Bashar al-Assad is Shiite or Sunni. Who did Putin contact: Who are the Sunnis, Shiites and Alawites. Number and places of residence of Sunnis and Shiites
In recent years, the Middle East has not left the headlines of news agencies around the world. The region is in a fever; the events taking place here largely determine the global geopolitical agenda. In this place, the interests of the largest players on the world stage are intertwined: the USA, Europe, Russia and China.
To better understand the processes taking place today in Iraq and Syria, it is necessary to look into the past. The contradictions that led to bloody chaos in the region are associated with the characteristics of Islam and the history of the Muslim world, which today is experiencing a real passionary explosion. Every day, events in Syria more and more clearly resemble a religious war, uncompromising and merciless. This has happened before in history: the European Reformation led to centuries of bloody conflicts between Catholics and Protestants.
And if immediately after the events of the “Arab Spring” the conflict in Syria resembled an ordinary armed uprising of the people against an authoritarian regime, today the warring parties can be clearly divided along religious lines: President Assad in Syria is supported by Alawites and Shiites, and the majority of his opponents are Sunnis. The units of the Islamic State (ISIS), the main “horror story” of any Westerner, are also made up of Sunnis - and of the most radical kind.
Who are Sunnis and Shiites? What is the difference? And why is it now that the difference between Sunnis and Shiites has led to armed confrontation between these religious groups?
To find answers to these questions, we will have to travel back in time and go back thirteen centuries, to a period when Islam was a young religion in its infancy. However, before that, a little general information that will help you better understand the issue.
Currents of Islam
Islam is one of the world's largest religions, which is in second place (after Christianity) in terms of the number of followers. The total number of its adherents is 1.5 billion people living in 120 countries. In 28 countries, Islam has been declared the state religion.
Naturally, such a massive religious teaching cannot be homogeneous. Islam includes many different movements, some of which are considered marginal even by Muslims themselves. The two largest sects of Islam are Sunnism and Shiism. There are other, less numerous movements of this religion: Sufism, Salafism, Ismailism, Jamaat Tabligh and others.
History and essence of the conflict
The split of Islam into Shiites and Sunnis occurred soon after the emergence of this religion, in the second half of the 7th century. Moreover, its reasons concerned not so much the tenets of faith as pure politics, and to be even more precise, a banal struggle for power led to the split.
After the death of Ali, the last of the four Rightly Guided Caliphs, the struggle for his place began. Opinions about the future heir were divided. Some Muslims believed that only a direct descendant of the Prophet’s family could lead the caliphate, to whom all his spiritual qualities should pass.
Another part of the believers believed that any worthy and authoritative person chosen by the community could become a leader.
Caliph Ali was the cousin and son-in-law of the prophet, so a significant part of the believers believed that the future ruler should be chosen from his family. Moreover, Ali was born in the Kaaba, he was the first man and child to convert to Islam.
Believers who believed that Muslims should be ruled by people from the clan of Ali formed a religious movement of Islam called “Shiism”; accordingly, its followers began to be called Shiites. Translated from Arabic, this word means “adherents, followers (Ali).” Another part of the believers, who considered the exclusivity of this kind of doubtful, formed the Sunni movement. This name appeared because Sunnis confirmed their position with quotations from the Sunnah, the second most important source in Islam after the Koran.
By the way, Shiites consider the Koran, recognized by Sunnis, to be partially falsified. In their opinion, information about the need to appoint Ali as Muhammad's successor was removed from it.
This is the main and fundamental difference between Sunnis and Shiites. It became the cause of the first civil war that occurred in the Arab Caliphate.
However, it should be noted that the further history of relations between the two branches of Islam, although it was not too rosy, Muslims managed to avoid serious conflicts on religious grounds. There have always been more Sunnis, and a similar situation continues today. It was representatives of this branch of Islam that founded such powerful states in the past as the Umayyad and Abbasid caliphates, as well as the Ottoman Empire, which in its heyday was a real threat to Europe.
In the Middle Ages, Shiite Persia was constantly at odds with the Sunni Ottoman Empire, which largely prevented the latter from completely conquering Europe. Despite the fact that these conflicts were rather politically motivated, religious differences also played an important role in them.
The contradictions between Sunnis and Shiites reached a new level after the Islamic Revolution in Iran (1979), after which a theocratic regime came to power in the country. These events put an end to Iran's normal relations with the West and its neighboring states, where mostly Sunnis were in power. The new Iranian government began to pursue an active foreign policy, which was regarded by the countries of the region as the beginning of Shiite expansion. In 1980, a war began with Iraq, the vast majority of whose leadership was occupied by Sunnis.
Sunnis and Shiites reached a new level of confrontation after a series of revolutions (known as the “Arab Spring”) that swept across the region. The conflict in Syria has clearly divided the warring parties along religious lines: the Syrian Alawite president is protected by the Iranian Islamic Guard Corps and the Shiite Hezbollah from Lebanon, and is opposed by detachments of Sunni militants supported by various states in the region.
How else do Sunnis and Shiites differ?
Sunnis and Shiites have other differences, but they are less fundamental. So, for example, the shahada, which is a verbal expression of the first pillar of Islam (“I testify that there is no God but Allah, and I testify that Muhammad is the Prophet of Allah”), sounds somewhat different among the Shiites: at the end of this phrase they add “... and Ali - friend of Allah."
There are other differences between the Sunni and Shia branches of Islam:
- Sunnis exclusively revere the Prophet Muhammad, while Shiites, in addition, glorify his cousin Ali. Sunnis revere the entire text of the Sunnah (their second name is “people of the Sunnah”), while Shiites only respect the part that concerns the Prophet and his family members. Sunnis believe that strictly following the Sunnah is one of the main duties of a Muslim. In this regard, they can be called dogmatists: the Taliban in Afghanistan strictly regulate even the details of a person’s appearance and behavior.
- If the largest Muslim holidays - Eid al-Adha and Kurban Bayram - are celebrated equally by both branches of Islam, then the tradition of celebrating the day of Ashura among Sunnis and Shiites has a significant difference. For Shiites, this day is a memorial day.
- Sunnis and Shiites have different attitudes towards such a norm of Islam as temporary marriage. The latter consider this a normal phenomenon and do not limit the number of such marriages. Sunnis consider such an institution illegal, since Muhammad himself abolished it.
