The myth about the barrage detachments during the Great Patriotic War. History of the first partisan detachment of the Great Patriotic War Formation of penal battalions and companies

Since the time of Khrushchev’s “thaw,” a myth was born about the NKVD barrage detachments, which shot retreating units of the Red Army with machine guns. After the collapse of the USSR, these nonsense flourished in full bloom.

In addition, supporters of this lie also claim that the majority of the population of the USSR did not want to fight, they were forced to defend the Stalinist regime “on pain of death.” By doing this they insult the memory of our valiant ancestors.

The concept of a barrier detachment is quite vague - “a permanent or temporary military formation created to perform a combat or special mission.” It also fits the definition of “special forces”.

During the Great Patriotic War, the composition, functions, and departmental affiliation of the barrage detachments constantly changed. At the beginning of February 1941, the NKVD was divided into the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs and the People's Commissariat of State Security (NKGB). Military counterintelligence was separated from the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs and transferred to the People's Commissariat for Defense of the USSR Navy, where the Third Directorate of NPOs and the NKVMF of the USSR were created. On July 27, 1941, the Third Directorate of NGOs issued a directive on its work in wartime.

According to the directive, mobile control and barrage detachments were organized; they were supposed to detain deserters and suspicious elements near the front line. They received the right of preliminary investigation, after which the detainees were handed over to the judiciary.

In July 1941, the NKVD and the NKGB were again united, the bodies of the Third Directorate of NGOs were transformed into special departments and became subordinate to the NKVD. Special departments received the right to arrest deserters and, if necessary, shoot them. Special departments had to fight spies, traitors, deserters, saboteurs, alarmists, and cowards. By NKVD Order No. 00941 of July 19, 1941, separate rifle platoons were created at special departments of divisions and corps, and companies at special departments of armies, battalions at the fronts, they were staffed by NKVD troops.

These units became the so-called “barrage detachments.” They had the right to organize a barricade service to prevent the escape of deserters, carefully check the documents of all military personnel, arrest deserters and conduct an investigation (within 12 hours) and transfer the case to a military tribunal. To send stragglers to their units, in exceptional cases, to immediately restore order at the front, the head of the special department received the right to shoot deserters.

In addition, the barrage detachments were supposed to identify and destroy enemy agents and check those who had escaped from German captivity.

Fight against bandits

Among the daily tasks of the barrage detachments was the fight against bandits. So, in June 1941, under the third department of the Baltic Fleet, a barrier detachment was formed - it was a maneuverable company on vehicles, reinforced by two armored cars. He operated on the territory of Estonia. Since there were almost no cases of desertion in the area of responsibility, the detachment with a group of operatives was sent to fight the Estonian Nazis. Their small gangs attacked individual military personnel and small units on the roads.

The actions of the barrier detachment significantly reduced the activity of Estonian bandits. The detachment also took part in the “cleansing” of the Virtsu Peninsula, which was liberated in mid-July 1941 by a counterattack by the 8th Army. Along the way, the detachment met a German outpost and defeated it in battle. Conducted an operation to destroy bandits in Varla and the village. Tystamaa, Pärnov district, destroyed a counter-revolutionary organization in Tallinn. In addition, the detachment participated in reconnaissance activities, sending three agents behind enemy lines. The two returned, they found out the location of German military installations, and they were attacked by Baltic Fleet aircraft.

During the battle for Tallinn, the detachment not only stopped and brought back those fleeing, but also held the defense itself. It was especially difficult on August 27, some units of the 8th Army fled, the barrier detachment stopped them, a counterattack was organized, the enemy was driven back - this played a decisive role in the successful evacuation of Tallinn. During the battles for Tallinn, more than 60% of the detachment’s personnel and almost all the commanders were killed! And these are cowardly scum who shoot their own?

In Kronstadt the detachment was restored, and from September 7 it continued its service. Special departments of the Northern Front also fought against bandits.

Directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command of September 5, 1941

That is, their difference from the barrier detachments under special departments of the NKVD, which were created to fight deserters and suspicious elements, is that the army detachments were created in order to prevent the unauthorized escape of units. They were larger (a battalion per division, not a platoon), and were staffed not by NKVD soldiers, but by Red Army soldiers. They had the right to shoot the initiators of panic and flight, and not to shoot those running.

As of October 10, 1941, special departments and detachments detained 657,364 people, 25,878 of them were arrested, 10,201 of them were shot. The rest were again sent to the front.

Barrage detachments also played a role in the defense of Moscow. In parallel with the defensive divisional battalions, there were detachments of special departments. Similar units were created by the territorial bodies of the NKVD, for example, in the Kalinin region.

Battle of Stalingrad

In connection with the breakthrough of the front and the Wehrmacht’s advance to the Volga and the Caucasus, on July 28, 1942, the famous order No. 227 of the NKO was issued. According to it, it was prescribed to create 3-5 barrier detachments (200 fighters in each) in the armies, placing them in the immediate rear of unstable units. They also received the right to shoot alarmists and cowards in order to restore order and discipline. They were subordinate to the Military Councils of the armies, through their special departments. The most experienced commanders of special departments were placed at the head of the detachments, and the detachments were provided with transport. In addition, barrage battalions in each division were restored.

