919, the Paris Peace Conference took place, resulting in the provision of state borders. It stated that the border should run in the middle of the main channel of the river. As an exception, it could pass along the shore, but only in two cases:

1. This is how it happened historically.
2. As a result of the colonization of the lands of one of the parties.

At first, this resolution did not provoke any disagreements or misunderstandings. Only after a while was the provision on state borders taken seriously, and it became an additional reason for the outbreak of the Daman conflict.

In the late 1950s, China began to strive to increase its international influence, so without much delay it entered into conflict with Taiwan (1958) and took an active part in the border war with India. Also, the PRC did not forget about the provision on state borders and decided to use it to revise the existing Soviet-Chinese borders.

The ruling elite of the Soviet Union was not against it, and in 1964 a consultation was held on border issues. True, it ended to no avail - everything remained the same as it was. During the Cultural Revolution in the PRC and after the Prague Spring, the Chinese government declared that the Soviet Union began to support “socialist imperialism,” and relations between the countries deteriorated even more. And at the center of this conflict was the island issue.

What else could have been the prerequisites for the Daman conflict?

After World War II, the PRC became a powerful ally for the USSR. The Soviet Union provided assistance to China in the war with Japan and supported it in the civil war against Kuomintang forces. The Chinese communists began to be loyal to the USSR, and there was a short-lived calm.

This fragile peace lasted until 1950, when the Cold War between Russia and the United States began. The two big countries wanted to unite the Korean Peninsula, but their “noble” aspirations led to global bloodshed.

At that time, the peninsula was split into communist and South Korea. Each side was confident that its vision of the country’s development was true, and on this basis an armed confrontation arose. At first communist Korea was in the lead in the war, but then South Korea came to the rescue came America and the UN forces. China did not stand aside; the government understood that if South Korea wins, the country will have a strong opponent who will certainly attack sooner or later. Therefore, the PRC is on the side of communist Korea.

During the fighting, the front line shifted to the 38th parallel and remained there until the end of the war, until 1953. When the confrontation subsided, the PRC government rethought its position in the international arena. China decides to break away from the influence of the USSR and pursue its own foreign policy, which would not depend on anyone.

This opportunity presented itself in 1956. At this time, the 20th Congress of the CPSU was held in Moscow, at which it was decided to abandon the personality cult of Stalin and radically change the foreign policy doctrine. The PRC was not delighted with such innovations; the country began to call Khrushchev’s policy revisionary, and the country chose a completely different foreign policy course.

This split came to be called the war of ideas between China and the Soviet Union. If the opportunity arose, the PRC tried to show that it was opposed to the USSR, like some other countries in the world.

In 1968, a period of liberalization began in Czechoslovakia (Prague Spring). The first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, Alexander Dubchenko, proposed reforms that significantly expanded the rights and freedoms of citizens and also assumed the decentralization of power in the country. Residents of the state supported such changes, but they were not acceptable to the USSR, so the Soviet Union sent troops into the country. This action was condemned by the PRC; this became another, truly real reason for the start of the Daman conflict.

Feelings of superiority or deliberate provocations

Historians claim that as a result of worsening relations between countries, the USSR began to cultivate a sense of superiority over the people of China. Russian border guards chose the exact location of the border for deployment and frightened Chinese fishermen by driving near their boats at high speed.

Although, according to other sources, it was the Chinese side that organized the provocations. The peasants crossed the border and went about their business, not paying attention to the border guards, who had to catch them and send them back. No weapons were used.

Perhaps these were the main reasons for the Daman conflict.

Islands

O. Damansky at that time was part of the Pozharsky district of Primorsky Krai; on the Chinese side, it was located near the main channel of the Ussuri River. The island was small in size: the length from north to south was approximately 1700 meters, from west to east - 600-700. The total area is 0.74 km 2. When floods occur, the land is completely submerged. But despite this, there are several brick buildings on the island, and the water meadows are a valuable natural resource.

Due to the increased number of provocations from China, the situation on the island became increasingly tense. If in 1960 there were about 100 illegal border crossings, then in 1962 their number increased to 5 thousand. The conflict on Damansky Island was approaching.

Information began to appear about an attack by the Red Guards on border guards. Such situations were not isolated; there were already thousands of them.

On January 4, 1969, the first mass provocation was carried out on Kirkinsky Island, more than 500 Chinese residents took part in it.

