Battle of Kursk story. Tank battles. Kursk Bulge

In order to realize this opportunity, the German military leadership launched preparations for a major summer offensive on in this direction. It hoped, by delivering a series of powerful counter-strikes, to defeat the main forces of the Red Army in the central sector of the Soviet-German front, regain the strategic initiative and change the course of the war in its favor. The plan of the operation (code name “Citadel”) was to encircle and then destroy Soviet troops by striking in converging directions from the north and south at the base of the Kursk ledge on the 4th day of the operation. Subsequently, it was planned to strike in the rear of the Southwestern Front (Operation Panther) and launch an offensive in the northeast direction in order to reach the deep rear of the central group Soviet troops and creating a threat to Moscow. To carry out Operation Citadel, the best generals of the Wehrmacht and the most combat-ready troops were involved, a total of 50 divisions (including 16 tank and motorized) and big number separate units that were part of the 9th and 2nd armies of Army Group Center (Field Marshal G. Kluge), the 4th Panzer Army and Task Force Kempf of Army Group South (Field Marshal E. Manstein). They were supported by aircraft of the 4th and 6th Air Fleets. In total, this group consisted of over 900 thousand people, about 10 thousand guns and mortars, up to 2,700 tanks and assault guns, and about 2,050 aircraft. This amounted to about 70% of tank, up to 30% of motorized and more than 20% of infantry divisions, as well as over 65% of all combat aircraft operating on Soviet-German front, which were concentrated on an area that accounted for only about 14% of its length.

In order to achieve rapid success of its offensive, the German command relied on the massive use of armored vehicles (tanks, assault guns, armored personnel carriers) in the first operational echelon. The medium and heavy tanks T-IV, T-V (Panther), T-VI (Tiger), and Ferdinand assault guns that entered service with the German Army had good armor protection and strong artillery. Their 75-mm and 88-mm cannons with a direct shot range of 1.5-2.5 km were 2.5 times greater than the range of the 76.2-mm cannon of the main Soviet T-34 tank. Due to the high initial velocity of the projectiles, increased armor penetration was achieved. The Hummel and Vespe armored self-propelled howitzers that were part of the artillery regiments of tank divisions could also be successfully used for direct fire at tanks. In addition, they were equipped with excellent Zeiss optics. This allowed the enemy to achieve a certain superiority in tank equipment. In addition, new aircraft entered service with German aviation: the Focke-Wulf-190A fighter, the Henkel-190A and Henkel-129 attack aircraft, which were supposed to ensure maintaining air superiority and reliable support for tank divisions.

The German command attached particular importance to the surprise of Operation Citadel. For this purpose, it was envisaged to carry out disinformation of the Soviet troops on a large scale. To this end, intensive preparations for Operation Panther continued in the South army zone. Demonstrative reconnaissance was carried out, tanks were deployed, transport means were concentrated, radio communications were carried out, agents were activated, rumors were spread, etc. In the Army Group Center zone, on the contrary, everything was diligently camouflaged. But although all activities were carried out with great care and method, they did not produce effective results.

In order to secure the rear areas of their strike forces, the German command in May-June 1943 undertook large punitive expeditions against the Bryansk and Ukrainian partisans. Thus, more than 10 divisions acted against 20 thousand Bryansk partisans, and in the Zhitomir region the Germans attracted 40 thousand soldiers and officers. But the enemy failed to defeat the partisans.

When planning the summer-autumn campaign of 1943, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command (SHC) intended to carry out a broad offensive, delivering the main blow in the southwestern direction with the goal of defeating Army Group South, liberating Left Bank Ukraine, Donbass and crossing the river. Dnieper.

The Soviet command began developing a plan for upcoming actions for the summer of 1943 immediately after the end of the winter campaign at the end of March 1943. The Supreme High Command Headquarters, the General Staff, and all the front commanders defending the Kursk ledge took part in the development of the operation. The plan included delivering the main attack in the southwestern direction. Soviet military intelligence It was possible to timely reveal the preparations of the German army for a major offensive on the Kursk Bulge and even set the date for the start of the operation.

The Soviet command was faced with a difficult task - to choose a course of action: to attack or defend. In his report on April 8, 1943 to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief with an assessment of the general situation and his thoughts on the actions of the Red Army in the summer of 1943 in the Kursk Bulge area, the marshal reported: “I consider it inappropriate for our troops to go on the offensive in the coming days in order to forestall the enemy . It would be better if we exhaust the enemy on our defense, knock out his tanks, and then, introducing fresh reserves, by going on a general offensive we will finally finish off the main enemy group.” The Chief of the General Staff shared the same views: “A thorough analysis of the situation and anticipation of the development of events allowed us to draw the correct conclusion: the main efforts must be concentrated north and south of Kursk, bleed the enemy here in a defensive battle, and then go on a counter-offensive and defeat him.” .

As a result, an unprecedented decision was made to switch to defense in the area of ​​the Kursk salient. The main efforts were concentrated in areas north and south of Kursk. There was a case in the history of war when the strongest side, which had everything necessary for an offensive, chose from several possible the most optimal course of action - defense. Not everyone agreed with this decision. The commanders of the Voronezh and Southern fronts, the generals, continued to insist on launching a pre-emptive strike in the Donbass. They were also supported by some others. The final decision was made in late May - early June, when the Citadel plan became known for sure. Subsequent analysis and the actual course of events showed that the decision to deliberately defend in conditions of significant superiority in forces in this case was the most rational type of strategic action.

The final decision for the summer and autumn of 1943 was made by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command in mid-April: it was necessary to expel the German occupiers beyond the Smolensk - r. line. Sozh - the middle and lower reaches of the Dnieper, crush the so-called defensive “eastern rampart” of the enemy, and also eliminate the enemy bridgehead in the Kuban. The main blow in the summer of 1943 was supposed to be delivered in the southwest, and the second in western directions. On the Kursk salient, it was decided to use deliberate defense to exhaust and bleed the strike groups of German troops, and then go on a counteroffensive to complete their defeat. The main efforts were concentrated in areas north and south of Kursk. The events of the first two years of the war showed that the defense of the Soviet troops did not always withstand massive enemy attacks, which led to tragic consequences.

To this end, it was planned to make maximum use of the advantages of a pre-created multi-line defense, bleed the enemy's main tank groups, exhaust his most combat-ready troops, and gain strategic air superiority. Then, launching a decisive counter-offensive, complete the defeat of enemy groups in the area of ​​the Kursk bulge.