- There are differences in the places of traditional pilgrimage: Sunnis visit Mecca and Medina in Saudi Arabia, and Shiites visit Najaf or Karbala in Iraq.
- Sunnis are required to perform five namaz (prayers) a day, while Shiites can limit themselves to three.
However, the main thing in which these two directions of Islam differ is the method of electing power and the attitude towards it. Among Sunnis, an imam is simply a clergyman who presides over a mosque. The Shiites have a completely different attitude to this issue. The head of the Shiites, the imam, is a spiritual leader who governs not only matters of faith, but also politics. He seems to stand above government structures. Moreover, the imam must come from the family of the Prophet Muhammad.
A typical example of this form of governance is today's Iran. The head of Iran's Shiites, the Rahbar, is higher than the president or the head of the national parliament. It completely determines the policy of the state.
Sunnis do not at all believe in the infallibility of people, and Shiites believe that their imams are completely sinless.
Shiites believe in twelve righteous imams (descendants of Ali), the fate of the last of whom (his name was Muhammad al-Mahdi) is unknown. He simply disappeared without a trace at the end of the 9th century. Shiites believe that al-Mahdi will return to the people on the eve of the Last Judgment to restore order in the world.
Sunnis believe that after death a person’s soul can meet with God, while Shiites consider such a meeting impossible both in a person’s earthly life and after it. Communication with God can only be maintained through an imam.
It should also be noted that Shiites practice the principle of taqiyya, which means pious concealment of one's faith.
Number and places of residence of Sunnis and Shiites
How many Sunnis and Shiites are there in the world? The majority of Muslims living on the planet today belong to the Sunni branch of Islam. According to various estimates, they make up from 85 to 90% of the followers of this religion.
Most Shiites live in Iran, Iraq (more than half the population), Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Yemen and Lebanon. In Saudi Arabia, Shiism is practiced by approximately 10% of the population.
Sunnis are in the majority in Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Afghanistan and the rest of Central Asia, Indonesia and the North African countries of Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia. In addition, the majority of Muslims in India and China belong to the Sunni branch of Islam. Russian Muslims are also Sunnis.
As a rule, there are no conflicts between adherents of these movements of Islam when living together in the same territory. Sunnis and Shiites often attend the same mosques, and this also does not cause conflicts.
The current situation in Iraq and Syria is rather an exception caused by political reasons. This conflict is associated with the confrontation between the Persians and Arabs, which has its roots in the dark depths of centuries.
Alawites
In conclusion, I would like to say a few words about the Alawite religious group, to which Russia’s current ally in the Middle East, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, belongs.
Alawites are a movement (sect) of Shiite Islam, with which it is united by the veneration of the Prophet’s cousin, Caliph Ali. Alawism originated in the 9th century in the Middle East. This religious movement absorbed the features of Ismailism and Gnostic Christianity, and the result was an “explosive mixture” of Islam, Christianity and various pre-Muslim beliefs that existed in these territories.
Today, Alawites make up 10-15% of the Syrian population, their total number is 2-2.5 million people.
Despite the fact that Alawism arose on the basis of Shiism, it is very different from it. Alawites celebrate some Christian holidays, such as Easter and Christmas, perform only two prayers a day, do not attend mosques, and may drink alcohol. Alawites revere Jesus Christ (Isa), the Christian apostles, the Gospel is read at their services, they do not recognize Sharia.
And if radical Sunnis from among the fighters of the Islamic State (ISIS) do not have a very good attitude towards Shiites, considering them “wrong” Muslims, then they generally call Alawites dangerous heretics who must be destroyed. The attitude towards Alawites is much worse than towards Christians or Jews; Sunnis believe that Alawites insult Islam by the mere fact of their existence.
Not much is known about the religious traditions of the Alawites, since this group actively uses the practice of taqiya, which allows believers to perform the rituals of other religions while maintaining their faith.
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Syrian President Bashar al-Assad took office as head of state in June 2000. His father, Hafez al-Assad, did everything in his power to preserve the mechanisms of the power structure he created. However, as experts note, Assad the father clearly did not have enough health and time to give his son the opportunity to surround himself with devoted people.
Today in Syria, the real levers of power are still in the hands of the ruling elite, the majority of which are Alawites. The Assad family belongs to them. But Alawites are a minority - they make up 12% of the country's population. By the way, Assad Jr.’s wife is a Sunni.
What is curious: in Syria, according to the Constitution, the post of president can only belong to a Sunni. Nevertheless, the Alawites almost completely control the government, the top of the army, and occupy key positions in the economic sector. Although the country is officially ruled by the Arab Socialist Renaissance Party (Baath), the preponderance of forces within it is in favor of the Alawites.
The position of the Alawites, who are more often called Nusayris (named after the founder of the sect, Muhammad ibn Nusayr, who lived in the second half of the 9th century), has always been unenviable. Sunni and Shiite orthodoxies perceived them as heretics and outsiders. Tensions have always existed between the Nusayris and other communities. It still exists today...
Nusayri teaching is filled with elements of Shiism, Christianity and pre-Muslim astral cults. Alawites deify Jesus and celebrate Christian Christmas and Easter. At the same time, the Nusayris preserved the cult of the sun, stars and moon. Observance of the basic Muslim commandments - prayer, pilgrimage, fasting, circumcision and dietary prohibitions - is not recognized. During the service, Nusayris partake of bread and wine and read the Gospel.
It is easy to imagine how suspicious and distrustful the Alawites are viewed by the orthodox Muslim majority when the imams gather in their domed prayer houses (qubbat) built on the tops of the hills in the dead of night. Sunni and religious leaders accuse Nusayri imams of divination, magic and witchcraft, and their temples are considered the haven of Satan.
Of course, during the three decades of the rule of Assad the father, the facts of open manifestations of hostility and hostility towards the Nusayris sharply declined, or even disappeared altogether. But the internal social cauldron undoubtedly continues to boil. The fire is fueled by the rejection of the privileges granted to the Alawite community by the late Nusayri president. Naturally, hostility towards the Alawites in general is transferred to the new president of Syria.
