Operation on the Kursk Bulge. Educational and leisure center "creative"

After the Battle of Stalingrad, which ended in disaster for Germany, the Wehrmacht attempted revenge the following year, 1943. This attempt went down in history as the Battle of Kursk and became the final turning point in the Great Patriotic War and World War II.

Background to the Battle of Kursk

During the counteroffensive from November 1942 to February 1943, the Red Army managed to defeat a large group of Germans, encircle and force the 6th Wehrmacht Army to surrender at Stalingrad, and liberate very large territories. Thus, in January-February, Soviet troops managed to capture Kursk and Kharkov and thereby cut through the German defenses. The gap reached approximately 200 kilometers in width and 100-150 in depth.

Realizing that a further Soviet offensive could lead to the collapse of the entire Eastern Front, the Nazi command in early March 1943 took a series of energetic actions in the Kharkov area. Very quickly, a strike force was created, which by March 15 again captured Kharkov and attempted to cut off the ledge in the Kursk area. However, here the German advance was stopped.

As of April 1943, the line of the Soviet-German front was practically flat along its entire length, and only in the Kursk area did it bend, forming a large ledge jutting into the German side. The configuration of the front made it clear where the main battles would unfold in the summer campaign of 1943.

Plans and forces of the parties before the Battle of Kursk

In the spring, heated debate broke out among the German leadership regarding the fate of the summer 1943 campaign. Some of the German generals (for example, G. Guderian) generally proposed to refrain from an offensive in order to accumulate forces for a large-scale offensive campaign in 1944. However, most German military leaders were strongly in favor of the offensive already in 1943. This offensive was supposed to be a kind of revenge for the humiliating defeat at Stalingrad, as well as the final turning point of the war in favor of Germany and its allies.

Thus, in the summer of 1943, the Nazi command again planned an offensive campaign. However, it is worth noting that from 1941 to 1943 the scale of these campaigns steadily decreased. So, if in 1941 the Wehrmacht led an offensive along the entire front, then in 1943 it was only a small section of the Soviet-German front.

The meaning of the operation, called “Citadel,” was the offensive of large Wehrmacht forces at the base of the Kursk Bulge and their attack in the general direction of Kursk. The Soviet troops located in the bulge would inevitably be surrounded and destroyed. After this, it was planned to launch an offensive into the gap created in the Soviet defense and reach Moscow from the southwest. This plan, if it had been successfully implemented, would have become a real disaster for the Red Army, because there were a very large number of troops in the Kursk ledge.

The Soviet leadership learned important lessons in the spring of 1942 and 1943. Thus, by March 1943, the Red Army was thoroughly exhausted by offensive battles, which led to defeat near Kharkov. After this, it was decided not to begin the summer campaign with an offensive, since it was obvious that the Germans were also planning to attack. Also, the Soviet leadership had no doubt that the Wehrmacht would advance precisely on the Kursk Bulge, where the configuration of the front line contributed to this as much as possible.

That is why, after weighing all the circumstances, the Soviet command decided to exhaust the German troops, inflict serious losses on them and then go on the offensive, finally securing the turning point in the war in favor of the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition.

To attack Kursk, the German leadership concentrated a very large group, numbering 50 divisions. Of these 50 divisions, 18 were tank and motorized. From the sky, the German group was covered by aircraft of the 4th and 6th Luftwaffe air fleets. Thus, the total number of German troops at the beginning of the battle of Kursk was approximately 900 thousand people, about 2,700 tanks and 2,000 aircraft. Due to the fact that the northern and southern Wehrmacht groupings on the Kursk Bulge were part of different army groups (“Center” and “South”), leadership was exercised by the commanders of these army groups - Field Marshals Kluge and Manstein.

The Soviet group on the Kursk Bulge was represented by three fronts. The northern face of the ledge was defended by troops of the Central Front under the command of Army General Rokossovsky, the southern by troops of the Voronezh Front under the command of Army General Vatutin. Also in the Kursk ledge were the troops of the Steppe Front, commanded by Colonel General Konev. The general leadership of the troops in the Kursk salient was carried out by Marshals Vasilevsky and Zhukov. The number of Soviet troops was approximately 1 million 350 thousand people, 5000 tanks and about 2900 aircraft.

Beginning of the Battle of Kursk (5 – 12 July 1943)

On the morning of July 5, 1943, German troops launched an offensive on Kursk. However, the Soviet leadership knew about the exact time of the start of this offensive, thanks to which it was able to take a number of countermeasures. One of the most significant measures was the organization of artillery counter-training, which made it possible to inflict serious losses in the first minutes and hours of the battle and significantly reduce the offensive capabilities of the German troops.

However, the German offensive began and achieved some successes in the early days. The first line of Soviet defense was broken through, but the Germans failed to achieve serious success. On the northern front of the Kursk Bulge, the Wehrmacht struck in the direction of Olkhovatka, but, unable to break through the Soviet defenses, they turned towards the village of Ponyri. However, here too the Soviet defense was able to withstand the onslaught of German troops. As a result of the battles on July 5-10, 1943, the German 9th Army suffered terrible losses in tanks: about two-thirds of the vehicles were out of action. On July 10, army units went on the defensive.

The situation unfolded more dramatically in the south. Here, in the first days, the German army managed to wedge itself into the Soviet defenses, but never broke through it. The offensive was carried out in the direction of the settlement of Oboyan, which was held by Soviet troops, who also inflicted significant damage on the Wehrmacht.

After several days of fighting, the German leadership decided to shift the direction of the attack to Prokhorovka. Implementing this decision would make it possible to cover a larger area than planned. However, here units of the Soviet 5th Guards Tank Army stood in the way of the German tank wedges.

On July 12, one of the largest tank battles in history took place in the Prokhorovka area. On the German side, approximately 700 tanks took part in it, while on the Soviet side - about 800. Soviet troops launched a counterattack on Wehrmacht units in order to eliminate the enemy’s penetration into the Soviet defense. However, this counterattack did not achieve significant results. The Red Army only managed to stop the advance of the Wehrmacht in the south of the Kursk Bulge, but it was possible to restore the situation at the beginning of the German offensive only two weeks later.

By July 15, having suffered huge losses as a result of continuous violent attacks, the Wehrmacht had practically exhausted its offensive capabilities and was forced to go on the defensive along the entire length of the front. By July 17, the withdrawal of German troops to their original lines began. Taking into account the developing situation, as well as pursuing the goal of inflicting a serious defeat on the enemy, the Supreme High Command Headquarters already on July 18, 1943 authorized the transition of Soviet troops on the Kursk Bulge to a counteroffensive.

Now the German troops were forced to defend themselves in order to avoid a military catastrophe. However, Wehrmacht units, seriously exhausted in offensive battles, could not offer serious resistance. The Soviet troops, reinforced with reserves, were full of power and readiness to crush the enemy.

To defeat the German troops covering the Kursk Bulge, two operations were developed and carried out: “Kutuzov” (to defeat the Oryol group of the Wehrmacht) and “Rumyantsev” (to defeat the Belgorod-Kharkov group).

As a result of the Soviet offensive, the Oryol and Belgorod groups of German troops were defeated. On August 5, 1943, Orel and Belgorod were liberated by Soviet troops, and the Kursk Bulge practically ceased to exist. On the same day, Moscow for the first time saluted the Soviet troops who liberated the cities from the enemy.

The last battle of the Battle of Kursk was the liberation of the city of Kharkov by Soviet troops. The battles for this city became very fierce, but thanks to the decisive onslaught of the Red Army, the city was liberated by the end of August 23. It is the capture of Kharkov that is considered the logical conclusion of the Battle of Kursk.

Losses of the parties

Estimates of the losses of the Red Army, as well as the Wehrmacht troops, have different estimates. Even more unclear are the large differences between the estimates of the parties' losses in different sources.

Thus, Soviet sources indicate that during the Battle of Kursk the Red Army lost about 250 thousand people killed and about 600 thousand wounded. Moreover, some Wehrmacht data indicate 300 thousand killed and 700 thousand wounded. Armored vehicle losses range from 1,000 to 6,000 tanks and self-propelled guns. Soviet aviation losses are estimated at 1,600 aircraft.

However, regarding the assessment of Wehrmacht losses, the data differ even more. According to German data, the losses of German troops ranged from 83 to 135 thousand people killed. But at the same time, Soviet data indicate the number of dead Wehrmacht soldiers at approximately 420 thousand. The losses of German armored vehicles range from 1,000 tanks (according to German data) to 3,000. Aviation losses amount to approximately 1,700 aircraft.

Results and significance of the Battle of Kursk

Immediately after the Battle of Kursk and directly during it, the Red Army began a series of large-scale operations with the aim of liberating Soviet lands from German occupation. Among these operations: “Suvorov” (operation to liberate Smolensk, Donbass and Chernigov-Poltava.

Thus, the victory at Kursk opened up vast operational scope for action for the Soviet troops. German troops, bloodless and defeated as a result of the summer battles, ceased to be a serious threat until December 1943. However, this does not mean at all that the Wehrmacht was not strong at that time. On the contrary, snapping furiously, the German troops sought to hold at least the Dnieper line.

For the Allied command, which landed troops on the island of Sicily in July 1943, the battle of Kursk became a kind of “help”, since the Wehrmacht was no longer able to transfer reserves to the island - the Eastern Front was a higher priority. Even after the defeat at Kursk, the Wehrmacht command was forced to transfer fresh forces from Italy to the east, and in their place send units battered in battles with the Red Army.

For the German command, the battle of Kursk became the moment when plans to defeat the Red Army and defeat the USSR finally became an illusion. It became clear that for quite a long time the Wehrmacht would be forced to refrain from conducting active operations.

The Battle of Kursk marked the completion of a radical turning point in the Great Patriotic War and the Second World War. After this battle, the strategic initiative finally passed into the hands of the Red Army, thanks to which, by the end of 1943, vast territories of the Soviet Union were liberated, including such large cities as Kyiv and Smolensk.

Internationally, the victory in the Battle of Kursk became the moment when the peoples of Europe enslaved by the Nazis took heart. The people's liberation movement in European countries began to grow even faster. Its culmination came in 1944, when the decline of the Third Reich became very clear.

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The Battle of Kursk, in its scale, military and political significance, is rightfully considered one of the key battles not only of the Great Patriotic War, but also of the Second World War. The Battle of Kursk finally established the power of the Red Army and completely broke the morale of the Wehrmacht forces. After it, the German army completely lost its offensive potential.

The Battle of Kursk, or as it is also called in Russian historiography, the Battle of Kursk, is one of the decisive battles during the Great Patriotic War, which took place in the summer of 1943 (July 5-August 23).

Historians call the Battles of Stalingrad and Kursk two of the most significant victories of the Red Army against the Wehrmacht forces, which completely turned the tide of hostilities.

In this article we will find out the date of the Battle of Kursk and its role and significance during the war, as well as its causes, course and results.

The historical significance of the Battle of Kursk is difficult to overestimate. If not for the exploits of Soviet soldiers during the battle, the Germans were able to seize the initiative on the Eastern Front and resume the offensive, again moving towards Moscow and Leningrad. During the battle, the Red Army defeated most of the Wehrmacht's combat-ready units on the Eastern Front, and it lost the opportunity to use fresh reserves, since they were already depleted.

In honor of the victory, August 23 forever became the Day of Military Glory of Russia. In addition, the battles included the largest and bloodiest tank battle in history, and also involved a huge amount of aircraft and other types of equipment.

The Battle of Kursk is also called the Battle of the Arc of Fire - all because of the critical importance of this operation and the bloody battles that took hundreds of thousands of lives.

The Battle of Stalingrad, which occurred earlier than the battle on the Kursk Bulge, completely destroyed the German plans for the rapid capture of the USSR. According to the Barbarossa plan and the Blitzkrieg tactics, the Germans tried to take the USSR in one fell swoop even before winter. Now the Soviet Union had gathered its strength and was able to pose a serious challenge to the Wehrmacht.

During the Battle of Kursk from July 5 to August 23, 1943, historians estimate that at least 200 thousand soldiers were killed and more than half a million were wounded. It is important to note that many historians consider these figures to be underestimated and the losses of the parties in the Battle of Kursk may have been much more significant. It is mainly foreign historians who speak about the bias of these data.

Intelligence service

Soviet intelligence played a huge role in the victory over Germany, which was able to learn about the so-called Operation Citadel. Soviet intelligence officers began receiving reports of this operation at the beginning of 1943. On April 12, 1943, a document was placed on the Soviet leader’s desk, which contained complete information about the operation - the date of its conduct, the tactics and strategy of the German army. It was difficult to imagine what would have happened if intelligence had not done its job. Probably, the Germans would still have been able to break through the Russian defense, since the preparations for Operation Citadel were serious - they prepared for it no worse than for Operation Barbarossa.

At the moment, historians are unsure exactly who exactly delivered this important knowledge to Stalin. It is believed that this information was obtained by one of the British intelligence officers, John Cancross, as well as a member of the so-called “Cambridge Five” (a group of British intelligence officers who were recruited by the USSR back in the early 1930s and worked for two governments at once).

There is also an opinion that information about the plans of the German command was conveyed by the intelligence officers of the Dora group, namely the Hungarian intelligence officer Sandor Rado.

Some historians believe that all the information about Operation Citadel was conveyed to Moscow by one of the most famous intelligence officers of the Second World War, Rudolf Ressler, who was in Switzerland at that time.

