Lend-Lease - the history of American military assistance to the USSR. Russia is still paying for Lend-Lease

The topic of Lend-Lease supplies during the Second World War is the most discussed and controversial. Assessments of the assistance of Western partners are extremely polar. Some believe that this was economic sabotage, while others argue that without Western help, the Soviet Union's victory in the war would have been impossible.

War - economic rivalry

The polarity of assessments is facilitated by the distortion of some facts and the silence of others. An objective assessment of events shows that the German victory was problematic. Back in the thirties, the German leadership made decisions that became the impetus for war. They affected both politics and economics. The complete mobilization of all resources leads to a war of economies, in which the weak are always the losers.

Englishwomen are preparing “Matilda” in the USSR under Lend-Lease:

From this point of view, the USSR was also not in the best position. The First World War and the Civil War weakened the country, leaving behind many economic problems, hunger, and poverty. Conflicts smoldered in the border areas, filling the atmosphere of peace with a premonition of a coming big war. Almost all the major European powers, as well as Japan and China, either participated in military operations against Soviet Russia or were considered by it as possible aggressors.

The country lived in conditions of a “besieged camp,” but for that time it was natural. This situation had to be changed. There is a pressing need to build new factories with high-tech production. But any construction required economic costs in other areas.

The USSR existed in such a difficult state throughout the interwar period, and it had to enter the Patriotic War in it. But in addition to all the difficulties, industry had to be hastily evacuated inland. The economy had to be rebuilt on the fly, and factories were erected on wheels and began to function in the open air.

The front required constant replenishment of equipment and equipment. There was a catastrophic shortage of weapons and ammunition, and the need for external assistance was extremely urgent. Lend-Lease became just such a help.

Lend-Lease supply difficulties

The main problem of cargo delivery was the geographical location of our country. Not a single supplier country had land borders with it. But this is not enough. All supply routes could not be called easily accessible, so transporting goods amounting to millions of tons along them became an extremely difficult task.

In total, three main supply routes were developed - Arctic, Pacific and Persian. Each had specific advantages and disadvantages.

The advantage of the Arctic route was the delivery of goods directly to the major ports of the northern USSR. However, the Germans constantly and quite successfully attacked the convoys, causing cargo losses of up to 15%. Along with the cargo, people died, and vehicles were damaged and sank.

Delivery of goods along the Persian route required the construction of a highway, which had to be built almost from scratch and passed through the entire country. In addition to the road with the necessary infrastructure, four large automobile factories were built. Local workers assembled trucks there and then drove them under their own power to their destination.

The most effective route was across the Pacific Ocean. This can be seen by studying delivery statistics. There were no hostilities between the USSR and Japan until 1945, so ships flying American flags left US ports without problems. They arrived in Vladivostok already under the Soviet flag, with a crew also Soviet.

The possibility of the destruction of such ships was extremely small. But stray torpedoes from Japanese or American submarines sometimes caused damage. Over the entire period, 23 ships were lost, and only 9 of them were carried away by severe weather conditions. Transport ships were usually transferred along with cargo as part of Lend-Lease. During the use of the Pacific route, 128 units were received.

There were also two routes that were not the main ones: the Arctic Pacific and the Black Sea. The latter passed through the Bosphorus and Dardanelles. It operated from May until September 20, 1945, when the fighting in Europe had already ended.

In addition to land and water routes, there was also an air route. Thousands of planes were transported along the Uelkal-Krasnoyarsk highway. Fighters, transport aircraft, and bombers reached their destinations under their own power in the most difficult weather and climatic conditions.

Difficulty of choice

Often in discussions about Lend-Lease supplies, the efficiency of the supplied equipment is compared with Soviet analogues. The comparison mainly involves products that are more accessible to understanding, which include military equipment and weapons. But sometimes some essential aspects are missed in the debate. The main thing can be considered that the necessary goods and equipment were selected by representatives of the Soviet Union, who were extremely interested in their quality. It is also important that all documentation on testing of supplied equipment is open to access on the Internet. You can easily find primary documents, reports of commissions and persons responsible for testing.

An example is a test report on a 37 mm gun made in the USA. Compared to its Soviet and British counterparts, it looks more attractive. Its shells, having a similar caliber, hit German tanks with greater efficiency due to their increased strength. The actual characteristics obtained from the report do not allow us to call this weapon unnecessary and obsolete.

But there were types of equipment that were not produced in our country. For some reason they are silent about this. But it is impossible to successfully conduct large-scale combat operations without heavy trucks, infantry armored vehicles or tow trucks to transport tanks. Battles are not won by tanks and planes alone. Although, without having trucks, you can still fight, but a lack of tanks will not bring victory.

Therefore, the value of Lend-Lease supplies is determined not by their cost and share in the total production of the USSR, but by their absolute significance. When considering any type of supplied equipment, you need to decide whether a country at war could produce it in the required quantity in such a short time? And what would you have to sacrifice for this?

The situation is the same with purely civilian products. During a total war, there are practically no civilian factories left. Enterprises that produce steam locomotives or carriages will certainly switch to the production of tanks and guns. But both locomotives and carriages will not stop breaking down and becoming inoperable due to enemy bombing. During all the war years, several hundred units of rolling stock were produced in the USSR. Under Lend-Lease, about two thousand locomotives and several thousand platforms were delivered. If you compare this with the entire fleet of equipment, it won’t be very much, but in comparison with the production of railway equipment in the country, the volume is very large.

There are opinions that some of the supplied equipment was not popular in the countries that manufactured it. Thus, Airacobra fighters were sent mainly to the USSR, because they did not perform well in the USA.

But it is forgotten that the same technology can solve completely different problems on different fronts. Fighters in Europe cover or intercept heavy bombers. Flights in the Pacific Ocean region involve long-distance, multi-hour flights. And the eastern front means intercepting attack aircraft at low altitudes or covering their own aircraft in areas of the front line.

In low-altitude combat, the pilot does not require oxygen equipment. The machines themselves become easier to maintain, and their best qualities are retained. But for this it is necessary to carry out all the routine maintenance prescribed by technical standards. And this is the concern of those who service the equipment.

The share of foreign fighters and bombers from the number of all wartime aircraft in the USSR was 20%. Lend-Lease deliveries received a quarter of all anti-aircraft guns (including large calibers) and all armored personnel carriers, which were not produced in the Soviet country.

About half a million trucks were delivered, which more than covers the shortage of transport needed for the entire Red Army during the peaceful period of 1941. Such volumes of supplies allowed Soviet automobile factories to switch to the production of military equipment without much loss.

Auxiliary equipment

For any state, maintaining knowledge-intensive and high-tech industries in wartime is an unaffordable luxury. Therefore, radio stations, teletypes, as well as thousands and thousands of kilometers of telephone cable were imported into the country in gigantic quantities.

Of course, such goods do not have the visibility that tanks and airplanes have, but it is hardly possible to carry out high-quality command and control of troops without reliable radio communications. No military operation without communications can be successful. And radio stations made in Canada were intended to equip Soviet tanks. For this there was “Wireless set No. 19, Mk. III".

Those arguing constantly forget about other equipment. And it is just as important for combat operations as weapons. All kinds of medical equipment and medicines saved the lives of soldiers and prevented their injuries and disabilities.

So much of this type of equipment was supplied that our own production facilities were equipped with them. Thus, the SON-2 radar became an almost exact copy of an analogue produced in England, and was manufactured using equipment imported under Lend-Lease.

If you compare the general production figures, you may “not understand” that it is impossible to replace a unique machine for cutting tank turret rings even with millions of Soviet-made files. It was precisely because of the lack of such machines at plant No. 183 that the production of T-34-85 tanks was delayed until mid-March 1944. And only the supply of machine tools under Lend-Lease corrected this situation.

Studying the protocols of 1944 and 1945, it is clear that the number of peace orders has increased significantly. Excavators, cranes, equipment for power plants, all kinds of machine tools poured in... It is impossible, even if we wanted to, to downplay the role of the supplied products in comparison with our own products.

These supplies should also include plants intended for oil refining. The Soviet Union did not produce high-octane gasoline. His needs in the country for 1941 were met by 4%. But for peacetime this figure is normal, but for wartime it is a disaster. During the years 1941-1945, more than 2 million tons of gasoline with an octane number of more than 99 were delivered under Lend-Lease. And this amounts to 50-60% of the total production of such gasoline in the country during all the war years. Most of the imported fuel was used by Lend-Lease equipment, and the remainder was used to dilute domestic gasoline to improve its quality.

Almost a third of all ammunition used in combat was filled with gunpowder from Lend-Lease supplies. Many industries of the USSR would not have been able to develop without the allied supplies of non-ferrous metals, alloying additives and rolled metal.

Household goods

The number of shoes imported into our country during the war years is measured in millions of pairs. After the end of the war, many warehouses could boast of the presence of American boots, of which there were about 4 million.

High-calorie food is important not only for soldiers, but also for the civilian population. It means saving people from hunger and ensuring large-scale military operations. Under Lend-Lease, so much canned high-energy food was supplied that it would be enough to supply ten million fighters for one and a half thousand days. And this is somewhat longer than the duration of the Great Patriotic War!

The warring country had nowhere to get grain for sowing, but in 1942, allied supplies made it possible to carry out sowing work in full.

Lend-Lease supplies included not only essential products. There were also exotic things, such as chocolate-covered meat. Despite the apparent absurdity, this combination is the best option for combining high-calorie foods with low weight and volume. So Lend-Lease brought the joke to life, and people working in harsh climatic conditions received high-calorie foods.

Supply price

Lend-Lease and payment for supplies is the main myth. During the Cold War, the issue of clearing up supply debt became a political tool. It was used by both conflicting parties.

The Western powers did not write off the Lend-Lease debts of the USSR, as they did for other indebted states. Nowadays, in disputes about the specific cost of goods supplied, very different figures are heard. Some believe that payments ended in 2006, others call the amount 10 billion at the end of deliveries. To this is also added a certain coefficient for inflation, the value of which is very uncertain.

Lend-Lease deliveries hold a special place among the Allied operations against the Axis countries. They helped increase the effectiveness of Soviet troops, allowing them to significantly reduce military and economic losses. And for the civilian population in the rear and in the liberated territories, these supplies became a serious help.

Literature:

Lend-Lease shipments World War II, US War Department documents, 1946.
The Roads to Russia: United States Lend-Lease to the Soviet Union, by Robert H. Jones, University of Oklahoma Press. 1969.
Soviet Supply Protocols, United States printing office.
A. Paperno, “Unknown WW2 in the North Pacific region.”
Vernidub I. I. “Victory Ammunition.”
TsAMO RF, f. 38, op. 11355, no. 832 “NIBT report from the test site for testing German tanks.”