To this day, the memories of the junior sergeant who served at the border post that year, Yuri Babansky, have been preserved:

In February, he unexpectedly received an appointment to the post of commander of an outpost department, the head of which was senior lieutenant Ivan Strelnikov. I arrive at the outpost, and there is no one there except the cook. “Everyone,” he says, “is on the shore, fighting with the Chinese.” I, of course, have a machine gun on my shoulder - and to Ussuri. And there really is a fight. Chinese border guards crossed the Ussuri on the ice and invaded our territory. So Strelnikov raised the outpost “at gunpoint.” Our guys were taller and healthier. But the Chinese are not born with bastards - they are dexterous, evasive; They don’t climb on their fists, they try in every possible way to dodge our blows. By the time everyone was thrashed, an hour and a half had passed. But without a single shot. Only in the face. Even then I thought: “A cheerful outpost.”

These were the first preconditions for the conflict on Damansky Island. According to the Chinese version, it was the Russians who acted as provocateurs. They senselessly beat up Chinese citizens who were peacefully going about their business on their own territory. During the Kirkinsky Incident, the Soviet military used armored personnel carriers to dislodge civilians, and on February 7, 1969, they fired several machine gun shots towards Chinese border guards.

True, no matter whose fault these clashes occurred, they could not lead to a serious armed conflict without the approval of the government.

Culprits

Now the most widespread opinion is that the military conflict on Damansky Island was a planned action on the part of China. Even Chinese historians directly or indirectly write about this in their works.

Li Danhui wrote that at the end of the 60s of the last century, the directives of the CPC Central Committee prohibited the Chinese from responding to the “provocations” of Soviet soldiers; only on January 25, 1969 it was allowed to plan retaliatory military actions. For this purpose, three companies of soldiers were recruited. On February 19, the decision on retaliatory military action was approved by the General Staff and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. There is also an opinion that Marshal Lin Biao warned the USSR government in advance about the upcoming action, which later resulted in a conflict.

An American intelligence bulletin issued on July 13, 1969 stated that China was conducting propaganda that emphasized the need for citizens to unite and urge them to prepare for war.

Sources also say that intelligence promptly notified the forces of the Soviet Union about the armed provocation. In any case, the impending attack was somehow known. In addition, it was difficult not to notice that the Chinese leadership wanted not so much to defeat the USSR, but to clearly demonstrate to America that it was also an enemy of the Soviet Union, and therefore could be a reliable partner for the United States.

The beginning of the conflict. March 1969

The conflict with China on Damansky Island in 1969 began on the first night of March - from the 1st to the 2nd. A group of 80 Chinese military personnel crossed the Ussuri River and landed in the western part of the island. Until 10 a.m., no one noticed these unauthorized intruders, as a result, the Chinese military had the opportunity to improve the location and plan further actions.

At approximately 10:20 a.m., Chinese troops were spotted at a Soviet observation post.

A group of Russian border guards, led by Senior Lieutenant Strelnikov, immediately went to the site of the border violation. Arriving on the island, they divided into two subgroups: one, led by Strelnikov, headed towards the Chinese military, the other, led by Sergeant Rabovich, moved along the shore, thereby cutting off a group of Chinese military from moving deeper into the island.

The Chinese conflict on Damansky began in the morning when Strelnikov’s group approached the violators and protested against the unauthorized invasion. The Chinese soldiers suddenly opened fire. At the same time, they open fire on Rabovich’s group. The Soviet border guards were taken by surprise and almost completely destroyed.

The conflict on March 2, 1969 on Damansky Island did not end there. The shots were heard by the head of the Kulebyakiny Sopki outpost, which was located next door, senior lieutenant Bubenin. He quickly decided to move with 23 soldiers to the rescue. But only upon approaching the island, Bubenin’s group was forced to immediately take a defensive position. The Chinese military launched an offensive operation with the goal of completely capturing Damansky Island. Soviet soldiers courageously defended the territory, not giving the Chinese the opportunity to throw themselves into the river.