Substantial support for the USSR was provided by British agents who were not recruited by the Union. During the Ultra program, British intelligence managed to hack the German Lorenz encryption machine, which transmitted messages between members of the senior leadership of the Third Reich. The first step was to intercept the plans for the summer offensive in the area of ​​Kursk and Belgorod, after which this information was immediately sent to Moscow.

Before the start of the Battle of Kursk, Zhukov claimed that as soon as he saw the future battlefield, he already knew how the strategic offensive of the German army would proceed. However, there is no confirmation of his words - it is believed that in his memoirs he simply exaggerates his strategic talent.

Thus, the Soviet Union knew about all the details of the offensive operation “Citadel” and was able to adequately prepare for it so as not to leave the Germans a chance to win.

Preparing for battle

At the beginning of 1943, the German and Soviet armies carried out offensive actions that led to the formation of a bulge in the center of the Soviet-German front, reaching a depth of 150 kilometers. This ledge was called the “Kursk Bulge”. In April, it became clear to both sides that one of the key battles would soon begin for this ledge, which could decide the outcome of the war on the Eastern Front.

There was no consensus at German headquarters. For a long time, Hitler could not develop an exact strategy for the summer of 1943. Many generals, including Manstein, were against the offensive at the moment. He believed that the offensive would make sense if it began right now, and not in the summer, when the Red Army could prepare for it. The rest either believed that it was time to go on the defensive, or to launch an offensive in the summer.

Despite the fact that the most experienced military leader of the Reich (Manshetein) was against it, Hitler still agreed to launch an offensive in early July 1943.

The Battle of Kursk in 1943 was the Union’s chance to consolidate the initiative after the victory at Stalingrad, and therefore the preparation for the operation was taken with previously unprecedented seriousness.

The situation at the USSR headquarters was much better. Stalin was aware of the German plans; he had a numerical advantage in infantry, tanks, guns and aircraft. Knowing how and when the Germans would attack, Soviet soldiers prepared defensive fortifications and laid minefields to meet them in order to repel the attack and then launch a counteroffensive. A huge role in the successful defense was played by the experience of Soviet military leaders, who, after two years of military operations, were still able to develop the tactics and strategy of waging war among the best military leaders of the Reich. The fate of Operation Citadel was sealed even before it began.

Plans and strengths of the parties

The German command planned to conduct a major offensive operation on the Kursk Bulge under the name (code name) "Citadel". In order to destroy the Soviet defense, the Germans decided to launch descending attacks from the north (area of ​​the city of Orel) and from the south (area of ​​the city of Belgorod). Having broken the enemy defenses, the Germans had to unite in the area of ​​​​the city of Kursk, thus completely encircling the troops of the Voronezh and Central Fronts. In addition, the German tank units had to turn in an eastern direction - to the village of Prokhorovka, and destroy the armored reserves of the Red Army so that they could not come to the aid of the main forces and would not help them get out of the encirclement. Such tactics were not at all new for German generals. Their tank flank attacks worked for four. Using such tactics, they were able to conquer almost all of Europe and inflict many crushing defeats on the Red Army in 1941-1942.

To carry out Operation Citadel, the Germans concentrated 50 divisions with a total number of 900 thousand people in Eastern Ukraine, Belarus and Russia. Of these, 18 divisions were tank and motorized. Such a large number of tank divisions was common for the Germans. The Wehrmacht forces always used lightning attacks from tank units to prevent the enemy from even having a chance to group and fight back. In 1939, it was the tank divisions that played a key role in the capture of France, which surrendered before it could fight.

The commanders-in-chief of the Wehrmacht forces were Field Marshal von Kluge (Army Group Center) and Field Marshal Manstein (Army Group South). The strike forces were commanded by Field Marshal Model, the 4th Panzer Army and Task Force Kempf were commanded by General Hermann Hoth.

Before the start of the battle, the German army received long-awaited tank reserves. Hitler sent more than 100 heavy Tiger tanks, almost 200 Panther tanks (first used at the Battle of Kursk) and less than a hundred Ferdinand or Elefant (Elephant) tank destroyers to the Eastern Front.

"Tigers", "Panthers" and "Ferdinands" were some of the most powerful tanks during the Second World War. Neither the Allies nor the USSR at that time had tanks that could boast such firepower and armor. If Soviet soldiers had already seen the “Tigers” and learned to fight against them, then the “Panthers” and “Ferdinands” caused many problems on the battlefield.

The Panthers were medium tanks that were slightly inferior in armor to the Tigers and were armed with a 7.5 cm KwK 42 cannon. These guns had an excellent rate of fire and fired over long distances with great accuracy.

"Ferdinand" is a heavy self-propelled anti-tank gun (tank destroyer), which was one of the most famous during the Second World War. Despite the fact that its numbers were small, it offered serious resistance to USSR tanks, since at that time it had perhaps the best armor and firepower. During the Battle of Kursk, the Ferdinands showed their power, perfectly withstanding hits from anti-tank guns, and even coped with artillery hits. However, its main problem was the small number of anti-personnel machine guns, and therefore the tank destroyer was very vulnerable to infantry, which could get close to it and blow them up. It was simply impossible to destroy these tanks with head-on shots. The weak points were on the sides, where they later learned to fire sub-caliber shells. The most vulnerable point in the tank’s defense was the weak chassis, which was disabled, and then the stationary tank was captured.

In total, Manstein and Kluge received less than 350 new tanks at their disposal, which was catastrophically insufficient, given the number of Soviet armored forces. It is also worth highlighting that approximately 500 tanks used during the Battle of Kursk were obsolete models. These are Pz.II and Pz.III tanks, which were already out of date at that time.

The 2nd Panzer Army during the Battle of Kursk included elite Panzerwaffe tank units, including the 1st SS Panzer Division "Adolf Hitler", the 2nd SS Panzer Division "DasReich" and the famous 3rd Panzer Division "Totenkopf" (it aka "Death's Head").

The Germans had a modest number of aircraft to support infantry and tanks - about 2,500 thousand units. In the number of guns and mortars, the German army was more than twice as inferior to the Soviet army, and some sources indicate a threefold advantage of the USSR in guns and mortars.

The Soviet command realized its mistakes in conducting defensive operations in 1941-1942. This time they built a powerful defensive line capable of holding off the massive advance of German armored forces. According to the command's plans, the Red Army was supposed to wear down the enemy with defensive battles, and then launch a counter-offensive at the most unfavorable moment for the enemy.

During the Battle of Kursk, the commander of the Central Front was one of the most talented and effective generals in the army - Konstantin Rokossovsky. His troops took upon themselves the task of defending the northern front of the Kursk ledge. The commander of the Voronezh Front on the Kursk Bulge was a native of the Voronezh region, Army General Nikolai Vatutin, on whose shoulders fell the task of defending the southern front of the salient. USSR Marshals Georgy Zhukov and Alexander Vasilevsky coordinated the actions of the Red Army.

The ratio of troop numbers was far from being on Germany's side. According to estimates, the Central and Voronezh Fronts had 1.9 million soldiers, including units of the Steppe Front (Steppe Military District). The number of Wehrmacht fighters did not exceed 900 thousand people. In terms of the number of tanks, Germany was inferior by less than half: 2.5 thousand versus less than 5 thousand. As a result, the balance of forces before the Battle of Kursk looked like this: 2:1 in favor of the USSR. Great Patriotic War historian Alexey Isaev says that the strength of the Red Army during the battle is overestimated. His point of view is subject to great criticism, since he does not take into account the troops of the Steppe Front (the number of fighters of the Steppe Front who participated in the operations amounted to more than 500 thousand people).

Kursk defensive operation

Before giving a full description of the events on the Kursk Bulge, it is important to show a map of actions to make it easier to navigate the information. Battle of Kursk on the map:

This picture shows the diagram of the Battle of Kursk. A map of the Battle of Kursk can clearly show how combat units acted during the battle. On the map of the Battle of Kursk you will also see symbols that will help you assimilate the information.

The Soviet generals received all the necessary orders - the defense was strong and the Germans would soon face resistance, which the Wehrmacht had not received in the entire history of its existence. On the day the Battle of Kursk began, the Soviet army pulled up a huge amount of artillery to the front in order to provide a response artillery barrage, which the Germans would not expect.

The beginning of the Battle of Kursk (defensive stage) was scheduled for the morning of July 5 - the offensive was supposed to take place immediately from the northern and southern fronts. Before the tank attack, the Germans carried out large-scale bombing, to which the Soviet army responded in kind. At this point, the German command (namely Field Marshal Manstein) began to realize that the Russians had learned about Operation Citadel and were able to prepare a defense. Manstein told Hitler more than once that this offensive no longer made sense at the moment. He believed that it was necessary to carefully prepare the defense and try first to repel the Red Army and only then think about counterattacks.

Start - Arc of Fire

On the northern front, the offensive began at six o'clock in the morning. The Germans attacked a little west of the Cherkassy direction. The first tank attacks ended in failure for the Germans. The strong defense led to heavy losses in the German armored units. And yet the enemy managed to penetrate 10 kilometers deep. On the southern front the offensive began at three o'clock in the morning. The main blows fell on the settlements of Oboyan and Korochi.

The Germans were unable to break through the defenses of the Soviet troops, since they were carefully prepared for battle. Even the Wehrmacht's elite tank divisions were barely making any progress. As soon as it became clear that German forces could not break through on the northern and southern fronts, the command decided that it was necessary to strike in the Prokhorovsk direction.

On July 11, heavy fighting began near the village of Prokhorovka, which escalated into the largest tank battle in history. Soviet tanks in the Battle of Kursk outnumbered German tanks, but despite this, the enemy resisted to the end. July 13-23 - The Germans are still trying to carry out offensive attacks, which end in failure. On July 23, the enemy completely exhausted its offensive potential and decided to go on the defensive.

Tank battle

It is difficult to answer how many tanks were involved on both sides, since data from different sources differs. If we take average data, then the number of USSR tanks reached about 1 thousand vehicles. While the Germans had about 700 tanks.

The tank battle (battle) during the defensive operation on the Kursk Bulge took place on July 12, 1943. Enemy attacks on Prokhorovka began immediately from the western and southern directions. Four tank divisions were advancing in the west and about 300 more tanks were sent from the south.

The battle began early in the morning and the Soviet troops gained an advantage, since the rising sun shone directly into the Germans’ tank observation devices. The battle formations of the sides quickly became mixed up, and just a few hours after the start of the battle it was difficult to tell where whose tanks were.

The Germans found themselves in a very difficult position, since the main strength of their tanks lay in long-range guns, which were useless in close combat, and the tanks themselves were very slow, whereas in this situation maneuverability was key. The 2nd and 3rd tank (anti-tank) armies of the Germans were defeated near Kursk. Russian tanks, on the contrary, gained an advantage, since they had a chance to target the vulnerable spots of heavily armored German tanks, and they themselves were very maneuverable (this is especially true of the famous T-34).

However, the Germans still gave a serious rebuff with their anti-tank guns, which undermined the morale of the Russian tank crews - the fire was so dense that the soldiers and tanks did not have time and could not form formations.

While the bulk of the tank forces were engaged in battle, the Germans decided to use the Kempf tank group, which was advancing on the left flank of the Soviet army. To repel this attack it was necessary to use the tank reserves of the Red Army. In the southern direction, already by 14.00, Soviet troops began to push back German tank units, which did not have fresh reserves. In the evening, the battlefield was already far behind the Soviet tank units and the battle was won.

Tank losses on both sides during the battle of Prokhorovka during the Kursk defensive operation were as follows:

• about 250 Soviet tanks;
• 70 German tanks.

The above figures are irrecoverable losses. The number of damaged tanks was significantly greater. For example, after the Battle of Prokhorovka, the Germans had only 1/10 fully combat-ready vehicles.

The Battle of Prokhorovka is called the largest tank battle in history, but this is not entirely true. In fact, this is the largest tank battle that lasted only one day. But the largest battle took place two years earlier, also between the forces of the Germans and the USSR on the Eastern Front near Dubno. During this battle, which began on June 23, 1941, 4,500 tanks collided with each other. The Soviet Union had 3,700 units of equipment, while the Germans had only 800 units.

Despite such a numerical advantage of the Union tank units, there was not a single chance of victory. There are several reasons for this. Firstly, the quality of the Germans' tanks was much higher - they were armed with new models with good anti-tank armor and weapons. Secondly, in Soviet military thought at that time there was a principle that “tanks do not fight tanks.” Most tanks in the USSR at that time had only bulletproof armor and could not penetrate the thick German armor themselves. That is why the first largest tank battle became a catastrophic failure for the USSR.

Results of the defensive phase of the battle

The defensive stage of the Battle of Kursk ended on July 23, 1943 with the complete victory of Soviet troops and the crushing defeat of the Wehrmacht forces. As a result of the bloody battles, the German army was exhausted and bleeding, a significant number of tanks were either destroyed or partially lost their combat effectiveness. The German tanks that took part in the battle of Prokhorovka were almost completely disabled, destroyed, or fell into enemy hands.

The loss ratio during the defensive phase of the Battle of Kursk was as follows: 4.95:1. The Soviet army lost five times as many soldiers, while German losses were much smaller. However, a huge number of German soldiers were wounded, as well as tank troops destroyed, which significantly undermined the combat power of the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front.

As a result of the defensive operation, Soviet troops reached the line they occupied before the German offensive, which began on July 5. The Germans went into deep defense.

