History of the 20s and 30s. Foreign policy of the USSR on the eve of the war

NEP: gains and losses. The country's economy during the NEPA years. The New Economic Policy (NEP) has had positive influence. Economy of Siberia. NEP in Siberia. Displacement of private trade from the Siberian market. NEP in Siberia: lost chances. History of the Russian economy. Comparison of reforms of the NEP period and post-Soviet Russia. It should be noted that the interpretation of the NEP gradually changed. External labor migration during the NEP period.

“Culture of the USSR 20-30 years” - Prominent writers. Cultural revolution. Creation of a socialist system public education. Introduction of unified artistic canons. Development of precise and natural sciences. Method socialist realism. Mandelstam and Akhmatova. Results of educational program. Ukrainian hut. Mass compulsory literacy training. Geneticist N.I. Vavilov. Transition to universal primary education. Science under ideological pressure.

“The USSR in the years 20-30” - 1936. The Constitution of the USSR is “The Constitution of victorious socialism.” Political transformations. Negative traits national policy in the USSR in the 1920-1930s. Civil War. "Next tasks Soviet power" All-Union Congress of Soviets. Results of NEPA. Approval of the command-administrative model of the economy. Downsides of Soviet industrialization. Characteristic features of the Soviet totalitarian regime.

“Foreign Policy of the USSR in the 20s” - Genoa Conference. Decisions of the Genoa Conference. An attempt to “ignite” the fire of the world revolution. Overcoming diplomatic isolation by Soviet Russia. Directions of foreign policy in the 20s. Comintern. International situation and foreign policy in the 20s. Strip of diplomatic recognition of the USSR. N. Bukharin. Streak of recognition. Foreign policy factor. Conference participants. General strike. The first peace treaties.

“Culture in the USSR 1920-1930” - “Red Jew”. Sculptor Vera Mukhina. Decree 1932 Worker and Collective Farm Woman, 1937. Steel. Marc Chagall. S. Kirsanov “Our hands will learn everything.” We will pull out all the riddles by thread. "The Rich Bride", 1938 Konstantin Yuon. "New Moscow". We will succeed in communism. Sukharev Tower, destroyed in 1934. Soviet literature. Iso. "Baltic Deputy" Alexander Deineka. Yuri Pimenov. What happened? The first metro line.

“USSR in 1920-1930” - Association of peasants into collective farms. Social transformations of the NEP. The pacification of Germany by England and France at the expense of Czechoslovakia. NEP – formation and main stages of development. Soviet culture in 1920 -1930. March 1930. September 28, 1939 - Treaty of Friendship and Border with Germany. Foreign policy of the 30s. Three types of farms were allowed. Internal party struggle in the 1920s. The cult of personality is the autocracy of Stalin.

Economic policy:

In the second half of the 1920s, the most important task of economic development was the transformation of the country from an agricultural to an industrial one, ensuring its economic independence and strengthening its defense capability. An urgent need was the modernization of the economy, the main condition of which was the technical improvement (re-equipment) of the entire national economy.

Industrialization policy. The course towards industrialization was proclaimed in December 1925 by the XIV Congress of the All-Union Communist Party(Bolsheviks) (renamed after the formation of the USSR). At the congress they discussed the need to transform the USSR from a country importing machinery and equipment into a country producing them. His documents substantiated the need for maximum development of production of means of production (group “A”) to ensure the economic independence of the country. The importance of creating socialist industry on the basis of increasing se technical equipment. The beginning of the industrialization policy was legislated in April 1927 by the IV Congress of Soviets of the USSR. In the early years, the main attention was paid to the reconstruction of old industrial enterprises. At the same time, over 500 new plants were built, including the Saratov and Rostov agricultural machinery plants, the Karsaknai copper smelter, etc. The construction of the Turkestan-Siberian Railway (Turksib) and the Dnieper Hydroelectric Power Station (Dneproges) began. Development and expansion industrial production almost 40% was carried out at the expense of the resources of the enterprise itself; in addition to intra-industrial accumulation, the source of financing was redistribution in favor of the industry of national income.

The implementation of the industrialization policy required changes in the industrial management system. There has been a transition to a sectoral management system, unity of command and centralization in the distribution of raw materials have been strengthened, work force and manufactured products. On the basis of the Supreme Economic Council of the USSR, the People's Commissariats of heavy, light and forestry industries were formed. The forms and methods of industrial management that emerged in the 20s and 30s became part of the economic mechanism that persisted for a long time. It was characterized by excessive centralization, directive command and suppression of local initiative. The functions of economic and party bodies, which interfered in all aspects of the activities of industrial enterprises, were not clearly delineated.

Industrial development. The first five-year plan. At the turn of the 1920s and 1930s, the country's leadership adopted a policy of fully accelerating, “spurring up” industrial development, and accelerating the creation of socialist industry. This policy was most fully embodied in the five-year plans for the development of the national economy. The first five-year plan (1928/29-1932/33) came into force on October 1, 1928. By this time, the tasks of the five-year plan had not yet been approved, and the development of some sections (in particular, on industry) continued. The five-year plan was developed with the participation of major specialists. A. N. Bach, a famous biochemist and public figure, I. G. Alexandrov and A. V. Winter - leading energy scientists, D. N. Pryanishnikov - founder of the scientific school of agrochemistry, etc.