True, such a conflict on the Damansky Peninsula could not last long. Lieutenant Bubenin made a fateful decision, which on March 2 determined the outcome of the battle for the island. Sitting on an armored personnel carrier, Bubenin headed to the rear of the Chinese troops, thereby trying to completely disorganize them. True, the armored personnel carrier was soon knocked out, but this did not stop Bubenin, he reached the transport of the killed lieutenant Strelnikov and continued his movement. As a result of this raid, the command post was destroyed and the enemy suffered serious losses. At 13:00 the Chinese began to withdraw troops from the island.

Due to the military conflict between the USSR and China on Damansky Island on March 2, the Soviet army lost 31 people, 14 were wounded. According to Soviet data, the Chinese side was left without 39 soldiers.

Events from March 2 to March 14, 1969

After the end of the first stage of the military conflict, the military command of the Iman border detachment arrived on the Damansky Peninsula. They planned activities that could stop such provocations in the future. It was decided to increase the border detachments. As an additional increase in combat effectiveness, the 135th Motorized Rifle Division settled in the area of ​​the island with the latest Grads in its arsenal. On the Chinese side, the 24th Infantry Regiment was deployed against the Soviet army.

True, the countries did not limit themselves to military maneuvers: organizing a demonstration in the center of the capital is a sacred matter. Thus, on March 3, a demonstration took place near the Soviet embassy in Beijing, the participants of which demanded an end to aggressive actions. Also, the Chinese press began publishing completely implausible and propaganda materials. The publications said that the Soviet army invaded Chinese territory and opened fire on the troops.

The Moscow newspaper Pravda also did not remain indifferent and expressed its point of view about the border conflict on Damansky Island. Here the events that took place were described more reliably. On March 7, the Chinese embassy in Moscow was picketed and pelted with ink bottles, apparently the public learned of the implausible rumors that were spreading among the Chinese about the Soviet army.

Whatever it was, and such provocative actions on March 2-14 did not significantly affect the course of events, a new border conflict on Damansky Island was just around the corner.

Fight in mid-March

On March 14, at approximately three o'clock in the afternoon, the Soviet army received an order to retreat; the Russian participants in the Daman conflict had to leave the island. Immediately after the retreat of the Soviet army, the Chinese military began to occupy the territory of the island.

The USSR government could not calmly look at the current situation; obviously, the border conflict on Damansky Island in 1969 was forced to move to the second stage. The Soviet army sent 8 armored personnel carriers to the island; as soon as the Chinese noticed them, they immediately moved to their shore. On the evening of March 14, the Soviet border guards were given the order to occupy the island, a group under the command of Lieutenant Colonel E. Yanshin immediately carried it out.

On the morning of March 15, fire was opened on Soviet troops. The Daman conflict of 1969 entered its second phase. According to intelligence data, about 60 enemy artillery barrels fired at the Soviet troops; after the shelling, three companies of Chinese fighters went on the offensive. However, the enemy failed to capture the island; the Daman conflict of 1969 was just beginning.

After the situation became critical, reinforcements moved to Yanshin’s group, a group led by Colonel D. Leonov. The newly arrived soldiers immediately engaged the Chinese in the south of the island. In this conflict on Damansky Island (1969), Colonel Leonov dies, his group suffers serious losses, but still does not leave their occupied positions and inflicts damage on the enemy.

Two hours after the start of the battle, the ammunition was expended, and the Soviet troops had to retreat from Damansky Island. The 1969 conflict did not end there: the Chinese felt their numerical advantage and began to occupy the vacated territory. But at the same time, the Soviet leadership gives the go-ahead for the use of Grads to deliver a fire strike against enemy forces. At approximately 5 pm, Soviet troops opened fire. The Chinese suffered heavy losses, the mortars were disabled, and ammunition and reinforcements were completely destroyed.

Half an hour after the artillery attack, motorized riflemen began to attack the Chinese, followed by border guards under the command of Lieutenant Colonels Konstantinov and Smirnov. The Chinese troops had no choice but to hastily leave the island. The conflict with China on the Damansky Peninsula continued at seven o'clock in the evening - the Chinese decided to counterattack. True, their efforts were ineffective, and the position of the Chinese army in this war did not change significantly.

During the military operations on March 14-15, the Soviet army lost 27 soldiers and 80 were wounded. As for the losses in the Daman conflict of the Chinese side, this data was strictly classified. It can be tentatively assumed that their losses amounted to about 200 people.