By order of the People's Commissariat of Defense No. 227, on October 15, 1942, 193 army detachments were created. From August 1 to October 15, 1942, these detachments detained 140,755 Red Army soldiers. 3,980 people were arrested, 1,189 of them were shot, the rest were sent to penal units. Most of the arrests and detentions were on the Don and Stalingrad fronts.

The barrage detachments played an important role in restoring order and returned a significant number of military personnel to the front. For example: on August 29, 1942, the headquarters of the 29th Infantry Division was surrounded (due to a breakthrough by German tanks); the units, having lost control, retreated in panic. The barrage detachment of Lieutenant GB Filatov stopped the fleeing people and returned them to defensive positions. On another section of the division’s front, Filatov’s barrier detachment stopped the enemy’s breakthrough.

On September 20, the Wehrmacht occupied part of Melikhovskaya, and the combined brigade began an unauthorized retreat. The barrage detachment of the 47th Army of the Black Sea Group of Forces restored order in the brigade. The brigade returned to its position and, together with the barrier detachment, drove back the enemy.

That is, the barrier detachments did not panic in critical situations, but restored order and fought the enemy themselves. On September 13, the 112th Rifle Division lost its positions under enemy attack. The barrier detachment of the 62nd Army under the command of State Security Lieutenant Khlystov repelled enemy attacks for four days and held the line until reinforcements arrived. On September 15-16, the barrier detachment of the 62nd Army fought for two days in the area of the Stalingrad railway station. The detachment, despite its small numbers, repulsed the enemy’s attacks and itself counterattacked and surrendered the line intact to units of the approaching 10th Infantry Division.

But there was also the use of barrier detachments for purposes other than their intended purpose; there were commanders who used them as linear units, because of this, some detachments lost most of their personnel and had to be formed anew.

During the Battle of Stalingrad, there were three types of barrage detachments: army ones, created by order No. 227, restored barrage battalions of divisions, and small detachments of special departments. As before, the overwhelming majority of detained fighters returned to their units.

Kursk Bulge

By decree of the Council of People's Commissars of April 19, 1943, the Directorate of Special Departments of the NKVD was again transferred to the NKO and the NKVMF and reorganized into the Main Counterintelligence Directorate "Smersh" ("Death to Spies") of the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR and the Counterintelligence Directorate "Smersh" of the People's Commissariat of the Navy.

On July 5, 1943, the Wehrmacht began its offensive, some of our units wavered. The barrier detachments fulfilled their mission here too. From July 5 to July 10, barrier detachments of the Voronezh Front detained 1,870 people, 74 people were arrested, the rest were returned to their units.

In total, the report of the head of the Counterintelligence Directorate of the Central Front, Major General A. Vadis, dated August 13, 1943, indicated that 4,501 people were detained, of which 3,303 were sent back to units.

On October 29, 1944, by order of the People's Commissar of Defense I.V. Stalin, the barrier detachments were disbanded due to changes in the situation at the front. Personnel were replenished with rifle units. In the last period of their existence, they no longer acted according to their profile - there was no need. They were used to guard headquarters, communication lines, roads, to comb the forest; personnel were often used for logistical needs - as cooks, storekeepers, clerks, and so on, although the personnel of these detachments were selected from the best soldiers and sergeants, awarded medals and orders, who had extensive combat experience.

Bottom line

The barrier detachments performed a very important function; they detained deserters and suspicious persons (among whom there were spies, saboteurs, and Nazi agents). In critical situations, they themselves entered into battle with the enemy. After the situation at the front changed (after the Battle of Kursk), the barrage detachments actually began to serve as commandant companies. To stop the fleeing, they had the right to shoot over the heads of the retreating, shoot the initiators and leaders in front of the line. But these cases were not widespread, only individual. There is not a single fact that the fighters of the barrage detachments shot to kill their own people. There are no such examples in the memoirs of front-line soldiers. In addition, they could prepare an additional defensive line in the rear to stop the retreating ones and so that they could gain a foothold on it.

The barrage detachments made their contribution to the overall Victory, honestly fulfilling their duty.
________________________________
Lubyanka in the days of the battle for Moscow: materials from the USSR state security agencies from the Central Archive of the FSB of Russia. Comp. A. T. Zhadobin. M., 2002.
“Arc of Fire”: The Battle of Kursk through the eyes of Lubyanka. Comp. A. T. Zhadobin et al. M., 2003.
State security bodies of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War. M., 2000.
Toptygin A.V. Unknown Beria. M., St. Petersburg, 2002.

The first days of the Great Patriotic War were catastrophic for the Soviet Union: the surprise attack on June 22, 1941 allowed Hitler's army to gain significant advantages.