The section of the five-year plan regarding industrial development was created by workers of the Supreme Economic Council under the leadership of its chairman V.V. Kuibyshev. It provided for an average annual increase in industrial output of 19-20%. Ensuring such high rates of development required maximum effort, which was well understood by many leaders of the party and state. N.I. Bukharin, in his article “Notes of an Economist” (1929), supported the need for high rates of industrialization. In his opinion, the implementation of such rates could be facilitated by increasing efficiency and reducing production costs, saving resources and reducing unproductive costs, increasing the role of science and the fight against bureaucracy. At the same time, the author of the article warned against “communist” hobbies and called for a more complete account of objective economic laws.

The plan was approved on V All-Union Congress Soviets in May 1929. The main task of the five-year plan was to transform the country from an agrarian-industrial one to an industrial one. In accordance with this, the construction of metallurgy, tractor, automobile and aircraft manufacturing enterprises began (in Stalingrad, Magnitogorsk, Kuznetsk, Rostov-on-Don, Kerch, Moscow and other cities). The construction of the Dneproges and Turksib was in full swing.

However, very soon a revision of industry targets began to increase them. Production assignments were “adjusted” building materials, for the smelting of iron and steel, for the production of agricultural machinery. The plenum of the Party Central Committee, held in November 1929, approved new target figures for industrial development in the direction of their sharp increase. According to I.V. Stalin and his inner circle, by the end of the five-year plan it was possible to smelt pig iron instead of the planned 10 million tons - 17 million, produce 170 thousand tractors instead of 55 thousand, produce 200 thousand cars instead of 100 thousand and etc. The new control figures were not thought out and had no basis in reality.

The country's leadership put forward the slogan - in the shortest possible time to catch up and surpass the advanced capitalist countries in technical and economic terms. Behind him was the desire to eliminate the backlog in the country's development as soon as possible at any cost and build a new society. Industrial backwardness and international isolation of the USSR stimulated the choice of a plan for the accelerated development of heavy industry.

In the first two years of the Five-Year Plan, until NEP reserves were exhausted, industry developed in accordance with planned targets and even exceeded them. In the early 1930s, its growth rate dropped significantly: in 1933 it was 5% versus 23.7% in 1928-1929. The accelerated pace of industrialization required increased capital investment. Industry was subsidized mainly through intra-industrial accumulation and redistribution of national income through the state budget in its favor. The most important source of its financing was the “pumping” of funds from the agricultural sector to the industrial sector. In addition, to receive additional funds The government began to issue loans and issued money, which caused a sharp increase in inflation. And although it was announced that the five-year plan would be completed in 4 years and 3 months, the “adjusted” targets of the plan for the production of most types of products could not be fulfilled.

Second five-year plan. The Second Five-Year Plan (1933-1937), approved by the 17th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) at the beginning of 1934, maintained the tendency to prioritize the development of heavy industry to the detriment of light industry. His main economic task was to complete the reconstruction of the national economy on the basis of the latest technology for all its sectors. Planned targets in the industry compared to the previous five years were more moderate and seemed realistic to be achieved. During the years of the Second Five-Year Plan, 4.5 thousand large industrial enterprises were built. The Ural Machine-Building and Chelyabinsk Tractor Plants, Novo-Tula Metallurgical and other plants, dozens of blast furnaces and open-hearth furnaces, mines and power plants came into operation. The first metro line was built in Moscow. The industry of the Union republics developed at an accelerated pace. Mechanical engineering enterprises were built in Ukraine, and metal processing plants were built in Uzbekistan.

The completion of the second five-year plan was announced ahead of schedule - again in 4 years and 3 months. In some industries, very good results have indeed been achieved. Steel production increased 3 times, and electricity production increased 2.5 times. Powerful industrial centers and new industries emerged: chemical, machine tool, tractor and aircraft manufacturing. At the same time lung development the industry producing consumer goods was not given due attention. Limited financial and material resources were directed here, so the results of the second five-year plan for group “B” turned out to be significantly lower than planned (from 40 to 80% in different industries).

The scale of industrial construction infected many Soviet people with enthusiasm. Call XV! Thousands of factory workers responded to the conference of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) to organize socialist competition.

The Stakhanov movement developed widely among workers in various industries. Its initiator, miner Alexei Stakhanov, set an outstanding record in September 1935, fulfilling 14 labor standards during a shift. A. Stakhanov's followers showed examples of an unprecedented increase in labor productivity. Many enterprises put forward counter plans for production development that were higher than those established. The labor enthusiasm of the working class had great importance to solve the problems of industrialization. At the same time, workers often succumbed to unrealistic calls, such as calls to fulfill the five-year plan in four years or to catch up and overtake the capitalist countries. The desire to set records also had a downside. Insufficient preparedness of newly appointed economic managers and the inability of the majority of workers to master new technology sometimes led to its damage and disruption of production.