TO defensive operation near Kursk, mainly troops of the Central and Voronezh fronts were involved. The Supreme Command Headquarters understood that the transition to deliberate defense was associated with a certain risk. Therefore, by April 30, the Reserve Front was formed (later renamed the Steppe Military District, and from July 9 - the Steppe Front). It included the 2nd Reserve, 24, 53, 66, 47, 46, 5th Guards Tank Armies, 1st, 3rd and 4th Guards, 3rd, 10th and 18th Tank Armies, 1st and 5th th mechanized corps. All of them were stationed in the areas of Kastorny, Voronezh, Bobrovo, Millerovo, Rossoshi and Ostrogozhsk. The front field control was located near Voronezh. Five tank armies, a number of separate tank and mechanized corps, and a large number of rifle corps and divisions were concentrated in the reserve of the Supreme High Command Headquarters (RVGK), as well as in the second echelons of the fronts, at the direction of the Supreme High Command. From April 10 to July, the Central and Voronezh Fronts received 10 rifle divisions, 10 anti-tank artillery brigades, 13 separate anti-tank artillery regiments, 14 artillery regiments, eight guards mortar regiments, seven separate tank and self-propelled artillery regiments. In total, 5,635 guns, 3,522 mortars, and 1,284 aircraft were transferred to the two fronts.

By the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, the Central and Voronezh Fronts and the Steppe Military District numbered 1,909 thousand people, more than 26.5 thousand guns and mortars, over 4.9 thousand tanks and self-propelled artillery units (SPG), about 2.9 thousand .planes.

After achieving the goals of the strategic defensive operation, the Soviet troops were planned to launch a counteroffensive. At the same time, the defeat of the enemy’s Oryol group (Kutuzov plan) was entrusted to the troops of the left wing of the Western (Colonel General V.D. Sokolovsky), Bryansk (Colonel General) and the right wing of the Central Front. The offensive operation in the Belgorod-Kharkov direction (the “Commander Rumyantsev” plan) was planned to be carried out by forces of the Voronezh and Steppe Fronts in cooperation with the troops of the Southwestern Front (Army General R.Ya. Malinovsky). Coordination of the actions of the front troops was entrusted to representatives of the Supreme Command Headquarters, Marshals of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov and A.M. Vasilevsky, colonel general of artillery, and aviation - to air marshal.

The troops of the Central, Voronezh Fronts and the Steppe Military District created a powerful defense, which included 8 defensive lines and lines with a total depth of 250-300 km. The defense was built as anti-tank, anti-artillery and anti-aircraft with deep echeloning of combat formations and fortifications, with a widely developed system of strong points, trenches, communication passages and barriers.

A state defense line was established along the left bank of the Don. The depth of the defense lines was 190 km on the Central Front and 130 km on the Voronezh Front. Each front had three army and three front defensive lines, equipped in engineering terms.

Both fronts had six armies: Central Front - 48, 13, 70, 65, 60th combined arms and 2nd tank; Voronezh - 6th, 7th Guards, 38th, 40th, 69th Combined Arms and 1st Tank. The width of the defense zones of the Central Front was 306 km, and that of the Voronezh Front was 244 km. On the Central Front, all combined arms armies were located in the first echelon; on the Voronezh Front, four combined arms armies were located.

The commander of the Central Front, General of the Army, having assessed the situation, came to the conclusion that the enemy would deliver the main blow in the direction of Olkhovatka in the defense zone of the 13th Combined Arms Army. Therefore, it was decided to reduce the width of the 13th Army’s defense zone from 56 to 32 km and increase its composition to four rifle corps. Thus, the composition of the armies increased to 12 rifle divisions, and its operational structure became two-echelon.

To the commander of the Voronezh Front, General N.F. It was more difficult for Vatutin to determine the direction of the enemy’s main attack. Therefore, the defense line of the 6th Guards Combined Arms Army (it was the one that defended in the direction of the main attack of the enemy’s 4th Tank Army) was 64 km. Given the presence of two rifle corps and one rifle division, the army commander was forced to build the army troops into one echelon, allocating only one rifle division to the reserve.

Thus, the depth of defense of the 6th Guards Army initially turned out to be less than the depth of the 13th Army's zone. This operational formation led to the fact that the commanders of the rifle corps, trying to create a defense as deep as possible, built a battle formation in two echelons.

Great importance was attached to the creation of artillery groups. Particular attention was paid to the massing of artillery in the likely directions of enemy attacks. On April 10, 1943, the People's Commissar of Defense issued a special order on the use of artillery from the reserve of the High Command in battle, the assignment of reinforcement artillery regiments to the armies, and the formation of anti-tank and mortar brigades for the fronts.

In the defense zones of the 48th, 13th and 70th armies of the Central Front, in the expected direction of the main attack of Army Group Center, 70% of all guns and mortars of the front and 85% of all artillery of the RVGK were concentrated (taking into account the second echelon and reserves of the front). Moreover, 44% of the artillery regiments of the RVGK were concentrated in the zone of the 13th Army, where the spearhead of the attack of the main enemy forces was aimed. This army, which had 752 guns and mortars with a caliber of 76 mm and above, was reinforced by the 4th Breakthrough Artillery Corps, which had 700 guns and mortars and 432 rocket artillery installations. This saturation of the army with artillery made it possible to create a density of up to 91.6 guns and mortars per 1 km of front (including 23.7 anti-tank guns). Such a density of artillery had not been seen in any of the previous defensive operations.

Thus, the desire of the Central Front command to solve the problems of the insurmountability of the defense being created already in the tactical zone, without giving the enemy the opportunity to break out beyond its boundaries, was clearly visible, which significantly complicated the further struggle.

The problem of using artillery in the defense zone of the Voronezh Front was solved somewhat differently. Since the front troops were built in two echelons, the artillery was distributed between the echelons. But even on this front, in the main direction, which made up 47% of the entire front line of defense, where the 6th and 7th Guards armies were stationed, it was possible to create a sufficiently high density - 50.7 guns and mortars per 1 km of front. 67% of the front's guns and mortars and up to 66% of the artillery of the RVGK (87 out of 130 artillery regiments) were concentrated in this direction.