Many border outposts and formations that took the brunt of the enemy’s first strike were killed. Wehrmacht troops advanced at high speed deep into Soviet territory. In a short time, 3.8 million soldiers and commanders of the Red Army were captured. But, despite the most difficult conditions of military operations, the defenders of the Fatherland from the very first days of the war showed courage and heroism. A striking example of heroism was the creation, in the first days of the war, in the occupied territory of the first partisan detachment under the command of Vasily Zakharovich Korzh. Korzh Vasily Zakharovich

The partisan detachment commanded by Korzh was ambushed by 2 German tanks. It was reconnaissance from the 293rd Wehrmacht Infantry Division. The partisans opened fire and knocked out one tank. As a result of this operation, they managed to capture 2 Nazis. This was the first partisan battle of the first partisan detachment in the history of the Great Patriotic War. On July 4, 1941, the detachment met enemy cavalry squadrons 4 kilometers from the city. Korzh quickly “deployed” the firepower of his detachment, and dozens of fascist cavalrymen died on the battlefield. The front moved to the east, and the partisans had more to do every day. They set up ambushes on the roads and destroyed enemy vehicles with infantry, equipment, ammunition, food, and intercepted motorcyclists. With the first mine Korzh personally made from explosives, used before the war to move tree stumps, the partisans blew up the first armored train. The squad's combat score grew.

But there was no connection with the mainland. Then Korzh sent a man behind the front line. The liaison officer was the famous Belarusian underground worker Vera Khoruzhaya. And she managed to get to Moscow. In the winter of 1941/42, it was possible to establish contact with the Minsk underground regional party committee, which deployed its headquarters in the Lyuban region. We jointly organized a sleigh ride in the Minsk and Polesie regions. Along the way, they “smoked out” uninvited foreign guests and gave them a “try” of partisan bullets. During the raid, the detachment was replenished thoroughly. Guerrilla warfare flared up. By November 1942, 7 impressively powerful detachments merged together and formed a partisan formation. Korzh took command over him. In addition, 11 underground district party committees, the Pinsk city committee, and about 40 primary organizations began to operate in the region. They even managed to “recruit” to their side an entire Cossack regiment formed by the Nazis from prisoners of war! By the winter of 1942/43, the Korzh union had restored Soviet power in a significant part of the Luninets, Zhitkovichi, Starobinsky, Ivanovo, Drogichinsky, Leninsky, Telekhansky, and Gantsevichi districts. Communication with the mainland has been established. Planes landed at the partisan airfield and brought ammunition, medicine, and walkie-talkies.

The partisans reliably controlled a huge section of the Brest-Gomel railway, the Baranovichi-Luninets section, and the enemy echelons went downhill according to a strict partisan schedule. The Dnieper-Bug Canal was almost completely paralyzed. In February 1943, the Nazi command attempted to put an end to the Korzh partisans. Regular units with artillery, aviation, and tanks were advancing. On February 15, the encirclement closed. The partisan zone turned into a continuous battlefield. Korzh himself led the column to break through. He personally led the shock troops to break through the ring, then the defense of the neck of the breakthrough, while convoys with civilians, wounded and property crossed the gap, and, finally, the rearguard group covering the pursuit. And so that the Nazis did not think that they had won, Korzh attacked a large garrison in the village of Svyatoy Volya. The battle lasted 7 hours, in which the partisans were victorious. Until the summer of 1943, the Nazis threw part after part against the Korzh formation.

And each time the partisans broke through the encirclement. Finally, they finally escaped from the cauldron to the area of Lake Vygonovskoye. . By Resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR dated September 16, 1943 No. 1000 - one of the ten commanders of the partisan formations of the Belarusian SSR - V.Z. Korzh was awarded the military rank of “Major General”. Throughout the summer and autumn of 1943, the “rail war” thundered in Belarus, proclaimed by the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement. The Korzh compound made a significant contribution to this grandiose “event.” In 1944, several operations that were brilliant in concept and organization upset all the Nazis’ plans for a systematic, well-thought-out withdrawal of their units to the west.

The partisans destroyed railway arteries (on July 20, 21 and 22, 1944 alone, demolitionists blew up 5 thousand rails!), tightly closed the Dnieper-Bug Canal, and thwarted the enemy’s attempts to establish crossings across the Sluch River. Hundreds of Aryan warriors, together with the commander of the group, General Miller, surrendered to the Korzh partisans. And a few days later the war left the Pinsk region... In total, by July 1944, the Pinsk partisan unit under the command of Korzh in battles defeated 60 German garrisons, derailed 478 enemy trains, blew up 62 railway bridges, destroyed 86 tanks and armored vehicles, 29 guns, 519 kilometers of communication lines are out of order. By decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR dated August 15, 1944, for the exemplary performance of command assignments in the fight against the Nazi invaders behind enemy lines and the courage and heroism shown, Vasily Zakharovich Korzh was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union with the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal. "(No. 4448). In 1946 he graduated from the Military Academy of the General Staff. Since 1946, Major General Korzh V.Z. in reserve. In 1949–1953 he worked as Deputy Minister of Forestry of the Belarusian SSR. In 1953–1963 he was chairman of the collective farm “Partizansky Krai” in the Soligorsk district of the Minsk region. In the last years of his life he lived in Minsk. Died May 5, 1967. He was buried at the Eastern (Moscow) cemetery in Minsk. Awarded 2 Orders of Lenin, 2 Orders of the Red Banner, Order of the Patriotic War 1st degree, Red Star, medals. A monument to the Hero was erected in the village of Khorostov, memorial plaques in the cities of Minsk and Soligorsk. The collective farm “Partizansky Krai”, streets in the cities of Minsk, Pinsk, Soligorsk, as well as a school in the city of Pinsk are named after him.