Resolution of the confrontation

During the conflict with China on the Damansky Peninsula, Soviet troops lost 58 people, among the dead were four officer soldiers, 94 people were wounded, including 9 officers. What losses the Chinese side suffered is still unknown, this is classified information, and historians only speculate that the number of Chinese soldiers killed ranges from 100 to 300 people. In Bioqing County there is a memorial cemetery where the ashes of 68 Chinese soldiers who died in the Daman conflict of 1969 rest. One of the Chinese defectors said that there were other graves, so the number of soldiers buried could exceed the 300 mark.

As for the Soviet Union, for their heroism, five military men received the title “Hero of the Soviet Union.” Among them:

• Colonel Democrat Vladimirovich Leonov - the title was awarded posthumously.
• Senior Lieutenant Ivan Ivanovich Strelnikov - awarded posthumously.
• Junior Sergeant Vladimir Viktorovich Orekhov - received the rank posthumously.
• Senior Lieutenant Vitaly Dmitrievich Bubenin.
• Junior Sergeant Yuri Vasilievich Babansky.

Many border guards and military personnel received state awards. For conducting military operations on Damansky Island, the participants were awarded.

• Three Orders of Lenin.
• Ten Orders of the Red Banner.
• Order of the Red Star (31 pieces).
• Ten Orders of Glory, Third Class.
• Medal "For Courage" (63 pcs.).
• Medal "For Military Merit" (31 pcs.).

During the operation, the Soviet army left the T-62 tank on enemy soil, but due to constant shelling it could not be returned. There was an attempt to destroy the vehicle with a mortar, but this idea was unsuccessful - the tank ingloriously fell through the ice. True, a little later the Chinese were able to pull him to their shore. It is currently a priceless exhibit in the Beijing Military Museum.

After hostilities ended, Soviet troops left the territory of Damansky Island. Soon the ice around the island began to melt, and it was difficult for Soviet soldiers to cross to its territory with their former agility. The Chinese took advantage of this situation and immediately took up positions on the lands of the border islands. To thwart the enemy's plans, Soviet soldiers fired at him from cannons, but this did not produce any tangible results.

The Daman conflict did not end there. In August of the same year, another major Soviet-Chinese armed conflict occurred. It went down in history as an incident near Lake Zhalanashkol. Relations between states have truly reached a critical point. Between the USSR and the PRC the possibility of a nuclear war was closer than ever.

Provocations and military clashes along the Soviet-Chinese border continued until September. As a result of the border conflict, the leadership was finally able to realize that it was impossible to continue an aggressive policy towards its northern neighbor. The state in which the Chinese army was found only once again confirmed this idea.

On September 10, 1969, an order was received to cease fire. Apparently, in this way they tried to create a favorable environment for political negotiations, which began the next day after receiving the order at Beijing airport.

As soon as the shooting stopped, the Chinese immediately took up stronger positions on the islands. This situation played an important role in the negotiations. On September 11 in Beijing, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR A.N. Kosygin, who was returning from the funeral of Ho Chi Minh, and Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China Zhou Enlai met and agreed that it was time to stop military operations and various kinds of hostile actions. They also agreed that the troops would remain in the positions they had previously occupied. Roughly speaking, Damansky Island passed into the possession of China.

Negotiation

Naturally, this state of affairs did not please the government of the USSR, so on October 20, 1969, another negotiations took place between the Soviet Union and the PRC. During these negotiations, the countries agreed that it was necessary to review the documents confirming the position of the Soviet-Chinese border.

After this, a whole series of negotiations took place, which were held alternately in Moscow and in Beijing. And only in 1991, Damansky Island finally became the property of the PRC (although de facto this happened back in 1969).

Nowadays

In 2001, the USSR KGB archive declassified photographs of the discovered bodies of Soviet soldiers. The images clearly indicated the presence of abuse on the Chinese side. All materials were transferred to the Dalnerechensk Historical Museum.

In 2010, a French newspaper published a series of articles stating that the USSR was preparing a nuclear strike against China in the fall of 1969. The materials referred to the People's Daily newspaper. A similar publication was published in the print media of Hong Kong. According to these data, America refused to remain neutral in the event of a nuclear attack on China. The articles stated that on October 15, 1969, the United States threatened to attack 130 Soviet cities in the event of an attack on the PRC. True, the researchers do not specify from which sources such data were taken and themselves acknowledge the fact that other experts do not agree with these statements.