Agrarian policy. The industrial breakthrough had a hard impact on the situation of peasant farms. Excessive taxation aroused discontent rural population. Prices for industrial goods increased exorbitantly. At the same time, government purchase prices for bread were artificially lowered. As a result, grain supplies to the state sharply decreased. This caused complications with grain procurements and a deep grain crisis at the end of 1927. It worsened the economic situation in the country and jeopardized the implementation of the industrialization plan. Some economists and business executives saw the cause of the crisis in the error of the party's course. To get out of this situation, it was proposed to change the relationship between the city and the countryside, to achieve greater balance. But to combat the grain procurement crisis, a different path was chosen.

To intensify grain procurements, the country's leadership resorted to emergency measures reminiscent of the policies of the period of “war communism.” Free market trade in grain was prohibited. If peasants refused to sell grain at fixed prices, they were subject to criminal liability, and local Soviets could confiscate part of their property. Special “investigative officers” and “work detachments” confiscated not only surpluses, but also the bread necessary for the peasant family. These actions led to a worsening of relations between the state and the rural population, which in 1929 reduced the area under cultivation.

The transition to collectivization. Crisis of the procurement campaign of 1927/28. and the tendency of some of the workers of the apparatus of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to centralized, administrative-command management of all sectors of the economy accelerated the transition to general collectivization. Held in December. 1927 The XV Congress of the CPSU (b) adopted a special resolution on the issue of work in the countryside. It talked about the development of all forms of cooperation in the countryside, which by this time united almost a third of peasant farms. A gradual transition to collective cultivation of the land was planned as a long-term task. But already in March 1928, the Party Central Committee, in a circular letter to local party organizations, demanded the strengthening of existing collective and state farms and the creation of new ones.

The practical implementation of the collectivization policy was reflected in the widespread creation of new collective farms. Significant sums were allocated from the state budget to finance collective farms. They were provided with benefits in the field of credit, taxation, and the supply of agricultural machinery. Measures were taken to limit the possibilities for the development of kulak farms (limiting land rental, etc.). Direct supervision of collective farm construction was carried out by the Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks for work in the village V. M. Molotov. The Collective Farm Center of the USSR was created, headed by G. N. Kaminsky.

In January 1930, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks adopted a resolution “On the pace of collectivization and measures of state assistance to collective farm construction.” It outlined strict deadlines for its implementation. In the main grain-growing regions of the country (Middle and Lower Volga region, North Caucasus) it was supposed to be completed by the spring of 1931, in the Central Black Earth Region, in Ukraine, the Urals, Siberia and Kazakhstan - by the spring of 1932. By the end of the first five-year plan, collectivization was planned to be carried out on a nationwide scale.

Despite the decision, both the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the grassroots party organizations intended to carry out collectivization in a more compressed form. A “competition” between local authorities began for the record-breaking rapid creation of “districts of complete collectivization.” In March 1930, the Model Charter of the Agricultural Artel was adopted. It proclaimed the principle of voluntariness in joining a collective farm, determined the procedure for unification and the volume of socialized means of production. However, in practice, these provisions were widely violated, which caused resistance from the peasants. Therefore, many of the first collective farms, created in the spring of 1930, quickly disintegrated. It was necessary to send detachments of “conscious” party workers (“twenty-five thousanders”) to the villages. Together with workers of local party organizations and the OGPU, moving from persuasion to threats, they convinced peasants to join collective farms. For Maintenance Newly emerging peasant production cooperatives in rural areas organized machine and tractor stations (MTS).

During mass collectivization, kulak farms were liquidated[i]. (In previous years, a policy was implemented to limit their development.) In accordance with the regulations of the late 20s and early 30s, lending was stopped and taxation of private households was increased, and laws on land leasing and labor hiring were abolished. It was forbidden to admit kulaks to collective farms. All these measures caused their protests and terrorist actions against collective farm activists. In February 1930, a law was adopted that determined the procedure for the liquidation of kulak farms. In accordance with it, the layers of the kulaks were divided into three categories. The first included the organizers of anti-Soviet and anti-collective farm protests. They were arrested and tried. The largest kulaks classified in the second category were to be resettled to other regions. The remaining kulak farms were subject to partial confiscation, and their owners were subject to eviction to new territories from the areas of their previous residence. During the process of dispossession, 1-1.1 million farms were liquidated (up to 15% of peasant households).

Results of collectivization. The disruption of existing forms of management in the countryside has caused serious difficulties in the development of the agricultural sector. Average annual grain production in 1933-1937. decreased to the level of 1909-1913, the number of livestock decreased by 40-50%. This was a direct consequence of the forced creation of collective farms and the inept leadership of the chairmen sent to them. At the same time, plans for food procurement grew. Following the harvest year of 1930, the grain regions of Ukraine, the Lower Volga and Western Siberia crop failure hit. To fulfill grain procurement plans, emergency measures were reintroduced. 70% of the harvest was confiscated from collective farms, up to the seed fund. In the winter of 1932-1933. many newly collectivized farms were gripped by famine, from which, according to various sources, from 3 million to 5 million people died (the exact figure is unknown, information about the famine was carefully hidden),

The economic costs of collectivization did not stop its implementation. By the end of the second five-year plan, over 243 thousand collective farms were organized. They included over 93% of the total number of peasant households. In 1933, a system of compulsory deliveries of agricultural products to the state was introduced. The state prices set for it were several times lower than market prices. Plans for collective farm crops were drawn up by the leadership of the MTS, approved by the executive committees of the district Soviets, and then reported to agricultural enterprises. Payment in kind (in grain and agricultural products) for the labor of MTS machine operators was introduced; its size was determined not by collective farms, but by higher authorities. The passport regime introduced in 1932 limited the rights of peasants to travel. The administrative-command system of collective farm management, high levels of government supplies, and low procurement prices for agricultural products slowed down economic development farms.