During the Battle of Kursk, a radical change occurred. After the Germans exhausted their offensive capabilities, the Red Army counteroffensive began on the Kursk Bulge. From July 17 to July 23, Soviet troops carried out the Izyum-Barvenkovskaya offensive operation.

The operation was carried out by the Southwestern Front of the Red Army. Its key goal was to pin down the enemy’s Donbass group so that the enemy would not be able to transfer fresh reserves to the Kursk Bulge. Despite the fact that the enemy threw perhaps his best tank divisions into battle, the forces of the Southwestern Front still managed to capture bridgeheads and pin down and encircle the Donbass German group with powerful blows. Thus, the Southwestern Front significantly helped in the defense of the Kursk Bulge.

Mius offensive operation

From July 17 to August 2, 1943, the Mius offensive operation was also carried out. The main task of the Soviet troops during the operation was to pull fresh German reserves from the Kursk Bulge to the Donbass and defeat the 6th Army of the Wehrmacht. To repel the attack in the Donbass, the Germans had to transfer significant air forces and tank units to protect the city. Despite the fact that Soviet troops failed to break through the German defenses near Donbass, they still managed to significantly weaken the offensive on the Kursk Bulge.

The offensive stage of the Battle of Kursk continued successfully for the Red Army. The next important battles on the Kursk Bulge took place near Orel and Kharkov - the offensive operations were called “Kutuzov” and “Rumyantsev”.

The offensive Operation Kutuzov began on July 12, 1943 in the area of ​​the city of Orel, where Soviet troops were confronted by two German armies. As a result of bloody battles, the Germans were unable to hold a bridgehead; on July 26, they retreated. Already on August 5, the city of Orel was liberated by the Red Army. It was on August 5, 1943 that for the first time during the entire period of hostilities with Germany, a small parade with fireworks took place in the capital of the USSR. Thus, it can be judged that the liberation of Orel was an extremely important task for the Red Army, which it successfully completed.

Offensive operation "Rumyantsev"

The next main event of the Battle of Kursk during its offensive phase began on August 3, 1943 on the southern face of the arc. As already mentioned, this strategic offensive was called “Rumyantsev”. The operation was carried out by forces of the Voronezh and Steppe Front.

Just two days after the start of the operation, on August 5, the city of Belgorod was liberated from the Nazis. And two days later, the forces of the Red Army liberated the city of Bogodukhov. During the offensive on August 11, Soviet soldiers managed to cut the German Kharkov-Poltava railway line. Despite all the counterattacks of the German army, the Red Army forces continued to advance. As a result of fierce fighting on August 23, the city of Kharkov was recaptured.

The Battle of Kursk was already won by Soviet troops at that moment. The German command also understood this, but Hitler gave a clear order to “stand until the last.”

The Mginsk offensive operation began on July 22 and lasted until August 22, 1943. The main goals of the USSR were as follows: to finally disrupt the German plan of attack on Leningrad, to prevent the enemy from transferring forces to the west and to completely destroy the 18th Army of the Wehrmacht.

The operation began with a powerful artillery strike in the enemy direction. The forces of the parties at the start of the operation on the Kursk Bulge looked like this: 260 thousand soldiers and about 600 tanks on the side of the USSR, and 100 thousand people and 150 tanks on the side of the Wehrmacht.

Despite strong artillery bombardment, the German army put up fierce resistance. Although the Red Army forces managed to immediately capture the first echelon of the enemy’s defense, they were unable to advance further.

At the beginning of August 1943, having received fresh reserves, the Red Army again began to attack German positions. Thanks to numerical superiority and powerful mortar fire, USSR soldiers managed to capture the enemy’s defensive fortifications in the village of Porechye. However, the spacecraft again could not advance further - the German defense was too dense.

A fierce battle between the opposing sides during the operation unfolded over Sinyaevo and Sinyaevskie Heights, which were captured by Soviet troops several times, and then they went back to the Germans. The fighting was fierce and both sides suffered heavy losses. The German defense was so strong that the spacecraft command decided to stop the offensive operation on August 22, 1943 and switch to a defensive defense. Thus, the Mgin offensive operation did not bring final success, although it played an important strategic role. To repel this attack, the Germans had to use reserves that were supposed to go to Kursk.

Smolensk offensive operation

Until the Soviet counteroffensive in the Battle of Kursk 1943 began, it was extremely important for the Headquarters to defeat as many enemy units as possible that the Wehrmacht could send under the Kursk to contain the Soviet troops. In order to weaken the enemy’s defenses and deprive him of the help of reserves, the Smolensk offensive operation was carried out. The Smolensk direction adjoined the western region of the Kursk salient. The operation was codenamed "Suvorov" and began on August 7, 1943. The offensive was launched by the forces of the left wing of the Kalinin Front, as well as the entire Western Front.

The operation ended in success, since it marked the beginning of the liberation of Belarus. However, most importantly, the military leaders of the Battle of Kursk achieved pinning down as many as 55 enemy divisions, preventing them from heading to Kursk - this significantly increased the chances of the Red Army forces during the counteroffensive near Kursk.

To weaken the enemy’s positions near Kursk, the Red Army carried out another operation - the Donbass offensive. The parties’ plans for the Donbass basin were very serious, because this place served as an important economic center - Donetsk mines were extremely important for the USSR and Germany. There was a huge German group in the Donbass, which numbered more than 500 thousand people.

The operation began on August 13, 1943 and was carried out by the forces of the Southwestern Front. On August 16, the Red Army forces met serious resistance on the Mius River, where there was a heavily fortified defensive line. On August 16, the forces of the Southern Front entered the battle and managed to break through the enemy defenses. Of all the regiments, the 67th stood out especially in battles. The successful offensive continued and on August 30 the spacecraft liberated the city of Taganrog.

On August 23, 1943, the offensive phase of the Battle of Kursk and the Battle of Kursk itself ended, but the Donbass offensive operation continued - the spacecraft forces had to push the enemy beyond the Dnieper River.

Now important strategic positions were lost for the Germans and the threat of dismemberment and death loomed over Army Group South. To prevent this, the leader of the Third Reich nevertheless allowed her to retreat beyond the Dnieper.

On September 1, all German units in this area began to retreat from Donbass. On September 5, Gorlovka was liberated, and three days later, during the fighting, Stalino, or as the city is now called, Donetsk, was taken.

The retreat for the German army was very difficult. The Wehrmacht forces were running out of ammunition for their artillery pieces. During the retreat, German soldiers actively used “scorched earth” tactics. The Germans killed civilians and burned villages and small towns along their route. During the Battle of Kursk in 1943, retreating through cities, the Germans plundered everything they could get their hands on.

On September 22, the Germans were pushed back across the Dnieper River in the area of ​​the cities of Zaporozhye and Dnepropetrovsk. After this, the Donbass offensive operation came to an end, ending in complete success for the Red Army.

All the above operations led to the fact that the Wehrmacht forces, as a result of the fighting in the Battle of Kursk, were forced to retreat beyond the Dnieper in order to build new defensive lines. The victory in the Battle of Kursk was the result of the increased courage and fighting spirit of Soviet soldiers, the skill of commanders and the competent use of military equipment.

The Battle of Kursk in 1943, and then the Battle of the Dnieper, finally secured the initiative on the Eastern Front for the USSR. No one doubted anymore that victory in the Great Patriotic War would be for the USSR. Germany’s allies also understood this, and they began to gradually abandon the Germans, leaving the Reich even less chance.

Many historians also believe that the Allied offensive on the island of Sicily, which at that moment was occupied mainly by Italian troops, played an important role in the victory over the Germans during the Battle of Kursk.

On July 10, the Allies launched an attack on Sicily and Italian troops surrendered to British and American forces with virtually no resistance. This greatly spoiled Hitler’s plans, since in order to retain Western Europe he had to transfer some troops from the Eastern Front, which again weakened the German position near Kursk. Already on July 10, Manstein told Hitler that the offensive near Kursk must be stopped and go into deep defense beyond the Dnieper River, but Hitler still hoped that the enemy would not be able to defeat the Wehrmacht.

Everyone knows that the Battle of Kursk during the Great Patriotic War was bloody and the date of its beginning is associated with the death of our grandfathers and great-grandfathers. However, there were also funny (interesting) facts during the Battle of Kursk. One of these cases involves the KV-1 tank.

During a tank battle, one of the Soviet KV-1 tanks stalled and the crew ran out of ammunition. He was opposed by two German Pz.IV tanks, which could not penetrate the KV-1’s armor. German tank crews tried to get to the Soviet crew by sawing through the armor, but nothing worked. Then two Pz.IVs decided to drag the KV-1 to their base to deal with the tankers there. They hooked up the KV-1 and began towing it. About halfway there, the KV-1 engine suddenly started and the Soviet tank dragged two Pz.IVs with it to its base. The German tank crews were shocked and simply abandoned their tanks.

Results of the Battle of Kursk

If the victory in the Battle of Stalingrad ended the period of defense of the Red Army during the Great Patriotic War, then the end of the Battle of Kursk marked a radical turning point in the course of hostilities.

After a report (message) about the victory in the Battle of Kursk arrived on Stalin’s desk, the General Secretary stated that this was only the beginning and very soon the Red Army troops would oust the Germans from the occupied territories of the USSR.

The events after the Battle of Kursk, of course, did not unfold simply for the Red Army. Victories were accompanied by huge losses, because the enemy stubbornly held the line.

The liberation of cities after the Battle of Kursk continued, for example, already in November 1943, the capital of the Ukrainian SSR, the city of Kyiv, was liberated.

A very important result of the Battle of Kursk - change in the Allies' attitude towards the USSR. A report to the US President, written in August, stated that the USSR now occupied a dominant position in World War II. There is proof of this. If Germany allocated only two divisions for the defense of Sicily from the combined forces of Great Britain and the United States, then on the Eastern Front the USSR attracted the attention of two hundred German divisions.

The US was very worried about the Russian successes on the Eastern Front. Roosevelt said that if the USSR continued to pursue such success, the opening of a “second front” would be unnecessary and the United States would then not be able to influence the fate of Europe without benefit to itself. Consequently, the opening of a “second front” should follow as quickly as possible, while US assistance was needed at all.

The failure of Operation Citadel entailed the disruption of further strategic offensive operations of the Wehrmacht, which had already been prepared for execution. A victory at Kursk would make it possible to develop an offensive against Leningrad, and after that the Germans set off to occupy Sweden.

The result of the Battle of Kursk was the undermining of Germany's authority among its allies. The successes of the USSR on the Eastern Front provided the opportunity for the Americans and British to expand in Western Europe. After such a crushing defeat for Germany, the leader of fascist Italy, Benito Mussolini, broke the agreement with Germany and left the war. Thus, Hitler lost his faithful ally.

Success, of course, came at a heavy price. The losses of the USSR in the Battle of Kursk were enormous, as were the German ones. The balance of forces has already been shown above - now it’s worth looking at the losses in the Battle of Kursk.

In fact, it is quite difficult to establish the exact number of deaths, since data from different sources differ greatly. Many historians take average figures - 200 thousand dead and three times as many wounded. The least optimistic data speaks of more than 800 thousand dead on both sides and the same number of wounded. The sides also lost a huge number of tanks and equipment. Aviation in the Battle of Kursk played almost a key role and aircraft losses amounted to about 4 thousand units on both sides. At the same time, aviation losses are the only ones where the Red Army lost no more than the German ones - each lost about 2 thousand aircraft. For example, the ratio of human losses looks like 5:1 or 4:1 according to different sources. Based on the characteristics of the Battle of Kursk, we can come to the conclusion that the effectiveness of Soviet aircraft at this stage of the war was in no way inferior to German ones, whereas at the beginning of hostilities the situation was radically different.

Soviet soldiers near Kursk showed extraordinary heroism. Their exploits were noted even abroad, especially by American and British publications. The heroism of the Red Army was also noted by German generals, including Manschein, who was considered the best military leader of the Reich. Several hundred thousand soldiers received awards “For participation in the Battle of Kursk.”

Another interesting fact is that children also took part in the Battle of Kursk. Of course, they did not fight on the front line, but they provided serious support in the rear. They helped deliver supplies and shells. And before the start of the battle, with the help of children, hundreds of kilometers of railways were built, which were necessary for the rapid transportation of military personnel and supplies.

Finally, it is important to secure all the data. Date of the end and beginning of the Battle of Kursk: July 5 and August 23, 1943.

Key dates of the Battle of Kursk:

• July 5 – 23, 1943 – Kursk strategic defensive operation;
• July 23 – August 23, 1943 – Kursk strategic offensive operation;
• July 12, 1943 – bloody tank battle near Prokhorovka;
• July 17 – 27, 1943 – Izyum-Barvenkovskaya offensive operation;
• July 17 – August 2, 1943 – Mius offensive operation;
• July 12 – August 18, 1943 – Oryol strategic offensive operation “Kutuzov”;
• August 3 – 23, 1943 – Belgorod-Kharkov strategic offensive operation “Rumyantsev”;
• July 22 – August 23, 1943 – Mginsk offensive operation;
• August 7 – October 2, 1943 – Smolensk offensive operation;
• August 13 – September 22, 1943 – Donbass offensive operation.

Results of the Battle of the Arc of Fire:

• a radical turn of events during the Great Patriotic War and World War II;
• the complete fiasco of the German campaign to capture the USSR;
• The Nazis lost confidence in the invincibility of the German army, which lowered the morale of the soldiers and led to conflicts in the ranks of the command.