The command of the Central and Voronezh Fronts paid great attention to the use of anti-tank artillery. They included 10 anti-tank brigades and 40 separate regiments, of which seven brigades and 30 regiments, that is, the vast majority of anti-tank weapons, were located on the Voronezh Front. On the Central Front, more than one third of all anti-tank artillery weapons became part of the front's artillery anti-tank reserve, as a result, the commander of the Central Front, K.K. Rokossovsky was able to quickly use his reserves to fight enemy tank groups in the most threatened areas. On the Voronezh Front, the bulk of anti-tank artillery was transferred to the first echelon armies.

Soviet troops outnumbered the enemy group opposing them near Kursk in personnel by 2.1 times, in artillery by 2.5 times, in tanks and self-propelled guns by 1.8 times, and in aircraft by 1.4 times.

On the morning of July 5, the main forces of the enemy strike forces, weakened by the preemptive artillery counter-training of the Soviet troops, went on the offensive, throwing up to 500 tanks and assault guns against the defenders in the Oryol-Kursk direction, and about 700 in the Belgorod-Kursk direction. German troops attacked the entire defense zone of the 13th Army and the adjacent flanks of the 48th and 70th armies in a strip 45 km wide. The northern enemy group delivered the main blow with the forces of three infantry and four tank divisions on Olkhovatka against the troops of the left flank of the 13th Army of the general. Four infantry divisions advanced against the right flank of the 13th Army and the left flank of the 48th Army (commander - general) towards Maloarkhangelsk. Three infantry divisions attacked the right flank of the general's 70th Army in the direction of Gnilets. The advance of ground forces was supported by air strikes. Heavy and stubborn fighting ensued. The command of the 9th German Army, not expecting to encounter such powerful resistance, was forced to re-conduct an hour-long artillery preparation. In increasingly fierce battles, warriors of all branches of the military fought heroically.

Defensive operations of the Central and Voronezh fronts during the Battle of Kursk

But the enemy tanks, despite the losses, continued to stubbornly move forward. The front command promptly reinforced the troops defending in the Olkhovat direction with tanks, self-propelled artillery units, rifle formations, field and anti-tank artillery. The enemy, intensifying the actions of its aviation, also brought heavy tanks into the battle. On the first day of the offensive, he managed to break through the first line of defense of the Soviet troops, advance 6-8 km and reach the second line of defense in the area north of Olkhovatka. In the direction of Gnilets and Maloarkhangelsk, the enemy was able to advance only 5 km.

Having encountered stubborn resistance from the defending Soviet troops, the German command brought almost all of the formations of the strike group of Army Group Center into the battle, but they were unable to break through the defenses. In seven days they managed to advance only 10-12 km, without breaking through the tactical defense zone. By July 12, the enemy's offensive capabilities on the northern front of the Kursk Bulge had dried up, he stopped attacks and went on the defensive. It should be noted that in other directions in the defense zone of the troops of the Central Front, the enemy did not carry out active offensive operations.

Having repelled enemy attacks, the troops of the Central Front began to prepare for offensive actions.

On the southern front of the Kursk salient, in the Voronezh Front, the struggle was also extremely intense. As early as July 4, the forward detachments of the 4th German Tank Army tried to shoot down the military outpost of the 6th Guards Army of the general. By the end of the day they managed to reach the front line of the army's defense at several points. On July 5, the main forces began to operate in two directions - towards Oboyan and Korocha. The main blow fell on the 6th Guards Army, and the auxiliary blow fell on the 7th Guards Army from the Belgorod area to Korocha.

Memorial "The beginning of the Battle of Kursk on the southern ledge." Belgorod region

The German command sought to build on the success achieved by continuing to increase its efforts along the Belgorod-Oboyan highway. By the end of July 9, the 2nd SS Panzer Corps not only broke through to the army (third) defense line of the 6th Guards Army, but also managed to wedge into it approximately 9 km southwest of Prokhorovka. However, he failed to break into operational space.

On July 10, Hitler ordered the commander of Army Group South to achieve a decisive turning point in the battle. Convinced of the complete impossibility of breaking the resistance of the troops of the Voronezh Front in the Oboyan direction, Field Marshal E. Manstein decided to change the direction of the main attack and now attack Kursk in a roundabout way - through Prokhorovka. At the same time, an auxiliary strike force attacked Prokhorovka from the south. The 2nd SS Panzer Corps, which included selected divisions “Reich”, “Totenkopf”, “Adolf Hitler”, as well as units of the 3rd Panzer Corps, were brought to the Prokhorovsk direction.

Having discovered the enemy’s maneuver, the front commander, General N.F. Vatutin advanced the 69th Army in this direction, and then the 35th Guards Rifle Corps. In addition, the Supreme Command Headquarters decided to strengthen the Voronezh Front at the expense of strategic reserves. On July 9, she ordered the commander of the troops of the Steppe Front, the general, to advance the 4th Guards, 27th and 53rd armies to the Kursk-Belgorod direction and transfer the subordination of General N.F. Vatutin 5th Guards and 5th Guards Tank Army. The troops of the Voronezh Front were supposed to disrupt the enemy’s offensive by delivering a powerful counterattack (five armies) against his group, which had wedged itself in the Oboyan direction. However, on July 11 it was not possible to launch a counterattack. On this day, the enemy captured the line planned for the deployment of tank formations. Only by introducing four rifle divisions and two tank brigades of the 5th Guards Tank Army into the battle did the general manage to stop the enemy two kilometers from Prokhorovka. Thus, oncoming battles of forward detachments and units in the Prokhorovka area began already on July 11.

Tankers, in cooperation with infantry, counterattack the enemy. Voronezh Front. 1943

On July 12, both opposing groups went on the offensive, striking in the Prokhorovsk direction on both sides of the Belgorod-Kursk railway. A fierce battle ensued. The main events took place southwest of Prokhorovka. From the north-west, Yakovlevo was attacked by formations of the 6th Guards and 1st Tank armies. And from the northeast, from the Prokhorovka area, the 5th Guards Tank Army with attached two tank corps and the 33rd Guards Rifle Corps of the 5th Guards Combined Arms Army attacked in the same direction. East of Belgorod, the attack was launched by rifle formations of the 7th Guards Army. After a 15-minute artillery raid, the 18th and 29th Tank Corps of the 5th Guards Tank Army and the 2nd and 2nd Guards Tank Corps attached to it on the morning of July 12 went on the offensive in the general direction of Yakovlevo.