But belonging to the Nusayri minority is not the only problem preventing Bashar from sleeping peacefully. An equally serious problem for him is his position as an individual in his native community. The fact is that the Nusayris are divided into two far from equal groups. The privileged HASSA (“initiated”) and the bulk - AMMA (“uninitiated”). The first have sacred books and special knowledge, which gives them power over the uninitiated masses. The latter are assigned the role of novices-performers.
The new Syrian leader was never a member of HASSA by birth, membership of which is the longed-for dream of every Nusayri. Therefore, he must not forget how low his origin is. And everyone else (including the Alawite community) does not forget about this either.
Having taken the presidency, Bashar resolutely set about reshuffling personnel in order to strengthen his own positions. According to Western sources, from 2000 to 2004 he changed about 15% of high-ranking officials. Not only civilians, but especially military ones.
It is appropriate to recall here that 90% of the senior command staff of the army and intelligence services traditionally represented the Alawite minority. This situation arose at the stage of formation and strengthening of the Syrian state in the first years of the reign of Hafez al-Assad. It remained that way throughout the following years.
However, long before ascending to the Syrian “throne,” Bashar demonstrated his character. So, in May 1995, he arrested Mohammed Duba. This man was caught illegally importing cars into the country and selling them on the black market. This news would not have aroused any interest if it had not been for the son of one of the most senior Syrian officials - a close associate of President Assad, the head of military intelligence and at the same time, as Western journalists found out, a major drug dealer, General Ali Duba. But in reality, this arrest was intended not so much to strike a blow at the smugglers, but to undermine the source of income of the general and his entourage and thereby deprive him of the economic basis for a possible fight for the presidency. The episode with Mohammed Duba showed that the young “lion” (as the president’s surname is translated from Arabic) is not only gaining political weight, but also deftly getting rid of potential competitors.
In the same year, the “heir to the throne” once again demonstrated his character by dismissing the commander of the Syrian special forces, General Ali Heidar. Only because he “allowed himself to disobey.” To understand the meaning of this act, it is necessary to recall who Heidar is. Like the late President Assad, he joined the Ba'ath while still in school and took part in the party's coup d'état in 1963. Subsequently, having led the special forces, he played one of the main roles in suppressing protests by supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood organization in the city of Hama in 1982. And so Bashar fired him for... “insufficient respect.” For the honored general, who was part of the president’s inner circle, this is a painful blow. For everyone else, this is an instructive lesson.
It is quite noteworthy that the anti-corruption campaign also affected the Assad clan. In November 1996, following an investigation into high-level corruption by Bashar and his men, one of the largest restaurants in Damascus was closed. It belonged to the eldest son of President Rifaat Assad's brother, who, according to Western intelligence services, was one of the largest drug traffickers in the Middle East. Bashar admitted then that he took this step because he was tired of the behavior of his uncle and cousins (Fares and Darid) and decided to put an end to them once and for all. At the same time, the “heir to the throne” managed to oversee investment policy issues. He became friends with young businessmen (“new Syrians”), which included the offspring of many representatives of the highest echelons of power. From time to time he lobbied for their interests, counting on their support in the future.
But let's go back to the beginning of Bashar al-Assad's presidency. On December 10, 2001, he accepted the government's resignation. It was headed by Mustafa Miro, and he was also tasked with forming a new cabinet. The new government consisted mainly not of officers, but of civil servants under the age of 50. This was the first civilian government in Syria in recent times.
During the personnel changes made by the young president in the new government, General A. Hammoud was appointed to the post of Minister of Internal Affairs instead of the dismissed M. Harb (another of the old associates of the late Assad). Prior to this, he (a representative of the Alawite community) headed the Syrian General Intelligence Directorate for several months. Sunni general H. Al-Bakhtiar was appointed in his place.
In January 2002, the Chief of the General Staff, A. Aslan, an Alawite and one of the high-ranking military men close to the late Assad, was dismissed. In the army, Aslan enjoyed a reputation as a leader who significantly strengthened the combat capability of the Syrian armed forces. Appointed to this post after the resignation of Hikmat Shehabi in 1998, he, as analysts noted, could not find a common language with Bashar’s brother-in-law, General Asaf Shaukat, who, after the death of Assad Sr., actually managed all personnel issues in the security forces of Syria.
Aslan's resignation from the post of chief of the general staff was also explained by the fact that for 24 years this post was held by a representative of the Sunni community of Aleppo. When Aslan arrived, the army started talking about further “Alawitization” of the command staff of the Syrian armed forces. Aslan's deputy, 67-year-old Sunni general Hasan Turkmani, was appointed to replace Aslan. In the Syrian army, he was known as one of the faithful and consistent supporters of strengthening military-technical cooperation with Russia. At the same time, the head of counterintelligence of the Air Force/Air Defense (one of the most “closed” Syrian intelligence services and closest to the late Assad), General I. Al-Khoweiji, resigned.
In early March of the same year, Bashar fired “for gross violations of standards of conduct and abuse of authority” about thirty high-ranking intelligence officers. Basically, these were employees of the territorial departments of the political security department of the Syrian Ministry of Internal Affairs, which was also headed by one of the closest associates of the former president, General A. Hassan. In October 2002, he was dismissed. Instead, Bashar appointed the head of the department as the commander of the intelligence of the Syrian troops in Lebanon, Ghazi Kanaan (who committed suicide in February 2005 after the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri).
In September 2003, Bashar dismissed the government headed by Mustafa Miro. The new cabinet was tasked with forming the Chairman of Parliament, Mohammed Naji Atari. Arab analysts noted then that the change of government was associated with a new impetus that the young president wanted to give to the process of liberal reforms. Atari is a representative of a radical faction advocating an accelerated transition of the Syrian economy to a market economy.
On May 11, 2004, the Minister of Defense, corps general of the first degree, Mustafa Tlas, who held this post for 30 years, lost his post. By the way, for the last 20 years he has been engaged not so much in the armed forces as in literary creativity. The already mentioned Turkmani was appointed in his place.
The next candidate for resignation could be Foreign Minister Farouk Sharaa, the head of the Foreign Ministry since 1984. According to the Arab press, the current president believes that the head of the foreign policy department is failing to cope with his responsibilities and cannot defend the country’s position in the international arena.