Battle of Kursk(July 5, 1943 - August 23, 1943, also known as the Battle of Kursk) is one of the key battles of the Second World War and the Great Patriotic War in terms of its scale, forces and means involved, tension, results and military-political consequences. In Soviet and Russian historiography, it is customary to divide the battle into 3 parts: Kursk defensive operation (July 5-12); Oryol (July 12 - August 18) and Belgorod-Kharkov (August 3-23) offensive. The German side called the offensive part of the battle “Operation Citadel.”

After the end of the battle, the strategic initiative in the war passed to the side of the Red Army, which until the end of the war carried out mainly offensive operations, while the Wehrmacht was on the defensive.

Story

After the defeat at Stalingrad, the German command decided to take revenge, having in mind the implementation of a major offensive on the Soviet-German front, the location of which was the so-called Kursk ledge (or arc), formed by Soviet troops in the winter and spring of 1943. The Battle of Kursk, like the battles of Moscow and Stalingrad, was distinguished by its great scope and focus. More than 4 million people, over 69 thousand guns and mortars, 13.2 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, and up to 12 thousand combat aircraft took part in it on both sides.

In the Kursk area, the Germans concentrated up to 50 divisions, including 16 tank and motorized divisions, which were part of the 9th and 2nd armies of the Center group of General Field Marshal von Kluge, the 4th Panzer Army and the Kempf task force group Army "South" of Field Marshal E. Manstein. Operation Citadel, developed by the Germans, envisaged the encirclement of Soviet troops with converging attacks on Kursk and a further offensive into the depths of the defense.

The situation in the Kursk direction by the beginning of July 1943

By the beginning of July, the Soviet command completed preparations for the Battle of Kursk. The troops operating in the Kursk salient area were reinforced. From April to July, the Central and Voronezh Fronts received 10 rifle divisions, 10 anti-tank artillery brigades, 13 separate anti-tank artillery regiments, 14 artillery regiments, 8 guards mortar regiments, 7 separate tank and self-propelled artillery regiments and other units . From March to July, 5,635 guns and 3,522 mortars, as well as 1,294 aircraft, were placed at the disposal of these fronts. The Steppe Military District, units and formations of the Bryansk and left wing of the Western Front received significant reinforcements. The troops concentrated in the Oryol and Belgorod-Kharkov directions were prepared to repel powerful attacks from selected Wehrmacht divisions and launch a decisive counteroffensive.

The defense of the northern flank was carried out by the troops of the Central Front under General Rokossovsky, and the southern flank by the Voronezh Front of General Vatutin. The depth of defense was 150 kilometers and was built in several echelons. Soviet troops had some advantage in manpower and equipment; In addition, warned of the German offensive, the Soviet command carried out counter-artillery preparation on July 5, inflicting significant losses on the enemy.

Having revealed the offensive plan of the fascist German command, the Supreme High Command Headquarters decided to exhaust and bleed the enemy’s strike forces through deliberate defense, and then complete their complete defeat with a decisive counteroffensive. The defense of the Kursk ledge was entrusted to the troops of the Central and Voronezh fronts. Both fronts numbered more than 1.3 million people, up to 20 thousand guns and mortars, more than 3,300 tanks and self-propelled guns, 2,650 aircraft. Troops of the Central Front (48, 13, 70, 65, 60th Combined Arms Army, 2nd Tank Army, 16th Air Army, 9th and 19th Separate Tank Corps) under the command of General K.K. Rokossovsky was supposed to repel the enemy's attack from Orel. In front of the Voronezh Front (38th, 40th, 6th and 7th Guards, 69th Armies, 1st Tank Army, 2nd Air Army, 35th Guards Rifle Corps, 5th and 2nd Guards Tank Corps) , commanded by General N.F. Vatutin was tasked with repelling the enemy’s attack from Belgorod. In the rear of the Kursk ledge, the Steppe Military District was deployed (from July 9 - Steppe Front: 4th and 5th Guards, 27th, 47th, 53rd armies, 5th Guards Tank Army, 5th Air Army, 1 rifle, 3 tank, 3 motorized, 3 cavalry corps), which was the strategic reserve of the Supreme High Command Headquarters.

On August 3, after powerful artillery preparation and air strikes, front troops, supported by a barrage of fire, went on the offensive and successfully broke through the first enemy position. With the introduction of second echelons of regiments into battle, the second position was broken through. To increase the efforts of the 5th Guards Army, advanced tank brigades of the corps of the first echelon of tank armies were brought into battle. They, together with rifle divisions, completed the breakthrough of the enemy’s main defense line. Following the advanced brigades, the main forces of the tank armies were brought into battle. By the end of the day, they had overcome the second line of enemy defense and advanced 12–26 km in depth, thereby separating the Tomarov and Belgorod centers of enemy resistance. Simultaneously with the tank armies, the following were introduced into the battle: in the zone of the 6th Guards Army - the 5th Guards Tank Corps, and in the zone of the 53rd Army - the 1st Mechanized Corps. They, together with rifle formations, broke the enemy’s resistance, completed the breakthrough of the main defensive line, and by the end of the day approached the second defensive line. Having broken through the tactical defense zone and destroyed the nearest operational reserves, the main strike group of the Voronezh Front began pursuing the enemy in the morning of the second day of the operation.

One of the largest tank battles in world history took place in the Prokhorovka area. About 1,200 tanks and self-propelled artillery units took part in this battle on both sides. On July 12, the Germans were forced to go on the defensive, and on July 16 they began to retreat. Pursuing the enemy, Soviet troops drove the Germans back to their starting line. At the same time, at the height of the battle, on July 12, Soviet troops on the Western and Bryansk fronts launched an offensive in the Oryol bridgehead area and liberated the cities of Orel and Belgorod. Partisan units provided active assistance to the regular troops. They disrupted enemy communications and the work of rear agencies. In the Oryol region alone, from July 21 to August 9, more than 100 thousand rails were blown up. The German command was forced to keep a significant number of divisions only on security duty.

Results of the Battle of Kursk

The troops of the Voronezh and Steppe Fronts defeated 15 enemy divisions, advanced 140 km in the southern and southwestern direction, and came close to the Donbass enemy grouping. Soviet troops liberated Kharkov. During the occupation and battles, the Nazis destroyed about 300 thousand civilians and prisoners of war in the city and region (according to incomplete data), about 160 thousand people were driven to Germany, they destroyed 1,600 thousand m2 of housing, over 500 industrial enterprises, all cultural and educational , medical and communal institutions. Thus, Soviet troops completed the defeat of the entire Belgorod-Kharkov enemy group and took an advantageous position to launch a general offensive with the aim of liberating Left Bank Ukraine and Donbass. Our relatives also took part in the Battle of Kursk.

The strategic talent of Soviet commanders was revealed in the Battle of Kursk. The operational art and tactics of military leaders showed superiority over the German classical school: second echelons in the offensive, powerful mobile groups, and strong reserves began to emerge. During the 50-day battles, Soviet troops defeated 30 German divisions, including 7 tank divisions. The total losses of the enemy amounted to more than 500 thousand people, up to 1.5 thousand tanks, 3 thousand guns and mortars, more than 3.5 thousand aircraft.

Near Kursk, the Wehrmacht military machine suffered such a blow, after which the outcome of the war was actually predetermined. This was a radical change in the course of the war, forcing many politicians on all warring sides to reconsider their positions. The successes of the Soviet troops in the summer of 1943 had a profound influence on the work of the Tehran Conference, in which the leaders of the countries participating in the anti-Hitler coalition took part, and on its decision to open a second front in Europe in May 1944.

The victory of the Red Army was highly appreciated by our allies in the anti-Hitler coalition. In particular, US President F. Roosevelt wrote in his message to J.V. Stalin: “During a month of gigantic battles, your armed forces, with their skill, their courage, their dedication and their tenacity, not only stopped the long-planned German offensive, but also began a successful a counter-offensive with far-reaching consequences... The Soviet Union can rightly be proud of its heroic victories.”

The victory at the Kursk Bulge was of invaluable importance for further strengthening the moral and political unity of the Soviet people and raising the morale of the Red Army. The struggle of Soviet people located in the territories of our country temporarily occupied by the enemy received a powerful impetus. The partisan movement gained even greater scope.

The decisive factor in achieving the victory of the Red Army in the Battle of Kursk was the fact that the Soviet command managed to correctly determine the direction of the main attack of the enemy’s summer (1943) offensive. And not only to determine, but also to be able to reveal in detail the plan of Hitler’s command, to obtain data about the plan for Operation Citadel and the composition of the grouping of enemy troops, and even the start time of the operation. The decisive role in this belonged to Soviet intelligence.

In the Battle of Kursk, Soviet military art received further development, and all 3 of its components: strategy, operational art and tactics. Thus, in particular, experience was gained in creating large groupings of troops in defense capable of withstanding massive attacks by enemy tanks and aircraft, creating powerful in-depth positional defense, the art of decisively massing forces and means in the most important directions, as well as the art of maneuvering as during a defensive battle as well as an offensive one.

The Soviet command skillfully chose the moment to launch a counteroffensive, when the enemy’s strike forces were already thoroughly exhausted during the defensive battle. With the transition of Soviet troops to a counteroffensive, the correct choice of attack directions and the most appropriate methods of defeating the enemy, as well as the organization of interaction between fronts and armies in solving operational-strategic tasks, were of great importance.

The presence of strong strategic reserves, their advance preparation and timely entry into battle played a decisive role in achieving success.

One of the most important factors that ensured the Red Army's victory on the Kursk Bulge was the courage and heroism of Soviet soldiers, their dedication in the fight against a strong and experienced enemy, their unshakable resilience in defense and unstoppable pressure in the offensive, readiness for any test to defeat the enemy. The source of these high moral and fighting qualities was not at all the fear of repression, as some publicists and “historians” are now trying to present, but a feeling of patriotism, hatred of the enemy and love of the Fatherland. It was they who were the sources of the mass heroism of Soviet soldiers, their loyalty to military duty when carrying out combat missions of the command, countless feats in battle and selfless dedication in defending their Fatherland - in a word, everything without which victory in the war is impossible. The Motherland highly appreciated the exploits of Soviet soldiers in the Battle of the Arc of Fire. More than 100 thousand participants in the battle were awarded orders and medals, and over 180 of the bravest warriors were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

The turning point in the work of the rear and the entire economy of the country, achieved by the unprecedented labor feat of the Soviet people, made it possible by mid-1943 to supply the Red Army in ever-increasing volumes with all the necessary material resources, and above all with weapons and military equipment, including new models, not only not inferior in terms of tactical and technical characteristics, they were the best examples of German weapons and equipment, but often surpassed them. Among them, it is necessary, first of all, to highlight the appearance of 85-, 122- and 152-mm self-propelled guns, new anti-tank guns using sub-caliber and cumulative projectiles, which played a big role in the fight against enemy tanks, including heavy ones, new types of aircraft, etc. d. All this was one of the most important conditions for the growth of the combat power of the Red Army and its increasingly steadily increasing superiority over the Wehrmacht. It was the Battle of Kursk that was the decisive event that marked the completion of a radical turning point in the war in favor of the Soviet Union. In a figurative expression, the backbone of Nazi Germany was broken in this battle. The Wehrmacht was never destined to recover from the defeats it suffered on the battlefields of Kursk, Orel, Belgorod and Kharkov. The Battle of Kursk became one of the most important stages on the path of the Soviet people and their Armed Forces to victory over Nazi Germany. In terms of its military-political significance, it was the largest event of both the Great Patriotic War and the entire Second World War. The Battle of Kursk is one of the most glorious dates in the military history of our Fatherland, the memory of which will live for centuries.

Situation and strengths of the parties

In the early spring of 1943, after the end of the winter-spring battles, a huge protrusion formed on the Soviet-German front line between the cities of Orel and Belgorod, directed to the west. This bend was unofficially called the Kursk Bulge. At the bend of the arc were located the troops of the Soviet Central and Voronezh fronts and the German army groups “Center” and “South”.

Some representatives of the highest command circles in Germany proposed that the Wehrmacht switch to defensive actions, exhausting the Soviet troops, restoring its own strength and strengthening the occupied territories. However, Hitler was categorically against it: he believed that the German army was still strong enough to inflict a major defeat on the Soviet Union and again seize the elusive strategic initiative. An objective analysis of the situation showed that the German army was no longer capable of attacking on all fronts at once. Therefore, it was decided to limit offensive actions to only one segment of the front. Quite logically, the German command chose the Kursk Bulge to strike. According to the plan, German troops were to strike in converging directions from Orel and Belgorod in the direction of Kursk. With a successful outcome, this ensured the encirclement and defeat of the troops of the Central and Voronezh fronts of the Red Army. The final plans for the operation, codenamed "Citadel", were approved on May 10-11, 1943.

It was not difficult to unravel the plans of the German command regarding exactly where the Wehrmacht would advance in the summer of 1943. The Kursk salient, extending many kilometers into the territory controlled by the Nazis, was a tempting and obvious target. Already on April 12, 1943, at a meeting at the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command of the USSR, it was decided to move to a deliberate, planned and powerful defense in the Kursk region. The Red Army troops had to hold back the onslaught of Nazi troops, wear down the enemy, and then launch a counteroffensive and defeat the enemy. After this, it was planned to launch a general offensive in the western and southwestern directions.

In case the Germans decided not to advance in the Kursk Bulge area, a plan of offensive actions was also created with forces concentrated on this section of the front. However, the defensive plan remained a priority, and it was its implementation that the Red Army began in April 1943.