Sources and literature.

1. Ioffe E.G. The Higher Partisan Command of Belarus 1941-1944 // Directory. – Minsk, 2009. – P. 23.

2. Kolpakidi A., Sever A. GRU Special Forces. – M.: “YAUZA”, ESKMO, 2012. – P. 45.

D.V. Gnedash

creation of barrage detachments

In addition, the barrage detachments were supposed to identify and destroy enemy agents and check those who had escaped from German captivity.

Fight against bandits

In Kronstadt the detachment was restored, and from September 7 it continued its service. Special departments of the Northern Front also fought against bandits.

By the beginning of September 1941, the military situation again became sharply complicated, so the Headquarters, at the request of the commander of the Bryansk Front, General A. I. Eremenko, allowed the creation of barrier detachments in those divisions that had proven themselves to be unstable. A week later this practice was extended to all fronts. The number of detachments was one battalion per division, one company per regiment. They were subordinate to the division commander and had vehicles for movement, several armored cars and tanks. Their task was to assist commanders and maintain discipline and order in units. They had the right to use it to stop the flight and eliminate the initiators of the panic.
That is, their difference from the barrier detachments under special departments of the NKVD, which were created to fight deserters and suspicious elements, is that the army detachments were created in order to prevent the unauthorized escape of units. They were larger (a battalion per division, not a platoon), and were staffed not by NKVD soldiers, but by Red Army soldiers. They had the right to shoot the initiators of panic and flight, and not to shoot those running.

As of October 10, 1941, special departments and detachments detained 657,364 people, 25,878 of them were arrested, 10,201 of them were shot. The rest were again sent to the front.

Battle of Stalingrad

Kursk Bulge

Summarize: The barrier detachments performed a very important function; they detained deserters and suspicious persons (among whom there were spies, saboteurs, and Nazi agents). In critical situations, they themselves entered into battle with the enemy. After the situation at the front changed (after the Battle of Kursk), the barrage detachments actually began to serve as commandant companies. To stop the fleeing, they had the right to shoot over the heads of the retreating, shoot the initiators and leaders in front of the line. But these cases were not widespread, only individual. There is not a single fact that the fighters of the barrage detachments shot to kill their own people. There are no such examples in the memoirs of front-line soldiers. In addition, they could prepare an additional defensive line in the rear to stop the retreating ones and so that they could gain a foothold on it.

The barrage detachments made their contribution to the overall Victory, honestly fulfilling their duty.

Sources:
Lubyanka in the days of the battle for Moscow: materials from the USSR state security agencies from the Central Archive of the FSB of Russia. Comp. A. T. Zhadobin. M., 2002.
“Arc of Fire”: The Battle of Kursk through the eyes of Lubyanka. Comp. A. T. Zhadobin et al. M., 2003.
State security bodies of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War. M., 2000.
Toptygin A.V. Unknown Beria. M., St. Petersburg, 2002.

Photo: website

The essence of the myth and its use

Back in the 60s of the twentieth century, against the backdrop of the “debunking of the cult of personality,” rumors spread across the country’s kitchens about “terrible executioners” who forced Red Army soldiers to run under the fire of the Nazis, shooting them in the back with light machine guns. They started writing songs about this like:

"This company advanced through the swamp,
And then she was ordered and she went back.
This company was shot with a machine gun
Your own barrage detachment".

“Testimonies of veterans” that no one had seen began to be transmitted “from mouth to mouth.” Like: “My father, my neighbor’s cousin, my godfather knows the veterans who were driven into battle by the NKVD with machine guns.” From these conversations, supposedly “justified indignation” began to emerge about “how both those who fought and those who shot them in the back can be considered veterans.” The spread of this myth was facilitated by the fact that the official authorities were in no hurry to comment on it - we will dwell on the reasons for this behavior below. Towards the end of the Soviet era, veterans began to retire en masse, and, accordingly, to communicate less in teams, and after the collapse of the USSR and to this day, unfortunately, there have been significantly fewer of them in general. And spreading lies has become even easier.

The myth of “barrier detachments” was actively used to denigrate the memory of the Great Patriotic War during the collapse of the Soviet Union and to justify the “need” of liberal reforms in Russia, Ukraine and other post-Soviet countries. He was especially effective in Ukraine during the events of 2004 - 2014. The nationalists, foaming at the mouth, argued that there are practically no “real” veterans left, and those who exist are supposedly the mythical “NKVD members with machine guns.” Even on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the Victory, this topic came up in almost every third liberal blog. If the authors wanted to, they would have sorted it out. But they don’t want to. Therefore, the truth is important and needed today more than ever. And in order to preserve the self-respect and historical memory of the entire people, and in order to pay tribute to veterans - both those who are nearby and those who, unfortunately, are no longer there. After all, this myth is a slap in the soul of all those who fought. It turns out that if they hadn’t been driven into the back with machine gun fire, there wouldn’t have been a Great Victory? Wouldn't you fight? Would you give it all up? Isn't this meanness towards them?

What is the truth?

The myth about the barrier detachments, as mentioned above, is woven from several fundamentally different phenomena related to the activities of various departments.