In July 2004, the Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Corps General A. Sayyad, resigned. Another Deputy Chief of the General Staff, F. Issa, as well as the Deputy Minister of Defense, Corps General A. Nabbi, retired after him.
On October 4, 2004, Bashar made a major reshuffle in the government, dismissing the ministers of interior, economy, information, justice, industry, labor, health and religious affairs. Ghazi Kanaan was appointed head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and Mahdi Dakhlallah, editor-in-chief of the government newspaper Baath, was appointed minister of information.
The situation is more difficult with the Syrian intelligence services. There, permutations (more precisely, their consequences) are weighed and, if possible, predicted. It must be admitted that deciding to make such a reshuffle in Syria is a very risky business. But, obviously, being in power for more than five years, Assad Jr. learned to navigate the Middle Eastern reality.
It is worth recalling that under Hafez al-Assad, broad powers of power were concentrated in the hands of the Sunnis. Tlas served as Minister of Defense, the now disgraced Abdel Halim Khaddam became first vice president, Shehabi became chief of the general staff.
However, the late Assad preferred to rely primarily on his Alawite relatives and friends. The president's siblings (Rifaat, Jamil, Ismail, Muhammad, Ali Suleiman) received responsible positions in the army, state and party bodies.
It is not surprising that the Alawites formed a “shadow club of the elite” (“Supreme Alawite Council”), which made decisions on all fundamental and socio-economic issues. The Alawites took strict control not only of the security forces, but also of government agencies, economic institutions, and part of large businesses.
What awaits the current president, given his belonging to the Alawite minority? The question is very relevant, given that in Syria there really is a significant potential for dissatisfaction with the current government, which could burst to the surface when a suitable reason appears.
Analysts do not rule out the possibility of a coup attempt by Sunni Muslims. Representatives of the Sunni majority are dissatisfied with the omnipotence of the Alawite minority. The struggle for power with clan undertones does not subside in the state apparatus and generals, and representatives of the new business elite are also striving for power. Hostile to the current regime are Islamic fundamentalists, whose uprising the late President Assad brutally suppressed in the early 80s.
A conspiracy by Alawite generals in the army, dissatisfied with Bashar, who, in their opinion, does not have a “military bone”, is also quite likely. They (including Sunni generals) are also unhappy that the young president has withdrawn most of the Syrian troops from Lebanon. Until now, this country has been an appetizing feeding trough for them. And Bashar, with one order, eliminated sources of income and well-run business for many influential generals - first of all, smuggling trade.
Not all is well within the Assad family itself. Bashar’s uncle Rifaat, who lives abroad, put forward his claims to power and still lays claim to “the throne.” He, a former curator of the Syrian intelligence services, is well versed in all the nuances of the internal political struggle in Syria and has many supporters in the intelligence services and army.
Therefore, the likelihood of a radical reshuffling of forces within the Syrian establishment in favor of the Sunni majority should not be downplayed. The fate of peaceful coexistence in Syria largely depends on how flexibly Bashar al-Assad will pursue his religious policy...
In the civil war in Syria, Iran has played a very important role almost from the very beginning. The leadership of the Islamic Republic immediately took measures to provide military assistance to the government of Bashar al-Assad. Units of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), military specialists and instructors have arrived in Syria. But in addition to the IRGC troops, armed formations that are not formally subordinate to Iran, but are actually under its control, are also fighting in Syria. We are talking about numerous paramilitary Shiite detachments, staffed by volunteers and taking an active part in the hostilities. There are several such “irregular” formations fighting in Syria.
The most numerous and active participant in the Syrian war from among the Shiite organizations is the Lebanese Hezbollah. The “Party of Allah,” and this is how the name of this organization is translated, was created in Beirut in 1982 and united numerous Shiites in Lebanon. From the very beginning of its existence, Hezbollah has maintained close ties with the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, being the main conductor of Tehran's interests in Lebanon.
Hezbollah leader Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah, 58, received his religious education in the Iranian city of Qom, one of the sacred centers of Shiites around the world. It was this man who turned Hezbollah into a powerful paramilitary structure and an influential political party. Today, the Lebanese say that with the help of Hezbollah they managed to force the Israeli army to leave southern Lebanon, where it had been stationed for fifteen years. Moreover, this merit is personally associated with the name of Sheikh Nasrallah. Compared to other Middle Eastern radical organizations, Hezbollah has very powerful resources - it has its own army, a political wing, financial structures, and extensive networks of offices around the world, right up to Latin America. 
Naturally, when civil war broke out in neighboring Syria, Hezbollah could not stay away. Firstly, the Lebanese living in border villages needed its protection, which, by the way, was used by the party leadership as a formal reason to explain its presence in Syria. Secondly, Bashar al-Assad, like his late father Hafez, always patronized Hezbollah and maintained close ties with it. Thirdly, participation in the civil war is also seen as assistance to Iran, as a common Shiite cause. At first, Hezbollah diligently denied the participation of its fighters in the civil war in Syria, but on May 4, 2013, Amin A-Sayad, one of the Lebanese leaders of the party, said that Hezbollah soldiers are indeed in Syria - to protect the country from influence West and Israel and for the protection of holy places.
In Syria, Hezbollah has become one of the most powerful participants in the war, since it has well-armed and trained militant units. However, after the turning point in the war and the virtual defeat of terrorists in most of Syria, obvious contradictions emerged between Hezbollah and other supporters of President Assad. The Syrian government is not interested in Hezbollah remaining on Syrian soil and controlling border areas, including Syrian-Lebanese trade.
It is not beneficial for Hezbollah to remain in Syria and Moscow. Our country, having played a key role in the destruction of terrorists, has every right to insist on respecting its interests. Russia maintains good relations not only with Syria and Iran, but also with Israel. It’s no wonder that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu spent the entire day of May 9 in Moscow, side by side with President Vladimir Putin. But Hezbollah’s withdrawal from Syria contradicts the interests of Iran, another influential player who, in fact, attracted the Lebanese Shiites to participate in hostilities, armed and trained them.