The defense on the Kursk Bulge was built thoroughly. In total, 8 defensive lines with a total depth of about 300 kilometers were created. Great attention was paid to mining the approaches to the defense line: according to various sources, the density of minefields was up to 1500-1700 anti-tank and anti-personnel mines per kilometer of front. Anti-tank artillery was not distributed evenly along the front, but was collected in so-called “anti-tank areas” - localized concentrations of anti-tank guns that covered several directions at once and partially overlapped each other’s sectors of fire. In this way, the maximum concentration of fire was achieved and shelling of one advancing enemy unit was ensured from several sides at once.

Before the start of the operation, the troops of the Central and Voronezh fronts totaled about 1.2 million people, about 3.5 thousand tanks, 20,000 guns and mortars, as well as 2,800 aircraft. The Steppe Front, numbering about 580,000 people, 1.5 thousand tanks, 7.4 thousand guns and mortars, and about 700 aircraft, acted as a reserve.

On the German side, 50 divisions took part in the battle, numbering, according to various sources, from 780 to 900 thousand people, about 2,700 tanks and self-propelled guns, about 10,000 guns and approximately 2.5 thousand aircraft.

Thus, by the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, the Red Army had a numerical advantage. However, we should not forget that these troops were located on the defensive, and therefore, the German command had the opportunity to effectively concentrate forces and achieve the required concentration of troops in breakthrough areas. In addition, in 1943, the German army received in fairly large quantities new heavy tanks "Tiger" and medium "Panther", as well as heavy self-propelled guns "Ferdinand", of which there were only 89 in the army (out of 90 built) and which, however, , in themselves posed a considerable threat, provided they were used correctly in the right place.

The first stage of the battle. Defense

Both commands of the Voronezh and Central Fronts predicted the date of the German troops' transition to the offensive quite accurately: according to their data, the attack should have been expected in the period from July 3 to July 6. The day before the start of the battle, Soviet intelligence officers managed to capture “tongue,” who reported that the Germans would begin the assault on July 5.

The northern front of the Kursk Bulge was held by the Central Front of Army General K. Rokossovsky. Knowing the time of the start of the German offensive, at 2:30 a.m. the front commander gave the order to conduct a half-hour artillery counter-training. Then, at 4:30, the artillery strike was repeated. The effectiveness of this measure was quite controversial. According to reports from Soviet artillerymen, the Germans suffered significant damage. However, apparently, this was still not true. We know for sure about small losses in manpower and equipment, as well as about the disruption of enemy wire lines. In addition, the Germans now knew for sure that a surprise attack would not work - the Red Army was ready for defense.

At 5:00 am the German artillery preparation began. It had not yet ended when the first echelons of Nazi troops went on the offensive following the barrage of fire. German infantry, supported by tanks, launched an offensive along the entire defensive line of the 13th Soviet Army. The main blow fell on the village of Olkhovatka. The most powerful attack was experienced by the right flank of the army near the village of Maloarkhangelskoye.

The battle lasted approximately two and a half hours, and the attack was repulsed. After this, the Germans shifted their pressure to the left flank of the army. The strength of their onslaught is evidenced by the fact that by the end of July 5, the troops of the 15th and 81st Soviet divisions were partially surrounded. However, the Nazis had not yet succeeded in breaking through the front. In just the first day of the battle, German troops advanced 6-8 kilometers.

On July 6, Soviet troops attempted a counterattack with two tank, three rifle divisions and a rifle corps, supported by two regiments of guards mortars and two regiments of self-propelled guns. The impact front was 34 kilometers. At first, the Red Army managed to push the Germans back 1-2 kilometers, but then the Soviet tanks came under heavy fire from German tanks and self-propelled guns and, after 40 vehicles were lost, were forced to stop. By the end of the day, the corps went on the defensive. The counterattack attempted on July 6 did not have serious success. The front managed to be “pushed back” by only 1-2 kilometers.

After the failure of the attack on Olkhovatka, the Germans shifted their efforts in the direction of the Ponyri station. This station was of serious strategic importance, covering the Orel-Kursk railway. Ponyri were well protected by minefields, artillery and tanks buried in the ground.

On July 6, Ponyri was attacked by about 170 German tanks and self-propelled guns, including 40 Tigers of the 505th heavy tank battalion. The Germans managed to break through the first line of defense and advance to the second. Three attacks that followed before the end of the day were repulsed by the second line. The next day, after persistent attacks, German troops managed to get even closer to the station. By 15:00 on July 7, the enemy captured the “1 May” state farm and came close to the station. The day of July 7, 1943 became a crisis for the defense of Ponyri, although the Nazis still failed to capture the station.

At the Ponyri station, German troops used the Ferdinand self-propelled guns, which turned out to be a serious problem for the Soviet troops. Soviet guns were practically unable to penetrate the 200 mm frontal armor of these vehicles. Therefore, the Ferdinanda suffered the greatest losses from mines and air raids. The last day when the Germans stormed the Ponyri station was July 12.

From July 5 to July 12, heavy fighting took place in the 70th Army's zone of action. Here the Nazis launched an attack with tanks and infantry, with German air superiority in the air. On July 8, German troops managed to break through the defense, occupying several settlements. The breakthrough was localized only by introducing reserves. By July 11, Soviet troops received reinforcements as well as air support. The dive bomber strikes caused quite significant damage to German units. On July 15, after the Germans had already been completely driven back, in the field between the villages of Samodurovka, Kutyrki and Tyoploye, military correspondents filmed damaged German equipment. After the war, this chronicle began to be mistakenly called “footage from near Prokhorovka,” although not a single “Ferdinand” was near Prokhorovka, and the Germans failed to evacuate two damaged self-propelled guns of this type from near Tyoply.

In the zone of action of the Voronezh Front (commander - General of the Army Vatutin), combat operations began in the afternoon of July 4 with attacks by German units on the positions of the front's military outposts and lasted until late at night.

On July 5, the main phase of the battle began. On the southern front of the Kursk Bulge, the battles were much more intense and were accompanied by more serious losses of Soviet troops than on the northern one. The reason for this was the terrain, which was more suitable for the use of tanks, and a number of organizational miscalculations at the level of the Soviet front-line command.

The main blow of the German troops was delivered along the Belgorod-Oboyan highway. This section of the front was held by the 6th Guards Army. The first attack took place at 6 a.m. on July 5 in the direction of the village of Cherkasskoe. Two attacks followed, supported by tanks and aircraft. Both were repulsed, after which the Germans shifted the direction of the attack towards the village of Butovo. In the battles near Cherkassy, ​​the enemy almost managed to achieve a breakthrough, but at the cost of heavy losses, Soviet troops prevented it, often losing up to 50-70% of the units' personnel.

During July 7-8, the Germans managed, while suffering losses, to advance another 6-8 kilometers, but then the attack on Oboyan stopped. The enemy was looking for a weak point in the Soviet defense and seemed to have found it. This place was the direction to the still unknown Prokhorovka station.

The Battle of Prokhorovka, considered one of the largest tank battles in history, began on July 11, 1943. On the German side, the 2nd SS Panzer Corps and the 3rd Wehrmacht Panzer Corps took part in it - a total of about 450 tanks and self-propelled guns. The 5th Guards Tank Army under Lieutenant General P. Rotmistrov and the 5th Guards Army under Lieutenant General A. Zhadov fought against them. There were about 800 Soviet tanks in the Battle of Prokhorovka.

The battle at Prokhorovka can be called the most discussed and controversial episode of the Battle of Kursk. The scope of this article does not allow us to analyze it in detail, so we will limit ourselves to only reporting approximate loss figures. The Germans irretrievably lost about 80 tanks and self-propelled guns, the Soviet troops lost about 270 vehicles.

Second phase. Offensive

On July 12, 1943, Operation Kutuzov, also known as the Oryol offensive operation, began on the northern front of the Kursk Bulge with the participation of troops of the Western and Bryansk fronts. On July 15, troops of the Central Front joined it.

On the German side, a group of troops consisting of 37 divisions was involved in the battles. According to modern estimates, the number of German tanks and self-propelled guns that took part in the battles near Orel was about 560 vehicles. Soviet troops had a serious numerical advantage over the enemy: in the main directions, the Red Army outnumbered German troops by six times in the number of infantry, five times in the number of artillery and 2.5-3 times in tanks.

German infantry divisions defended themselves on well-fortified terrain, equipped with wire fences, minefields, machine gun nests and armored caps. Enemy sappers built anti-tank obstacles along the river banks. It should be noted, however, that work on the German defensive lines had not yet been completed when the counteroffensive began.

On July 12 at 5:10 am, Soviet troops began artillery preparation and launched an air strike on the enemy. Half an hour later the assault began. By the evening of the first day, the Red Army, waging heavy fighting, advanced to a distance of 7.5 to 15 kilometers, breaking through the main defensive line of German formations in three places. Offensive battles continued until July 14. During this time, the advance of Soviet troops was up to 25 kilometers. However, by July 14, the Germans managed to regroup their troops, as a result of which the Red Army offensive was stopped for some time. The Central Front offensive, which began on July 15, developed slowly from the very beginning.

Despite the stubborn resistance of the enemy, by July 25 the Red Army managed to force the Germans to begin withdrawing troops from the Oryol bridgehead. In early August, battles began for the city of Oryol. By August 6, the city was completely liberated from the Nazis. After this, the Oryol operation entered its final phase. On August 12, fighting began for the city of Karachev, which lasted until August 15 and ended with the defeat of the group of German troops defending this settlement. By August 17-18, Soviet troops reached the Hagen defensive line, built by the Germans east of Bryansk.

The official date for the start of the offensive on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge is considered to be August 3. However, the Germans began a gradual withdrawal of troops from their positions as early as July 16, and from July 17, units of the Red Army began pursuing the enemy, which by July 22 turned into a general offensive, which stopped at approximately the same positions that Soviet troops occupied at the start of the Battle of Kursk . The command demanded the immediate continuation of hostilities, but due to the exhaustion and fatigue of the units, the date was postponed by 8 days.

By August 3, the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe Fronts had 50 rifle divisions, about 2,400 tanks and self-propelled guns, and more than 12,000 guns. At 8 o'clock in the morning, after artillery preparation, Soviet troops began their offensive. On the first day of the operation, the advance of units of the Voronezh Front ranged from 12 to 26 km. The troops of the Steppe Front advanced only 7-8 kilometers during the day.

On August 4-5, battles took place to eliminate the enemy group in Belgorod and liberate the city from German troops. By evening, Belgorod was taken by units of the 69th Army and the 1st Mechanized Corps.

By August 10, Soviet troops cut the Kharkov-Poltava railway. There were about 10 kilometers left to the outskirts of Kharkov. On August 11, the Germans struck in the Bogodukhov area, significantly weakening the pace of the offensive of both fronts of the Red Army. Fierce fighting continued until August 14.

The steppe front reached the near approaches to Kharkov on August 11. On the first day, the attacking units were not successful. Fighting on the outskirts of the city continued until July 17. Both sides suffered heavy losses. In both Soviet and German units, it was not uncommon to have companies numbering 40-50 people, or even less.

The Germans launched their last counterattack at Akhtyrka. Here they even managed to make a local breakthrough, but this did not change the situation globally. On August 23, a massive assault on Kharkov began; This day is considered the date of the liberation of the city and the end of the Battle of Kursk. In fact, the fighting in the city stopped completely only on August 30, when the remnants of German resistance were suppressed.

Battle of Kursk(July 5, 1943 – August 23, 1943, also known as Battle of Kursk) in terms of its scale, the forces and means involved, tension, results and military-political consequences, it is one of the key battles of the Second World War and the Great Patriotic War. In Soviet and Russian historiography, it is customary to divide the battle into 3 parts: Kursk defensive operation (July 5-12); Oryol (July 12 - August 18) and Belgorod-Kharkov (August 3-23) offensive. The German side called the offensive part of the battle “Operation Citadel.”

After the end of the battle, the strategic initiative in the war passed to the side of the Red Army, which until the end of the war carried out mainly offensive operations, while the Wehrmacht was on the defensive.

Preparing for battle

During the winter offensive of the Red Army and the subsequent counter-offensive of the Wehrmacht in Eastern Ukraine, a protrusion with a depth of up to 150 and a width of up to 200 km, facing the west (the so-called “Kursk Bulge”) was formed in the center of the Soviet-German front. During April - June 1943, there was an operational pause at the front, during which the parties prepared for the summer campaign.

Plans and strengths of the parties

The German command decided to conduct a major strategic operation on the Kursk salient in the summer of 1943. It was planned to launch converging attacks from the areas of the cities of Orel (from the north) and Belgorod (from the south). The strike groups were supposed to unite in the Kursk area, encircling the troops of the Central and Voronezh fronts of the Red Army. The operation received the code name “Citadel”. According to the information of the German general Friedrich Fangor (German. Friedrich Fangohr), at a meeting with Manstein on May 10-11, the plan was adjusted at the suggestion of General Hoth: the 2nd SS Panzer Corps turns from the Oboyansky direction towards Prokhorovka, where terrain conditions allow for a global battle with the armored reserves of the Soviet troops.