At the start of the war, military counterintelligence was part of the People's Commissariat of Defense (analogous to the modern Ministry of Defense). On June 27, 1941, the Third Directorate of the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR issues directive No. 35523 on the work of its bodies in wartime:

"Organization of mobile control and barrier detachments on roads, railway junctions, for clearing forests, etc., allocated by the command, including in their composition operational workers of the Third Directorate with the tasks:

A) detention of deserters;
b) detaining all suspicious elements that have penetrated the front line;
c) a preliminary investigation carried out by operational employees of the Third Directorate of NPOs (1-2 days) with the subsequent transfer of material along with those detained under jurisdiction" (State Security Bodies of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War. Vol. 2. Beginning. Book 1. June 22 - August 31, 1941. M., 2000. P.92–93) "

No machine guns or mass shootings. I think everyone understands how difficult it was in the immediate rear areas in the first days of the war. Some military units could not withstand the blow and retreated. Some units are in panic. Some fighters from the recently mobilized residents fled to their homes. Masses of civilian refugees fled to the east. One cannot belittle the heroism and enormous courage of those who took the first blows and held their positions - both units of the Red Army, the NKVD, and the fleet. But there were also those who did not have the fortitude for this, or who simply became victims of circumstances.

In addition, both criminal marauders and Nazi saboteurs from the Abwehr and the SS actively took advantage of the created situation. A significant number of Ukrainian nationalists and people from Russian emigrant circles, who were fluent in Russian and Ukrainian, and easily passed themselves off as local residents, were recruited to serve in their special forces. Many were deliberately dressed in Soviet uniforms.

It was these spies, saboteurs, criminals, deserters that the employees of the first barrier detachments had to stop. In addition, they were supposed to, in fact, help confused soldiers who had strayed from their units. No one was shot in the back. After the investigation, the detainees were sent either to their place of service or residence (civilian), or transferred to law enforcement agencies “according to jurisdiction.”

In July 1941, the NKVD and NKGB were merged into one structure. The former Third Directorate of the People's Commissariat of Defense, which was involved in military counterintelligence, is merged into the NKVD - special departments are formed on its basis. The day after the unification, Lavrentiy Beria signed Directive No. 169:

"The purpose of transforming the bodies of the Third Directorate into special departments with their subordination to the NKVD is to wage a merciless fight against spies, traitors, saboteurs, deserters and all kinds of alarmists and disruptors. Ruthless reprisal against alarmists, cowards, deserters who undermine the power and discredit the honor of the Red Army is as important as the fight against espionage and sabotage".

"Message from State Security Commissioner 3rd Rank S. Milshtein to People's Commissar of Internal Affairs L.P. Beria on the actions of Special Departments and barrage detachments of the NKVD troops of the USSR for the period from the beginning of the war to October 10, 1941
Top secret
PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE USSR
Commissioner General of State Security
Comrade BERIA
REFERENCE

From the beginning of the war to October 10th of this year. Special departments of the NKVD and barrage detachments of the NKVD troops for the protection of the rear detained 657,364 military personnel who lagged behind their units and fled from the front.
Of these, 249,969 people were detained by the operational barriers of the Special Departments and 407,395 military personnel were detained by the barrage detachments of the NKVD troops to protect the rear.
Of those detained, 25,878 people were arrested by Special Departments, the remaining 632,486 people were formed into units and again sent to the front.
Among those arrested by Special Departments:
spies - 1505
saboteurs - 308
traitors - 2621
cowards and alarmists - 2643
deserters - 8772
distributors of provocative rumors - 3987
self-shooters - 1671
others - 4371
Total - 25,878
According to the decisions of the Special Departments and the verdicts of the Military Tribunals, 10,201 people were shot, 3,321 of them were shot in front of the line.
Deputy Beginning Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR
Commissioner of State security rank 3
Milshtein
[October] 1941" (Toptygin A.V. Unknown Beria. M.–SPb., 2002. P.439–440)."

What does arithmetic tell us this time? Of the 657,364 detained by all types of detachments and barriers, about 25 thousand were arrested (not shot!). Only 4%! Shot - about 10 thousand - or about 1.5%! And they were shot not “arbitrarily by detachments,” but by court decision! Where are the "bloody executioners"??? Think about it, about 1.5% OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF DETAINED were shot by court order.

Now let’s return to the topic of the “barriers” from the NKVD. On July 24, 1941, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR adopted a resolution “On measures to combat parachute landings and enemy saboteurs in the front line.” According to it, the fight against enemy reconnaissance and sabotage groups and paratroopers was entrusted to the NKVD. The NKVD introduced the positions of front-line and army chiefs of military rear security. The personnel of the border troops and part of the personnel of the internal troops of the NKVD were transferred to their subordination (the rest, as we already wrote, acted at the front as ordinary rifle units). In April 1942, due to the increase in the number of combat missions performed by NKVD troops in the front line, an independent Directorate of NKVD Troops was created within the GUVV to protect the rear of the active Red Army. Their total number was about 45 thousand people. The length of the front was up to 3000 kilometers, so there was no way to “block” it completely with such forces. Separate outposts operated.

" The purpose of barrage outposts is: a) the fight against desertion, espionage, saboteurs and enemy airborne assault; b) the detention of all military personnel who have strayed from their units, traveling separately or as part of units, as well as the detention of all suspicious persons..."