The Daman conflict is considered a serious disagreement between two powerful states, which almost led to tragedy. But perhaps no one can say how true this is. Each country adhered to its own point of view, disseminated the information that was beneficial to it, and furiously hid the truth. The result is dozens of lost lives and ruined destinies.

War is always a tragedy. And for us, those who are far from politics and the noble desire to shed blood for a high ideal, it is completely incomprehensible why we must certainly take up arms. Humanity has long left the caves, the cave paintings of bygone times have turned into completely understandable speech, and there is no longer a need to hunt for survival. But the rituals of human sacrifice have been transformed and turned into completely legitimate armed confrontations.

The Daman conflict is another indicator of human irresponsibility and cynicism. It seems that the tragedy of World War II should have taught the rulers of all countries of the world one simple truth: “War is bad.” Although this is bad only for those who do not return from the battlefield, for the rest you can get a certain benefit from any confrontation - “here’s a medal for you, and then disappear completely.” This principle was also applied during the Daman conflict: the soldiers were sure that they were being provoked by the enemy, and government officials, meanwhile, were resolving their own issues. Some historians believe that the conflict was just an excuse to divert public attention from what was really happening in the world.

On October 7, 1966, amid political disagreements between Maoist China and the Soviet Union, all Chinese students were expelled from the USSR. In general, China was an ally of the USSR, and there were no fundamental or large-scale conflicts between the countries, but some outbreaks of tension were still observed. We decided to recall the five most acute conflicts between the USSR and China.

This is what historians call the diplomatic conflict between the PRC and the USSR, which began in the late 1950s. The peak of the conflict occurred in 1969, while the end of the conflict is considered to be the end of the 1980s. The conflict was accompanied by a split in the international communist movement. Criticism of Stalin in Khrushchev’s report at the end of the 20th Congress of the CPSU, the new Soviet course on economic development under the policy of “peaceful coexistence” with capitalist countries displeased Mao Zedong as contradicting the idea of ​​the “Leninist sword” and the entire communist ideology. Khrushchev's policies were called revisionist, and its supporters in the CCP (Liu Shaoqi and others) were repressed during the Cultural Revolution.

The “Great War of Ideas between China and the USSR” (as the conflict was called in the PRC) was started by Mao Zedong in order to strengthen his power in the PRC. During the conflict, the Chinese demanded that the USSR transfer Mongolia to China, demanded permission to create an atomic bomb, “lost territories” and more.

Border conflict on Damansky Island

On March 2 and 15, 1969, in the area of ​​Damansky Island on the Ussuri River, 230 km south of Khabarovsk and 35 km west of the regional center of Luchegorsk, the largest Soviet-Chinese armed clashes took place. Moreover, they were the largest in the modern history of Russia and China.

After the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, a provision emerged that borders between states should, as a rule (but not necessarily), run through the middle of the main channel of the river. But it also provided for exceptions.

The Chinese used the new border regulations as a reason to revise the Sino-Soviet border. The USSR leadership was ready to do this: in 1964, a consultation was held on border issues, but it ended without results. Due to ideological differences during the “cultural revolution” in China and after the Prague Spring of 1968, when the PRC authorities declared that the USSR had taken the path of “socialist imperialism,” relations became particularly strained.

Damansky Island, which was part of the Pozharsky district of Primorsky Krai, is located on the Chinese side of the main channel of the Ussuri. Since the early 1960s, the situation in the island area has been heating up. According to statements from the Soviet side, groups of civilians and military personnel began to systematically violate the border regime and enter Soviet territory, from where they were expelled each time by border guards without the use of weapons. At first, peasants entered the territory of the USSR at the direction of the Chinese authorities and demonstratively engaged in economic activities there. The number of such provocations increased sharply: in 1960 there were 100, in 1962 - more than 5,000. Then Red Guards began to attack border patrols.

On October 20, 1969, new negotiations were held between the heads of government of the USSR and the PRC, and the parties managed to reach an agreement on the need to revise the Soviet-Chinese border. But only in 1991 Damansky finally went to the PRC.

In total, during the clashes, Soviet troops lost 58 people killed or died from wounds (including 4 officers), and 94 people were wounded (including 9 officers). The losses of the Chinese side are still classified information and, according to various estimates, range from 500-1000 to 1500 and even 3 thousand people.