To carry out the operation, the Germans concentrated a group of up to 50 divisions (of which 18 tank and motorized), 2 tank brigades, 3 separate tank battalions and 8 assault gun divisions, with a total number, according to Soviet sources, of about 900 thousand people. The leadership of the troops was carried out by Field Marshal General Günther Hans von Kluge (Army Group Center) and Field Marshal Erich von Manstein (Army Group South). Organizationally, the strike forces were part of the 2nd Tank, 2nd and 9th Armies (commander - Field Marshal Walter Model, Army Group Center, Orel region) and the 4th Tank Army, 24th Tank Corps and operational group "Kempf" (commander - General Hermann Goth, Army Group "South", Belgorod region). Air support for the German troops was provided by the forces of the 4th and 6th Air Fleets.

To carry out the operation, several elite SS tank divisions were deployed to the Kursk area:

• 1st Division Leibstandarte SS "Adolf Hitler"
• 2nd SS Panzer Division "Das Reich"
• 3rd SS Panzer Division "Totenkopf" (Totenkopf)

The troops received a certain amount of new equipment:

• 134 Pz.Kpfw.VI Tiger tanks (another 14 command tanks)
• 190 Pz.Kpfw.V “Panther” (11 more - evacuation (without guns) and command)
• 90 Sd.Kfz assault guns. 184 “Ferdinand” (45 each in sPzJgAbt 653 and sPzJgAbt 654)
• a total of 348 relatively new tanks and self-propelled guns (the Tiger was used several times in 1942 and early 1943).

At the same time, however, a significant number of frankly outdated tanks and self-propelled guns remained in the German units: 384 units (Pz.III, Pz.II, even Pz.I). Also during the Battle of Kursk, German Sd.Kfz.302 teletankettes were used for the first time.

The Soviet command decided to conduct a defensive battle, exhaust the enemy troops and defeat them, launching counterattacks on the attackers at a critical moment. For this purpose, a deeply layered defense was created on both sides of the Kursk salient. A total of 8 defensive lines were created. The average mining density in the direction of expected enemy attacks was 1,500 anti-tank and 1,700 anti-personnel mines for every kilometer of the front.

The troops of the Central Front (commander - General of the Army Konstantin Rokossovsky) defended the northern front of the Kursk ledge, and the troops of the Voronezh Front (commander - General of the Army Nikolai Vatutin) - the southern front. The troops occupying the ledge relied on the Steppe Front (commanded by Colonel General Ivan Konev). The coordination of the actions of the fronts was carried out by representatives of the Headquarters Marshals of the Soviet Union Georgy Zhukov and Alexander Vasilevsky.

In the assessment of the forces of the parties in the sources, there are strong discrepancies associated with different definitions of the scale of the battle by different historians, as well as differences in the methods of accounting and classification of military equipment. When assessing the forces of the Red Army, the main discrepancy is related to the inclusion or exclusion from the calculations of the reserve - the Steppe Front (about 500 thousand personnel and 1,500 tanks). The following table contains some estimates:

The role of intelligence

From the beginning of 1943, interceptions of secret communications from the High Command of the Nazi Army and secret directives from Hitler increasingly mentioned Operation Citadel. According to the memoirs of Anastas Mikoyan, back on March 27, Stalin informed him in general detail about the German plans. On April 12, 1943, the exact text of Directive No. 6 “On the plan for Operation Citadel” of the German High Command, translated from German, was placed on Stalin’s desk, endorsed by all Wehrmacht services, but not yet signed by Hitler, who signed it only three days later. This data was obtained by a scout working under the name "Werther". The real name of this man still remains unknown, but it is assumed that he was an employee of the Wehrmacht High Command, and the information he received came to Moscow through the Luzi agent Rudolf Rössler operating in Switzerland. There is an alternative assumption that Werther is Adolf Hitler's personal photographer.

However, it should be noted that back on April 8, 1943, G. K. Zhukov, relying on data from intelligence agencies of the Kursk fronts, very accurately predicted the strength and direction of German attacks on the Kursk Bulge:

Although the exact text of the “Citadel” fell on Stalin’s desk three days before Hitler signed it, the German plan had already become obvious to the highest Soviet military command four days earlier, and the general details of the existence of such a plan had been known to them for at least another year. eight days before.

Kursk defensive operation

The German offensive began on the morning of July 5, 1943. Since the Soviet command knew exactly the start time of the operation - 3 o'clock in the morning (the German army fought according to Berlin time - translated into Moscow time as 5 o'clock in the morning), at 22:30 and 2:20 Moscow time the forces of two fronts carried out counter-artillery preparation with an amount of ammunition 0.25 ammo. German reports noted significant damage to communication lines and minor losses in manpower. There was also an unsuccessful air raid by the 2nd and 17th Air Armies (more than 400 attack aircraft and fighters) on the enemy’s Kharkov and Belgorod air hubs.

Before the start of the ground operation, at 6 a.m. our time, the Germans also launched a bomb and artillery strike on the Soviet defensive lines. The tanks that went on the offensive immediately encountered serious resistance. The main blow on the northern front was delivered in the direction of Olkhovatka. Having failed to achieve success, the Germans moved their attack in the direction of Ponyri, but even here they were unable to break through the Soviet defense. The Wehrmacht was able to advance only 10-12 km, after which from July 10, having lost up to two-thirds of its tanks, the German 9th Army went on the defensive. On the southern front, the main German attacks were directed towards the Korocha and Oboyan areas.

July 5, 1943 Day one. Defense of Cherkasy.

Operation Citadel - the general offensive of the German army on the Eastern Front in 1943 - was aimed at encircling the troops of the Central (K.K. Rokossovsky) and Voronezh (N.F. Vatutin) fronts in the area of ​​​​the city of Kursk through counter attacks from the north and south under the base of the Kursk salient, as well as the destruction of Soviet operational and strategic reserves east of the main direction of the main attack (including in the area of ​​Prokhorovka station). Main blow with southern directions were carried out by the forces of the 4th Panzer Army (commander - Hermann Hoth, 48 Tank Tank and 2 Tank SS Tank) with the support of the Army Group "Kempf" (W. Kempf).

At the initial stage of the offensive, the 48th Panzer Corps (com: O. von Knobelsdorff, chief of staff: F. von Mellenthin, 527 tanks, 147 self-propelled guns), which was the most powerful formation of the 4th Panzer Army, consisting of: 3 and 11 tank divisions , mechanized (tank-grenadier) division "Greater Germany", 10th tank brigade and 911th division. assault gun division, with the support of 332 and 167 infantry divisions, had the task of breaking through the first, second and third lines of defense of units of the Voronezh Front from the Gertsovka - Butovo area in the direction of Cherkassk - Yakovlevo - Oboyan. At the same time, it was assumed that in the Yakovlevo area the 48th Tank Tank would link up with units of the 2nd SS Division (thus encircling the 52nd Guards Rifle Division and the 67th Guards Infantry Division), change units of the 2nd SS Division Tank Division, after which the units of the SS division were supposed to be used against the operational reserves of the Red Army Armies in the area of ​​the station. Prokhorovka, and 48 Tank Corps was supposed to continue operations in the main direction Oboyan - Kursk.

To complete the assigned task, units of the 48th Tank Corps on the first day of the offensive (Day “X”) needed to break into the defenses of the 6th Guards. A (Lieutenant General I.M. Chistyakov) at the junction of the 71st Guards Rifle Division (Colonel I.P. Sivakov) and the 67th Guards Rifle Division (Colonel A.I. Baksov), capture the large village of Cherkasskoe and make a breakthrough with armored units in direction to the village of Yakovlevo. The offensive plan of the 48th Tank Corps determined that the village of Cherkasskoye was to be captured by 10:00 on July 5th. And already on July 6, units of the 48th Tank Army. were supposed to reach the city of Oboyan.

However, as a result of the actions of Soviet units and formations, their courage and fortitude, as well as their advance preparation of defensive lines, the Wehrmacht’s plans in this direction were “significantly adjusted” - 48 Tk did not reach Oboyan.

The factors that determined the unacceptably slow pace of advance of the 48th Tank Corps on the first day of the offensive were the good engineering preparation of the area by Soviet units (from anti-tank ditches almost throughout the entire defense to radio-controlled minefields), the fire of divisional artillery, guards mortars and the actions of attack aircraft against those accumulated in front of engineering barriers to enemy tanks, competent placement of anti-tank strong points (No. 6 south of Korovin in the 71st Guards Rifle Division, No. 7 southwest of Cherkassky and No. 8 southeast of Cherkassky in the 67th Guards Rifle Division), rapid reorganization of the battle formations of the 196th Guards battalions .sp (Colonel V.I. Bazhanov) in the direction of the enemy’s main attack south of Cherkassy, ​​timely maneuver by the divisional (245 detachment, 1440 grapnel) and army (493 iptap, as well as 27 optabr colonel N.D. Chevola) anti-tank reserve, relatively successful counterattacks on the flank of the wedged units of 3 TD and 11 TD with the involvement of forces of 245 detachment troops (Lieutenant Colonel M.K. Akopov, 39 M3 tanks) and 1440 SUP (Lieutenant Colonel Shapshinsky, 8 SU-76 and 12 SU-122), and also not completely suppressed resistance of the remnants of the military outpost in the southern part of the village of Butovo (3 baht. 199th Guards Regiment, Captain V.L. Vakhidov) and in the area of ​​workers’ barracks southwest of the village. Korovino, which were the starting positions for the offensive of the 48th Tank Corps (the capture of these starting positions was planned to be carried out by specially allocated forces of the 11th Tank Division and 332nd Infantry Division by the end of the day on July 4, that is, on the day of “X-1”, but the resistance of the combat outpost was never completely suppressed by dawn on July 5th). All of the above factors influenced both the speed of concentration of units in their initial positions before the main attack, and their progress during the offensive itself.

Also, the pace of the corps' advance was affected by the German command's shortcomings in planning the operation and poorly developed interaction between tank and infantry units. In particular, the “Greater Germany” division (W. Heyerlein, 129 tanks (of which 15 Pz.VI tanks), 73 self-propelled guns) and the 10 armored brigade assigned to it (K. Decker, 192 combat and 8 Pz.V command tanks) in the current conditions The battle turned out to be clumsy and unbalanced formations. As a result, throughout the first half of the day, the bulk of the tanks were crowded in narrow “corridors” in front of engineering barriers (it was especially difficult to overcome the swampy anti-tank ditch west of Cherkassy), and came under a combined attack from Soviet aviation (2nd VA) and artillery from PTOP No. 6 and No. 7, 138 Guards Ap (Lieutenant Colonel M. I. Kirdyanov) and two regiments of the 33 detachment (Colonel Stein), suffered losses (especially among officers), and was unable to deploy in accordance with the offensive schedule on tank-accessible terrain at the line Korovino - Cherkasskoe for a further attack in the direction of the northern outskirts of Cherkassy. At the same time, infantry units that had overcome anti-tank barriers in the first half of the day had to rely mainly on their own firepower. So, for example, the combat group of the 3rd battalion of the Fusilier Regiment, which was at the forefront of the attack of the VG division, at the time of the first attack found itself without tank support at all and suffered significant losses. Possessing huge armored forces, the VG division was actually unable to bring them into battle for a long time.

The resulting congestion on the advance routes also resulted in the untimely concentration of artillery units of the 48th Tank Corps in firing positions, which affected the results of artillery preparation before the start of the attack.

It should be noted that the commander of the 48th Tank Corps became hostage to a number of erroneous decisions of his superiors. Knobelsdorff's lack of an operational reserve had a particularly negative impact - all divisions of the corps were brought into battle almost simultaneously on the morning of July 5, 1943, after which they were drawn into active hostilities for a long time.

The development of the offensive of the 48th Tank Corps on the day of July 5 was greatly facilitated by: active actions of engineer-assault units, aviation support (more than 830 sorties) and overwhelming quantitative superiority in armored vehicles. It is also necessary to note the proactive actions of units of the 11th TD (I. Mikl) and 911th department. division of assault guns (overcoming the strip of engineering obstacles and reaching the eastern outskirts of Cherkassy with a mechanized group of infantry and sappers with the support of assault guns).

An important factor in the success of German tank units was the qualitative leap in the combat characteristics of German armored vehicles that occurred by the summer of 1943. Already during the first day of the defensive operation on the Kursk Bulge, the insufficient power of anti-tank weapons in service with the Soviet units was revealed when fighting both the new German tanks Pz.V and Pz.VI, and modernized tanks of older brands (about half of the Soviet anti-tank tanks were armed with 45-mm guns, the power of 76-mm Soviet field and American tank guns made it possible to effectively destroy modern or modernized enemy tanks at distances two to three times less than the effective firing range of the latter; heavy tank and self-propelled units at that time were practically absent not only in the combined arms 6th Guards A, but also in the 1st Tank Army of M.E. Katukov, which occupied the second line of defense behind it).

Only after the bulk of the tanks had overcome the anti-tank barriers south of Cherkassy in the afternoon, repelling a number of counterattacks by Soviet units, the units of the VG division and 11th Panzer Division were able to cling to the southeastern and southwestern outskirts of the village, after which the fighting moved into the street phase. At about 21:00, Divisional Commander A.I. Baksov ordered the withdrawal of units of the 196th Guards Regiment to new positions to the north and northeast of Cherkassy, ​​as well as to the center of the village. When units of the 196th Guards Regiment retreated, minefields were laid. At about 21:20, a battle group of grenadiers from the VG division, with the support of the Panthers of the 10th Tank Brigade, broke into the village of Yarki (north of Cherkassy). A little later, the 3rd Wehrmacht TD managed to capture the village of Krasny Pochinok (north of Korovino). Thus, the result of the day for the 48th Tank Tank of the Wehrmacht was a wedge into the first line of defense of the 6th Guards. And at 6 km, which can actually be considered a failure, especially against the backdrop of the results achieved by the evening of July 5 by the troops of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps (operating to the east parallel to the 48th Tank Corps), which was less saturated with armored vehicles, which managed to break through the first line of defense of the 6th Guards. A.