As we see, detaining the “stray” military personnel was absolutely not their main task. And the “detention” had nothing to do with executions and arrests...

But the enormous heroism of these warriors needs to be noted. Their main opponent was the best professionals of the Third Reich special forces. In the autumn-winter of 1941, the NKVD troops sent more than 95 thousand Red Army soldiers and commanders to assembly points. 2,500 deserters were also detained. But most of them were sent to assembly points, and only 12 people were sent to a military tribunal!

A new stage in the activities of the detachments began during the defense of Stalingrad. On July 28, 1942, the famous 227th order of the People's Commissar of Defense I.V. Stalin was issued:

" 2. To the military councils of the armies and, above all, to the commanders of the armies:

b) form within the army 3-5 well-armed barrage detachments (200 people each), place them in the immediate rear of unstable divisions and oblige them, in the event of panic and disorderly withdrawal of division units, to shoot panickers and cowards on the spot and thereby help honest fighters divisions to fulfill their duty to the Motherland"...

The barrage detachments were subordinate to the Military Councils of the armies through their special departments. They were formed not from NKVD servicemen, but from the best Red Army soldiers.

Message from the Special Department of the NKVD of the Stalingrad Front to the Directorate of Special Departments of the NKVD of the USSR dated August 14, 1942 “On the progress of the implementation of order No. 227 and the response of the personnel of the 4th Tank Army to it”:

" In total, 24 people were shot during the specified period of time. So, for example, the commanders of the 414th SP, 18th SD Styrkov and Dobrynin, during the battle, became cowardly, abandoned their squads and fled from the battlefield, both were detained by barriers. by detachment and by resolution of the Special Division they were shot in front of the formation.

A Red Army soldier from the same regiment and division, Ogorodnikov, self-injured his left hand and was convicted of the crime, for which he was put on trial by a military tribunal.

Based on order No. 227, three army barrier detachments were formed, each with 200 people. These units are fully armed with rifles, machine guns and light machine guns.

Operative workers of special departments were appointed heads of detachments.

As of August 7, 1942, the indicated barrier detachments and barrier battalions detained 363 people in units and formations in army sectors, of which 93 people. escaped encirclement, 146 lagged behind their units, 52 lost their units, 12 came from captivity, 54 fled from the battlefield, 2 with dubious wounds.

As a result of a thorough check: 187 people were sent to their units, 43 to the staffing department, 73 to special NKVD camps, 27 to penal companies, 2 to a medical commission, 6 people. arrested and, as stated above, 24 people. shot in front of the line"...

Is the scale really impressive? This is for two tank corps, several divisions, tens of thousands of personnel...

In October 1942, 193 army barrage detachments were formed, of which 16 were on the Stalingrad Front and 25 on the Don. For approximately 10 million Red Army soldiers, there were less than 40 thousand personnel of the barrage detachments. Tell me, could 40 thousand “drive into battle”, “shooting in the back”, 10 million? The question is rhetorical.

But overall they acted effectively. From August 1 to October 15, 1942, barrier detachments detained 140,755 military personnel who had escaped from the front line. Of those detained, 3,980 people were arrested, 1,189 people were shot, 2,776 people were sent to penal companies, 185 people were sent to penal battalions, 131,094 people were returned to their units and transit points.

On the Volga, the fighters of the barrier detachments showed miracles of heroism. Moreover, they not only restrained panic, but also fought the enemy themselves in the most difficult and critical areas!

"On August 29, 1942, the headquarters of the 29th Infantry Division of the 64th Army of the Stalingrad Front was surrounded by enemy tanks that had broken through; parts of the division, having lost control, retreated to the rear in panic. The barrier detachment under the command of State Security Lieutenant Filatov, taking decisive measures, stopped those retreating in disarray military personnel and returned them to the previously occupied defense lines. In another sector of this division, the enemy tried to break through into the depths of the defense and delayed the enemy’s advance.

On September 14, the enemy launched an offensive against units of the 399th Infantry Division of the 62nd Army. The soldiers and commanders of the 396th and 472nd rifle regiments began to retreat in panic. The head of the barrier detachment, junior lieutenant of state security Yelman, ordered his detachment to open fire over the heads of the retreating people. As a result, the personnel of these regiments were stopped and two hours later the regiments occupied their previous lines of defense.

On September 20, the Germans occupied the eastern outskirts of Melekhovskaya. The combined brigade, under enemy pressure, began an unauthorized withdrawal. The actions of the barrier detachment of the 47th Army of the Black Sea Group of Forces brought order to the brigade. The brigade occupied its previous positions and, on the initiative of the political instructor of the company of the same barrier detachment, Pestov, through joint actions with the brigade, the enemy was driven back from Melekhovskaya.

At critical moments, the barrage detachments directly engaged the enemy, successfully holding back his onslaught and inflicting losses on him.

Thus, on September 13, the 112th Rifle Division, under enemy pressure, withdrew from its occupied line. The barrier detachment of the 62nd Army, under the leadership of the detachment chief, State Security Lieutenant Khlystov, took up defense on the approaches to an important height. For four days, the soldiers and commanders of the detachment repelled attacks by enemy machine gunners, inflicting heavy losses on them. The barrier detachment held the line until the military units arrived.