Even earlier, at dawn, on the river. Psel, in the defense zone of the 5th Guards Army, the Totenkopf tank division launched an offensive. However, the divisions of the SS Panzer Corps "Adolf Hitler" and "Reich", which were directly opposed to the 5th Guards Tank Army, remained on the occupied lines, having prepared them for defense overnight. In a rather narrow area from Berezovka (30 km northwest of Belgorod) to Olkhovatka, a battle between two tank strike groups took place. The battle lasted all day. Both sides suffered heavy losses. The fight was extremely fierce. Losses Soviet tanks hulls accounted for 73% and 46%, respectively.

As a result of a fierce battle in the Prokhorovka area, neither side was able to solve the tasks assigned to it: the Germans - to break through to the Kursk area, and the 5th Guards Tank Army - to reach the Yakovlevo area, defeating the opposing enemy. But the enemy’s path to Kursk was closed. The motorized SS divisions “Adolf Hitler”, “Reich” and “Totenkopf” stopped attacks and consolidated their positions. On that day, the 3rd German Tank Corps, advancing on Prokhorovka from the south, was able to push back the formations of the 69th Army by 10-15 km. Both sides suffered heavy losses.

The collapse of hopes.
German soldier on the Prokhorovsky field

Despite the fact that the counterattack of the Voronezh Front slowed down the enemy’s advance, it did not achieve the goals set by the Supreme Command Headquarters.

In fierce battles on July 12 and 13, the enemy strike force was stopped. However, the German command did not abandon its intention to break through to Kursk bypassing Oboyan from the east. In turn, the troops participating in the counterattack of the Voronezh Front did everything to fulfill the tasks assigned to them. The confrontation between the two groups - the advancing German and the counterattacking Soviet - continued until July 16, mainly on the lines they occupied. During these 5-6 days (after July 12), there were continuous battles with enemy tanks and infantry. Attacks and counterattacks followed each other day and night.

On the Belgorod-Kharkov direction. Broken enemy equipment after a Soviet air raid

On July 16, the 5th Guards Army and its neighbors received orders from the commander of the Voronezh Front to switch to a tough defense. The next day, the German command began to withdraw its troops to their original positions.

One of the reasons for the failure was that the most powerful group of Soviet troops struck the most powerful group of the enemy, but not in the flank, but in the forehead. The Soviet command did not use the advantageous configuration of the front, which made it possible to strike at the base of the enemy wedge in order to encircle and subsequently destroy the entire group of German troops operating north of Yakovlevo. In addition, Soviet commanders and staffs, the troops as a whole, did not yet properly master combat skills, and military leaders did not properly master the art of attack. There were also omissions in the interaction of infantry with tanks, ground troops with aviation, and between formations and units.

On the Prokhorovsky field, the number of tanks fought against their quality. The 5th Guards Tank Army had 501 T-34 tanks with a 76-mm cannon, 264 T-70 light tanks with a 45-mm cannon, and 35 heavy Churchill III tanks with a 57-mm cannon, received by the USSR from England. This tank had very low speed and poor maneuverability. Each corps had a regiment of SU-76 self-propelled artillery units, but not a single SU-152. The Soviet medium tank had the ability to penetrate 61 mm thick armor at a distance of 1000 m with an armor-piercing shell and 69 mm at a distance of 500 m. The armor of the tank was: frontal - 45 mm, side - 45 mm, turret - 52 mm. The German medium tank T-IVH had armor thickness: frontal - 80 mm, side - 30 mm, turret - 50 mm. The armor-piercing shell of its 75-mm cannon at a range of up to 1500 m penetrated armor of more than 63 mm. The German heavy tank T-VIH "tiger" with an 88-mm cannon had armor: frontal - 100 mm, side - 80 mm, turret - 100 mm. Its armor-piercing projectile penetrated 115 mm thick armor. It penetrated the armor of the thirty-four at a range of up to 2000 m.

A company of American M3s General Lee tanks, supplied to the USSR under Lend-Lease, advances to the front line of defense of the Soviet 6th Guards Army. July 1943

The 2nd SS Panzer Corps, which opposed the army, had 400 modern tanks: about 50 heavy Tiger tanks (88 mm gun), dozens of high-speed (34 km/h) medium Panther tanks, modernized T-III and T-IV ( 75-mm cannon) and Ferdinand heavy assault guns (88-mm cannon). To hit a heavy tank, the T-34 had to get within 500 m of it, which was not always possible; the rest of the Soviet tanks had to come even closer. In addition, the Germans placed some of their tanks in caponiers, which ensured their invulnerability from the side. It was possible to fight with any hope of success in such conditions only in close combat. As a result, losses mounted. At Prokhorovka, Soviet troops lost 60% of their tanks (500 out of 800), and German troops lost 75% (300 out of 400; according to German data, 80-100). For them it was a disaster. For the Wehrmacht, such losses turned out to be difficult to replace.

The repulsion of the most powerful attack by the troops of Army Group “South” was achieved as a result of the joint efforts of formations and troops of the Voronezh Front with the participation of strategic reserves. Thanks to the courage, perseverance and heroism of soldiers and officers of all branches of the military.

Church of the Holy Apostles Peter and Paul on Prokhorovsky Field

The counteroffensive of the Soviet troops began on July 12 with attacks from the northeast and east of the formations of the left wing of the Western Front and the troops of the Bryansk Front against the German 2nd Tank Army and the 9th Army of Army Group Center defending in the Oryol direction. On July 15, troops of the Central Front launched attacks from the south and southeast on Kromy.

Soviet counteroffensive during the Battle of Kursk

Concentric strikes by the front troops broke through the enemy's deeply layered defenses. Advancing in converging directions towards Orel, Soviet troops liberated the city on August 5. Pursuing the retreating enemy, by August 17-18 they reached the Hagen defensive line, prepared in advance by the enemy on the approaches to Bryansk.

As a result of the Oryol operation, Soviet troops defeated the enemy’s Oryol group (they defeated 15 divisions) and advanced westward up to 150 km.

Residents of the liberated city of Oryol and Soviet soldiers at the entrance to the cinema before the screening of the newsreel documentary film “The Battle of Oryol”. 1943

The troops of the Voronezh (from July 16) and Steppe (from July 19) fronts, pursuing the retreating enemy troops, by July 23 reached the lines occupied before the start of the defensive operation, and on August 3 launched a counteroffensive in the Belgorod-Kharkov direction.

Crossing of the Seversky Donets by soldiers of the 7th Guards Army. Belgorod. July 1943

With a swift blow, their armies defeated the troops of the German 4th Tank Army and Task Force Kempf, and liberated Belgorod on August 5.