Border conflict near Lake Zhalanashkol

This battle is part of the “Daman conflict”; it took place on August 13, 1969 between Soviet border guards and Chinese soldiers who violated the USSR border. As a result, the violators were pushed out of Soviet territory. In China, this border conflict is known as the Terekta Incident, after the name of the river flowing from the Chinese Yumin County towards Lake Zhalanashkol.

Conflict on the Chinese Eastern Railway

The conflict on the Chinese Eastern Railway (CER) occurred in 1929 after the ruler of Manchuria, Zhang Xueliang, seized control of the Chinese Eastern Railway, which was a joint Soviet-Chinese enterprise. During subsequent hostilities, the Red Army defeated the enemy. The Khabarovsk Protocol, signed on December 22, ended the conflict and restored the status of the road that existed before the clashes.

Vietnam-China military conflict

The last serious crisis between China and the USSR occurred in 1979, when the PRC (Chinese army) attacked Vietnam. According to Taiwanese writer Long Yingtai, this act was largely related to the internal political struggle in the Communist Party of China. The then leader of the People's Republic of China, Deng Xiaoping, needed to strengthen his position in the party, and he tried to achieve this with the help of a “small victorious campaign.”

Already from the first days of the war, Soviet specialists, located both in Vietnam and in neighboring countries, began combat activities together with the Vietnamese. In addition to them, reinforcements began to arrive from the USSR. An air bridge between the USSR and Vietnam was established.

The USSR expelled the Chinese embassy from Moscow, and sent its personnel not by plane, but by rail. In fact, after the Ural ridge all the way to the border with China and Mongolia, they could see columns of tanks heading east. Naturally, such preparations did not go unnoticed, and Chinese troops were forced to leave Vietnam and return to their original positions.

Video

Damansky Island. 1969

Original taken from parker_111 in Conflict on Damansky Island. 1969

After the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, a provision emerged that borders between states should, as a rule (but not necessarily), run along the middle of the main channel of the river. But it also provided for exceptions, such as drawing a border along one of the banks, when such a border was formed historically - by treaty, or if one side colonized the second bank before the other began to colonize it.


In addition, international treaties and agreements do not have retroactive effect. However, in the late 1950s, when the PRC, seeking to increase its international influence, entered into conflict with Taiwan (1958) and participated in the border war with India (1962), the Chinese used the new border regulations as a reason to revise the Soviet -Chinese border.

The leadership of the USSR was ready to do this; in 1964, a consultation was held on border issues, but it ended without results.

Due to ideological differences during the Cultural Revolution in China and after the Prague Spring of 1968, when the PRC authorities declared that the USSR had taken the path of “socialist imperialism,” relations became particularly strained.

Damansky Island, which was part of the Pozharsky district of Primorsky Krai, is located on the Chinese side of the main channel of the Ussuri. Its dimensions are 1500–1800 m from north to south and 600–700 m from west to east (area about 0.74 km²).

During flood periods, the island is completely hidden under water and has no economic value.

Since the early 1960s, the situation in the island area has been heating up. According to statements from the Soviet side, groups of civilians and military personnel began to systematically violate the border regime and enter Soviet territory, from where they were expelled each time by border guards without the use of weapons.

At first, at the direction of the Chinese authorities, peasants entered the territory of the USSR and demonstratively engaged in economic activities there: mowing and grazing livestock, declaring that they were on Chinese territory.

The number of such provocations increased sharply: in 1960 there were 100, in 1962 - more than 5,000. Then Red Guards began to attack border patrols.

Such events numbered in the thousands, each of them involving up to several hundred people.

On January 4, 1969, a Chinese provocation was carried out on Kirkinsky Island (Qiliqindao) with the participation of 500 people.

According to the Chinese version of events, the Soviet border guards themselves staged provocations and beat up Chinese citizens engaged in economic activities where they had always done so.

During the Kirkinsky incident, they used armored personnel carriers to oust civilians and killed 4 of them, and on February 7, 1969, they fired several single machine gun shots in the direction of the Chinese border detachment.

However, it was repeatedly noted that none of these clashes, no matter whose fault they occurred, could result in a serious armed conflict without the approval of the authorities. The assertion that the events around Damansky Island on March 2 and 15 were the result of an action carefully planned by the Chinese side is now the most widespread; including directly or indirectly recognized by many Chinese historians.