By the mid-1930s, the bureaucratization of economic management intensified. The deformations in the development of the national economy deepened: light industry lagged further and further behind heavy industry. Agriculture, railway and river transport experienced serious difficulties.

The fight against dissent. In parallel with the formation of the regime of personal power of I. V: Stalin, the struggle against dissent unfolded. The scale of repression against “class-hostile” individuals increased. Punitive measures affected almost all segments of the population. Following dispossession, repressive measures were taken against the urban population. Many senior officials of the State Planning Committee, the Supreme Economic Council, and the People's Commissariats fell into the category of “enemies of the people.” Business executives and engineers, primarily representatives of old (bourgeois) specialists, were declared to be the culprits for the failure of industrial plans. At the end of 1930, in the “Industrial Party” case, a group of scientific and technical intelligentsia led by the director of the Research Thermal Engineering Institute L.K. Ramzin was brought to trial and convicted. Prominent agricultural scientists N.D. Kondratyev, A.V. Chayanov and others were in the dock on charges of belonging to the Labor Peasant Party. The “fault” of the scientists was that their views on the ongoing collectivization differed from the official views. In particular, they considered a necessary condition development of rural cooperation, availability of a market. A group of former leaders of the Menshevik Party, as well as former tsarist generals and officers who served in the Red Army, were arrested.

The expansion of the scale of repression was accompanied by a violation of the rule of law. The USSR Central Executive Committee adopted several resolutions that became the basis for the ongoing lawlessness. A special meeting was created - an extrajudicial body in the state security system. His decision on the basis and measures of repression was not subject to control. Other extrajudicial, unconstitutional bodies—the “troikas” and “twos” of the NKVD—based their work on the same principle. A new procedure for conducting cases of terrorist acts was established. Their consideration was carried out within ten days without the participation of the defense and prosecution. One of the legal theorists who provided a “scientific basis” for the arbitrariness of the 30s was the USSR Prosecutor General A. Ya. Vyshinsky.

Administrative-command methods of managing the socio-political and cultural life of the country were strengthened. Many public organizations were liquidated. The reasons for their abolition were varied. In some cases - small numbers or financial troubles. In others - being part of societies of “enemies of the people”. The All-Union Association of Engineers and the Russian Society of Radio Engineers were liquidated. Society of Lovers of Russian Literature, Society of Russian History and Antiquities. The Society of Old Bolsheviks and the Society of Former Political Prisoners and Exiled Settlers, which united, in addition to Bolsheviks, former anarchists, Mensheviks, Bundists, Socialist Revolutionaries, etc., ceased to exist. Mainly those associations continued to operate that could be used in the interests of the state (Osoaviakhim, Red Cross Society and the Red Crescent, International organization assistance to the fighters of the revolution - MOPR, etc.). Professional associations creative intelligentsia were placed under the control of party and government officials.

Constitution of the USSR of 1936. The transformation of the economy and increased centralization in the management system led to the formation of a new model of society, to the almost complete “nationalization” of the national economy. The changes that have occurred in the economic, socio-political and national-state development of the Soviet Union since the mid-20s required changes to the Basic Law. Prominent government and party workers took part in the development of the draft of the new Constitution, including M. I. Kalinin, N. I. Bukharin, A. S. Bubnov, G. K. Ordzhonikidze, as well as a large group of legal experts.

On December 5, 1936, the VIII Extraordinary Congress of Soviets approved the new Constitution of the USSR. It recorded the characteristic features of the administrative-command system that had formed in the country. However, during that period (and in the subsequent years of the existence of the Soviet state), it was believed that the Constitution legislated the construction of a socialist society in the USSR.

The Basic Law reflected changes in the national state structure of the USSR, the emergence of new union and autonomous republics and regions. In connection with the liquidation of the TSFSR, independent republics arose: the Armenian, Azerbaijan and Georgian SSR. The Kazakh Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic and the Kirghiz Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic were transformed into union republics. The total number of union republics directly included in the USSR increased to 11. The voluntary nature of the state unification of the Soviet socialist republics was confirmed.

Political basis countries formed Soviets of Working People's Deputies. The structure of state power changed: its highest legislative body became The Supreme Council, consisting of two chambers (the Council of the Union and the Council of Nationalities). His tasks included approving the composition of the USSR government. The responsibilities of the all-Union People's Commissariats in the field of legislation, national economic development, and strengthening the country's defense capability expanded. At the same time, the rights of some republican authorities were unjustifiably narrowed, in particular in the legislative sphere.