Soldiers of the 89th Belgorod-Kharkov Guards Rifle Division
pass along the street of Belgorod. August 5, 1943

The Battle of Kursk was one of biggest battles Second World War. On both sides, more than 4 million people, over 69 thousand guns and mortars, more than 13 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, and up to 12 thousand aircraft were involved in it. Soviet troops defeated 30 divisions (including 7 tanks) of the enemy, whose losses amounted to over 500 thousand people, 3 thousand guns and mortars, more than 1.5 thousand tanks and assault guns, over 3.7 thousand aircraft . The failure of Operation Citadel forever buried the myth created by Nazi propaganda about the “seasonality” of the Soviet strategy, that the Red Army could attack only in winter. Collapse offensive strategy The Wehrmacht once again showed the adventurism of the German leadership, which overestimated the capabilities of its troops and underestimated the strength of the Red Army. The Battle of Kursk led to a further change in the balance of forces at the front in favor of the Soviet Armed Forces, finally secured their strategic initiative and created favorable conditions for the deployment of a general offensive on a broad front. The defeat of the enemy at the “Fire Arc” became an important stage in achieving a radical turning point in the course of the war, the overall victory of the Soviet Union. Germany and its allies were forced to go on the defensive in all theaters of World War II.

Cemetery of German soldiers near Glazunovka station. Oryol region

As a result of the defeat of significant Wehrmacht forces on the Soviet-German front, more favorable conditions were created for the deployment of American-British troops in Italy, the disintegration of the fascist bloc began - the Mussolini regime collapsed, and Italy came out of the war on the side of Germany. Under the influence of the victories of the Red Army, the scale of the resistance movement in the countries occupied by German troops increased, and the authority of the USSR as the leading force of the anti-Hitler coalition strengthened.

In the Battle of Kursk, the level of military art of the Soviet troops increased. In the field of strategy, the Soviet Supreme High Command took a creative approach to planning the summer-autumn campaign of 1943. Feature decision taken was expressed in the fact that the side with strategic initiative and overall superiority in forces went on the defensive, deliberately giving an active role to the enemy in the initial phase of the campaign. Subsequently, within the framework of a single process of conducting a campaign, following the defense, it was planned to transition to a decisive counter-offensive and deploy a general offensive in order to liberate Left Bank Ukraine, Donbass and overcome the Dnieper. The problem of creating an insurmountable defense on an operational-strategic scale was successfully solved. Its activity was ensured by the saturation of the fronts with a large number of mobile troops (3 tank armies, 7 separate tank and 3 separate mechanized corps), artillery corps and artillery divisions of the RVGK, formations and units of anti-tank and anti-aircraft artillery. It was achieved by conducting artillery counter-preparation on the scale of two fronts, wide maneuver of strategic reserves to strengthen them, and launching massive air strikes against enemy groups and reserves. The Supreme High Command headquarters skillfully determined the plan for conducting a counteroffensive in each direction, creatively approaching the choice of directions for the main attacks and methods of defeating the enemy. Thus, in the Oryol operation, Soviet troops used concentric attacks in converging directions, followed by fragmentation and destruction of the enemy group in parts. In the Belgorod-Kharkov operation, the main blow was delivered by adjacent flanks of the fronts, which ensured the rapid breaking of the enemy’s strong and deep defenses, the dissection of his group into two parts and the exit of Soviet troops to the rear of the enemy’s Kharkov defensive region.

In the Battle of Kursk, the problem of creating large strategic reserves and their effective use was successfully resolved, and strategic air supremacy was finally won, which was held by Soviet aviation until the end of the Great Patriotic War. The Supreme High Command headquarters skillfully carried out strategic interaction not only between the fronts participating in the battle, but also with those operating in other directions (troops of the Southwestern and Southern fronts on the Seversky Donets and Mius pp. constrained the actions of German troops on a wide front, which made it difficult for the Wehrmacht command to transfer from here of his troops near Kursk).

The operational art of the Soviet troops in the Battle of Kursk for the first time solved the problem of creating a deliberate positional insurmountable and active operational defense up to 70 km deep. The deep operational formation of the front forces made it possible during a defensive battle to firmly hold the second and army defense lines and front lines, preventing the enemy from breaking through into the operational depth. High activity and greater stability of the defense were given by the wide maneuver of second echelons and reserves, artillery counter-preparation and counter-attacks. During the counter-offensive, the problem of breaking through the enemy's deeply echeloned defense was successfully resolved through the decisive massing of forces and means in the breakthrough areas (from 50 to 90% of their total number), the skillful use of tank armies and corps as mobile groups of fronts and armies, and close cooperation with aviation , which carried out a full front-scale air offensive, which largely ensured the high rate of advance of the ground forces. Valuable experience was gained in conducting tank battles both in a defensive operation (near Prokhorovka) and during the offensive when repelling counterattacks of large enemy armored groups (in the Bogodukhov and Akhtyrka areas). The problem of ensuring sustainable command and control of troops in operations was solved by bringing control points closer to the combat formations of troops and the widespread introduction of radio equipment into all organs and control points.

Memorial complex "Kursk Bulge". Kursk

At the same time, during the Battle of Kursk, there were also significant shortcomings that negatively affected the course of hostilities and increased the losses of Soviet troops, which amounted to: irrevocable - 254,470 people, sanitary - 608,833 people. They were partly due to the fact that by the beginning of the enemy’s offensive, the development of a plan for artillery counterpreparation in the fronts had not been completed, because reconnaissance was unable to accurately identify the locations of troop concentrations and target locations on the night of July 5. Counterpreparations began prematurely, when the enemy troops had not yet completely occupied their starting position for the offensive. In a number of cases, the fire was conducted over areas, which allowed the enemy to avoid heavy losses, bring the troops in order in 2.5-3 hours, go on the offensive and on the first day penetrate the defenses of the Soviet troops by 3-6 km. The counterattacks of the fronts were prepared hastily and were often launched against an enemy who had not exhausted its offensive potential, so they did not reach the final goal and ended with the counterattacking troops going over to the defensive. During the Oryol operation, there was excessive haste in going on the offensive, which was not determined by the situation.

In the Battle of Kursk, Soviet soldiers showed courage, perseverance and mass heroism. Over 100 thousand people were awarded orders and medals, 231 people were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, 132 formations and units received the Guards rank, 26 were awarded the honorary titles of Orel, Belgorod, Kharkov and Karachev.