Both in Soviet times and now in modern Russia, the only existing opinion is that Germany lost the Second World War only thanks to the USSR, which made a decisive contribution to the victory over fascism.

At the same time, the assistance that was provided to the USSR during the war by its allies in the anti-Hitler coalition, primarily the USA and England, was insignificant and did not in any way affect the victory of the USSR in the Second World War, since it amounted to only about 4% of the funds spent by the country on the war.

This assistance is Lend-Lease (from the English lend - to lend and lease - to rent, rent) - a government program under which the United States of America transferred to its allies in World War II: ammunition, equipment, food and strategic raw materials, including petroleum products.

In the West, there is a different point of view on Lend-Lease, according to which the assistance provided to the Soviet Union during the Second World War greatly helped the latter win the Second World War, and, accordingly, win together with the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition in the Second World War.

In order to figure out which side is right, what the notorious 4% are, let’s look at what exactly, by whom and when was supplied to the USSR during the Second World War.

The notorious Lend-Lease: What was it like?

The USSR was subject to the US Lend-Lease law, based on the following principles:

• all payments for supplied materials are made after the end of the war
• materials that are destroyed will not be subject to any payment
• materials that remain suitable for civilian needs are paid for no earlier than 5 years after the end of the war, in the form of long-term loans
• US share in Lend-Lease – 96.4%

Supplies from the USA to the USSR can be divided into the following stages:

• pre-Lend-Lease - from June 22, 1941 to September 30, 1941 (paid in gold)
• first protocol - from October 1, 1941 to June 30, 1942 (signed October 1, 1941)
• second protocol - from July 1, 1942 to June 30, 1943 (signed October 6, 1942)
• third protocol - from July 1, 1943 to June 30, 1944 (signed October 19, 1943)
• the fourth protocol - from July 1, 1944, (signed on April 17, 1944), formally ended on May 12, 1945, but deliveries were extended until the end of the war with Japan, which the USSR undertook to enter 90 days after the end of the war in Europe (that is, on August 8 1945). On the Soviet side, it received the name “October 17 Program” (1944) or the fifth protocol. From the American – “MailPost Program”.

Japan surrendered on September 2, 1945, and on September 20, 1945, all Lend-Lease deliveries to the USSR were stopped.

In addition, during the Second World War, the “Russia War Relief Committee” was created in the United States, which, using donations collected, supplied medicines, medical supplies and equipment, food and clothing worth more than $1.5 billion.

A similar committee operated in England, but the amount it collected was much more modest. And with the funds of the Armenians of Iran and Ethiopia, money was collected for the construction of a tank column named after Bagramyan.

Note 1: As we see, supplies of military equipment and other things necessary for waging war to the USSR were carried out from the first days of the war. And this, as everyone knows, was the most difficult and intense stage of military operations taking place on the territory of the Soviet Union, since no one knew whether the USSR would lose in this war or not, which means that every tank, every plane, every cartridge supplied by the allies was precious.

By the way, people in Russia often like to remember that the USSR paid for the assistance provided in gold (For information on how the USSR paid in gold and whose gold it was, most likely, see Appendix I), but they paid for the pre-Lend-Lease deliveries of 1941 in gold , and for the remaining years? Has the Soviet Union paid for all the machinery, equipment, non-ferrous metals and other materials supplied to it?

The most interesting thing is that the USSR still has not paid for the assistance provided to it! And the point here is not that the Lend-Lease debt is some astronomical amount. Quite the contrary, both the USSR and Russia were able to pay at any moment, but the whole point, as always, is not about money, but about politics.

The United States decided not to claim payment for military supplies under Lend-Lease, but the USSR was offered to pay for civilian supplies, but Stalin refused to even report the results of the inventory of goods received. This was due to the fact that otherwise, as USSR Foreign Minister A.A. wrote to Stalin. Gromyko: “...the Americans may then demand that we decipher the remains for individual groups, in particular for equipment.

Having received from us this kind of information about the remains of civilian items, the Americans can, referring to Article V of the Agreement of June 11, 1942, present to us a demand for the return of the items most valuable to us.”

The Soviet leadership simply appropriated all the remaining technology and equipment received during the war from the allies and in particular from the Americans, which the USSR was obliged to return!

In 1948 The USSR agreed to pay only a small amount. In 1951 The USA twice reduced the amount of payment to 800 million dollars, and the USSR agreed to pay only 300 million. The debt was partially repaid during the time of N. Khrushchev, the remainder amounted to about 750 million dollars in the era of L. Brezhnev. According to the 1972 agreement The USSR agreed to pay 722 million dollars along with interest and by 1973. 48 million were paid, after which payments stopped. In 1990 A new maturity date was set - 2030. in the amount of 674 million dollars.

Thus, out of the total volume of American supplies under Lend-Lease of $11 billion, the USSR, and then Russia, recognized and then partially paid for $722 million, or about 7%. However, it is worth considering that today’s dollar is about 15 times “lighter” than the 1945 dollar.

In general, after the end of the war, when the help of the allies in the anti-Hitler coalition was no longer needed, Stalin abruptly remembered that they were capitalists and enemies to whom there was no need to repay any debts.

Before giving dry supply figures, it is worth getting acquainted with what Soviet military commanders and party leaders actually said about Lend-Lease. As they, in contrast to modern forum “historians” and specialists in military equipment from the plow, estimated, that same 4% of the total.

Marshal Zhukov said in post-war conversations:

“Now they say that the allies never helped us...

But it cannot be denied that the Americans sent us so much material, without which we would not have been able to form our reserves and would not have been able to continue the war...

We didn't have explosives or gunpowder. There was nothing to equip rifle cartridges with. The Americans really helped us out with gunpowder and explosives. And how much sheet steel they sent us! Would we have been able to quickly establish tank production if not for American steel assistance? And now they present the matter in such a way that we had all this in abundance...

Without American trucks, we would have nothing to pull our artillery with.”

– From the report of KGB Chairman V. Semichastny to N. S. Khrushchev; classified as “top secret”.

The role of Lend-Lease was also highly appreciated by A.I. Mikoyan, who during the war was responsible for the work of the seven allied People's Commissariats (trade, procurement, food, fish and meat and dairy industries, maritime transport and river fleet) and, as the People's Commissar of the country's foreign trade, with 1942, in charge of receiving allied supplies under Lend-Lease:

“... when American stew, shortening, egg powder, flour, and other products began to arrive to us, what significant additional calories our soldiers immediately received! And not only the soldiers: something also fell to the rear.

Or let's take the supply of cars. After all, we received, as far as I remember, taking into account losses along the way, about 400 thousand first-class cars for that time such as Studebaker, Ford, Willys cars and amphibians. Our entire army actually found itself on wheels, and what wheels! As a result, its maneuverability increased and the pace of the offensive increased noticeably.

Yes... - Mikoyan said thoughtfully. “Without Lend-Lease, we would probably have fought for another year and a half.”

G. Kumanev “Stalin’s people’s commissars speak.”

We will return to the question of the extra years of the war, but for now let’s look at who supplied what and how much to the Soviet Union during the war years and what role this assistance played in the victory over Germany.

Note 2: What is important is the name of the aid supplied under Lend-Lease was determined by the Soviet government and was intended to plug the “bottlenecks” in the supply of Soviet industry and the army.

That is, the most essential things necessary for conducting military operations at that particular moment were supplied. Therefore, for the entire period of the war, in some respects, military equipment, machinery or vehicles supplied under Lend-Lease may seem ridiculous, but at a certain period, for example, in the battle of Moscow, this help was invaluable.

Thus, the 750 British and 180 American tanks that arrived from September to December 1941 amounted to more than 50% of the number of tanks that the Red Army had (1731 tanks) at that time against the Wehrmacht!!! In the Battle of Moscow, imported military equipment amounted to 20%, which, in turn, was equivalent to the monthly losses of Soviet armored vehicles.

And Soviet and Russian historians laugh at the size of the assistance provided, while calling the military equipment supplied to the USSR obsolete. Then in 1941 it was neither small nor outdated, when it helped Soviet troops survive and win the battle of Moscow, thereby deciding the outcome of the war in their favor, and after the victory it sharply became insignificant and did not affect the course of hostilities in any way.

The total amount of everything provided under Lend-Lease by all donor countries:

Aircraft - 22,150. The USSR received 18.7 thousand aircraft from the USA alone. In 1943 The United States supplied 6,323 combat aircraft (18% of all fighters produced by the USSR in 1943), of which 4,569 fighters (31% of all fighters produced by the USSR in 1943).

In addition to the 4,952 P-39 Airacobra and 2,420 P-63 Kingcobra fighters supplied under Lend-Lease, more than a million high-explosive shells were also supplied to the USSR for their 37-mm M4 aircraft gun. It’s not enough to have an airplane; you also need to use it to fire at enemy targets.

Also, all aircraft supplied under Lend-Lease, without exception, were equipped with radio stations. At the same time, for the construction of aircraft on the territory of the USSR, a special tarpaulin was used, supplied exclusively under Lend-Lease.

Many Soviet pilots became Heroes of the Soviet Union by flying Lend-Lease aircraft. Soviet historiography tried in every possible way to hide or minimize this fact. For example, three times Hero of the Soviet Union Alexander Pokryshkin piloted the P-39 Airacobra. Twice Hero of the Soviet Union Dmitry Glinka also flew the P-39 Airacobra. Twice Hero of the Soviet Union Arseny Vasilyevich Vorozheikin flew a Kittihawk fighter.

Tanks and self-propelled guns - 12,700. The British supplied 1,084 Matilda-2 tanks (164 were lost during transportation), 3,782 (420 lost during transportation) Valentine tanks, 2,560 Bren MK1 armored personnel carriers, 20 Tetrarch MK- light tanks 7, 301 (43 lost during transportation) Churchill tank, 650 T-48 (Soviet designation SU-57),. The United States delivered 1,776 (104 lost during transportation) light Stuart tanks, 1,386 (410 lost during transportation) Lee tanks, 4,104 (400 lost during transportation) Sherman tanks. 52 self-propelled guns M10.

Ships and vessels - 667. Of these: naval 585 - 28 frigates, 3 icebreakers, 205 torpedo boats, 105 landing craft of various types, 140 submarine hunters and other small ones. In addition, American engines from General Motors were installed on the Soviet large sea hunters of Project 122. And trade - 82 (including 36 wartime buildings, 46 pre-war buildings).

Ground transport. Cars - During the war, the Soviet Union received only 52 thousand Willys jeeps, and this does not include Dodge cars. In 1945, out of 665 thousand available trucks, 427 thousand were received under Lend-Lease. Of these, about 100 thousand were legendary Studebakers.