Social basis The state was declared as a union of workers and peasants while maintaining the dictatorship of the proletariat. (In practice, this was expressed in the dictatorship of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and its apparatus.) The socialist economic system and socialist ownership of the tools and means of production were declared the economic basis of the USSR. This property existed in two forms: state (mines, factories in industry, state farms and MTS in the countryside) and collective farm-cooperative property.

In connection with the liquidation of the former exploiting classes and private property, changes were made to electoral system. Restrictions on voting rights for the rural population were abolished. The system of multi-stage elections in government bodies authorities and open voting. The Constitution legally established universal, secret, equal and direct elections to Councils at all levels.

Citizens of the USSR were guaranteed the rights to work, rest, education, and material security in old age. Work was declared the duty of every citizen capable of it, according to the principle: “He who does not work, does not eat.” Freedom of religious worship was proclaimed. At the same time, freedom of anti-religious propaganda was introduced.

In the book “History of the Bolshevik Communist Party. Short Course,” prepared with the direct participation of J.V. Stalin and published in 1938, the new Basic Law was called the Constitution of “the victory of socialism and workers’ and peasants’ democracy.” History has shown the illusory nature of this conclusion by the head of state. However, the position about the victory of socialism in the USSR, about the completion of the transition period from capitalism to socialism in the mid-30s, was strengthened in Soviet historical literature for many decades.

Political processes of the 30s. Political course I.V. Stalin and the concentration of unlimited power in his hands aroused opposition sentiments among many leading party workers and ordinary members of the CPSU(b). JV Stalin was called “the evil genius of the Russian revolution” by opponents of repression who sought to counteract them. A group of Moscow party workers (“Union for the Defense of Leninism”), led by M. N. Ryutin, addressed a manifesto “To all members of the EKGT (b).” It proposed removing I.V. Stalin from the post of General Secretary of the Central Committee and making adjustments to the system of managing the national economy. In 1932, the group members were arrested, accused of attempting to restore capitalism, and executed. The introduction of methods of arbitrariness and lawlessness created a climate of fear, suspicion, and mutual distrust of each other in the country.

In the mid-30s, repressions began against old party members who did not agree with the established methods of leading the country. The reason for the mass repressions was the murder on December 1, 1934 of S. M. Kirov, the first secretary of the Leningrad city and regional party committees, a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. Investigation into the circumstances of this terrorist attack directed by J.V. Stalin. According to the official version, the murder was committed on behalf of an underground Trotskyist-Zinovy ​​group in order to disorganize the country's leadership. Several party and government workers were sentenced to capital punishment, although their participation in the assassination attempt on S. M. Kirov was not proven.

In 1937, in the case of the so-called parallel anti-Soviet Trotskyist center, a group of senior officials from the People's Commissariat of Heavy and Timber Industry was brought to trial. Among them were Yu. L. Pyatakov (in the past - one of the participants in the opposition to J. V. Stalin) and G. Ya. Sokolnikov. They were accused, among other things, of attempts to undermine the economic power of the USSR, of sabotage, of organizing accidents at enterprises, of deliberately disrupting state plans. Thirteen defendants were sentenced to death and four to prison. An attempt to prevent lawlessness was made by the People's Commissar of Heavy Industry G. K. Ordzhonikidze. Together with employees of the People's Commissariat, he checked the affairs of a group of “enemies of the people” engaged in the construction of heavy industry enterprises, and proved their innocence.

In 1936, he was convicted on fictitious charges of anti-Soviet activities and espionage (the case of the anti-Soviet “united Trotskyist-Zinoviev center”) former leaders parties of G. E. Zinoviev, L. B. Kamenev and others. Thousands of political emigrants and many Comintern workers became victims of repression. Repressive policies were carried out against entire peoples. In 1937, the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks decided to immediately evict the Korean population living there from the Far Eastern Territory. The need for this act was motivated by the possible sending of Chinese and Korean spies to the Far East by Japanese intelligence services. Subsequently, over 36 thousand Korean families (more than 170 thousand people) were deported to the regions of Central Asia.

The repressions affected the command cadres of the Red Army (M. N. Tukhachevsky, I. E. Yakir, I. P. Uborevich, A. I. Egorov, V. K. Blyukher). In 1938, another political trial was fabricated in the case of the “anti-Soviet right-wing Trotskyist bloc” (N.I. Bukharin, A.I. Rykov, etc.). The defendants were accused of intending to liquidate the existing social and political system, restore capitalism. They allegedly intended to achieve this goal by means of espionage and... sabotage activities by undermining the country's economy. All these actions took place in violation of the rules of justice and ended in the execution of the convicts.

Tens of thousands of innocent people were arrested based on false denunciations and accusations of “counter-revolutionary” activities. They were sentenced to imprisonment and forced labor in the system Government controlled camps (GULAG). Prisoner labor was used in logging, construction of new factories and railways. By the end of the 30s, the Gulag system included more than 50 camps, over 420 penal colonies, 50 colonies for minors. The number of people imprisoned there increased from 179 thousand in 1930 to 839.4 thousand at the end of 1935 and to 996.4 thousand at the end of 1937 (official data). However, the total number of victims of repression was significantly higher. One of the indirect indicators of the scale of repression is data on population dynamics in the USSR. From January 1, 1929 to January 1, 1933, the number of residents increased by 11 million people. From January 1, 1933 to December 1937, the population decreased by almost 2 million.