Material prepared by the Research Institute

(military history) Military Academy
General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation

(Used illustrations from the book Arc of Fire. Battle of Kursk July 5 - August 23, 1943 Moscow and / d Belfry)

The beginning of the combat path of the Ural Volunteer Tank Corps

The defeat of the Nazi army at Stalingrad in the winter of 1942-1943 shook the fascist bloc to its core. For the first time since the beginning of World War II, Hitler's Germany faced the formidable specter of inevitable defeat in all its inevitability. Its military power, the morale of the army and the population were thoroughly undermined, and its prestige in the eyes of its allies was seriously shaken. In order to improve the internal political situation in Germany and prevent the collapse of the fascist coalition, the Nazi command decided in the summer of 1943 to conduct a major offensive operation on the central section of the Soviet-German front. With this offensive, it hoped to defeat the group of Soviet troops located on the Kursk ledge, again seize the strategic initiative and turn the tide of the war in its favor. By the summer of 1943, the situation on the Soviet-German front had already changed in favor of the Soviet Union. By the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, the overall superiority in forces and means was on the side of the Red Army: in people by 1.1 times, in artillery by 1.7 times, in tanks by 1.4 times and in combat aircraft by 2 times.

The Battle of Kursk occupies a special place in the Great Patriotic War. It lasted 50 days and nights, from July 5 to August 23, 1943. This battle has no equal in its ferocity and tenacity of struggle.

Wehrmacht goal: general plan The German command was reduced to encircling and destroying the troops of the Central and Voronezh fronts defending in the Kursk area. If successful, it was planned to expand the offensive front and regain the strategic initiative. To implement his plans, the enemy concentrated powerful strike forces, which numbered over 900 thousand people, about 10 thousand guns and mortars, up to 2,700 tanks and assault guns, and about 2,050 aircraft. Great hopes were placed on the latest Tiger and Panther tanks, Ferdinand assault guns, Focke-Wulf-190-A fighter aircraft and Heinkel-129 attack aircraft.

The goal of the Red Army: the Soviet command decided to first bleed the enemy strike forces in defensive battles, and then go on a counteroffensive.

The battle that began immediately took on a grand scale and was extremely tense. Our troops did not flinch. They faced avalanches of enemy tanks and infantry with unprecedented tenacity and courage. The advance of enemy strike forces was suspended. Only at the cost of huge losses did he manage to wedge into our defenses in some areas. On the Central Front - 10-12 kilometers, on Voronezh - up to 35 kilometers. The largest oncoming tank battle of the entire Second World War near Prokhorovka finally buried Hitler’s Operation Citadel. It happened on July 12. 1,200 tanks and self-propelled guns simultaneously participated in it on both sides. This battle was won by Soviet soldiers. The Nazis, having lost up to 400 tanks during the day of battle, were forced to abandon the offensive.

On July 12, the second stage of the Battle of Kursk began - the counteroffensive of Soviet troops. On August 5, Soviet troops liberated the cities of Orel and Belgorod. On the evening of August 5, in honor of this major success, a victorious salute was given in Moscow for the first time in two years of war. From that time on, artillery salutes constantly announced the glorious victories of Soviet weapons. On August 23, Kharkov was liberated.

Thus ended the Battle of the Kursk Arc of Fire. During it, 30 selected enemy divisions were defeated. Nazi troops lost about 500 thousand people, 1500 tanks, 3 thousand guns and 3700 aircraft. For courage and heroism, over 100 thousand Soviet soldiers who took part in the Battle of the Arc of Fire were awarded orders and medals. The Battle of Kursk ended a radical turning point in the Great Patriotic War in favor of the Red Army.

Losses in the Battle of Kursk.

UDTK on the Kursk Bulge. Oryol offensive operation

The 30th Ural Volunteer Tank Corps, part of the 4th Tank Army, received its baptism of fire in the Battle of Kursk.

T-34 tanks - 202 units, T-70 - 7, BA-64 armored vehicles - 68,

self-propelled 122 mm guns - 16, 85 mm guns - 12,

M-13 installations - 8, 76 mm guns - 24, 45 mm guns - 32,

37 mm guns - 16, 120 mm mortars - 42, 82 mm mortars - 52.

The army, commanded by Lieutenant General of Tank Forces Vasily Mikhailovich Badanov, arrived on the Bryansk Front on the eve of the fighting that began on July 5, 1943, and during the counter-offensive of the Soviet troops it was brought into battle in the Oryol direction. The Ural Volunteer Tank Corps under the command of Lieutenant General Georgy Semenovich Rodin had the task: advancing from the Seredichi area to the south, cut off enemy communications on the Bolkhov-Khotynets line, reach the area of ​​​​the village of Zlyn, and then straddle the Orel-Bryansk railway and highway and cut off the escape route of the Oryol group of Nazis to the west. And the Urals carried out the order.

On July 29, Lieutenant General Rodin assigned the task to the 197th Sverdlovsk and 243rd Molotov tank brigades: to cross the Nugr River in cooperation with the 30th motorized rifle brigade (msbr), capture the village of Borilovo and then advance in the direction settlement Vishnevsky. The village of Borilovo was located on a high bank and dominated the surrounding area, and from the bell tower of the church it was visible for several kilometers in circumference. All this made it easier for the enemy to conduct defense and complicated the actions of the advancing units of the corps. At 20:00 on July 29, after a 30-minute artillery barrage and a volley of guards mortars, two tank motorized rifle brigades began crossing the Nugr River. Under the cover of tank fire, the company of Senior Lieutenant A.P. Nikolaev, as on the Ors River, was the first to cross the Nugr River, capturing the southern outskirts of the village of Borilovo. By the morning of July 30, the battalion of the 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade, with the support of tanks, despite stubborn enemy resistance, captured the village of Borilovo. All units of the Sverdlovsk brigade of the 30th UDTK were concentrated here. By order of the corps commander, at 10:30 the brigade began an offensive in the direction of height 212.2. The assault was difficult. It was completed by the 244th Chelyabinsk Tank Brigade, which was previously in the reserve of the 4th Army, brought into battle.

Hero of the Soviet Union Alexander Petrovich Nikolaev, company commander of a motorized rifle battalion of the 197th Guards Sverdlovsk Tank Brigade. From personal archiveON THE.Kirillova.