3,786,000 tires were also supplied for vehicles. While in the USSR during all the years of the war, the total number of cars produced was 265.5 thousand units. In general, before the war, the Red Army’s need for vehicles was estimated at 744 thousand and 92 thousand tractors. There were 272.6 thousand cars and 42 thousand tractors in stock.

Only 240 thousand cars were planned to come from the national economy, of which 210 thousand were trucks, not counting tractors. And even summing up these figures, we do not get the planned staffing level. And of those who were in the army by 08/22/41. 271.4 thousand Soviet vehicles were lost. Now think about how many soldiers can carry a load weighing hundreds of kilograms on their hands for tens or hundreds of kilometers?

Motorcycles – 35,170.

Tractors – 8,071.

Small arms. Automatic weapons - 131,633, rifles - 8,218, pistols - 12,997.

Explosives - 389,766 tons: dynamite - 70,400,000 pounds (31,933 tons), gunpowder - 127,000 tons, TNT - 271,500,000 pounds (123,150 tons), toluene - 237,400,000 pounds (107,683 tons). Detonators – 903,000.

Note 3: The same explosives and gunpowder that Zhukov spoke about, with the help of which bullets and shells could hit the enemy, and not lie in warehouses as worthless pieces of metal, because the Germans seized the factories for their production, and new factories have not yet been built and they will not be built for a long time covered all the necessary needs of the army.

What are tens of thousands of tanks and guns worth if you can’t fire them? Absolutely nothing. It was precisely this opportunity to shoot at the enemy that the allies - the Americans and the British - gave to Soviet soldiers, thereby providing invaluable assistance during the most difficult period of the war, in 1941, as well as in all subsequent years of this war.

Railway rolling stock. Locomotives - 1,981. Soviet ones were almost never produced during the war. They will be discussed a little later. But now it is worth mentioning that diesel or steam locomotives, for example, in 1942 in the USSR were produced - not a single diesel locomotive, 9 steam locomotives.

Freight cars - 11,155. In the Soviet Union itself, as many as 1,087 cars were produced in 1941-1945. It seems like a small thing, some wagons, these are not guns or airplanes, but how can you deliver thousands of tons of cargo hundreds of kilometers from the factory to the front line? On soldiers' backs or on horses? And this is time, the same time that during war is more valuable than all the gold in the world, because the outcome of the battle depends on it.

Raw materials and resources. Non-ferrous metals - 802,000 tons (of which 387,600 tons of copper (the USSR produced 27,816 tons of copper in 1941-45)), petroleum products - 2,670,000 tons, chemicals - 842,000 tons, cotton - 106,893,000 tons, leather - 49,860 tons, alcohol - 331,066 liters.

Ammunition: army boots - 15,417,000 pairs, blankets - 1,541,590, buttons - 257,723,498 pieces, 15 million pairs of shoes. The telephone cable received from the USA was 3 times greater than the quantity that the USSR produced during the war.

Food – 4,478,000 tons. Under Lend-Lease, the USSR received 250 thousand tons of stewed meat, 700 thousand tons of sugar, more than 50% of the USSR's needs for fats and vegetable oils. Despite the fact that the Americans themselves denied themselves these very products so that Soviet soldiers could get more of them.

Separately, it is necessary to mention those delivered to the USSR in 1942. – 9000 tons of seed material. The Bolsheviks and party leaders, of course, remained silent, territories were captured, vast territories, production and people were evacuated to distant corners of the country.

It is necessary to sow rye, wheat, and fodder crops, but they simply do not exist. The Allies delivered everything necessary to the USSR on time. It was thanks to this help that the Soviet Union was able to grow its own grain during the war and provide it to a certain extent for its citizens.

Note 4: But war is not only and not so much shells and cartridges, guns and machine guns, but also soldiers, the very ones who must go into battle, sacrifice their health and lives for the sake of victory. Soldiers who need to eat and eat well, otherwise the soldier simply will not be able to hold a weapon in his hands and pull the trigger, let alone go on the attack.

For modern people who know neither famine nor war, it is easy to talk about the dedication, heroism and exceptional contribution to victory of a particular country, having never seen a single battle in their lives, let alone a full-scale war. Therefore, for them, in their opinion, the main thing is to have something to fight with, and such “little things” as food do not even fade into the background or into the background.

But war does not consist of a series of incessant battles and battles, there is defense, the transfer of troops from one sector of the front to another, and so on. And the soldier, without receiving food, will simply die of hunger.

There are plenty of examples of how Soviet soldiers died at the front from hunger, and not from an enemy bullet. After all, at the very beginning, the Germans captured the territories of Belarus and Ukraine, the very territories that supplied bread and meat. Therefore, to deny the obvious - the allied assistance in the victory of the USSR in the Second World War, provided even with the help of food supplies - is stupid.

Separately, before drawing certain conclusions, I consider it necessary to focus attention on those names of weapons, equipment or materials that not only helped to “forge” victory for the USSR during the Second World War, but raised the USSR in the post-war period at the technological level, eliminating its lag behind Western or American countries. Thus, Lend-Lease played its role as a “lifesaver” for the USSR, helping the country to recover as soon as possible. But this particular point was not simply denied, as in the case of weapons, but was simply hushed up, both in the USSR and today in Russia.

And now in more detail

Transport:

In the second half of the war, the Lend-Lease Studebakers (specifically, Studebaker US6) became the main chassis for Katyushas. While the US gave approx. 20 thousand vehicles for Katyusha; after June 22, only 600 trucks were produced in the USSR (mainly ZIS-6 chassis).

As you can see, the difference between 20,000 and 600 is quite significant. If we talk about car production in general, then during the war 205 thousand cars were manufactured in the USSR, and 477 thousand were received under Lend-Lease, that is, 2.3 times more. It is also worth mentioning that 55% of the cars produced in the USSR during the war years were GAZ-MM trucks with a carrying capacity of 1.5 tons - “lorry-and-a-half”.

Machines and equipment:

Industrial products delivered at the end of the war included 23.5 thousand machine tools, 1526 cranes and excavators, 49.2 thousand tons of metallurgical equipment, 212 thousand tons of power equipment, including turbines for the Dnieper Hydroelectric Power Station. To understand the significance of the supply of these machines and mechanisms, you can compare them with production at domestic enterprises, for example, in 1945.

That year, only 13 cranes and excavators were assembled in the USSR, 38.4 thousand metal-cutting machines were produced, and the weight of metallurgical equipment produced was 26.9 thousand tons. The range of Lend-Lease equipment and components included thousands of items: from bearings and measuring instruments to cutting machines and metallurgical mills.

An American engineer who visited the Stalingrad Tractor Plant at the end of 1945 discovered that half of the machine park of this enterprise was supplied under Lend-Lease.

Along with batches of individual machines and mechanisms, the Allies provided the Soviet Union with several production and technological lines, and even entire factories. American oil refineries in Kuibyshev, Guryev, Orsk and Krasnovodsk, and a tire plant in Moscow produced their first products at the end of 1944. Soon, automobile assembly lines transferred to the Soviet Union from Iran and a plant for the production of rolled aluminum began to operate.

Thanks to the import of more than a thousand American and British power plants, industrial enterprises and residential areas of many cities came to life. At least two dozen American mobile power plants made it possible to solve the problem of power supply to Arkhangelsk in 1945 and in subsequent years.

And one more very important fact related to Lend-Lease machines. On January 23, 1944, the T-34-85 tank was adopted by the Red Army. But its production at the beginning of 1944 was carried out only at one plant Љ 112 (“Krasnoe Sormovo”). The largest manufacturer of "thirty-fours", the Nizhny Tagil plant Љ 183, could not switch to producing the T-34-85, since there was nothing to process the turret ring gear with a diameter of 1600 mm.

The rotary machine available at the plant made it possible to process parts with a diameter of up to 1500 mm. Of the NKTP enterprises, such machines were available only at Uralmashzavod and plant Љ 112. But since Uralmashzavod was loaded with the IS tank production program, there was no hope for it in terms of production of the T-34-85. Therefore, new rotary machines were ordered from the UK (Loudon) and the USA (Lodge).

As a result, the first T-34-85 tank left the workshop of the Љ 183 plant only on March 15, 1944. These are the facts; as they say, you can’t argue with them. If the plant had not received 183 imported rotary machines, new tanks would not have come out of its gates. So it turns out that, in all honesty, it is necessary to add 10,253 T-34-85 tanks produced by Nizhny Tagil “Vagonka” before the end of the war to Lend-Lease supplies of armored vehicles.

Railway transport:

It was not enough to produce tanks and planes; they also had to be delivered to the front. The production of mainline steam locomotives in the USSR amounted to 914 in 1940, 708 in 1941, 9 in 1942, 43 in 1943, 32 in 1944, 8 in 1945. 5 mainline diesel locomotives were produced in 1940, and in 1941 - one, after which their production was discontinued until 1945 inclusive.

9 mainline electric locomotives were produced in 1940, and 6 in 1941, after which their production was also discontinued. Thus, during the Great Patriotic War, the locomotive fleet was not replenished through its own production. Under Lend-Lease, 1,900 steam locomotives and 66 diesel-electric locomotives were delivered to the USSR (according to other sources, 1,981 locomotives). Thus, deliveries under Lend-Lease exceeded the total Soviet production of steam locomotives in 1941-1945 by 2.4 times, and electric locomotives by 11 times.

The production of freight cars in the USSR in 1942-1945 amounted to 1,087 units, compared to 33,096 in 1941. Under Lend-Lease, a total of 11,075 cars were delivered, or 10.2 times more than Soviet production. In addition, railway fastenings, tires, locomotive axles and wheels were supplied.

Under Lend-Lease, 622.1 thousand tons of railway rails were supplied to the USSR, which amounted to 83.3% of the total volume of Soviet production. If we exclude production for the second half of 1945 from the calculations, then Lend-Lease on rails will amount to 92.7% of the total volume of Soviet rail production. Thus, almost half of the railroad rails used on Soviet railroads during the war came from the United States.

Without exaggeration, it can be said that supplies under Lend-Lease prevented the paralysis of railway transport in the USSR during the war.

Means of communication:

It’s a rather “slippery” topic that the USSR and Russia have tried and are still trying not to talk about, because in this regard many questions arise and answers that are inconvenient for jingoists are found. The fact is that with numerous calculations of Lend-Lease volumes, we are usually talking about military supplies. And to be even more precise – about the supply of weapons and military equipment. Most often, it is for this category of Lend-Lease that percentages are calculated in order to prove that the Allied assistance was insignificant.