Organized resistance in the village of Cherkasskoe was suppressed around midnight on July 5. However, the German units were able to establish complete control over the village only by the morning of July 6, that is, when, according to the offensive plan, the corps was already supposed to approach Oboyan.

Thus, the 71st Guards SD and 67th Guards SD, without having large tank formations (at their disposal were only 39 American M3 tanks of various modifications and 20 self-propelled guns from the 245th detachment and 1440 saps) were held in the area of ​​​​the villages of Korovino and Cherkasskoye for about a day five enemy divisions (three of them tank). In the battle of July 5, 1943 in the Cherkassy region, the soldiers and commanders of the 196th and 199th Guards particularly distinguished themselves. rifle regiments of the 67th Guards. divisions. Competent and truly heroic actions of the soldiers and commanders of the 71st Guards SD and 67th Guards SD allowed the command of the 6th Guards. And in a timely manner, pull up army reserves to the place where units of the 48th Tank Corps are wedged at the junction of the 71st Guards Rifle Division and the 67th Guards Rifle Division and prevent a general collapse of the defense of the Soviet troops in this area in the subsequent days of the defensive operation.

As a result of the hostilities described above, the village of Cherkasskoe virtually ceased to exist (according to post-war eyewitness accounts, it was a “lunar landscape”).

The heroic defense of the village of Cherkasskoe on July 5, 1943 - one of the most successful moments of the Battle of Kursk for the Soviet troops - unfortunately, is one of the undeservedly forgotten episodes of the Great Patriotic War.

July 6, 1943 Day two. First counterattacks.

By the end of the first day of the offensive, the 4th TA had penetrated the defenses of the 6th Guards. And to a depth of 5-6 km in the offensive sector of 48 TK (in the area of ​​​​the village of Cherkasskoe) and at 12-13 km in the section of 2 TK SS (in the Bykovka - Kozmo-Demyanovka area). At the same time, the divisions of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps (Obergruppenführer P. Hausser) managed to break through the entire depth of the first line of defense of the Soviet troops, pushing back units of the 52nd Guards SD (Colonel I.M. Nekrasov), and approached the 5-6 km front directly to the second line of defense occupied by the 51st Guards Rifle Division (Major General N. T. Tavartkeladze), entering into battle with its advanced units.

However, the right neighbor of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps - AG "Kempf" (W. Kempf) - did not complete the task of the day on July 5, encountering stubborn resistance from units of the 7th Guards. And, thereby exposing the right flank of the 4th Tank Army that had advanced forward. As a result, Hausser was forced from July 6 to July 8 to use a third of the forces of his corps, namely the Death's Head TD, to cover his right flank against the 375th Infantry Division (Colonel P. D. Govorunenko), whose units performed brilliantly in the battles of July 5 .

On July 6, the tasks of the day for units of the 2nd SS Tank Tank (334 tanks) were determined: for the Death's Head TD (Brigadeführer G. Priss, 114 tanks) - the defeat of the 375th Infantry Division and the expansion of the breakthrough corridor in the direction of the river. Linden Donets, for the Leibstandarte TD (brigadeführer T. Wisch, 99 tanks, 23 self-propelled guns) and “Das Reich” (brigadeführer W. Kruger, 121 tanks, 21 self-propelled guns) - the fastest breakthrough of the second line of defense near the village. Yakovlevo and access to the line of the bend of the Psel river - the village. Teterevino.

At about 9:00 on July 6, 1943, after powerful artillery preparation (carried out by artillery regiments of the Leibstandarte, Das Reich divisions and 55 MP six-barreled mortars) with the direct support of the 8th Air Corps (about 150 aircraft in the offensive zone), the divisions of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps moved into offensive, delivering the main blow in the area occupied by the 154th and 156th Guards Regiment Regiment. At the same time, the Germans managed to identify control and communications points of the 51st Guards SD regiments and carry out a fire raid on them, which led to the disorganization of communications and control of its troops. In fact, the battalions of the 51st Guards SD repelled enemy attacks without communication with higher command, since the work of liaison officers was not effective due to the high dynamics of the battle.

The initial success of the attack by the Leibstandarte and Das Reich divisions was ensured due to the numerical advantage in the breakthrough area (two German divisions against two guards rifle regiments), as well as due to good interaction between the division regiments, artillery and aviation - the advanced units of the divisions, the main ramming force of which were the 13th and 8th heavy companies of the "Tigers" (7 and 11 Pz.VI, respectively), with the support of assault gun divisions (23 and 21 StuG) advanced to the Soviet positions even before the end of the artillery and air strike, finding themselves at the moment of its end several hundred meters from the trenches.

By 13:00, the battalions at the junction of the 154th and 156th Guards Regiment Regiments were driven from their positions and began a disorderly retreat in the direction of the villages of Yakovlevo and Luchki; The left-flank 158th Guards Regiment, having folded its right flank, generally continued to hold the line of defense. The withdrawal of units of the 154th and 156th Guards Regiment was carried out mixed with enemy tanks and motorized infantry and was associated with heavy losses (in particular, in the 156th Guards Regiment, out of 1,685 people, about 200 people remained in service on July 7, that is, the regiment was actually destroyed) . There was practically no general leadership of the withdrawing battalions; the actions of these units were determined only by the initiative of junior commanders, not all of whom were ready for this. Some units of the 154th and 156th Guards Regiments reached the locations of neighboring divisions. The situation was partly saved by the actions of the artillery of the 51st Guards SD and the 5th Guards Division coming from the reserve. Stalingrad Tank Corps - howitzer batteries of the 122nd Guards Ap (Major M. N. Uglovsky) and artillery units of the 6th Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade (Colonel A. M. Shchekal) fought heavy battles in the depths of the defense of the 51st Guards. divisions, slowing down the pace of the advance of the combat groups TD "Leibstandarte" and "Das Reich", in order to enable the retreating infantry to gain a foothold on new lines. At the same time, the artillerymen managed to retain most of their heavy weapons. A short but fierce battle broke out for the village of Luchki, in the area of ​​which the 464th Guards Artillery Division and the 460th Guards Division managed to deploy. mortar battalion 6th Guards MSBR 5th Guards. Stk (at the same time, due to insufficient supply of vehicles, the motorized infantry of this brigade was still on the march 15 km from the battlefield).

At 14:20, the armored group of the Das Reich division as a whole captured the village of Luchki, and the artillery units of the 6th Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade began to retreat north to the Kalinin farm. After this, right up to the third (rear) defensive line of the Voronezh Front in front of the battle group of the TD "Das Reich" there were virtually no units of the 6th Guards. army capable of restraining its advance: the main forces of the army’s anti-tank artillery (namely the 14th, 27th and 28th brigade brigades) were located to the west - on the Oboyanskoye Highway and in the offensive zone of the 48th Tank Tank, which, based on the results of the battles on July 5, was assessed by the army command as the direction of the main strike by the Germans (which was not entirely correct - the strikes of both German tank corps of the 4th TA were considered by the German command as equivalent). To repel the attack of the Das Reich TD artillery of the 6th Guards. And by this point there was simply nothing left.

The offensive of the Leibstandarte TD in the Oboyan direction in the first half of the day on July 6 developed less successfully than that of Das Reich, which was due to the greater saturation of its offensive sector with Soviet artillery (the regiments of Major Kosachev’s 28th regiments were active), timely attacks by the 1st Guards. Tank Brigade (Colonel V.M. Gorelov) and 49th Tank Brigade (Lieutenant Colonel A.F. Burda) from the 3rd Mechanized Corps of the 1st TA M.E. Katukov, as well as the presence in its offensive zone of the well-fortified village of Yakovlevo, in street battles in in which the main forces of the division, including its tank regiment, got bogged down for some time.

Thus, by 14:00 on July 6, the troops of the 2nd SS Tank Tank had basically completed the first part of the general offensive plan - the left flank of the 6th Guards. A was crushed, and a little later with the capture of. Yakovlevo, on the part of the 2nd SS Tank Tank, conditions were prepared for their replacement by units of the 48th Tank Tank. The advanced units of the 2nd SS Tank Tank were ready to begin fulfilling one of the general goals of Operation Citadel - the destruction of the Red Army reserves in the area of ​​the station. Prokhorovka. However, Hermann Hoth (commander of the 4th TA) was unable to fully implement the offensive plan on July 6, due to the slow advance of the troops of the 48th Tank Corps (O. von Knobelsdorff), which encountered the skillful defense of Katukov’s army, which entered the battle in the afternoon. Although Knobelsdorff's corps managed to encircle some regiments of the 67th and 52nd Guards SD of the 6th Guards in the afternoon. And in the area between the Vorskla and Vorsklitsa rivers (with a total strength of about a rifle division), however, having encountered the tough defense of the 3 Mk brigades (Major General S. M. Krivoshein) on the second line of defense, the corps divisions were unable to capture bridgeheads on the northern bank of the Pena River, discard the Soviet mechanized corps and go to the village. Yakovlevo for the subsequent change of units of 2nd SS Tank. Moreover, on the left flank of the corps, the battle group of the tank regiment 3 TD (F. Westhoven), which had gaped at the entrance to the village of Zavidovka, was shot by tank crews and artillerymen of the 22 Tank Brigade (Colonel N. G. Venenichev), which was part of the 6 Tank Tank Brigade (Major General A . D. Getman) 1 TA.

However, the success achieved by the Leibstandarte divisions, and especially Das Reich, forced the command of the Voronezh Front, in conditions of incomplete clarity of the situation, to take hasty retaliatory measures to plug the breakthrough that had formed in the second line of defense of the front. After the report of the commander of the 6th Guards. And Chistyakova about the state of affairs on the left flank of the army, Vatutin with his order transfers the 5th Guards. Stalingrad Tank (Major General A. G. Kravchenko, 213 tanks, of which 106 are T-34 and 21 are Mk.IV “Churchill”) and 2 Guards. Tatsinsky Tank Corps (Colonel A.S. Burdeyny, 166 combat-ready tanks, of which 90 are T-34 and 17 are Mk.IV Churchill) subordinate to the commander of the 6th Guards. And he approves of his proposal to launch counterattacks on the German tanks that broke through the positions of the 51st Guards SD with the forces of the 5th Guards. Stk and under the base of the entire advancing wedge 2 tk SS forces of 2 guards. Ttk (directly through the battle formations of the 375th Infantry Division). In particular, on the afternoon of July 6, I.M. Chistyakov assigned the commander of the 5th Guards. CT to Major General A. G. Kravchenko the task of withdrawing from the defensive area he occupied (in which the corps was already ready to meet the enemy, using the tactics of ambushes and anti-tank strong points) of the main part of the corps (two of the three brigades and a heavy breakthrough tank regiment), and a counterattack by these forces on the flank of the Leibstandarte TD. Having received the order, the commander and headquarters of the 5th Guards. Stk, already knowing about the capture of the village. Lucky tanks from the Das Reich division, and more correctly assessing the situation, tried to challenge the execution of this order. However, under the threat of arrest and execution, they were forced to begin implementing it. The attack by the corps brigades was launched at 15:10.

Sufficient own artillery assets of the 5th Guards. The Stk did not have it, and the order did not leave time for coordinating the actions of the corps with its neighbors or aviation. Therefore, the attack of tank brigades was carried out without artillery preparation, without air support, on flat terrain and with practically open flanks. The blow fell directly on the forehead of the Das Reich TD, which regrouped, setting up tanks as an anti-tank barrier and, calling in aviation, inflicted a significant fire defeat on the brigades of the Stalingrad Corps, forcing them to stop the attack and go on the defensive. After this, having brought up anti-tank artillery and organized flank maneuvers, units of the Das Reich TD, between 17 and 19 hours, managed to reach the communications of the defending tank brigades in the area of ​​the Kalinin farm, which was defended by 1696 zenaps (Major Savchenko) and 464 Guards Artillery, which had withdrawn from the village of Luchki. .division and 460 Guards. mortar battalion 6th Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade. By 19:00, units of the Das Reich TD actually managed to encircle most of the 5th Guards. Stk between the village. Luchki and the Kalinin farm, after which, building on the success, the command of the German division of part of the forces, acting in the direction of the station. Prokhorovka, tried to capture the Belenikhino crossing. However, thanks to the proactive actions of the commander and battalion commanders, the 20th Tank Brigade (Lieutenant Colonel P.F. Okhrimenko) remaining outside the encirclement of the 5th Guards. Stk, who managed to quickly create a tough defense around Belenikino from various corps units that were at hand, managed to stop the offensive of the Das Reich TD, and even forced the German units to return back to x. Kalinin. Being without contact with corps headquarters, on the night of July 7, surrounded units of the 5th Guards. The Stk organized a breakthrough, as a result of which part of the forces managed to escape from the encirclement and linked up with units of the 20th Tank Brigade. During July 6, 1943, units of the 5th Guards. Stk 119 tanks were irretrievably lost for combat reasons, another 9 tanks were lost for technical or unknown reasons, and 19 were sent for repairs. Not a single tank corps had such significant losses in one day during the entire defensive operation on the Kursk Bulge (the losses of the 5th Guards Stk on July 6 even exceeded the losses of 29 tanks during the attack on July 12 at the Oktyabrsky storage farm).