On July 31, in liberated Borilov, the heroically killed tank crews and machine gunners were buried, including tank battalion commanders: Major Chazov and Captain Ivanov. The massive heroism of the corps soldiers shown in the battles from July 27 to 29 was highly appreciated. In the Sverdlovsk brigade alone, 55 soldiers, sergeants and officers were awarded government awards for these battles. In the battle for Borilovo, Sverdlovsk medical instructor Anna Alekseevna Kvanskova accomplished a feat. She rescued the wounded and, replacing incapacitated artillerymen, brought shells to firing positions. A. A. Kvanskova was awarded the Order of the Red Star, and was subsequently awarded the Order of Glory III and II degrees for her heroism.

Guard Sergeant Anna Alekseevna Kvanskova assists the lieutenantA.A.Lysin, 1944.

Photo by M. Insarov, 1944. CDOOSO. F.221. OP.3.D.1672

The exceptional courage of the Ural warriors, their willingness to carry out a combat mission without sparing their lives, aroused admiration. But mixed with it was the pain of the losses suffered. It seemed that they were too large compared to the results achieved.

A column of German prisoners of war captured in battles in the Oryol direction, USSR, 1943.

Damaged German equipment during the battles on the Kursk Bulge, USSR, 1943.

July '43... These hot days and nights of war are an integral part of the history of the Soviet Army with the Nazi invaders. The front, in its configuration in the area near Kursk, resembled a giant arc. This segment attracted the attention of the fascist command. The German command prepared the offensive operation as revenge. The Nazis spent a lot of time and effort developing the plan.

Hitler's operational order began with the words: “I have decided, as soon as weather conditions permit, to carry out the Citadel offensive - the first offensive of this year... It must end with quick and decisive success.” Everything was gathered by the Nazis into a powerful fist. The fast-moving tanks “Tigers” and “Panthers” and super-heavy self-propelled guns “Ferdinands”, according to the Nazis’ plan, were supposed to crush and scatter the Soviet troops, and turn the tide of events.

Operation Citadel

The Battle of Kursk began on the night of July 5, when a captured German sapper said during interrogation that the German Operation Citadel would begin at three in the morning. There were only a few minutes left before the decisive battle... The Military Council of the front had to make a very important decision, and it was made. On July 5, 1943, at two hours and twenty minutes, the silence exploded with the thunder of our guns... The battle that began lasted until August 23.

As a result, events on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War resulted in the defeat of Hitler's groups. The strategy of Operation Citadel of the Wehrmacht on the Kursk bridgehead is crushing blows using surprise against the forces of the Soviet Army, encircling and destroying them. The triumph of the Citadel plan was supposed to ensure the implementation of further plans of the Wehrmacht. To thwart the plans of the Nazis, the General Staff developed a strategy aimed at defending the battle and creating conditions for the liberation actions of the Soviet troops.

Progress of the Battle of Kursk

The actions of the Army Group "Center" and the Task Force "Kempf" of the Armies "South", which came from Orel and Belgorod in the battle on the Central Russian Upland, were to decide not only the fate of these cities, but also change the entire subsequent course of the war. Reflecting the attack from Orel was entrusted to the formations of the Central Front. Units of the Voronezh Front were supposed to meet the advancing detachments from Belgorod.

The steppe front, consisting of rifle, tank, mechanized and cavalry corps, was entrusted with a bridgehead in the rear of the Kursk bend. On July 12, 1943, on the Russian field near the Prokhorovka railway station, the greatest end-to-end tank battle took place, noted by historians as unprecedented in the world, the largest end-to-end tank battle in terms of scale. Russian power on its own soil passed another test and turned the course of history towards victory.

One day of battle cost the Wehrmacht 400 tanks and almost 10 thousand human losses. Hitler's groups were forced to go on the defensive. The battle on the Prokhorovsky field was continued by units of the Bryansk, Central and Western fronts, starting Operation Kutuzov, the task of which was to defeat enemy groups in the Orel area. From July 16 to 18, the corps of the Central and Steppe Fronts eliminated Nazi groups in the Kursk Triangle and began pursuing it with the support of air force. With their combined forces, Hitler's formations were thrown back 150 km to the west. The cities of Orel, Belgorod and Kharkov were liberated.

The meaning of the Battle of Kursk

• Of unprecedented force, the most powerful tank battle in history, was key in the development of further offensive actions in the Great Patriotic War;
• Battle of Kursk the main part of the strategic tasks of the General Staff of the Red Army in the plans of the 1943 campaign;
• As a result of the implementation of the “Kutuzov” plan and the “Commander Rumyantsev” operation, units of Hitler’s troops in the area of ​​​​the cities of Orel, Belgorod and Kharkov were defeated. The strategic Oryol and Belgorod-Kharkov bridgeheads have been liquidated;
• The end of the battle meant the complete transfer of strategic initiatives into the hands of the Soviet Army, which continued to advance to the West, liberating cities and towns.

Results of the Battle of Kursk

• The failure of the Wehrmacht's Operation Citadel presented to the world community the impotence and complete defeat of Hitler's campaign against the Soviet Union;
• A radical change in the situation on the Soviet-German front and throughout as a result of the “fiery” Battle of Kursk;
• The psychological breakdown of the German army was obvious; there was no longer confidence in the superiority of the Aryan race.

70 years ago the Great Battle of Kursk began. The Battle of Kursk is one of the most important battles of the Second World War in terms of its scope, the forces and means involved, the intensity, the results and the military-strategic consequences. The Great Battle of Kursk lasted 50 incredibly difficult days and nights (July 5 - August 23, 1943). In Soviet and Russian historiography, it is customary to divide this battle into two stages and three operations: the defensive stage - the Kursk defensive operation (July 5 - 12); offensive - Oryol (July 12 - August 18) and Belgorod-Kharkov (August 3 - 23) offensive operations. The Germans called the offensive part of their operation “Citadel”. About 2.2 million people, approximately 7.7 thousand tanks, self-propelled guns and assault guns, over 29 thousand guns and mortars (with a reserve of more than 35 thousand), more than 4 thousand combat aircraft.

During the winter of 1942-1943. the offensive of the Red Army and the forced withdrawal of Soviet troops during the Kharkov defensive operation of 1943, the so-called Kursk ledge. The "Kursk Bulge", a protrusion facing west, was up to 200 km wide and up to 150 km deep. Throughout April - June 1943, there was an operational pause on the Eastern Front, during which the Soviet and German armed forces were intensively preparing for the summer campaign, which was to be decisive in this war.

The forces of the Central and Voronezh fronts were located on the Kursk ledge, threatening the flanks and rear German groups armies "Center" and "South". In turn, the German command, having created powerful strike groups on the Oryol and Belgorod-Kharkov bridgeheads, could deliver strong flank attacks on the Soviet troops defending in the Kursk area, encircle them and destroy them.