But military supplies consisted not only of tanks, aircraft and guns. A special place, for example, in the list of allied supplies was occupied by radio equipment and communications equipment. In this area, according to the then leading specialists of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade on imported communications, the Soviet Union lagged behind its allies by almost 10 years. Not only did the technical characteristics and workmanship of Soviet radio stations on the eve of the Great Patriotic War leave much to be desired, but they were also in short supply.

In the tank forces of the Red Army, for example, on April 1, 1941, only T-35, T-28 and KV tanks were 100% equipped with radio stations. All others were divided into “radial” and “linear”. Transceiver radio stations were installed on “radium” tanks, but nothing was installed on “linear” tanks. The space for the radio station in the niche of the BT-7 or T-26 turret was occupied by a rack for 45-mm rounds or disks for the DT machine gun. In addition, in the niches of the “linear” tanks, the rear “Voroshilov” machine guns were installed.

On April 1, 1941, the troops had 311 T-34 “linear” tanks, that is, without a radio station, and 130 “radio” tanks, 2452 BT-7 “linear” and 1883 “radio” tanks, 510 BT-7M “linear” and 181 “radium”, 1270 BT-5 “linear” and 402 “radium”, finally, 3950 T-26 “linear” and 3345 “radium” (in relation to the T-26 we are talking only about single-turret tanks).

Thus, out of 15,317 tanks of the mentioned types, only 6,824 vehicles were equipped with radio stations, that is, 44%. Communication with the rest in battle was carried out only by flag signaling. I think there is no need to explain that during a battle, amidst shell explosions, smoke and dust, showing the direction of movement and directing a tank attack with the help of flags is “a little” difficult and simply suicidal.

It will not be unexpected to say that the situation with communications equipment in other branches of the military - aviation, infantry, cavalry, etc. was similar, and sometimes even worse. After the start of the war, the situation only worsened. By the end of 1941, 55% of the Red Army's radio stations were lost, and most of the manufacturing plants were in the process of being evacuated.

In fact, only one plant continued to produce radios. As a result, for example, from January to July 1942, the Stalingrad Tractor Plant shipped 2,140 T-34 tanks to the active army, of which only 360 were equipped with radio stations. This is something like 17%. Approximately the same picture was observed at other factories.

In 1942, radio stations, locators, telephones, charging units, radio beacons and other devices began to arrive in the USSR under Lend-Lease, the purpose of which was only guessed at in the Soviet Union. From the summer of 1942 to July 1943, the import of radio stations increased more than 10 times, and telephone sets almost doubled.

Based on the norms for manning divisions in military conditions, these radio stations were enough to equip 150, and field telephones to supply 329 divisions. Thanks to the supply of 400-watt radio stations, for example, front, army headquarters and airfields were fully provided with communications.

The domestic industry began to produce similar radio stations only in 1943, in a semi-handicraft way and in quantities of no more than three units per month. With the arrival of another American radio station, V-100, in 1942, the Red Army was able to provide reliable communications to the division-regiment link. In 1942-1943, most heavy KV tanks were also equipped with imported radio stations Љ 19.

As for field telephones, their shortage in the Red Army from 1941 to 1943, largely thanks to imports, was reduced from 80 to 20%. The import of the telephone cable supplied with the devices (338 thousand km) was three times higher than its production in the USSR.

The supply of communications equipment was of great importance for the control of troops in the final battles of the war. In value terms, in 1944-1945 they exceeded the imports of previous years by 1.4 times. According to military supply standards, the radio stations imported in 1944-1945 (23,777 units) would be enough to supply 360 divisions; charging units (6663 pcs.) - 1333 divisions, and telephone sets (177,900 pcs.) - to staff 511 divisions. By the end of the war, the “share” of allied communications equipment in the Red Army and Navy averaged about 80%.

It should be noted that a large amount of imported communication equipment was sent to the national economy. Thanks to the supply of 200 high-frequency telephone stations, the production of which was practically absent in the USSR, by 1944 it was possible to establish reliable communications between Moscow and the largest Soviet cities: Leningrad, Kharkov, Kiev, Ulyanovsk, Sverdlovsk, Saratov, etc.

And imported telegraph devices “Teletype”, telephone switches and civilian devices in a matter of months replaced the Soviet ones, providing reliable communications between transport routes and remote regions of the country with administrative centers. Following the 3-channel high-frequency telephony systems, more complex, 12-channel ones began to arrive in the country.

If before the war the Soviet Union managed to create an experimental 3-channel station, then there were no 12-channel stations at all. It is no coincidence that it was immediately installed to serve the most important lines connecting Moscow with the largest cities of the country - Leningrad, Kiev and Kharkov.

American radio stations Љ 299, 399, 499, designed to provide communications for the headquarters of armies and navies, have also found wide application in the sea and river fleets, in the communications system of the fishing industry and the country's electric power industry. And the entire art radio broadcasting system of the country was provided by only two American 50-watt radio transmitters “M-83330A”, installed in 1944 in Moscow and Kyiv. Four more transmitters were sent to the NKVD special communications system.

It is also difficult to overestimate the supply of British and American radars. In the Soviet Union, this topic was also hushed up in every possible way, because: in the USSR during the war years, 775 radars of all types were manufactured, and more than 2 thousand were received under Lend-Lease, including 373 naval and 580 aircraft.

In addition, a significant part of domestic radars was simply copied from imported samples. In particular, 123 (according to other sources, even 248) SON-2 artillery radars (SON - gun guidance station) were an exact copy of the English GL-2 radar. It would also be appropriate to mention that NI I-108 and plant Љ 498, where SON-2 was assembled, were equipped with imported equipment by two-thirds.

And what do we have in the end? Communications, as you know, are often called the nerves of the army, which means that during the Great Patriotic War these nerves were mostly imported.

Food:

Already at the beginning of the war, the Germans captured the territory that produced 84% of sugar and almost 40% of grain in the USSR. In 1942, after the occupation of southern Russia, the situation became even more complicated. The United States supplied the entire range of food products to the USSR under Lend-Lease. Of which the modern reader knows nothing except canned meat.

But in addition to canned meat, nicknamed the “second front,” the Lend-Lease diet included the no less popular “Roosevelt eggs” - powdered eggs from the “just add water” series, dark chocolate (for pilots, scouts and sailors), biscuits, as well as a canned substance called “meat in chocolate”, incomprehensible to Russian taste. Canned turkeys and chickens were supplied with the same “sauce”.

Food supplies for Leningrad and the cities of the Far North played a special role. In Arkhangelsk alone, through which one of the main flows of food flowed, 20 thousand people died from hunger and disease during the first war winter - every tenth resident of the pre-war city!

And if not for those 10 thousand tons of Canadian wheat, which, after much delay, Stalin allowed to remain in Arkhangelsk, it is unknown how many more people would have been killed by hunger. It is even more difficult to calculate how many lives in the liberated areas were saved by 9 thousand tons of seeds transferred to the Soviet Union via the Iranian “air bridge” in 1942 at the beginning of spring field work.

Two years later the situation became catastrophic. The Red Army, which went on the offensive, liberated vast war-ravaged territories in which millions of people lived in 1943-1944. The situation was complicated by drought in the regions of Siberia, the Volga region and the North Caucasus.

An acute food crisis has broken out in the country, which military historians prefer to remain silent about, focusing on the course of hostilities and the supply of the army. Meanwhile, in November 1943, the already meager food distribution standards were secretly reduced by almost a third.

This significantly reduced the workers’ rations (800 g of bread was provided on the worker’s food card), not to mention the dependents. Therefore, food supplies by mid-1944 significantly exceeded the total food imports under the First and Second Protocols, displacing metals and even some types of weapons in Soviet requests.

The food supplied to the USSR would be enough to feed an army of ten million for 1600 days. For information, the Great Patriotic War lasted 1418 days!

Conclusions: In order to show that Lend-Lease deliveries to yesterday's allies did not play any role in the war of the Soviet Union with Germany, the Bolsheviks and modern Russian forum “historians” used their favorite technique - to give out the total mass of equipment produced in the USSR for the entire period of the war and compare it with the amount of military equipment supplied under Lend-Lease, while simultaneously keeping silent about the most unpleasant moments associated with Lend-Lease. Of course, in this total mass, all the military equipment supplied by the Americans and the British had a small share. But, at the same time, Stalin and the Bolsheviks slyly kept silent that:

A) During the most intense period of the war for the USSR, namely from September to December 1941, it was British and American tanks and aircraft that helped the USSR survive. A fifth of all tanks participating in the Battle of Moscow were Lend-Lease, foreign.

b) The names of supplied materials and equipment under Lend-Lease were determined by the Soviet government and were intended to plug the “bottlenecks” in the supply of Soviet industry and the army. That is, the most essential things necessary for conducting military operations at that particular moment were supplied.

In 1941, what was needed was mainly military equipment, since the production of weapons had not yet been established at the evacuated factories and it was this that was supplied, and when the USSR survived the first year of the war, it no longer needed tanks and planes, first of all, but raw materials , equipment and food, which were in good working order and supplied to him by the allies of the anti-Hitler coalition.

V) It is, allegedly, such secondary materials as non-ferrous metals, explosives, communications equipment, transport, etc. that significantly influenced both the production of military equipment within the country and simply helped the soldiers of the Red Army fight the enemy. As an example, “Katyushas”, which simply would not drive without Lend-Lease Studebakers, or gunpowder, without which, in general, it is problematic to shoot a weapon, no matter how good it is.

G) Food is a separate line. In the list of which, without a doubt, it is necessary to include the seed material that the USSR received from the allies during the war. Not only was there enough canned meat for the entire period of the war and beyond that, but at the moment when the USSR needed seeds to resume the sowing season, the necessary assistance was provided to it.

This means that the war and post-war famine of the civilian population that the Soviet Union experienced after the war would have been even more terrible and deadly. For some, this may seem insignificant, but it is precisely from these “insignificant” and “minor” moments that victory is achieved.

It’s not enough to have a machine gun in your hands, you need to shoot something else from it, the soldier must be fed, shod, dressed, like his commanders, who, in turn, can quickly receive and transmit urgent information about the location of the enemy, about the beginning of his offensive, or on the contrary, retreat.

d) The debt for deliveries under Lend-Lease, a ridiculous debt for which the USSR and Russia have been paying for about 60 years, can be perceived as both the level of gratitude for the assistance provided by the USA and England during the war, and the attitude towards yesterday's allies until today, that is simply none.

And in the end, the allies also found themselves guilty before the USSR-Russia, in which there are still reproaches about insufficient assistance from them during the war. Which very well characterizes the approach in foreign policy to states and peoples on the part of the USSR-Russia.