After being surrounded by 5th Guards. Stk, continuing the development of success in the northern direction, another detachment of the tank regiment TD "Das Reich", taking advantage of the confusion during the withdrawal of Soviet units, managed to reach the third (rear) line of the army defense, occupied by units 69A (Lieutenant General V.D. Kryuchenkin) , near the village of Teterevino, and for a short time wedged itself into the defense of the 285th infantry regiment of the 183rd infantry division, but due to a clear lack of strength, having lost several tanks, it was forced to retreat. The entry of German tanks to the third line of defense of the Voronezh Front on the second day of the offensive was regarded by the Soviet command as an emergency.

The offensive of the "Dead Head" TD did not receive significant development during July 6 due to the stubborn resistance of units of the 375th Infantry Division, as well as the counterattack of the 2nd Guards in its sector in the afternoon. Tatsin tank corps (Colonel A. S. Burdeyny, 166 tanks), which took place simultaneously with the counterattack of the 2nd Guards. Stk, and demanded the involvement of all the reserves of this SS division and even some units of the Das Reich TD. However, inflict losses on the Tatsin Corps even approximately comparable to the losses of the 5th Guards. The Germans did not succeed in the counterattack, even though during the counterattack the corps had to cross the Lipovy Donets River twice, and some of its units were surrounded for a short time. Losses of the 2nd Guards. The total number of tanks for July 6 was: 17 tanks burned out and 11 damaged, that is, the corps remained fully combat-ready.

Thus, during July 6, formations of the 4th TA were able to break through the second line of defense of the Voronezh Front on their right flank and inflicted significant losses on the troops of the 6th Guards. A (of the six rifle divisions, by the morning of July 7, only three remained combat-ready, and of the two tank corps transferred to it, one). As a result of the loss of control of units of the 51st Guards SD and 5th Guards. Stk, at the junction of 1 TA and 5 Guards. Stk formed an area not occupied by Soviet troops, which in the following days, at the cost of incredible efforts, Katukov had to plug with brigades of the 1st TA, using his experience of defensive battles near Orel in 1941.

However, all the successes of the 2nd SS Tank Tank, which led to the breakthrough of the second defensive line, again could not be translated into a powerful breakthrough deep into the Soviet defense to destroy the strategic reserves of the Red Army, since the troops of AG Kempf, having achieved some successes on July 6, nevertheless again failed complete the task of the day. AG Kempf was still unable to secure the right flank of the 4th Tank Army, which was threatened by the 2nd Guards. Ttk supported by the still combat-ready 375 sd. German losses in armored vehicles also had a significant impact on the further course of events. So, for example, in the tank regiment of the TD "Great Germany" 48 Tank Tank, after the first two days of the offensive, 53% of the tanks were considered uncombatable (Soviet troops disabled 59 out of 112 vehicles, including 12 "Tigers" out of 14 available), and in the 10th Tank Brigade to on the evening of July 6, only 40 combat Panthers (out of 192) were considered combat-ready. Therefore, on July 7, the 4th TA corps was given less ambitious tasks than on July 6—expanding the breakthrough corridor and securing the army’s flanks.

The commander of the 48th Panzer Corps, O. von Knobelsdorff, summed up the results of the day's battle on the evening of July 6:

Starting from July 6, 1943, not only the German command had to retreat from previously developed plans (which did this on July 5), but also the Soviet command, which clearly underestimated the strength of the German armored strike. Due to the loss of combat effectiveness and failure of the material part of most divisions of the 6th Guards. And, from the evening of July 6, general operational control of the troops holding the second and third lines of Soviet defense in the area of ​​​​the breakthrough of the German 4th Tank Army was actually transferred from the commander of the 6th Guards. A I. M. Chistyakov to the commander of the 1st TA M. E. Katukov. The main framework of the Soviet defense in the following days was created around the brigades and corps of the 1st Tank Army.

Battle of Prokhorovka

On July 12, the largest (or one of the largest) oncoming tank battles in history took place in the Prokhorovka area.

According to data from Soviet sources, on the German side, about 700 tanks and assault guns took part in the battle, according to V. Zamulin - the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, which had 294 tanks (including 15 Tigers) and self-propelled guns.

On the Soviet side, the 5th Tank Army of P. Rotmistrov, numbering about 850 tanks, took part in the battle. After a massive airstrike, the battle on both sides entered its active phase and continued until the end of the day.

Here is one of the episodes that clearly shows what happened on July 12: the battle for the Oktyabrsky state farm and the heights. 252.2 resembled the sea surf - four tank brigades of the Red Army, three batteries of the SAP, two rifle regiments and one battalion of a motorized rifle brigade rolled in waves onto the defense of the SS grenadier regiment, but, having met fierce resistance, retreated. This went on for almost five hours until the guards drove the grenadiers out of the area, suffering colossal losses.

From the memoirs of a battle participant, Untersturmführer Gurs, commander of a motorized rifle platoon of the 2nd Grp:

During the battle, many tank commanders (platoon and company) were out of action. High level of commander losses in the 32nd Tank Brigade: 41 tank commanders (36% of the total), tank platoon commander (61%), company commander (100%) and battalion commander (50%). The command level and the motorized rifle regiment of the brigade suffered very high losses; many company and platoon commanders were killed and seriously injured. Its commander, Captain I. I. Rudenko, was out of action (evacuated from the battlefield to the hospital).

A participant in the battle, deputy chief of staff of the 31st Tank Brigade, and later Hero of the Soviet Union, Grigory Penezhko, recalled the human condition in those terrible conditions:

By the end of July 12, the battle ended with unclear results, only to resume on the afternoon of July 13 and 14. After the battle, German troops were unable to advance any significantly, despite the fact that the losses of the Soviet tank army, caused by tactical errors of its command, were much greater. Having advanced 35 kilometers between July 5 and 12, Manstein’s troops were forced, after trampling on the achieved lines for three days in vain attempts to break into the Soviet defenses, to begin withdrawing troops from the captured “bridgehead.” During the battle, a turning point came. Soviet troops, which went on the offensive on July 23, pushed back the German armies in the south of the Kursk Bulge to their original positions.

Losses

According to Soviet data, about 400 German tanks, 300 vehicles, and over 3,500 soldiers and officers remained on the battlefield of the Battle of Prokhorovka. However, these numbers have been called into question. For example, according to G. A. Oleinikov’s calculations, more than 300 German tanks could not have taken part in the battle. According to research by A. Tomzov, citing data from the German Federal Military Archive, during the battles of July 12-13, the Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler division irretrievably lost 2 Pz.IV tanks, 2 Pz.IV and 2 Pz.III tanks were sent for long-term repairs , in the short term - 15 Pz.IV and 1 Pz.III tanks. The total losses of tanks and assault guns of the 2nd SS Tank Tank on July 12 amounted to about 80 tanks and assault guns, including at least 40 units lost by the Totenkopf division.

At the same time, the Soviet 18th and 29th Tank Corps of the 5th Guards Tank Army lost up to 70% of their tanks.

According to the memoirs of Wehrmacht Major General F.W. von Mellenthin, in the attack on Prokhorovka and, accordingly, in the morning battle with the Soviet TA, only the Reich and Leibstandarte divisions, reinforced by a battalion of self-propelled guns, took part - in total up to 240 vehicles, including including four "tigers". It was not expected to meet a serious enemy; in the opinion of the German command, Rotmistrov’s TA was drawn into battle against the “Totenkopf” division (in reality, one corps) and the oncoming attack of more than 800 (according to their estimates) tanks came as a complete surprise.

However, there is reason to believe that the Soviet command “overslept” the enemy and the TA attack with attached corps was not at all an attempt to stop the Germans, but was intended to go behind the rear of the SS tank corps, for which its “Totenkopf” division was mistaken.

The Germans were the first to notice the enemy and managed to change formation for battle; the Soviet tank crews had to do this under fire.

Results of the defensive phase of the battle

The central front, involved in the battle in the north of the arc, suffered losses of 33,897 people from July 5-11, 1943, of which 15,336 were irrevocable, its enemy, Model’s 9th Army, lost 20,720 people during the same period, which gives a loss ratio of 1.64:1. The Voronezh and Steppe fronts, which took part in the battle on the southern front of the arc, lost from July 5-23, 1943, according to modern official estimates (2002), 143,950 people, of which 54,996 were irrevocable. Including the Voronezh Front alone - 73,892 total losses. However, the chief of staff of the Voronezh Front, Lieutenant General Ivanov, and the head of the operational department of the front headquarters, Major General Teteshkin, thought differently: they believed that the losses of their front were 100,932 people, of which 46,500 were irrevocable. If, contrary to Soviet documents from the war period, we consider the official numbers of the German command to be correct, then taking into account the German losses on the southern front of 29,102 people, the ratio of losses of the Soviet and German sides here is 4.95: 1.

According to Soviet data, in the Kursk defensive operation alone from July 5 to July 23, 1943, the Germans lost 70,000 killed, 3,095 tanks and self-propelled guns, 844 field guns, 1,392 aircraft and over 5,000 vehicles.

During the period from July 5 to July 12, 1943, the Central Front consumed 1,079 wagons of ammunition, and the Voronezh Front used 417 wagons, almost two and a half times less.

The reason that the losses of the Voronezh Front so sharply exceeded the losses of the Central Front was due to the smaller massing of forces and assets in the direction of the German attack, which allowed the Germans to actually achieve an operational breakthrough on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge. Although the breakthrough was closed by the forces of the Steppe Front, it allowed the attackers to achieve favorable tactical conditions for their troops. It should be noted that only the absence of homogeneous independent tank formations did not give the German command the opportunity to concentrate its armored forces in the direction of the breakthrough and develop it in depth.

According to Ivan Bagramyan, the Sicilian operation did not in any way affect the Battle of Kursk, since the Germans were transferring forces from west to east, therefore “the defeat of the enemy in the Battle of Kursk facilitated the actions of the Anglo-American troops in Italy.”

Oryol offensive operation (Operation Kutuzov)

On July 12, the Western (commanded by Colonel-General Vasily Sokolovsky) and Bryansk (commanded by Colonel-General Markian Popov) fronts launched an offensive against the 2nd Tank and 9th armies of the Germans in the area of ​​​​the city of Orel. By the end of the day on July 13, Soviet troops broke through the enemy’s defenses. On July 26, the Germans left the Oryol bridgehead and began to retreat to the Hagen defensive line (east of Bryansk). On August 5 at 05-45, Soviet troops completely liberated Oryol. According to Soviet data, 90,000 Nazis were killed in the Oryol operation.

Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operation (Operation Rumyantsev)

On the southern front, the counter-offensive by the forces of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts began on August 3. On August 5 at approximately 18-00 Belgorod was liberated, on August 7 - Bogodukhov. Developing the offensive, Soviet troops cut the Kharkov-Poltava railway on August 11, and captured Kharkov on August 23. The German counterattacks were unsuccessful.

On August 5, the first fireworks display of the entire war was given in Moscow - in honor of the liberation of Orel and Belgorod.

Results of the Battle of Kursk

The victory at Kursk marked the transfer of strategic initiative to the Red Army. By the time the front stabilized, Soviet troops had reached their starting positions for the attack on the Dnieper.

After the end of the battle on the Kursk Bulge, the German command lost the opportunity to conduct strategic offensive operations. Local massive offensives, such as the Watch on the Rhine (1944) or the Balaton operation (1945), were also unsuccessful.

Field Marshal Erich von Manstein, who developed and carried out Operation Citadel, subsequently wrote:

According to Guderian,

Discrepancies in loss estimates

The casualties of both sides in the battle remain unclear. Thus, Soviet historians, including Academician of the USSR Academy of Sciences A. M. Samsonov, talk about more than 500 thousand killed, wounded and prisoners, 1,500 tanks and over 3,700 aircraft.

However, German archival data indicate that the Wehrmacht lost 537,533 people on the entire Eastern Front in July-August 1943. These figures include those killed, wounded, sick, and missing (the number of German prisoners in this operation was insignificant). In particular, based on 10 days of reports of their own losses, the Germans lost:

Total total losses of enemy troops taking part in the attack on the Kursk salient for the entire period 01-31.7.43: 83545 . Therefore, the Soviet figures for German losses of 500 thousand look somewhat exaggerated.

According to the German historian Rüdiger Overmans, in July and August 1943 the Germans lost 130 thousand 429 people killed. However, according to Soviet data, from July 5 to September 5, 1943, 420 thousand Nazis were exterminated (which is 3.2 times more than Overmans), and 38,600 were taken prisoner.

In addition, according to German documents, on the entire Eastern Front the Luftwaffe lost 1,696 aircraft in July-August 1943.

On the other hand, even Soviet commanders during the war did not consider Soviet military reports about German losses to be accurate. Thus, the chief of staff of the Central Front, Lieutenant General M.S. Malinin wrote to lower headquarters:

In works of art

• Liberation (film epic)

• "Battle for Kursk" (eng. BattleofKursk, German Die Deutsche Wochenshau) - video chronicle (1943)
• “Tanks! Battle of Kursk" Tanks!The Battle of Kursk) - documentary film produced by Cromwell Productions, 1999
• "War of the Generals. Kursk" (English) GeneralsatWar) - documentary film by Keith Barker, 2009
• “Kursk Bulge” is a documentary film directed by V. Artemenko.
• Composition Panzerkampf by Sabaton