The attitude of the state to religion. At the end of the 20s, state regulation of activities increased religious associations. By this time, almost all religious organizations declared their loyalty to the new system. The development of a union law on religious cults began. Discussion of his project was carried out in the departments implementing “church policy”: the NKVD, the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR. During the discussion, a discussion arose about the prospects of religion in Soviet society, about the nature of the activities of religious organizations, and about the forms of anti-religious propaganda. It was argued that the work of many church communities had acquired an anti-Soviet character. It was proposed to intensify the fight against them as a counter-revolutionary force. It was decided to preserve the existing legislation in the republics in relation to religion.

In the spring of 1930, the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the RSFSR adopted a resolution “On Religious Associations.” A ban was introduced on economic (creation of cooperatives) and charitable work of communities. The teaching of religious doctrines in educational institutions - state, public, and private - was prohibited. To contact religious organizations A commission on religious issues was created under the All-Russian Central Executive Committee. It included representatives of the People's Commissariats of Justice, Internal Affairs, Education, and the OGPU. Later, the commission was transformed into an all-Union commission under the Presidium of the USSR Central Executive Committee (P. L. Krasikov became its chairman).

The propaganda campaign intensified to explain to the population the “failure” of religious beliefs. The center of atheistic propaganda was the “Union of Militant Atheists,” headed by the publicist and author of many anti-religious books Km. Yaroslavsky. The Union published newspapers and magazines with circulations of many thousands (“Militant Atheism”, “Atheist at the Machine”, “Anti-Religious”, “Young Atheists”, etc.). Anti-religious museums and exhibitions were created, and courses were organized to train propagandists of atheism. The Second Congress of the Union of Atheists (1929) proclaimed atheistic work to be the most important area of ​​the class struggle. The fight against religion was declared a fight for socialism.

In February 1930, the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars adopted a resolution “On the fight against counter-revolutionary elements in the governing bodies of religious associations.” Local authorities were recommended to strengthen control over the composition of community leaders. It was proposed to exclude persons “hostile” to the Soviet system from the active membership of religious associations. Targeted repressions against the clergy have become more frequent. Taxation of clergy was increased. In case of non-payment of taxes, their property was confiscated, and they themselves were evicted to other parts of the country. The procedure for closing churches was simplified: the decision on this issue was transferred to the regional executive committees and regional executive committees of the Soviets. In the mid-30s, the number of operating religious buildings (temples, churches, mosques, synagogues, etc.) amounted to 28.5% of those available in pre-revolutionary Russia. In this regard, the Central Election Commission considered it necessary to abolish the previously created commission on religious issues. The new Constitution of the USSR did not include a provision on freedom of religious propaganda.

By the mid-30s, the formation of the administrative-command system was completed in the USSR. Its most important features were: centralization of the economic management system, merging of political management with economic management, strengthening of authoritarian principles in the management of socio-political life. The narrowing of democratic freedoms and rights of citizens and public institutions was accompanied by the growth and strengthening of the personality cult of J.V. Stalin. Many domestic and foreign historians consider it possible to say that in the 30s a totalitarian society was formed in the USSR.

USSR in 1938 - early 1941:

The internal political and economic development of the USSR remained complex and contradictory. This was explained by the strengthening of the personality cult of J.V. Stalin, the omnipotence of the party leadership, and the further strengthening of bureaucratization and centralization of management. At the same time, the faith of the majority of the people in socialist ideals, labor enthusiasm and high citizenship grew.

The personality cult of J.V. Stalin was caused by various factors; the lack of democratic traditions in the country; largely preserved monarchist psychology of the masses, giving rise to the illusion of wisdom and infallibility of the leader, an atmosphere of fear in conditions of repression and political processes. The real and imaginary (propagandized) successes of socialist construction also contributed to the strengthening of the people's faith in J.V. Stalin. The cult of J.V. Stalin was propagated by his inner circle, who made a quick political career out of it: K.E. Voroshilov, L.M. Kaganovich, V.M. Molotov, G.M. Malenkov, N.S. Khrushchev, L. P. Beria and others. Throughout the country, the cult of J.V. Stalin was introduced into the consciousness of the people by numerous party workers and civil servants.

In the economic field, the system of state socialism continued to develop - strict planning, distribution and control in all areas economic activity. The powers of the State Planning Committee were expanded, and the People's Commissariat of State Control was created. Command-administrative methods of management were strengthened, which, despite their shortcomings, played positive role in mobilizing economic and human resources to reflect fascist aggression. The Soviet government carried out a series of economic, military, socio-political and ideological measures to strengthen the country's defense capability.