By the way, Iranian Major General Qasem Soleimani, commander of the special forces al-Quds (Jerusalem) as part of the IRGC, is responsible for training Hezbollah in Syria. For the past 18 years, he has commanded the elite Quds Force, and before that he commanded the IRGC units in Iranian Kerman, where he was able to deal a serious blow to local drug traffickers who were importing Afghan heroin into the country. This officer is considered one of the most experienced Iranian military leaders and, at the same time, a rather mysterious figure with whom both Western and Russian media associate almost all IRGC operations in Syria. In the West, Qassem Soleimani is demonized; in Iran, he is considered a real national hero, who has spent his entire life defending the interests of the country and Islam both at home and abroad.
But the Lebanese Hezbollah is far from the only Shiite military-political formation fighting in Syria. After the start of the war, with the direct support of Iran, the creation of volunteer brigades was organized, into which young Shiite men from Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan were invited. These countries, as we know, are also home to extremely large Shia communities.
In November 2014, the Liwa Fatimiyoun - Fatimiyoun Brigade was formed, then transformed into a division. From the name of the division it is clear that it goes back to the name of Fatima, the youngest daughter of the Prophet Muhammad. Unlike Hezbollah, which has a 36-year-old history, Fatimiyoun was created solely for the purpose of transferring to Syria. Although the brigade command initially denied direct ties with Iran, it is clear that officers of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps played a key role in the creation of Fatimiyoun. The personnel of the Fatimiyun brigade are made up of citizens of Afghanistan - Afghan Shiites - Hazaras. As you know, Iranian-speaking Hazaras are a people of Mongol-Turkic origin who inhabit the central regions of Afghanistan and make up at least 10% of the population of this country. The Hazaras profess Shiism and speak a dialect of the Dari language.
The size of the brigade at different times ranged from 10-12 thousand to 20 thousand people. Naturally, the brigade is staffed with volunteers, but there is no shortage of them - living conditions in Afghanistan do not satisfy many young people, and the areas inhabited by Hazaras are distinguished by poverty even compared to the rest of the country. Traditionally, Hazara youth try to emigrate to neighboring Iran, hoping to find work there, since even in remote Iranian provinces it is easier to find a job and receive a salary than in Afghanistan. But not all Hazaras manage to obtain a work permit and complete all the necessary documents. Therefore, many young people prefer to enroll in the “Fatimids” - some for ideological and religious reasons, and some simply for the sake of receiving uniforms, allowances, etc.
The Hazaras are trained and equipped in Iran, and then they are transported to Syria, where their “path of warriors” begins. However, among the Fatimiyoun fighters there are many not only very young guys, but also seasoned fighters who have gone through more than one armed conflict in Afghanistan itself. After all, at different times, the Hazaras fought against Soviet troops, and against the Taliban, and against the Americans, not to mention the confrontation with the formations of numerous Mujahideen field commanders - Sunnis.
Of course, it would be wrong to imagine that all Hazaras are fighting in Syria solely for money. Many fight for ideological reasons, defending Shiite shrines. In addition, the Hazaras have their own scores to settle with the radical Sunnis fighting against Assad. When the Taliban came to power in Afghanistan, the Hazaras began to suffer severe discrimination, many of them became victims of reprisals at the hands of the Taliban, who were known to hate Shiites.
Now the Afghan Shiites are taking revenge on their coreligionists of the Taliban, only not in Afghanistan, but in Syria. By the way, the Afghan government has a negative attitude towards the participation of volunteers from among its citizens in the Syrian war on Assad’s side. Firstly, in Afghanistan it is the Sunnis, not the Shiites, who are the dominant religious community. Many Afghans are fighting in Syria on the side of Sunni forces against Assad. Secondly, and even more important, Kabul continues to largely depend on American assistance, and the participation of the Hazaras in pro-Assad formations is another reason for claims from Washington.
Throughout its participation in the Syrian war, the Fatima Brigade has been thrown into the most difficult sectors of the front, so there is nothing surprising in the extremely high losses - at least 700 Afghan citizens serving in Fatimiyoun were killed in Aleppo and Daraa alone. On February 3, 2016, when pro-government Syrian troops broke the blockade of the Shiite-populated cities of Nubel and Al-Zahra in the north of Aleppo province, the striking force of the offensive was Hezbollah and formations of foreign Shiite volunteers, including the Hazara Fatimiyoun brigade.
Subsequently, “Liva Zainabiyoun” emerged from “Fatimiyoun” - the Brigade of Zainab’s followers, named after Zainab bint Ali, the granddaughter of the Prophet Muhammad. "Zainabiyoun" was formed from volunteers - citizens of Pakistan. Since 2013, they served in Fatimiyoun alongside the Afghans, but as the number of Pakistani volunteers increased, it was decided to create a separate formation. Initially, he was assigned the task of protecting Shiite holy places in Syria, but then Zaynabiyoun began to take part in numerous military operations in Aleppo and Daraa.
As in the case of Fatimiyoun, the training of “Zaynab warriors” is carried out with the participation of Iran. The volunteers are Pakistani Shiites, mostly from the town of Parachinar in the Tribal Areas in the north-west of the country. By the way, in this city in December 2015 there was a terrorist attack on the market that took the lives of 23 people. Thus, terrorists from Lashkar-e-Jhangvi took revenge on the Parachinars for participating in hostilities in Syria on the side of Bashar al-Assad.
Iraq is the second country in the world after Iran in which Shiites make up more than half of the population. In addition, Iraq has a long border with Syria and common problems - ISIS terrorists are fighting in both Iraq and Syria (banned in Russia). Naturally, the Syrian war did not bypass Iraq. In 2013, the Arab Shiite militia Harakat Hezbollah An-Nujaba was formed here, led by Sheikh Akram al-Kaabi. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps directly took over the armament and military training of Iraqi Shiites.
The militia includes Liwa Ammar Ibn Yasser (Ammar Ibn Yasser Brigade), Liwa al-Hamad (Praise Brigade), Liwa al-Imam al-Hasan al-Muytaba (Imam Hassan Chosen Brigade) and the Golan Liberation Brigade . The name of the last brigade directly refers to the Golan Heights and reveals its intentions - the liberation of the heights from Israeli troops.
Almost immediately after the creation of Harakat Hezbollah An-Nujaba, its fighters began to go to war in Syria. Along with the Afghans, Lebanese and Pakistanis, the Iraqis played a key role in the Aleppo offensive in 2015 and in the liberation of Nubel and Al-Zahra in 2016, where they also suffered heavy losses. Unlike the Afghan brigade, the Iraqi brigade has an even stronger ideological motivation, since those ISIS militants who were rampant in Iraq later partially moved to Syria. That is, in fact, this is a war against the same people and groups.