To summarize all of the above, we can say that at a minimum the following:

Without Lend-Lease assistance, it is quite possible that the Soviet Union would still have won the Second World War (although in the light of already known information this statement is not so clear), but the war would have lasted several years longer and, accordingly, would have lost several million people more lives.

But they did not lose it precisely thanks to the help of the Lend-Lease allies. This is what these insignificant 4% mean, as Soviet historians wrote and Russian historians write today, of the total produced by the Soviet Union during the war years - several million human lives!

Even if we don’t focus on the details that we discussed above, these 4% are the lives of someone’s fathers, mothers, brothers or sisters. It is quite possible that these would be our relatives, which means that it is quite possible that we were born thanks to this insignificant 4%.

So, are their lives and ours really an insufficient contribution of the USA, England, Canada and other allied countries in the anti-Hitler coalition to the victory over Germany? So, don’t both the USA and England deserve a kind word and gratitude from us today? At least a little bit, at least by 4%?

Is 4% a lot or a little - millions of lives saved? Let everyone decide for themselves and answer this question according to their conscience.

The additions contain several striking examples of how the Soviet leadership was able to appropriate part of the assistance received under Lend-Lease, and also put an end to the speculation of the Soviet and Russian side regarding payment for Lend-Lease in gold, traces of which, by the way, lead to completely unexpected conclusions.

Appendix I. How the USSR paid for Lend-Lease in gold (Edinburgh gold and the Spanish trace).

Let's start with the fact that the USSR used gold to pay for pre-Lend-Lease, as well as for goods and materials purchased from allies other than Lend-Lease. Modern Russian forum “specialists” claim that the USSR paid for Lend-Lease in gold even after 1941, without making a difference between Lend-Lease itself and pre-Lend-Lease, and also completely deliberately omitting the fact that the Soviet Union During the war, purchases were made outside the Lend-Lease framework. As an example of their correctness, such generalist “experts” cite the sunken British cruiser Edinburgh, which carried approximately 5.5 tons of gold in 1942.

And, as they claim, this was the USSR’s payment to the allies for the military equipment received under Lend-Lease. But the fact is that after this, on the part of such “specialists,” there comes a deathly silence. Why?

Yes, because the USSR could not pay in gold for deliveries under Lend-Lease in 1942 - the Lend-Lease agreement stipulated that material and technical assistance would be supplied to the Soviet side with a deferred payment. 465 gold bars with a total weight of 5536 kilograms loaded onto the cruiser Edinburgh in Murmansk in April 1942 were payment from the Soviet Union to England for weapons supplied in excess of the list stipulated in the Lend-Lease agreement.

But it turned out that this gold did not reach England. The cruiser Edinburgh was damaged and scuttled. And, the Soviet Union, even during the war years, received insurance in the amount of 32.32% of the value of gold, paid by the British War Risk Insurance Bureau.

By the way, all the gold transported, the notorious 5.5 tons, at prices of that time cost just over 100 million dollars. Let's compare it with the total amount of assistance provided under Lend-Lease of 10 billion dollars, which neither the USSR nor Russia, of course, like to talk about, but at the same time, making wide eyes, they vaguely hint that it was simply an astronomical amount.

However, the story of Edinburgh's gold did not end there.

In 1981, the English treasure hunting company Jesson Marine Recovery entered into an agreement with the authorities of the USSR and Great Britain on the search and recovery of gold. “Edinburgh” lay at a depth of 250 meters. In the most difficult conditions, the divers managed to lift 5129 kg. According to the agreement, 2/3 of the gold was received by the USSR, 1/3 by Great Britain. Minus the payment to the company for the gold lifting operation carried out.

Thus, not only was the gold transported by Edinburgh not a payment for Lend-Lease, not only did this gold never reach the Allies, and a third of its value was reimbursed to the USSR during the war years, and even later forty years, when this gold was raised, most of it was returned to the USSR.

What is most interesting and deserves the closest attention is whose gold it was that the USSR used to pay its allies?

Following simple logic, we have the right to think that the USSR could pay with its own and only its own gold. And nothing else. But, as they say, it’s not like that. And the point here is this: during the Spanish Civil War, on October 15, 1936, Caballero and Negrin officially turned to the Soviet Union with a request to accept approximately 500 tons of gold for storage. And already on February 15, 1937, an act of acceptance of 510.07 tons of Spanish gold was signed, which was melted into gold bars with the Soviet mark.

Did Spain get its gold back? No. Therefore, even the gold that the Soviet Union used to pay its allies during World War II most likely...was Spanish. Which very well characterizes the workers’ and peasants’ power of the country of the Soviets.

Someone might say that these are mere speculations and that the Soviet leadership is the most honest, the most international, only thinking about how to help everyone in need in the world. This is roughly how aid was given to the Republicans in Spain during the Civil War. The USSR helped or helped, but not disinterestedly. When it came to money, all the capitalists of the world simply cried with envy, seeing how the USSR provided “free and selfless” assistance to the revolutionary workers and peasants in Spain.

So Moscow billed Spain for the placement and storage of gold reserves, the services of Soviet advisers, pilots, tank crews, translators and mechanics. The expenses for round trip travel of Soviet military personnel and their families, payment of daily allowances, salaries, costs of accommodation, maintenance, treatment in hospitals and stays on leave for Soviet military personnel and members of their families, funeral expenses and benefits for military widows, training of Spanish pilots were taken into account. in the Soviet Union, the construction and refurbishment of airfields on Republican-controlled territory where training flights took place. All this was paid for in Spanish gold.

For example, the total amount of material supplied from the USSR from September 1936 to July 1938 amounted to $166,835,023. And for all shipments to Spain from October 1936 to August 1938, the republican authorities fully paid the entire debt to the Soviet Union in the amount of $171,236,088.

By adding the cost of military equipment sent at the end of 1938 - beginning of 1939 to Spain from Murmansk via France ($55,359,660), we get the total cost of military-technical supplies.

It varies from 222,194,683 to 226,595,748 dollars. Due to the fact that the cargo of the last delivery was not completely delivered to its intended destination and part of it was returned to Soviet military warehouses, the final figure for the cost of military cargo delivered to Republican Spain is 202 .4 million dollars

So is it really possible that after the USSR “pocketed” Spanish gold and provided “disinterested” assistance to the Republicans, it will behave differently with the Americans and the British in matters of payment for Lend-Lease and other assistance received? No. Further, this will be demonstrated using a specific example.

Appendix II. How the USSR returned equipment and equipment to the allies.

It is enough to simply quote a number of Soviet documents that were exchanged between the Soviet and American sides during negotiations on the settlement of issues related to the payment of Lend-Lease after the war. But first, it’s better to cite an excerpt from a memo from the USSR Foreign Minister A.A. Gromyko, from which it becomes clear why the Soviet side hid in every possible way from its former allies the amount of surviving technology and equipment:

Memorandum by Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR A.A. Gromyko to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR I.V. Stalin on negotiations with the Americans to settle Lend-Lease payments

21.09.1949

“If in the negotiations we proceed from the above calculations of the global amount of compensation, based on the size of the balances of Lend-Lease supplies to the USSR, we would have to inform the Americans about the presence of such balances, which is undesirable for the following reasons: the Americans may then demand from us a decryption balances for individual groups, in particular for equipment. Having received from us this kind of information about the remains of civilian items, the Americans can, referring to Article V of the Agreement of June 11, 1942, present to us a demand for the return of the items most valuable to us.”

Thus, Stalin and the Soviet party leadership, after the war, tried by any means to avoid returning the borrowed equipment and machinery. That is why all researchers are still faced with the following problem - it is known how much equipment, weapons and equipment the allies in the anti-Hitler coalition supplied to the USSR and for what amount, but there is no exact data on the amount of all remaining equipment and equipment after the end of World War II war with the Soviet Union, which he had to return.

Therefore, on the one hand, the Soviet Union did not return the technology and equipment itself, much less, did not pay a single penny for it to the allies. And propagandists, both then in the USSR and today in Russia, received a convenient argument, proving that the allied assistance in the Lend-Lease war was insignificant.

Although, knowing that the USSR hid data on the amount of assistance received, we have the right to believe American and British data on the amount of all equipment, weapons and materials supplied to the USSR and, based on these data, draw conclusions regarding how much this received through lending -Liz help helped the USSR in the war against Germany.

As an example of such concealment of data and deliberate machinations on the part of the Soviet leadership, one can cite excerpts from the diary of Soviet-American negotiations to resolve outstanding Lend-Lease issues (Washington) held on January 13, 1950.

“As for the factories supplied under Lend-Lease, Panyushkin asked Wiley if he was referring to the factory equipment supplied as part of the loan agreement of October 15, 1945.

To this, Wiley replied that these were the factories that were supplied to the Soviet Union under Lend-Lease, but were not used for military purposes.

In response to this, Panyushkin said that during the war there are no factories that have nothing to do with the war.”

How “elegantly” the Soviet leadership removed entire factories from the list of payment or return!!! It simply stated that all the equipment used in the USSR was related to the war, and therefore is not civilian equipment that would have to be returned under the terms of Lend-Lease, and if it is recognized as such and the USSR reports its unsuitability, then in addition for this Under the terms of Lend-Lease, the Soviet leadership does not have to pay for equipment!

And so on throughout the entire list of military equipment, equipment or materials. And, if the USSR was able to keep entire factories for itself, then it’s not worth talking about some: cars, planes, ships or machine tools. All this became sharply Soviet.

And, if the Americans nevertheless persisted in the issue of some type of technology or equipment, then the Soviet side in every possible way delayed the negotiation processes, underestimated the cost of this item, or simply declared it unsuitable, and therefore not obligatory for return.

Eg:

LETTER OF THE UNITED STATES DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE J. E. WEBB TO THE USSR CHARGES AFFAIRS TEMPORARY TO THE USA V.I. BAZYKIN

“With regard to the two icebreakers which were not returned to the United States by December 1, 1949, in accordance with the Agreement of September 27, 1949, and which the Soviet Government informed the United States Government on November 12, 1949, that they would be returned to Germany or Japan by 30 June 1950, the United States Government wishes to express its regret that the Soviet Government finds it impossible at present to deliver these vessels before November or December 1950.

In view of the fact that the Soviet Government has still not complied with the request of the United States Government for the return of the 186 vessels, the United States Government must therefore consider that your Government continues to fail to comply with the obligations arising from Article V of the Basic Lend-Lease Agreement.”