For example, Li Danhui writes that in 1968-1969, the response to Soviet provocations was limited by the directives of the CPC Central Committee; only on January 25, 1969, it was allowed to plan “response military actions” near Damansky Island with the help of three companies. On February 19, the General Staff and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China agreed to this.

Events of March 1-2 and the following week
On the night of March 1-2, 1969, about 300 Chinese troops in winter camouflage, armed with AK assault rifles and SKS carbines, crossed to Damansky and lay down on the higher western shore of the island.

The group remained unnoticed until 10:40, when the 2nd outpost “Nizhne-Mikhailovka” of the 57th Iman border detachment received a report from an observation post that a group of armed people of up to 30 people was moving in the direction of Damansky. 32 Soviet border guards, including the head of the outpost, Senior Lieutenant Ivan Strelnikov, went to the scene of events in GAZ-69 and GAZ-63 vehicles and one BTR-60PB. At 11:10 they arrived at the southern tip of the island. The border guards under the command of Strelnikov were divided into two groups. The first group, under the command of Strelnikov, headed towards a group of Chinese military personnel standing on the ice southwest of the island.

The second group, under the command of Sergeant Vladimir Rabovich, was supposed to cover Strelnikov’s group from the southern coast of the island. Strelnikov protested the violation of the border and demanded that Chinese military personnel leave the territory of the USSR. One of the Chinese servicemen raised his hand up, which served as a signal for the Chinese side to open fire on the groups of Strelnikov and Rabovich. The moment of the start of the armed provocation was captured on film by military photojournalist Private Nikolai Petrov. Strelnikov and the border guards who followed him died immediately, and a squad of border guards under the command of Sergeant Rabovich also died in a short battle. Junior Sergeant Yuri Babansky took command of the surviving border guards.

Having received a report about the shooting on the island, the head of the neighboring 1st outpost “Kulebyakiny Sopki”, senior lieutenant Vitaly Bubenin, went to the BTR-60PB and GAZ-69 with 20 soldiers to help. In the battle, Bubenin was wounded and sent the armored personnel carrier to the rear of the Chinese, skirting the northern tip of the island along the ice, but soon the armored personnel carrier was hit and Bubenin decided to go out with his soldiers to the Soviet coast. Having reached the armored personnel carrier of the deceased Strelnikov and boarded it, Bubenin’s group moved along the Chinese positions and destroyed their command post. They began to retreat.

In the battle on March 2, 31 Soviet border guards were killed and 14 were injured. The losses of the Chinese side (according to the USSR KGB commission) amounted to 247 people killed

Around 12:00 a helicopter arrived at Damansky with the command of the Iman border detachment and its chief, Colonel D.V. Leonov, and reinforcements from neighboring outposts. Reinforced squads of border guards were deployed to Damansky, and the 135th Motorized Rifle Division of the Soviet Army with artillery and installations of the BM-21 Grad multiple launch rocket system was deployed in the rear. On the Chinese side, the 24th Infantry Regiment, numbering 5,000 people, was preparing for combat.

On March 3, a demonstration took place near the Soviet embassy in Beijing. On March 4, the Chinese newspapers People's Daily and Jiefangjun Bao (解放军报) published an editorial "Down with the new kings!", blaming the incident on the Soviet troops, who, according to the author of the article, "moved by a clique of renegade revisionists, brazenly invaded Zhenbaodao Island on the Wusulijiang River in Heilongjiang Province of our country, opened rifle and cannon fire on the border guards of the People's Liberation Army of China, killing and wounding many of them." On the same day, the Soviet newspaper Pravda published an article “Shame on the provocateurs!” According to the author of the article, “an armed Chinese detachment crossed the Soviet state border and headed towards Damansky Island. Fire was suddenly opened on the Soviet border guards guarding this area from the Chinese side. There are dead and wounded." On March 7, the Chinese Embassy in Moscow was picketed. Demonstrators also threw ink bottles at the building.

Events March 14-15
On March 14 at 15:00 an order was received to remove border guard units from the island. Immediately after the withdrawal of the Soviet border guards, Chinese soldiers began to occupy the island. In response to this, 8 armored personnel carriers under the command of the head of the motorized maneuver group of the 57th border detachment, Lieutenant Colonel E. I. Yanshin, moved in battle formation towards Damansky; The Chinese retreated to their shore.