Thus, throughout almost the entire civil war in Syria, numerous Shiite formations from Iraq, Lebanon, Afghanistan and Pakistan played a very important role in supporting government troops. The number of “Shiite internationalists” fighting on the side of Damascus exceeds the number of foreigners coming to Syria to fight on the side of the opposition. Iran, represented by the IRGC command, is also actively concerned about the influx of new volunteers.
However, the question that is already acute is what will happen to all Shiite formations after the gradual cessation of hostilities. If the Lebanese Hezbollah and the Iraqis retreat to their countries, then who will withdraw the Afghan and Pakistani forces? After all, these are tens of thousands of armed people who, over several years of war, have learned to fight excellently. Perhaps Iran will use experienced fighters elsewhere to protect its religious and political interests, or perhaps they will simply have to go home, returning to Afghan and Pakistani towns and villages.
In the last relatively peaceful year of 2011, 20 million 800 thousand people lived in Syria. In September 2015, 3.9 million Syrians fled their country, and another 7.6 million fled their city or village, seeking a safer home within Syria. 300 thousand people died between 2012 and September 2105, 200 thousand languish in the dungeons of Syrian prisons and camps at the behest of the ruling regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria. Almost every Syrian family has not only been touched by the war, but has been brutally dealt with by the war.
Even Russia, perhaps, did not experience a tragedy of this magnitude during the Civil War of 1917-1922. But what is the reason for this colossal, on the scale of a small country, tragedy, is there any hope for its exhaustion, for the restoration of peace and harmony on the blood-soaked ancient Syrian land, a land on which millennia turn over centuries, like in Russia?
If the people are alive, it doesn’t matter whether they are in Syria or in exile, then there is still hope. But in order to outline the path of treatment, you need to understand where the origins of the disease are. They are deep, very deep, matching Syrian history itself. What has been happening in recent years and looks to some like the people’s struggle for freedom and democracy, to others like a struggle of legitimate power against terrorists and insurgents, is in fact just another paroxysm of the one and a half thousand year struggle between the two main branches of Islam - Sunnis and Shiites .
At the end of July 657, near the village of Sifino on the Euphrates, destroyed and depopulated shortly before during the victorious wars of the Caliphate with Byzantium, a multi-day battle took place between two Arab armies - the army of the governor of Syria Muawiyah ibn Abu Sufyan and the army of the cousin of the Prophet Muhammad and his son-in-law - Ali ibn abu Talib. By the way, this place is located 40 kilometers from the very city of Raqqa, where Russian bombs and missiles are now falling.
The battle ended inconclusively, but it was fought for supreme power over the faithful. Who should rule the ummah - the collection of all Muslims. Ali's supporters believed that only Ali and his direct descendants and that God chooses the caliph of the faithful. Mu'awiya's supporters were confident that any worthy man from the Quraysh tribe, the tribe to which Muhammad belonged, could be caliph and that the caliph was elected by the ummah. They remembered the words of the Prophet - “my community will not agree on a mistake.” In 661 Ali was killed. In 680, near Karbala, the son of Ali Hussein died in a battle with the son of Muawiya. Two traditions of power among Muslims - through Ali and Divine will (Shiites - from Shia at Ali - supporters of Ali) and through all the relatives of Muhammad - Quraish and the will of the Ummah (Sunnis - from sunnah - custom, example of behavior - in this case - the Prophet) - have not stopped fighting since then.
In the 10th-11th centuries it was a brutal war between the Fatimid Shiite caliphs of Africa and the Abbasid Sunni caliphs of Syria, Arabia and Egypt, at the beginning of the 16th century - a bloody long-term rivalry between the Shahinshah of Iran Ismail I Safavid, who proclaimed the Shiite tradition as the compulsory state religion of Iran, and the Ottoman Sunni sultan and Caliph Selim I Yavuz (Grozny), who mercilessly exterminated the Shiites. In the Battle of Chaldiran near Lake Van in August 1514, Sultan Selim defeated the Shahin Shah and took Iraq, Eastern Anatolia and Azerbaijan from him. But the victory, although convincing, was not final. The confrontation between Shiites and Sunnis continued both within the Ottoman Empire and between the Sunni Ottomans and Shiite Iran.
This war continues today. Many still remember the war between Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein and the leader of the Iranian Jamahiriya, Ayatollah Khomeini (1980-1988). Iraq, which is Shiite in the majority of its population, but Sunni in its ruling elite, fought for eight years with Iran, which became militantly Shiite after the Islamic Revolution. The war ended with a truce and the restoration of the status quo ante bellum, but one and a half million dead remained on the battlefields. There were incomparably more people maimed, gassed, and deprived of shelter and property. Syria, whose citizens are predominantly Sunni Muslims, sided with Iran in that war.
But why has such bitterness divided the two branches of Islam for one and a half millennia, whose followers equally revere both the Prophet Muhammad and the Holy Koran?
Outwardly, the dispute is about power. Ali's supporters say that the last righteous leader of the community (they call them imams), the 12th Imam - Muhammad Al-Mahdi ibn al Hanafiyya, was hidden from everyone as a five-year-old child in 873, and he still remains in a secret refuge, but he will definitely come again. Invisible communication with him is what allows the Shia community to live and governs the community.
The modern Iranian state is based on this principle. Politically - democracy, with elections of the president and the Majlis, but above this democracy stands the supreme ruler - the Rahbar, who communicates with a hidden imam and who makes decisions - fatwas, mandatory for the president of the country, for the Majlis, on behalf of Muhammad al-Mahdi. This 12th imam in Shiism is an indisputable figure. He, and accordingly the rahbar, have infallibility (ishmah). Now the Rahbar of Iran is Ali Hosseini Khamenei (since June 4, 1989). Rahbara elects (and, if necessary, removes) a council of 86 mujtahids - people recognized by the people who have mysterious communication with the hidden twelfth imam.