In response to a request from the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding the return of 186 naval vessels to the United States, USSR Naval Minister Comrade Yumashev, in his letter dated June 24 of this year. reported the following:

"A) If it is necessary to return 186 ships and strict adherence to the nomenclature specified in the US note dated September 3, 1948, the navy can transfer to the Americans: 15 landing craft (of which 14 are in satisfactory condition and 1 in unsatisfactory condition), 101 torpedo boats (9 - in satisfactory condition and 92 - in unsatisfactory condition), 39 large hunters and 31 small hunters - all in unsatisfactory condition - a total of 186 vessels.

b) In the event that the Americans do not demand compliance with the nomenclature, the navy could hand over 186 ships - all in unsatisfactory condition.”

Memorandum by the Minister of Foreign Trade of the USSR M.A. Menshikov and First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR A.A. Gromyko I.V. Stalin in connection with negotiations with the United States on the settlement of Lend-Lease payments

18.09.1950

“State that out of the total number of 498 vessels, 261 units, including 1 AM-type minesweeper, 16 Navy-type minesweepers, 55 large hunters, 52 small hunters, 92 torpedo boats, 44 landing craft and 1 motorboat, are in completely unsatisfactory technical condition, taken out of service and unsuitable for further use, which can be confirmed by providing relevant documents on their technical condition.

State that the remaining 237 ships, including 29 AM-class minesweepers, 25 Navy-class minesweepers, 19 large hunters, 4 small hunters, 101 torpedo boats, 35 landing craft, 4 floating repair shops, 6 pontoon barges and 14 river tugs can still be used for some time only for auxiliary purposes. These ships are not suitable for independent passages in open sea areas.

Offer the Americans to sell these ships to the Soviet Union... consider it possible to purchase ships at a price not exceeding an average of 17%.

...to declare that as a result of the violation of the agreement of October 15, 1945 by the United States, which underdelivered various equipment and materials by $19 million, the Soviet Union suffered damage estimated at approximately $49 million. Demand compensation for this damage;

If the Americans again raise questions about the payment of freight for the transportation of commercial cargo on Lend-Lease ships ($6.9 million according to American estimates) and the insurance compensation we received for Lend-Lease cargo, state that since these questions were not raised in negotiations since 1947, the Soviet side considers them to have fallen due to negotiations on establishing a global amount of compensation.”

As they say, no comments.

Lend-Lease is a system for the United States of America to loan or lease military equipment, weapons, ammunition, equipment, strategic raw materials, food and other various goods to countries allied in the anti-Hitler coalition. The Lend-Lease Act was approved by the US Congress on March 11, 1941. According to this document, the president received the authority to transfer, exchange, lease and loan weapons and strategic materials to the government of any country in the event that its fight against aggressors is vital for defense U.S.A. Countries receiving Lend-Lease assistance signed bilateral agreements with the United States, which stipulated that materials destroyed, lost or consumed during the war would not be subject to any payment after its end. The remaining materials suitable for civilian consumption must be paid for in whole or in part on the basis of long-term American loans. In total, from March 11, 1941 to August 1, 1945, the United States provided the allied countries with materials and services worth $46 billion under the Lend-Lease system, including Great Britain and other countries of the British Commonwealth - worth $30.3 billion , the Soviet Union - by 9.8 billion, France - by 1.4 billion, China - by 631 million, Latin American countries - by $421 million.
In the first five months of the Great Patriotic War, the Lend-Lease law did not apply to the USSR. During this period, the United States sent $41 million worth of weapons and materials to the Soviet Union in cash. And only on November 7, 1941, US President F. D. Roosevelt extended the Lend-Lease law to the USSR.
Until this point, deliveries of goods to the USSR under Lend-Lease were carried out in accordance with the Anglo-Soviet mutual assistance agreement of July 12, 1941 from Great Britain. Already at the end of July 1941, as part of these deliveries, the English minelayer Adventure delivered a cargo of depth charges and magnetic mines to Arkhangelsk. And in August 1941, the first convoy with Lend-Lease cargo left England for the northern ports of the USSR.
The delivery of Anglo-American equipment and weapons to the Soviet Union was carried out by three routes. It was originally planned that up to 75% of all economic assistance from the Western allies would be sent by ships through the Arctic seas to the ports of Murmansk and Arkhangelsk. Until the spring of 1942, 12 sea convoys consisting of 103 ships were sent along this route, of which only one ship was lost. However, then the situation changed dramatically. The fascist German command began to attract significant aviation forces, submarines and large surface ships to fight the Allied convoys. As a result, convoys RO-13,16 and 17 suffered heavy losses.
The second supply route under Lend-Lease ran from the ports of the Persian Gulf, through the deserts and mountains of Iran and Iraq to the Soviet Transcaucasus. Cargoes were sent by rail, highways and air. From December 1941 to the end of 1942, thanks to the joint work of Soviet, British and American specialists, the capacity of Middle Eastern ports was significantly increased, and already in 1943, 3,447 thousand tons of cargo and military equipment, and in 1944 this figure increased 1.5 times and amounted to 5,498 thousand tons.
At the beginning of 1945, all supplies through Iran and Iraq were stopped. In total, during the Great Patriotic War, over 10 million tons of cargo were delivered to the USSR via the southern route.
In the summer of 1942, during negotiations, a third route was approved - sending aircraft by air through Alaska and Siberia. The length of the route from the American city of Fairbanks to Krasnoyarsk was 14 thousand km. It was along this route that about 8 thousand American combat aircraft were delivered during the war years.
Over the entire period of the Great Patriotic War, the United States and England supplied the Soviet Union with 18.7 thousand aircraft, about 11 thousand tanks and self-propelled artillery units, and up to 10 thousand guns of various calibers from the main types of weapons. In relation to the military equipment and weapons produced in the USSR, this amounted to 16.7% for aviation, 10.5% for tanks and self-propelled guns, and about 2% for artillery of the total production volume of our country.

"Valentine" "Stalin" is coming to the USSR under the Lend-Lease program.

The history of Lend-Lease has been mythologized by both opponents of Soviet power and its supporters. The former believe that without military supplies from the USA and England the USSR could not have won the war, the latter believe that the role of these supplies is completely insignificant. We bring to your attention a balanced view of this issue by historian Pavel Sutulin, originally published in his LiveJournal.

History of Lend-Lease

Lend-Lease (from the English “lend” - to lend and “lease” - to rent) is a unique program for lending to allies by the United States of America through the supply of equipment, food, equipment, raw materials and materials. The first step towards Lend-Lease was taken by the United States on September 3, 1940, when the Americans transferred 50 old destroyers to Britain in exchange for British military bases. On January 2, 1941, Oscar Cox, an employee of the Ministry of Finance, prepared the first draft of the Lend-Lease law. On January 10th, this bill was transmitted to the Senate and House of Representatives. On March 11, the Law received approval from both chambers and was signed by the President, and three hours later the President signed the first two directives to this law. The first of them ordered the transfer of 28 torpedo boats to Britain, and the second ordered the transfer of 50 75-mm cannons and several hundred thousand shells to Greece. This is how the history of Lend-Lease began.

The essence of Lend-Lease was, in general, quite simple. According to the Lend-Lease law, the United States could supply equipment, ammunition, equipment, etc. countries whose defense was vital for the States themselves. All deliveries were free of charge. All machinery, equipment and materials spent, used up or destroyed during the war were not subject to payment. Property remaining after the end of the war that was suitable for civilian purposes had to be paid for.

As for the USSR, Roosevelt and Churchill made a promise to supply it with the materials necessary for war immediately after Germany’s attack on the Soviet Union, that is, on June 22, 1941. On October 1, 1941, the First Moscow Protocol on Supply to the USSR was signed in Moscow, the expiration of which was set on June 30. The Lend-Lease Act was extended to the USSR on October 28, 1941, as a result of which the Union was granted a loan of $1 billion. During the war, three more protocols were signed: Washington, London and Ottawa, through which supplies were extended until the end of the war. Lend-Lease deliveries to the USSR officially ceased on May 12, 1945. However, until August 1945, deliveries continued according to the “Molotov-Mikoyan list.”

Lend-Lease deliveries to the USSR and their contribution to victory

During the war, hundreds of thousands of tons of cargo were delivered to the USSR under Lend-Lease. Military historians (and, perhaps, everyone else) are of greatest interest, of course, in allied military equipment - we’ll start with that. Under Lend-Lease, the following were supplied to the USSR from the USA: light M3A1 “Stuart” - 1676 pcs., light M5 - 5 pcs., light M24 - 2 pcs., medium M3 “Grant” - 1386 pcs., medium M4A2 “Sherman” (with a 75-mm cannon) - 2007 pcs., medium M4A2 (with a 76-mm cannon) - 2095 pcs., heavy M26 - 1 pc. From England: infantry "Valentine" - 2394 units, infantry "Matilda" MkII - 918 units, light "Tetrarch" - 20 units, heavy "Churchill" - 301 units, cruising "Cromwell" - 6 units. From Canada: “Valentine” - 1388. Total: 12199 tanks. In total, during the war years, 86.1 thousand tanks were delivered to the Soviet-German front.

Thus, Lend-Lease tanks accounted for 12.3% of the total number of tanks produced/delivered to the USSR in 1941-1945. In addition to tanks, self-propelled guns/self-propelled guns were also supplied to the USSR. ZSU: M15A1 - 100 pcs., M17 - 1000 pcs.; Self-propelled guns: T48 - 650 pcs., M18 - 5 pcs., M10 - 52 pcs. A total of 1,807 units were delivered. In total, 23.1 thousand self-propelled guns were produced and received in the USSR during the war. Thus, the share of self-propelled guns received by the USSR under Lend-Lease is equal to 7.8% of the total number of equipment of this type received during the war. In addition to tanks and self-propelled guns, armored personnel carriers were also supplied to the USSR: English “Universal Carrier” - 2560 units. (including from Canada - 1348 pcs.) and American M2 - 342 pcs., M3 - 2 pcs., M5 - 421 pcs., M9 - 419 pcs., T16 - 96 pcs., M3A1 “Scout” - 3340 pcs. ., LVT - 5 pcs. Total: 7185 units. Since armored personnel carriers were not produced in the USSR, Lend-Lease vehicles made up 100% of the Soviet fleet of this equipment. Criticism of Lend-Lease very often draws attention to the low quality of armored vehicles supplied by the Allies. This criticism actually has some basis, since American and British tanks were often inferior in terms of performance characteristics to both their Soviet and German counterparts. Especially considering that the Allies usually supplied the USSR with not the best examples of their equipment. For example, the most advanced modifications of the Sherman (M4A3E8 and Sherman Firefly) were not supplied to Russia.