At 20:00 on March 14, the border guards received an order to occupy the island. That same night, Yanshin’s group of 60 people in 4 armored personnel carriers dug in there. On the morning of March 15, after broadcasting from both sides through loudspeakers, at 10:00 from 30 to 60 Chinese artillery and mortars began shelling Soviet positions, and 3 companies of Chinese infantry went on the offensive. A fight ensued.

Between 400 and 500 Chinese soldiers took up positions near the southern part of the island and prepared to move behind Yangshin's rear. Two armored personnel carriers of his group were hit, and communication was damaged. Four T-62 tanks under the command of D.V. Leonov attacked the Chinese at the southern tip of the island, but Leonov’s tank was hit (according to various versions, by a shot from an RPG-2 grenade launcher or was blown up by an anti-tank mine), and Leonov himself was killed by a shot from a Chinese sniper when trying to leave a burning car.

What made the situation worse was that Leonov did not know the island and, as a result, Soviet tanks came too close to the Chinese positions. However, at the cost of losses, the Chinese were not allowed to enter the island.

Two hours later, having used up their ammunition, the Soviet border guards were nevertheless forced to withdraw from the island. It became clear that the forces brought into the battle were not enough and the Chinese significantly outnumbered the border guard detachments. At 17:00, in a critical situation, in violation of the instructions of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee not to introduce Soviet troops into the conflict, on the orders of the commander of the Far Eastern Military District, Oleg Losik, fire was opened from the then-secret Grad multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS).

The shells destroyed most of the material and technical resources of the Chinese group and military, including reinforcements, mortars, and stacks of shells. At 17:10, motorized riflemen of the 2nd motorized rifle battalion of the 199th motorized rifle regiment and border guards under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Smirnov and Lieutenant Colonel Konstantinov went on the attack in order to finally suppress the resistance of the Chinese troops. The Chinese began to retreat from their occupied positions. At about 19:00 several firing points came to life, after which three new attacks were launched, but they were repulsed.

Soviet troops again retreated to their shores, and the Chinese side no longer undertook large-scale hostile actions on this section of the state border.

In total, during the clashes, Soviet troops lost 58 people killed or died from wounds (including 4 officers), and 94 people were wounded (including 9 officers).

The irretrievable losses of the Chinese side are still classified information and, according to various estimates, range from 100-150 to 800 and even 3000 people. In Baoqing County there is a memorial cemetery where the remains of 68 Chinese soldiers who died on March 2 and 15, 1969 are located. Information received from a Chinese defector suggests that other burials exist.

For their heroism, five servicemen received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union: Colonel D. Leonov (posthumously), Senior Lieutenant I. Strelnikov (posthumously), Junior Sergeant V. Orekhov (posthumously), Senior Lieutenant V. Bubenin, Junior Sergeant Yu. Babansky.

Many border guards and military personnel of the Soviet Army were awarded state awards: 3 - Orders of Lenin, 10 - Orders of the Red Banner, 31 - Orders of the Red Star, 10 - Orders of Glory III degree, 63 - medals "For Courage", 31 - medals "For Military Merit" .

Settlement and aftermath
Soviet soldiers were unable to return the destroyed T-62 due to constant Chinese shelling. An attempt to destroy it with mortars was unsuccessful, and the tank fell through the ice. Subsequently, the Chinese were able to pull it to their shores and now it stands in the Beijing military museum.

After the ice melted, the exit of the Soviet border guards to Damansky turned out to be difficult and it was necessary to prevent Chinese attempts to capture it with sniper and machine-gun fire. On September 10, 1969, a ceasefire was ordered, apparently to create a favorable background for the negotiations that began the next day at Beijing airport.

Immediately, Damansky and Kirkinsky were occupied by Chinese armed forces.

On September 11 in Beijing, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR A.N. Kosygin, who was returning from the funeral of Ho Chi Minh, and Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China Zhou Enlai agreed to stop hostile actions and that the troops would remain in their occupied positions. In fact, this meant the transfer of Damansky to China.

On October 20, 1969, new negotiations between the heads of government of the USSR and the PRC were held, and an agreement was reached on the need to revise the Soviet-Chinese border. Then a series of negotiations were held in Beijing and Moscow, and in 1991, Damansky Island finally went to the PRC.