On September 15-16, the barrier detachment of the 62nd Army successfully fought against superior enemy forces in the area of the Stalingrad railway station for two days. Despite its small numbers, the barrier detachment not only repelled German attacks, but also counterattacked, inflicting significant losses in manpower on the enemy. The detachment left its line only when units of the 10th Infantry Division arrived to replace it."

"On October 15, 1942, during fierce battles in the area of the Stalingrad Tractor Plant, the enemy managed to reach the Volga and cut off the remnants of the 112th Rifle Division, as well as the 115th, 124th and 149th separate rifle divisions from the main forces of the 62nd Army brigades. At the same time, there were repeated attempts among the leading command staff to abandon their units and cross to the eastern bank of the Volga. In these conditions, a special department of the 62nd Army created an operational group under the leadership of senior intelligence officer Lieutenant of State Security Ignatenko, uniting the remnants. platoons of special departments with personnel of the 3rd army barrier detachment, she did an exceptionally great job of restoring order, detaining deserters, cowards and alarmists who tried to cross to the left bank of the Volga under various pretexts. Within 15 days, the task force was detained and returned to the field. battle of up to 800 privates and command personnel, and 15 military personnel, by order of special authorities, were shot in front of the formation".

The army detachments also fought well on the Kursk Bulge.

In 1942 - 1943, soldiers of army barrier detachments not only performed defensive functions and not only fought on the front line, but also actively assisted military counterintelligence agencies in identifying enemy spies and saboteurs.

By 1944, the army leadership, which already often used barrier detachments as reserves or as regular commandant units, completely stopped using them “for their intended purpose” due to the lack of such a need. In October 1944, they, as such, were liquidated.

Lies about barrage detachments anger real veterans. Many of them did not encounter the activities of barrier detachments at all during the war, and if they did, it was very rare.

" Yes, there were barrage detachments. But I don’t know that any of them fired at their own people, at least on our sector of the front. I have already requested archival documents on this matter, but no such documents were found. The barrier detachments were located at a distance from the front line, covered the troops from the rear from saboteurs and enemy landings, detained deserters, who, unfortunately, were there; they restored order at the crossings and sent soldiers who had strayed from their units to assembly points. I will say more, the front received reinforcements, naturally, unfired, as they say, not having smelled gunpowder, and the barrage detachments, consisting exclusively of soldiers who had already been fired upon, the most persistent and courageous, were, as it were, the reliable and strong shoulder of the elder. It often happened that the barrier detachments found themselves eye to eye with the same German tanks, chains of German machine gunners and suffered heavy losses in battles. This is an irrefutable fact"...

" Yes, now those who know about the war from book pictures are inventing this kind of fables... Indeed, such detachments were deployed in threatening areas. These people are not some kind of monsters, but ordinary fighters and commanders. They played two roles. First of all, they prepared a defensive line so that the retreating forces could gain a foothold on it. Secondly, they stopped alarmism. When the turning point in the war came, I no longer saw these units"...

What do we have in the bottom line?

This is the truth that our liberals, Ukrainian Nazis and other liars and falsifiers of history really don’t like.

“NKVD barrier detachments” in the form in which they are portrayed by pro-Western film directors and bloggers have never existed. The barrage detachments under the military counterintelligence NGO, and then under the NKVD, were very small in number, and had completely different tasks - they fought as saboteurs, spies, paratroopers, and caught “as many as possible” military men and deserters who had strayed from their own. Moreover, no one was shot or arrested - but they were sent to assembly points or (in exceptional cases) transferred to law enforcement agencies “due to jurisdiction.”

The army detachments were formed not from NKVD personnel, but from Red Army soldiers - and the best and most honored ones. There were only a few of them, too, and there was no way they could drive 10 million people into battle.

Not a single case of shooting of retreating units has been recorded in history! The maximum was shooting overhead, execution on the spot, or arrest of only the instigators of panic for subsequent trial...

The fighters of the barrier detachments themselves simultaneously served as army reserves and fought the enemy on the front line in the most dangerous directions.

Oh yes, silence... Why did they arise? Firstly, in the USSR they generally did not like to talk about the real methods of work of the special services. Secondly, in the story about the barrier detachments there was not always a pleasant truth regarding not their activities, but the activities of a significant part of the Red Army fighters, because the number of those who became confused at some point and left their positions often numbered tens of thousands of people. They were not punished for this, they were given the opportunity to rehabilitate themselves, and, as a rule, they subsequently behaved courageously and with dignity. But the Union did not want to discuss this fact even in this way. And yes. Barrier detachments had to be used in areas where rifle and tank units, which included many recently mobilized, were fighting. In units of border guards or marines, barrage measures were never carried out due to lack of need. They never retreated without orders anyway.

This is how the truth is radically different from the myths that movies and “yellow literature” bring into our ears. Considering the scale of the problem, I think there is no doubt that history was deliberately distorted during a large-scale information and psychological operation against our people.

A significant contribution to the victory of the Soviet Union over Nazi Germany was made by partisan detachments operating behind enemy lines from Leningrad to Odessa. They were led not only by career military personnel, but also by people of peaceful professions. Real heroes.