The situation with supplies under Lend-Lease to aviation is much better. In total, during the war years, 18,297 aircraft were delivered to the USSR, including from the USA: P-40 "Tomahawk" fighters - 247, P-40 "Kitihawk" - 1887, P-39 "Airacobra" - 4952, P-63 " Kingcobra - 2400, P-47 Thunderbolt - 195; A-20 Boston bombers - 2771, B-25 Mitchell - 861; other types of aircraft - 813. 4171 Spitfires and Hurricanes were delivered from England. In total, the Soviet troops received 138 thousand aircraft during the war. Thus, the share of foreign equipment in the domestic aircraft fleet was 13%. However, even here the allies refused to supply the USSR with the pride of their Air Force - the B-17, B-24 and B- strategic bombers. 29, of which 35 thousand were produced during the war, and at the same time, it was precisely such vehicles that the Soviet Air Force needed most.

Under Lend-Lease, 8 thousand anti-aircraft and 5 thousand anti-tank guns were supplied. In total, the USSR received 38 thousand units of anti-aircraft and 54 thousand anti-tank artillery. That is, the share of Lend-Lease in these types of weapons was 21% and 9%, respectively. However, if we take all Soviet guns and mortars as a whole (receipts during the war - 526.2 thousand), then the share of foreign guns in it will be only 2.7%.

During the war, 202 torpedo boats, 28 patrol ships, 55 minesweepers, 138 submarine hunters, 49 landing ships, 3 icebreakers, about 80 transport ships, about 30 tugs were transferred to the USSR under Lend-Lease. There are about 580 ships in total. In total, the USSR received 2,588 ships during the war years. That is, the share of Lend-Lease equipment is 22.4%.

The most noticeable were the Lend-Lease deliveries of cars. In total, 480 thousand cars were delivered under Lend-Lease (85% of them from the USA). Including about 430 thousand trucks (mainly US 6 companies Studebaker and REO) and 50 thousand jeeps (Willys MB and Ford GPW). Despite the fact that the total receipt of vehicles on the Soviet-German front amounted to 744 thousand units, the share of Lend-Lease vehicles in the Soviet vehicle fleet was 64%. In addition, 35,000 motorcycles were supplied from the United States.

But supplies of small arms under Lend-Lease were very modest: only about 150,000 units. Considering that the total supply of small arms to the Red Army during the war amounted to 19.85 million units, the share of Lend-Lease weapons is approximately 0.75%.

During the war years, 242.3 thousand tons of motor gasoline were supplied to the USSR under Lend-Lease (2.7% of the total production and receipt of motor gasoline in the USSR). The situation with aviation gasoline is as follows: 570 thousand tons of gasoline were supplied from the USA, and 533.5 thousand tons from Britain and Canada. In addition, 1,483 thousand tons of light gasoline fractions were supplied from the USA, Britain and Canada. From light gasoline fractions, gasoline is produced as a result of reforming, the yield of which is approximately 80%. Thus, from 1,483 thousand tons of fractions, 1,186 thousand tons of gasoline can be obtained. That is, the total supply of gasoline under Lend-Lease can be estimated at 2,230 thousand tons. During the war, the USSR produced about 4,750 thousand tons of aviation gasoline. This number probably includes gasoline produced from fractions supplied by the Allies. That is, the USSR's production of gasoline from its own resources can be estimated at approximately 3,350 thousand tons. Consequently, the share of Lend-Lease aviation fuel in the total amount of gasoline supplied and produced in the USSR is 40%.

622.1 thousand tons of railway rails were supplied to the USSR, which is equal to 36% of the total number of rails supplied and produced in the USSR. During the war, 1,900 steam locomotives were delivered, while in the USSR in 1941-1945, 800 steam locomotives were produced, of which 708 in 1941. If we take the number of steam locomotives produced from June to the end of 1941 as a quarter of the total production, then the number of locomotives produced during the war will be approximately 300 units. That is, the share of Lend-Lease steam locomotives in the total volume of steam locomotives produced and delivered in the USSR is approximately 72%. In addition, 11,075 cars were delivered to the USSR. For comparison, in 1942-1945, 1092 railway cars were produced in the USSR. During the war years, 318 thousand tons of explosives were supplied under Lend-Lease (of which the USA - 295.6 thousand tons), which is 36.6% of the total production and supply of explosives to the USSR.

Under Lend-Lease, the Soviet Union received 328 thousand tons of aluminum. If we believe B. Sokolov (“The Role of Lend-Lease in the Soviet War Efforts”), who estimated Soviet aluminum production during the war at 263 thousand tons, then the share of Lend-Lease aluminum in the total amount of aluminum produced and received by the USSR will be 55%. 387 thousand tons of copper were supplied to the USSR - 45% of the total production and supply of this metal to the USSR. Under Lend-Lease, the Union received 3,606 thousand tons of tires - 30% of the total number of tires produced and supplied to the USSR. 610 thousand tons of sugar were supplied - 29.5%. Cotton: 108 million tons – 6%. During the war, 38.1 thousand metal-cutting machines were supplied from the USA to the USSR, and 6.5 thousand machines and 104 presses were supplied from Great Britain. During the war, the USSR produced 141 thousand machine tools and forging presses. Thus, the share of foreign machine tools in the domestic economy was 24%. The USSR also received 956.7 thousand miles of field telephone cable, 2.1 thousand miles of sea cable and 1.1 thousand miles of submarine cable. In addition, 35,800 radio stations, 5,899 receivers and 348 locators, 15.5 million pairs of army boots, 5 million tons of food, etc. were supplied to the USSR under Lend-Lease.

According to the data summarized in diagram No. 2, it is clear that even for the main types of supplies, the share of Lend-Lease products in the total volume of production and supplies to the USSR does not exceed 28%. In general, the share of Lend-Lease products in the total volume of materials, equipment, food, machinery, raw materials, etc. produced and supplied to the USSR. Typically estimated at 4%. In my opinion, this figure, in general, reflects the real state of affairs. Thus, we can say with a certain degree of confidence that Lend-Lease did not have any decisive impact on the USSR’s ability to wage war. Yes, under Lend-Lease such types of equipment and materials were supplied that made up the majority of the total production of such in the USSR. But would the lack of supply of these materials become critical? In my opinion, no. The USSR could well redistribute production efforts so as to provide itself with everything necessary, including aluminum, copper, and locomotives. Could the USSR do without Lend-Lease at all? Yes, I could. But the question is, what would it cost him? Without Lend-Lease, the USSR could have taken two ways to solve the problem of the shortage of those goods that were supplied under Lend-Lease. The first way is to simply turn a blind eye to this deficiency. As a result, the army would experience a shortage of cars, aircraft and a number of other types of equipment and equipment. Thus, the army would certainly be weakened. The second option is to increase our own production of products supplied under Lend-Lease by attracting excess labor to the production process. This force, accordingly, could only be taken at the front, and thereby again weaken the army. Thus, when choosing any of these paths, the Red Army found itself a loser. The result is a prolongation of the war and unnecessary casualties on our part. In other words, Lend-Lease, although it did not have a decisive influence on the outcome of the war on the Eastern Front, nevertheless saved hundreds of thousands of lives of Soviet citizens. And for this alone Russia should be grateful to its allies.

Speaking about the role of Lend-Lease in the victory of the USSR, we should not forget about two more points. Firstly, the vast majority of equipment, equipment and materials were supplied to the USSR in 1943-1945. That is, after the turning point during the war. For example, in 1941, goods worth approximately $100 million were supplied under Lend-Lease, which amounted to less than 1% of the total supply. In 1942, this percentage was 27.6. Thus, more than 70% of deliveries under Lend-Lease occurred in 1943-1945, and during the most terrible period of the war for the USSR, allied assistance was not very noticeable. As an example, in diagram No. 3 you can see how the number of aircraft supplied from the USA changed in 1941-1945. An even more telling example is cars: as of April 30, 1944, only 215 thousand of them were delivered. That is, more than half of the Lend-Lease vehicles were delivered to the USSR in the last year of the war. Secondly, not all of the equipment supplied under Lend-Lease was used by the army and navy. For example, out of 202 torpedo boats delivered to the USSR, 118 never had to take part in the hostilities of the Great Patriotic War, since they were put into operation after its end. All 26 frigates received by the USSR also entered service only in the summer of 1945. A similar situation was observed with other types of equipment.

And finally, to conclude this part of the article, a small stone in the garden of Lend-Lease critics. Many of these critics focus on the insufficient supplies of the allies, reinforcing this by the fact that, they say, the United States, given its level of production, could supply more. Indeed, the USA and Britain produced 22 million small arms, but delivered only 150,000 thousand (0.68%). Of the tanks produced, the Allies supplied the USSR with 14%. The situation with cars was even worse: in total, about 5 million cars were produced in the USA during the war years, and about 450 thousand were delivered to the USSR - less than 10%. And so on. However, this approach is certainly wrong. The fact is that supplies to the USSR were limited not by the production capabilities of the allies, but by the tonnage of available transport ships. And it was with him that the British and Americans had serious problems. The Allies simply did not physically have the number of transport ships necessary to transport more cargo to the USSR.

Delivery routes

Lend-Lease cargo reached the USSR via five routes: through Arctic convoys to Murmansk, along the Black Sea, through Iran, through the Far East and through the Soviet Arctic. The most famous of these routes, of course, is Murmansk. The heroism of the sailors of the Arctic convoys is glorified in many books and films. It is probably for this reason that many of our fellow citizens had the false impression that the main deliveries under Lend-Lease went to the USSR precisely by Arctic convoys. Such an opinion is pure delusion. In diagram No. 4 you can see the ratio of cargo transportation volumes along various routes in long tons. As we see, not only did most of the Lend-Lease cargo not pass through the Russian North, but this route was not even the main one, giving way to the Far East and Iran. One of the main reasons for this state of affairs was the danger of the northern route due to the activity of the Germans. In diagram No. 5 you can see how effectively the Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine operated in Arctic convoys.

The use of the trans-Iranian route became possible after Soviet and British troops (from the north and south, respectively) entered the territory of Iran, and already on September 8, a peace agreement was signed between the USSR, England and Iran, according to which British and Soviet troops were stationed on the territory of Persia troops. From that moment on, Iran began to be used for supplies to the USSR. Lend-Lease cargo went to the ports of the northern tip of the Persian Gulf: Basra, Khorramshahr, Abadan and Bandar Shahpur. Aircraft and automobile assembly plants were established in these ports. From these ports to the USSR, cargo traveled in two ways: by land through the Caucasus and by water through the Caspian Sea. However, the Trans-Iranian route, like the Arctic convoys, had its drawbacks: firstly, it was too long (the convoy route from New York to the coast of Iran around the South African Cape of Good Hope took approximately 75 days, and then the passage of cargo took time across Iran and the Caucasus or the Caspian Sea). Secondly, navigation in the Caspian Sea was hampered by German aviation, which sank and damaged 32 ships with cargo in October and November alone, and the Caucasus was not the calmest place: in 1941-1943 alone, 963 bandit groups with a total number of 17,513 were liquidated in the North Caucasus Human. In 1945, instead of the Iranian route, the Black Sea route began to be used for supplies.