So, Shiism and Sunnism are two different worldviews. The Sunni worldview in general (although there are exceptions in the Sufi orders) is very pragmatic and positive. It is similar in relation to man to Lutheranism in Christianity. Any educated person can interpret the Koran, any person can express his opinion on who should be chosen as caliph.
Shiites perceive the world as a secret that cannot be revealed to anyone, which God himself reveals only to the chosen ones. The idea that people differ in their degree of revelation is very strong in Shiism. There are leaders - and there are people. The leaders are not those who advanced with money or cunning, family nobility, no, the leaders are those who hear the voice of the hidden imam, the leaders are those who have a vision of the secret light that emanates from him. They must govern the faithful. The caliphs who ruled the ummah after Muhammad, even those whom the Sunnis call righteous - Abu Bakr, Omar and Othman, for most Shiites they are usurpers and impostors. Moreover, for them, all the Sunni caliphs after Ali are usurpers, right up to the current and not recognized by many Sunnis leader of ISIS (an organization banned on the territory of the Russian Federation) - Abu Bakr al Baghdadi. So the split is deep.
Of course, at the level of mystics, both Sunni and Shiite, there is no hostility towards each other. Mystics understand that the paths are different, the faiths are different, but they see the same highest values, the same goals and, in general, respect each other: “Who is a hermit, who is a Muslim, who is a Shiite - an admirer of imams, but they all belong to the same tribe, tribe people,” says an ancient saying of the East.
But politicians are always politicians. And the power of a politician lies in somehow recruiting, as political scientists now like to say, supporters. Of course, these may be relatives, but there are few of them; these may be vassals, but they are few; some large aggregates are needed. What are these aggregates? First of all, of course, religious ones. Then national communities appeared, ethnic, racial, social, class. But these divisions became significant much later, at best at the end of the 18th century. And religious divisions are very ancient. To bring together adherents of different traditions, to divide them according to the principle: friend-foe, superman-subhuman, righteous-unjust, angel-pig - is a nice thing for a politician. Then, with some skill and gift, millions of people completely unfamiliar to you personally will follow you.
Moreover, religious communities are the most powerful thing, this is what embraces a person entirely. When people are called to unite on a social, or class, or national level, then much in religion contradicts these calls. For Muslims, this is a generally impossible thing, because everything that is not in God is an evasion, this is shirk, this is heresy. Both nationalism and socialism are heresies for a devout Muslim, and, by and large, for a Christian.
One more thing. All movements, except religious ones, do not embrace a person completely and do not give him eternity. Yes, here you are solving some national problems, social problems, but what about eternity? Usually all these nationalist and socialist movements are on bad terms with religion and, therefore, with eternity. And therefore these movements turned out to be relatively weak. For two centuries, having darkened the world, having collected their harvest in the form of tens, if not hundreds of millions of lives of dead and injured people, they, in general, have more or less weakened now. And in their place came again the eternal religious identification as the main political force for recruiting supporters. In this sense, we can say that September 11, 2001, when the New York skyscrapers collapsed, was the beginning of a new old era. That new old era, when again religion clearly and powerfully became the dominant factor in the political process for everyone, and everyone started talking about it.
And the 1,500-year-old conflict between Shiites and Sunnis also threw off its fashionable ideological veils and appeared in the primordial guise of a conflict in which the leaders use the religious identification of people as the main means of political recruitment. And although the ratio of Sunnis and Shiites in the world is not at all equal - Sunnis among Muslims are 83%, and Shiites, respectively, about 17%, in the Middle East their strength is comparable - the huge powerful Iran, most of Iraq (approximately 2/3 of the population are Shiites ), Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Yemen, large groups of Shiites in Lebanon, smaller in Syria. In Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia, about 15% of the population is Shiite.
But let’s return to Syria, to the Alawite State created by the French in 1919. Who are the Alawites? The Alawites themselves say that they are ordinary Shiites, the same as in Iran. But this is absolutely not true. And it must be said that this absolute untruth is religiously determined. The fact is that all Shiites apply to themselves such a category as “takiyah” - hiding their true faith. Often in the minority and persecuted, they have adapted to the fact that sometimes they have to hide their true faith. And the Alawites publicly say something that is not what actually exists. Already in 1973, the Council of 80 Alawite Sheikhs announced that they are the same Twelver Shiites who honor 12 imams, like all the main Shiites, like the Shiites of Iran, like the Shiites of Lebanon, “and everything that is still attributed to us is far from the truth and invented our enemies and the enemies of Allah."
But in reality, everything is not so simple at all. When in the late 1960s, Sami Jundi, himself a Shiite Ismaili, Minister of Information for the Alawite dictator of Syria, General Salah Jadid, proposed publishing the holy books of the Alawites - and then everyone would understand that the Alawites are really normal Shiites (and these books have never been published, and religious scholars argue: some say that they exist, others say that they do not exist at all), the all-powerful military dictator Jadid replied that if he did this, “our sheikhs will tear me to pieces.”
But who are the Alawites? Alawites are the same Arabs, but they profess a special religion that combines elements of Islam, Christianity and the very early pre-Christian beliefs of the Aramaic population of Syria. The most important point that makes this religion absolutely impossible for either Sunnis or Shiites is the Doctrine of the Gate.
Recognizing, like the Twelvers, 12 imams, the Alawites say that you can communicate with each of them only through a special person, each of these imams has its own gate - bab in Arabic. And only through such a person-gate can one turn to the imam. Ali's own Baba is Salman al-Farisi. The founder of this religious movement is the last bab Abu Shuaib Muhammad ibn Nusayr - this is the bab of the 11th Imam al Hasan al Askari, who died in 874. By his name, Muslims often call Alawites Nusayris (since the self-name “Alawites” comes from the name of Caliph Ali, and Muslims find such a conjugation with “sectarians” offensive). The 12th “hidden imam” does not have his own baba. Muhammad ibn Nusayr helps believers communicate with the 12th Imam.
The Alawite creed reads as follows: “I believe and confess that there is no other God except Ali ibn Abi Talib, the venerable (al mabud), there is no other covering (hijab) except Muhammad the worthy (al mahmud), and there is no other gate (bab) , except Salman al Farisi, the predestined (al maksud).”