Economic policy. The development of the USSR was determined by the tasks of the third five-year plan (1938-1942), approved by the XVIII Congress of the CPSU (b) in March 1939. A political slogan was put forward - to catch up and surpass the developed capitalist countries in terms of production per capita. This attitude was demagogic. It was based on falsified and inflated indicators of the results of the implementation of the second five-year plan. Despite undoubted successes (in 1937 the USSR took second place in the world in terms of production after the USA), the industrial (and especially technical) lag behind the West was not overcome. Distortions in the economy were clearly evident. The advanced positions achieved in the metallurgical, chemical, and some branches of the engineering industry were combined with a noticeable lag in the development of new technologies, and especially in the production of consumer goods. In light industry, plans were fulfilled by 40-60% and did not meet the level of needs of the population. A difficult situation was also observed in agriculture, where production by 1938 had sharply decreased compared to the end of the 20s.

The main efforts in the third five-year plan were aimed at developing industries that ensure defense capability from the outside. Their growth rates significantly exceeded the growth rates of industry as a whole. By 1941, up to 43% of total capital investments were directed to these industries.

The formation of the young Soviet state was quite difficult and long. This was largely due to the fact that the international community was in no hurry to recognize it. In such conditions, the foreign policy of the USSR in the 20-30s of the 20th century was distinguished by rigidity and consistency, since it was necessary to solve many problems.

The main tasks facing diplomats

As we said, the main task was to normalize relations with other countries. But the USSR in the 20-30s also assumed the export of revolutionary ideas to other states. However, romantic ideals the revolutions were quickly cooled by reality. Realizing the unreality of some ideas, the government of the newly created country quickly switched to more realistic tasks.

First achievements

At the very beginning of the twentieth century, a truly significant event took place: the USSR achieved the complete lifting of the trade blockade, which had a very painful impact on the country’s economy, which was already greatly weakened. The Decree on Concessions, which was issued on November 23, 1920, played a very important role.

In principle, immediately after signing all trade agreements with Great Britain, Kaiser Germany and other countries, diplomats actually achieved unofficial recognition of the USSR throughout the world. The official period stretched from 1924 to 1924. The year 1924 turned out to be especially successful, when it was possible to resume relations with more than three dozen foreign countries.

This was the foreign policy of the USSR in the 20s and 30s. In short, it was possible to reorient the economy towards an industrial direction, as the country began to receive sufficient quantities of raw materials and technologies.

The first foreign ministers, thanks to whom such a breakthrough became possible, were Chicherin and Litvinov. These brilliant diplomats, who received their education back in Tsarist Russia, became a real “guiding bridge” between the young USSR and the rest of the world. They conducted the foreign policy of the USSR in the 20-30s of the 20th century.

It was they who achieved the signing of a trade agreement with England, as well as other European powers. Accordingly, it is to them that the Soviet Union owes the lifting of the trade and economic blockade, which hindered the normal development of the country.

New deterioration in relations

But the foreign policy of the USSR in the 20-30s knew not only victories. Around the beginning of the thirties it began new round deterioration of relations with the Western world. This time the pretext was the fact that the USSR government officially supported the national movement in China. Relations with England were practically severed due to the fact that the country treated the striking English workers with sympathy. It got to the point that Vatican leaders openly began to call for a “Crusade” against the Soviet Union.

It is not surprising that in the 20-30s. XX century was distinguished by extreme caution: it was impossible to give the slightest reason for aggression.

Relations with Nazi Germany

One should not assume that the Soviet leadership pursued some kind of inadequate policy, disproportionate to the times. It was precisely the government of the USSR in those years that was distinguished by rare sanity. Thus, immediately after 1933, when the National Socialist Party came to sole power in Germany, it was the Soviet Union that began to actively insist on the creation of a collective European security system. All efforts of diplomats were traditionally ignored by the leaders of European powers.

An attempt to stop Hitler's aggression

In 1934, another event occurred that the country had been waiting for a long time. The USSR was finally admitted to the League of Nations, which was the ancestor of the UN. Already in 1935, an allied treaty was concluded with France, which provided for friendly mutual assistance in the event of an attack on one of the allies. Hitler immediately responded by seizing the Rhineland. Already in 1936, the process of actual Reich aggression against Italy and Spain began.

Of course, the political forces in the country understood what all this threatened, and therefore the foreign policy of the USSR in the 20-30s began to undergo serious changes again. The sending of equipment and specialists to fight the Nazis began. This marked the march of fascism across Europe, and the leaders of the European powers practically did not resist it.

Further aggravation of the situation

The fears of Soviet politicians were fully confirmed when in 1938 Hitler carried out the Anschluss of Austria. In September of the same year, the Munich Conference was held, which was attended by representatives of Germany, Great Britain and other countries.

No one was surprised that as a result, the Sudetenland of Czechoslovakia was unanimously given over to power. The Soviet Union was perhaps the only country that openly condemned the fact of Hitler’s naked aggression. Just a year later, not only all of Czechoslovakia, but also Poland came under his rule.

The situation was complicated by the fact that Far East the situation kept getting worse. In 1938 and 1939, units of the Red Army came into fire contact with the Japanese. These were the famous Khasan and Khalkin-Gol battles. Also fighting were carried out on Mongolian territory. Mikado believed that the heir to Tsarist Russia in the person of the USSR retained all the weaknesses of his predecessor, but greatly miscalculated: Japan was defeated, being forced to make significant territorial concessions.