Old Man Minai

At the beginning of the war, Minai Filipovich Shmyrev was the director of the Pudot Cardboard Factory (Belarus). The 51-year-old director had a military background: he was awarded three Crosses of St. George in World War I, and fought against banditry during the Civil War. In July 1941, in the village of Pudot, Shmyrev formed a partisan detachment from factory workers. In two months, the partisans engaged the enemy 27 times, destroyed 14 vehicles, 18 fuel tanks, blew up 8 bridges, and defeated the German district government in Surazh. In the spring of 1942, Shmyrev, by order of the Central Committee of Belarus, united with three partisan detachments and headed the First Belarusian Partisan Brigade. The partisans drove the fascists out of 15 villages and created the Surazh partisan region. Here, before the arrival of the Red Army, Soviet power was restored. On the Usvyaty-Tarasenki section, the “Surazh Gate” existed for six months - a 40-kilometer zone through which the partisans were supplied with weapons and food. All of Father Minai’s relatives: four small children, a sister and mother-in-law were shot by the Nazis. In the fall of 1942, Shmyrev was transferred to the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement. In 1944 he was awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union. After the war, Shmyrev returned to farm work.

Son of the kulak "Uncle Kostya"

Konstantin Sergeevich Zaslonov was born in the city of Ostashkov, Tver province. In the thirties, his family was dispossessed and exiled to the Kola Peninsula in Khibinogorsk. After school, Zaslonov became a railway worker, by 1941 he worked as the head of a locomotive depot in Orsha (Belarus) and was evacuated to Moscow, but voluntarily went back. He served under the pseudonym “Uncle Kostya” and created an underground that, with the help of mines disguised as coal, derailed 93 fascist trains in three months. In the spring of 1942, Zaslonov organized a partisan detachment. The detachment fought with the Germans and lured 5 garrisons of the Russian National People's Army to its side. Zaslonov died in a battle with RNNA punitive forces, who came to the partisans under the guise of defectors. He was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

NKVD officer Dmitry Medvedev

A native of the Oryol province, Dmitry Nikolaevich Medvedev was an NKVD officer. He was fired twice - either because of his brother - “an enemy of the people”, or “for the unjustified termination of criminal cases.” In the summer of 1941 he was reinstated into the ranks. He headed the reconnaissance and sabotage task force "Mitya", which conducted more than 50 operations in the Smolensk, Mogilev and Bryansk regions. In the summer of 1942, he headed the “Winners” special detachment and conducted more than 120 successful operations. 11 generals, 2,000 soldiers, 6,000 Bandera supporters were killed, and 81 echelons were blown up. In 1944, Medvedev was transferred to staff work, but in 1945 he traveled to Lithuania to fight the Forest Brothers gang. He retired with the rank of colonel. Hero of the Soviet Union.

Saboteur Molodtsov-Badaev

Vladimir Aleksandrovich Molodtsov worked in a mine from the age of 16. He worked his way up from a trolley racer to a deputy director. In 1934 he was sent to the Central School of the NKVD. In July 1941 he arrived in Odessa for reconnaissance and sabotage work. He worked under the pseudonym Pavel Badaev. Badaev's troops hid in the Odessa catacombs, fought with the Romanians, broke communication lines, carried out sabotage in the port, and carried out reconnaissance. The commandant's office with 149 officers was blown up. At the Zastava station, a train with the administration for occupied Odessa was destroyed. The Nazis sent 16,000 people to liquidate the detachment. They released gas into the catacombs, poisoned the water, mined the passages. In February 1942, Molodtsov and his contacts were captured. Molodtsov was executed on July 12, 1942. Hero of the Soviet Union posthumously.

OGPU employee Naumov

A native of the Perm region, Mikhail Ivanovich Naumov, was an employee of the OGPU at the beginning of the war. Shell-shocked while crossing the Dniester, was surrounded, went out to the partisans and soon led a detachment. In the fall of 1942 he became the chief of staff of partisan detachments in the Sumy region, and in January 1943 he headed a cavalry unit. In the spring of 1943, Naumov conducted the legendary Steppe Raid, 2,379 kilometers long, behind Nazi lines. For this operation, the captain was awarded the rank of major general, which is a unique event, and the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. In total, Naumov conducted three large-scale raids behind enemy lines. After the war he continued to serve in the ranks of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Kovpak Sidor Artemyevich

Kovpak became a legend during his lifetime. Born in Poltava into a poor peasant family. During World War I he received the St. George Cross from the hands of Nicholas II. During the Civil War he was a partisan against the Germans and fought with the whites. Since 1937, he was chairman of the Putivl City Executive Committee of the Sumy Region. In the fall of 1941, he led the Putivl partisan detachment, and then a formation of detachments in the Sumy region. The partisans carried out military raids behind enemy lines. Their total length was more than 10,000 kilometers. 39 enemy garrisons were defeated. On August 31, 1942, Kovpak participated in a meeting of partisan commanders in Moscow, was received by Stalin and Voroshilov, after which he carried out a raid beyond the Dnieper. At this moment, Kovpak’s detachment had 2,000 soldiers, 130 machine guns, 9 guns. In April 1943, he was awarded the rank of major general. Twice Hero of the Soviet Union.