However, the safest and most convenient route was the Pacific route from Alaska to the Far East (46% of total supplies) or through the Arctic Ocean to Arctic ports (3%). Basically, Lend-Lease cargo was delivered to the USSR from the USA, of course, by sea. However, most of the aviation moved from Alaska to the USSR under its own power (the same AlSib). However, this path also had its difficulties, this time associated with Japan. In 1941 - 1944, the Japanese detained 178 Soviet ships, some of them - the transports "Kamenets-Podolsky", "Ingul" and "Nogin" - for 2 months or more. 8 ships - the transports "Krechet", "Svirstroy", "Maikop", "Perekop", "Angarstroy", "Pavlin Vinogradov", "Lazo", "Simferopol" - were sunk by the Japanese. The transports “Ashgabat”, “Kolkhoznik”, “Kyiv” were sunk by unidentified submarines, and about 10 more ships were lost under unclear circumstances.

Lend-Lease payment

This is perhaps the main topic of speculation among people trying to somehow denigrate the Lend-Lease program. Most of them consider it their indispensable duty to declare that the USSR allegedly paid for all cargo supplied under Lend-Lease. Of course, this is nothing more than a delusion (or a deliberate lie). Neither the USSR nor any other countries that received assistance under the Lend-Lease program, in accordance with the Lend-Lease law, paid, so to speak, a single cent for this assistance during the war. Moreover, as was already written at the beginning of the article, they were not obliged to pay after the war for those materials, equipment, weapons and ammunition that were spent during the war. It was necessary to pay only for what remained intact after the war and could be used by the recipient countries. Thus, there were no Lend-Lease payments during the war. Another thing is that the USSR actually sent various goods to the USA (including 320 thousand tons of chrome ore, 32 thousand tons of manganese ore, as well as gold, platinum, wood). This was done as part of the reverse Lend-Lease program. In addition, the same program included free repairs of American ships in Russian ports and other services. Unfortunately, I was unable to find the total amount of goods and services provided to the Allies under reverse Lend-Lease. The only source I found claims that this same amount was 2.2 million dollars. However, I personally am not sure of the authenticity of this data. However, they may well be considered as a lower limit. The upper limit in this case will be an amount of several hundred million dollars. Be that as it may, the share of reverse Lend-Lease in the total Lend-Lease trade turnover between the USSR and the allies will not exceed 3-4%. For comparison, the amount of reverse Lend-Lease from the UK to the USA is equal to 6.8 billion dollars, which is 18.3% of the total exchange of goods and services between these states.

So, no payment for Lend-Lease occurred during the war. The Americans provided the bill to the recipient countries only after the war. The volume of Great Britain's debts to the United States amounted to $4.33 billion, to Canada - $1.19 billion. The last payment in the amount of $83.25 million (to the United States) and $22.7 million (Canada) was made on December 29, 2006. The volume of China's debts was determined at 180 million. dollars, and this debt has not yet been repaid. The French paid the United States on May 28, 1946, providing the United States with a number of trade preferences.

The USSR's debt was determined in 1947 in the amount of 2.6 billion dollars, but already in 1948 this amount was reduced to 1.3 billion. However, the USSR refused to pay. The refusal also followed new concessions from the United States: in 1951, the amount of the debt was again revised and this time amounted to 800 million. An agreement on the procedure for repaying the debt to pay for Lend-Lease between the USSR and the USA was signed only on October 18, 1972 (debt amount was again reduced, this time to $722 million; the repayment period was 2001), and the USSR agreed to this agreement only on the condition that it was provided with a loan from the Export-Import Bank. In 1973, the USSR made two payments totaling $48 million, but then stopped payments due to the implementation of the Jackson-Vanik amendment to the 1972 Soviet-American trade agreement in 1974. In June 1990, during negotiations between the presidents of the USA and the USSR, the parties returned to discussing debt. A new deadline for the final repayment of the debt was set - 2030, and the amount - 674 million dollars. Currently, Russia owes the United States $100 million for supplies under Lend-Lease.

Other types of supplies

Lend-Lease was the only significant type of allied supplies to the USSR. However, not the only one in principle. Before the adoption of the Lend-Lease program, the United States and Britain supplied the USSR with equipment and materials in cash. However, the size of these supplies was quite small. For example, from July to October 1941, the United States supplied the USSR with cargo worth only $29 million. In addition, Britain provided for the supply of goods to the USSR on account of long-term loans. Moreover, these deliveries continued even after the adoption of the Lend-Lease program.

We should not forget about the many charitable foundations created to raise funds for the benefit of the USSR around the world. The USSR and private individuals also provided assistance. Moreover, such help came even from Africa and the Middle East. For example, the “Russian Patriotic Group” was created in Beirut, and the Russian Medical Aid Society was created in the Congo. The Iranian merchant Rahimyan Ghulam Hussein sent 3 tons of dried grapes to Stalingrad. And merchants Yusuf Gafuriki and Mamed Zhdalidi transferred 285 heads of cattle to the USSR.

Literature
1. Ivanyan E. A. History of the USA. M.: Bustard, 2006.
2. /Brief History of the USA / Under. ed. I. A. Alyabyev, E. V. Vysotskaya, T. R. Dzhum, S. M. Zaitsev, N. P. Zotnikov, V. N. Tsvetkov. Minsk: Harvest, 2003.
3. Shirokorad A. B. Far Eastern Final. M.: AST: Transizdatkniga, 2005.
4. Schofield B. Arctic convoys. Northern naval battles in World War II. M.: Tsentrpoligraf, 2003.
5. Temirov Yu. T., Donets A. S. War. M.: Eksmo, 2005.
6. Stettinius E. Lend-Lease - a weapon of victory (http://militera.lib.ru/memo/usa/stettinius/index.html).
7. Morozov A. Anti-Hitler coalition during the Second World War. The role of Lend-Lease in the victory over the common enemy (http://militera.lib.ru/pub/morozov/index.html).
8. Russia and the USSR in the wars of the 20th century. Losses of the armed forces / Under the general. ed. G. F. Krivosheeva. (http://www.rus-sky.org/history/library/w/)
9. The national economy of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War. Statistical collection.(

Russia is still paying for Lend-Lease

Despite the fact that the war ended 67 years ago, and with it Lend-Lease supplies stopped, we still have not paid off with the United States for military equipment and weapons, food and equipment, spare parts and fuels and lubricants... The final date for repayment of our debt – 2030.

How can it be?

In fairness, we note that the successful one paid off its Lend-Lease debt to Canada only on December 29, 2006. So, maybe those who think Lend-Lease are right bondage, the share of supplies in the total volume is insignificant, and the received samples of equipment and weapons are outdated?

Paid in blood

The Lend-Lease Act was passed by the US Congress on March 11, 1941. According to it, America transferred ammunition, equipment, food and strategic raw materials, including petroleum products, to its allies in World War II. It was assumed that “delivered materials (machines, various military equipment, weapons, raw materials, other items) destroyed, lost and used during the war are not subject to payment.” Had to pay just for that, which remained intact after the war and could be used by the recipient countries. Thus, there were no Lend-Lease payments during the war. True, there was some kind of cunning “reverse Lend-Lease” scheme, according to which USSR sent to gold, platinum, wood, manganese and chrome ores, etc. More like barter, but this is the casuistry of international treaties.

After the end of the war, the volume of US supplies under Lend-Lease to the USSR was determined: it amounted to 11.3 billion US dollars. (According to data from other sources - about 10 billion dollars.) The Americans asked to partially pay for civilian supplies that were in warehouses on September 2, 1945. Since the USSR did not report its inventory data, the Americans estimated these supplies at $2.6 billion, and a year later they halved this amount. But, as Stalin said, “The USSR paid off its Lend-Lease debts in full with blood”.

China won't pay

By the summer of 1941, a very tense situation had developed in Iran. Considering that Hitler was planning a campaign against India with the subsequent seizure of Middle Eastern countries, Iran was flooded with German agents. On July 25, British troops entered Iran from the south and Soviet troops from the north, and at the same time eliminated the entire known German intelligence network.

In preparation for receiving Lend-Lease cargo, the ports in Khorramshahr, Bandar Shahpur and Basra were reconstructed, and large aircraft and automobile assembly plants and field warehouses for picking and processing cargo were built on the shores of the Persian Gulf. The Allies also modernized the roads and railways they needed and built airfields. First of all, the railway from the Persian Gulf to Tehran was reconstructed and a modern paved highway and service stations were built on the basis of country roads. Hundreds of diesel locomotives, thousands of freight cars and platforms, as well as trucks were delivered from and.

At first, the planes were assembled in Margil and Shuaib, and after the creation of an air base in Abadan, 2 Soviet air regiments, staffed by experienced front-line pilots, were formed for ferrying. Some of the cars were sent disassembled and assembled in the USSR.

The group of American military specialists sent to Russia was led by Russians. Controlling transportation along the southern route was none other than Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan, deputy chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. Local residents - Arabs and Persians - worked at the assembly plants, the administration consisted of Americans and British, and Soviet military specialists accepted the products.

In March 1943, the Americans took over supervision of the Trans-Iranian Railway and the ports of the Persian Gulf. Since the middle of the year, assembly plants have started operating in the towns of Ash-Shuaiba (southwest of Basra, Iraq) and Andimeshk, on the Trans-Iranian Railway. Immediately the flow increased - up to 10,000 cars per month began to arrive from the south. The car assembly plant in Andimeshka alone sent about 78,000 cars to the USSR - that’s what American mass production technology means! In total, we received two-thirds of Lend-Lease cars via the southern route.

However, the trans-Iranian route, like the Arctic convoys, had its drawbacks: firstly, it was too long (the convoy’s route from the coast of Iran around the South African Cape of Good Hope took approximately 75 days, and then it also took time for the cargo to pass through Iran and the Caucasus or the Caspian Sea). Secondly, German aviation interfered with shipping in the Caspian Sea. With the distance of the front from the borders of the USSR, this route lost its significance, and in 1945, Lend-Lease cargo went through the Black Sea.

I would like to end with an excerpt from the article Wilson, professor at the University of Kansas: “What America experienced during the war was fundamentally different from the trials that befell its main allies. Only Americans could name "good war", because it helped to significantly improve the standard of living and required too few sacrifices from the vast majority of the population ... "