Diplomatic relations with Germany

After Stalin tried at least three times to negotiate the creation of an ill-fated European security system, the leadership of the USSR was forced to establish diplomatic relations with Nazi Germany. Currently, Western historians are vying to convince the world of the aggressive intentions of the Soviet Union, but its true goal was simple. The country tried to secure its borders from attack, forced to negotiate with a potential enemy.

Treaties with the Reich

In mid-1939, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was signed. According to the terms of the secret part of the document, Germany received Western Poland, and the USSR received Finland, the Baltic states, Eastern Poland, most of present-day Ukraine. The previously normalized relations with England and France were completely ruined.

At the end of September, politicians of the USSR and Germany signed an agreement on friendship and borders. How can we better understand the goals pursued by the foreign policy of the USSR in the 20s and 30s? The table we provide below will help you with this.

This is what characterized the foreign policy of the USSR in the 20s and 30s.

This period was one of the most difficult in the life of the state. Having broken the resistance of most of the republics that did not want to join the Union, and having unsuccessfully completed the Bolshevik-Polish war, the USSR embarked on the path of establishing its own statehood. Immediately after the founding of the Union, the fight against dissent began. In the early 20s, the Socialist Revolutionaries were tried in the USSR, active counter-revolutionary propaganda was carried out, and the fight against the White Guards and local resistance from rebel armies was completed.

The socialism under construction showed its inconsistency, which is why the country's top leadership decided to “retreat to capitalism” and the New Economic Policy was introduced. At the same time, the pressure of all opposition movements continued; in 1924, the complete suppression of the Mensheviks was completed, they were completely discredited in front of the public, although Lenin did not dare to demonstrably destroy them, preferring a slow, wholesale destruction through “exposures” of members of the Menshevik movement.

During Civil War the Bolshevik party had supreme authority In the USSR, here, in fact, an authoritarian regime reigned. The key body, completely controlled by the Bolsheviks, was the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b). Under Lenin, this body did not have much power, but after his illness its influence increased. I.V. became the General Secretary of the Central Committee. Dzhugashvili (Comrade Stalin), for whom this was a serious step in achieving absolute personal power, although Lenin tried to prevent him from doing this.
Dzhugashvili abandoned the idea of ​​“exporting revolution” and filed new idea, according to which socialism could be built within one country. His theses were adopted in 1926, after which the NEP began to be folded, and a new attempt to build socialism began. Dzhugashvili's main opponent in the political arena, Trotsky, was defeated and expelled from the USSR.

According to Dzhugashvili, small peasant farms could not provide the country with everything necessary; he accused the so-called “kulaks”, who produce the bulk of agricultural products in the country, of sabotage. The country began an active transition to industrialization, the policy of the central government became more stringent - compliance with the set standards was demanded from the center, regardless of any circumstances. Describing the USSR in the 20s briefly, it must be added that at the end of this period, Dzhugashvili began to promote the idea that the failure of socialism was not to blame for the inept actions of the authorities, but for the so-called “enemies of the people.” During this period, the bloody machine of Stalin's repressions was just beginning to gain momentum.

The official foreign policy of the USSR in the 1930s was based on the desire to restore diplomatic relations with other countries. Not officially, the foreign policy of the Soviet state was supposed to lead to the spread of the ideology of communism and the ideas of world revolution. However, gradually by the beginning of the 30s the government realized that this was impossible. The need to strengthen power in the country comes to the fore.

Thanks to the work of Soviet diplomats, by the beginning of the 20s the economic blockade was lifted. And by 1933 the new state was actually recognized. In 1924, diplomatic relations with foreign countries were successfully established. Trade was resumed with the most important European powers: England, Italy, Germany and others. This became possible largely thanks to the activities of the first Soviet People's Commissars for Foreign Affairs (Chicherin, Litvinov). The signing of the decree on concessions by the Council of People's Commissars (1920, November 23) also contributed to the improvement of the international situation.

The government of the USSR, despite quite difficult situation in the country, and monitored changes in the international situation. The foreign policy of the USSR on the eve of the war, after the National Socialist Party came to power in Germany, was initially aimed at strengthening borders and forming a serious European security system. Soviet diplomats actively acted in this direction. However, diplomatic efforts did not bring tangible results, which ultimately led to some rapprochement between the USSR and Germany. The Soviet Union becomes a member of the League of Nations (1934), in next year A treaty of mutual assistance was concluded with France. Hitler successfully used this circumstance. The conclusion of the treaty, regarded as an action directed against Germany, largely provoked the seizure of the Rhineland.

Gradually, Hitler's appetites grew. In 1936, the intervention of Italy and Spain began. Later, in 1938, the USSR condemned the transfer of the Sudetenland to Czechoslovakia by Germany. The European policy of appeasing the aggressor later provoked the seizure of the territories of Poland and Czechoslovakia.

Foreign policy events even then suggested the likelihood of a military conflict with Germany. However, the rapprochement course gave the Soviet Union time to develop industry and the economy, and create a combat-ready army. The country did its best to prevent the confrontation from starting too early.

The result of the change in foreign policy was the Molotov-Ribbentrop non-aggression pact, concluded between the USSR and Germany in August 1939, and a (secret) protocol on delimiting the spheres of influence of the two powers. At the same time, diplomatic relations with France and England were severed.