Firstly, this is a direct deification of a person, which, of course, no normal Shia allows himself. Secondly, this is the Trinity. And they directly talk about the Trinity, that Ali is the essence, Muhammad is the name, and Salman Al-Farisi is the gate. This, of course, is a copy of Christianity. Christ, from the Muslim point of view, is a man. And the main dogma of Islam, which is shared by all Muslims, is the dogma of divine unity, tawhid. The Alawites have an obvious violation of this dogma and, therefore, polytheism, from the point of view of Muslims. In addition, Alawites believe in the transmigration of the soul after death into another body. And only the Alawites have this new human body. According to their ideas, Muslims become donkeys, Christians become pigs, and Jews become monkeys.
As for rituals, medieval travelers, Sunnis who described the Alawites in the 14th century (Ahmad ibn Taymiyya, Ibn Batuta), unanimously say that they do not recognize any Muslim fasts, restrictions and ablutions, that they honor Christ, the apostles, many Christian martyrs, and on the days of the feasts of martyrs they call themselves by their names, that they perform night masses, at which they partake of wine and read the Gospel, that they have two levels of initiation: initiates - hassa and commoners - amma, and women cannot participate at all in their religious activities in any form. That they revere the Sun, Moon and stars also associate them with Christ and Muhammad. Muhammad is called the Sun.
Obviously, this is not Islam at all. The French scientist Jacques Wehlers, who dedicated several fundamental books to the Alawites in the 1940s, considered their beliefs “a deformation of the crusaders or early Christianity, combined with the remnants of ancient paganism.” These people, precisely because they were not Muslims, not Christians, not Jews, did not have their own millet, that is, their official religious community in the Ottoman Empire, they were persecuted, they wanted to completely destroy them several times. And they didn’t destroy it only because if they were destroyed, who would cultivate the land in Latakia? And the land belonged to rich Sunni and Orthodox landowners, and they asked the sultans to leave the Alawites alone.
The Alawites were very poor people, they were the very bottom of society, they could never even collect taxes. They sold their daughters for the most obscene business in the cities back in Ottoman times, they themselves were hired as slaves for a time, or even for life, just to have food. They were a poor agricultural class, and even their sheikhs were relatively poor people. Poor people, and even Gentiles, and even pagans. They were called kafirs and mushrikuns, that is, infidels and polytheists. They were despised by both Sunnis and Christians. They lived for centuries in this miserable state, but kept their faith. Ibn Batuta says that the Sunni caliphs forced them to build mosques, but they made stalls for their cattle in them.
When the Arab national revival began, the most educated Alawites dreamed that they, Arabs in language, would become equal to Sunnis and Christian Arabs. But very quickly they realized that the rich Sunnis, their landowners, both despised and continue to despise them. And then the French came. And if for the Sunni Arabs the French were deceivers, scoundrels and invaders, then for the Alawites the French occupation administration of General Gouraud was accepted as manna from heaven.
The Sunnis almost completely refused to cooperate with the occupation administration, while the Alawites, on the contrary, readily agreed to this. And the French, in gratitude, created the Alawite state in Latakia, in which Alawites made up 2/3 of the population. And throughout Syria, it was mainly Alawites who were recruited into the troops, the local, native Syrian troops, the so-called Troupes Spciales du Levant. Others, for example, the Druze - also a very unique religious group, they consider themselves a separate religion, although they have distant ties with Shiism - raised an uprising against the French in 1925, and, naturally, they were not taken into the army. But the Alawites did not raise any uprisings, and they were taken with pleasure. Then it turned out, even when the Alawites were not in power, in independent Syria in 1955, that the Alawites, numbering 8 - a maximum of 11% of the Syrian population, make up 65% of the non-commissioned officers of the Syrian army and more than half of the officers (57%). They were willingly taken into the Syrian army because they had undergone modern military training in the French native units, and they themselves willingly went to military schools, since they did not have the money to study for civilian professions, and military education was at the expense of the state.
Al-Jazeera correspondent Safwan Jullak is Syrian. Familiar with the situation in the country from the inside. Our correspondent asked him several questions about the religious component of the Syrian conflict.
- We know that Sunnis, Shiites, Alawites live in Syria... Alawism is one of the branches of Shiism. Allegedly, Shiites differ from Sunnis in that they insist that the ummah should be led only by the direct heir of the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him), while the Sunnis do not have this. Is this really why there is so much blood? How important is the religious component in the Syrian conflict?
Now the religious factor is already important. There is a rule: if your enemies are strong, then they need to be separated. There is no better way in the Arab world than to divide on religious grounds.
For example, in Iraq there are many Shiites and many Sunnis. Before America got involved, no one talked about discrepancies. People lived peacefully, no matter how they prayed or dressed. The division into Shiites and Sunnis is an artificial process. The American CIA and the Israeli Mossad did their best.
Five years ago, Shiites, Sunnis and Alawites lived absolutely peacefully in Syria. I had friends among some, others and others, we have a common homeland. The Syrian revolution is a revolution of freedom. First of all, the people wanted freedom and nothing else. Then the West began to foment dirty troubles between Sunnis and Shiites, actually forcing them to fight among themselves. The Syrian revolution has turned into a civil war. From the Capitol they watch how Syria is being destroyed by its people, how the people are at war with themselves...
The same process is eating up the Syrian opposition. She is very diverse. As I said, to destroy the enemy, you need to divide him. Despite the fact that there are a lot of different battalions, neither side will achieve success. Everyone has their own goals.
- I had to read that Alawites have always been the poorest people and therefore willingly joined the army. That’s why it was not difficult for Bashar Assad’s father, the Alawite Hafez Assad, to carry out a coup d’etat, because all the officers were Alawites. This is true?
No. When Hafez Assad carried out a coup in 1970 and became the sole ruler, only then did he remove all Sunnis from leadership positions in the army and intelligence services and appoint Alawites whom he trusted. Hafez Assad and his son Bashar trusted leadership positions in the country to Alawites, Kurds, Turkmens, everyone except Sunnis. This went on for a long time and as a result they made a kingdom out of Syria under the guise of a “republic”.
86% of Syria's population is Sunni. Bashar al-Assad was and still is afraid of the Sunnis. For the minority (Alawites) rules the majority.
By the way, when did the so-called “Arab spring”, Sunnis, Shiites, Kurds, and Turkmens took to the streets, only Alawites did not come out. And this is their mistake...