Plans and strengths of the parties

Germany. In the spring of 1943, when the enemy forces were exhausted and the mud had set in, negating the possibility of a rapid offensive, the time had come to prepare plans for the summer campaign. Despite the defeat in the Battle of Stalingrad and the Battle of the Caucasus, the Wehrmacht retained its offensive power and was a very dangerous opponent who thirsted for revenge. Moreover, the German command carried out a number of mobilization measures and by the beginning of the summer campaign of 1943, compared with the number of troops at the beginning of the summer campaign of 1942, the number of the Wehrmacht had increased. On the Eastern Front, excluding the SS and Air Force troops, there were 3.1 million people, almost the same as there were in the Wehrmacht at the start of the campaign to the East on June 22, 1941 - 3.2 million people. In terms of the number of formations, the Wehrmacht of the 1943 model was superior to the German armed forces of the 1941 period.

For the German command, unlike the Soviet one, a wait-and-see strategy and pure defense were unacceptable. Moscow could afford to wait with serious offensive operations; time was on its side - the power of the armed forces was growing, full force Enterprises evacuated to the east began to operate (they even increased production compared to the pre-war level), and partisan warfare in the German rear expanded. The likelihood of Allied armies landing in Western Europe, opening of a second front. In addition, it was not possible to create a strong defense on the Eastern Front, stretching from the Arctic Ocean to the Black Sea. In particular, Army Group South was forced to defend with 32 divisions a front stretching up to 760 km - from Taganrog on the Black Sea to the Sumy region. The balance of forces allowed the Soviet troops, if the enemy limited himself only to defense, to conduct offensive operations in various sectors of the Eastern Front, concentrating the maximum number of forces and means, pulling up reserves. The German army could not stick to defense alone; this was the path to defeat. Only a war of maneuver, with breakthroughs in the front line, with access to the flanks and rear of the Soviet armies, made it possible to hope for a strategic turning point in the war. Major success on the Eastern Front allowed us to hope, if not for victory in the war, then for a satisfactory political solution.

On March 13, 1943, Adolf Hitler signed Operational Order No. 5, where he set the task of preventing the advance of the Soviet army and “imposing his will on at least one sector of the front.” In other sectors of the front, the task of the troops is reduced to bleeding the advancing enemy forces on defensive lines created in advance. Thus, the Wehrmacht strategy was chosen back in March 1943. All that remained was to determine where to strike. The Kursk ledge emerged at the same time, in March 1943, during the German counteroffensive. Therefore, Hitler, in order No. 5, demanded the delivery of converging attacks on the Kursk ledge, wanting to destroy the Soviet troops located on it. However, in March 1943, German troops in this direction were significantly weakened by previous battles, and the plan to attack the Kursk salient had to be postponed indefinitely.

On April 15, Hitler signed Operation Order No. 6. Operation Citadel was planned to begin as soon as weather conditions permitted. Army Group “South” was supposed to strike from the Tomarovka-Belgorod line, break through the Soviet front at the Prilepy-Oboyan line, and connect at Kursk and east of it with formations of the Army Group “Center”. Army Group Center launched a strike from the Trosna line, an area south of Maloarkhangelsk. Its troops were supposed to break through the front in the Fatezh-Veretenovo sector, concentrating the main efforts on the eastern flank. And connect with Army Group South in the Kursk region and east of it. The troops between the shock groups, on the western front of the Kursk ledge - the forces of the 2nd Army, were supposed to organize local attacks and, when the Soviet troops retreated, immediately go on the offensive with all their forces. The plan was quite simple and obvious. They wanted to cut off the Kursk ledge with converging attacks from the north and south - on the 4th day it was planned to encircle and then destroy the Soviet troops located on it (Voronezh and Central Fronts). This made it possible to create a wide gap in the Soviet front and seize the strategic initiative. In the Orel area, the main striking force was represented by the 9th Army, in the Belgorod area - by the 4th Tank Army and the Kempf operational group. Operation Citadel was to be followed by Operation Panther - a strike to the rear of the South-Western Front, an offensive in the north-east direction in order to reach the deep rear of the central group of the Red Army and create a threat to Moscow.

The start of the operation was scheduled for mid-May 1943. The commander of Army Group South, Field Marshal Erich von Manstein, believed that it was necessary to strike as early as possible, forestalling the Soviet offensive in the Donbass. He was also supported by the commander of Army Group Center, Field Marshal Günter Hans von Kluge. But not all German commanders shared his point of view. Walter Model, commander of the 9th Army, had enormous authority in the eyes of the Fuhrer and on May 3 prepared a report in which he expressed doubts about the possibility of the successful implementation of Operation Citadel if it began in mid-May. The basis of his skepticism was intelligence data about the defensive potential of the Central Front opposing the 9th Army. The Soviet command prepared a deeply echeloned and well-organized line of defense and strengthened its artillery and anti-tank potential. And the mechanized units were withdrawn from forward positions, taking them out of a possible enemy attack.

A discussion of this report took place on May 3-4 in Munich. According to Model, the Central Front under the command of Konstantin Rokossovsky had an almost double superiority in the number of combat units and equipment over the 9th German Army. Model's 15 infantry divisions had half the regular infantry strength; in some divisions, 3 of the 9 regular infantry battalions were disbanded. Artillery batteries had three guns instead of four, and some batteries had 1-2 guns. By May 16, the divisions of the 9th Army had an average “combat strength” (the number of soldiers directly participating in the battle) of 3.3 thousand people. For comparison, the 8 infantry divisions of the 4th Panzer Army and the Kempf group had a “combat strength” of 6.3 thousand people. And infantry was needed to break into the defensive lines of the Soviet troops. In addition, the 9th Army experienced serious problems with transport. Army Group South, after the Stalingrad disaster, received formations that were reorganized in the rear in 1942. Model had mainly infantry divisions that had been at the front since 1941 and were in urgent need of replenishment.

Model's report made a strong impression on A. Hitler. Other military leaders were unable to put forward serious arguments against the calculations of the commander of the 9th Army. As a result, they decided to delay the start of the operation by a month. This decision of Hitler would then become one of the most criticized German generals who blamed their mistakes on the Supreme Commander-in-Chief.

It must be said that although this delay led to an increase in the striking power of the German troops, the Soviet armies were also seriously strengthened. The balance of forces between Model's army and Rokossovsky's front from May to early July did not improve, and even worsened for the Germans. In April 1943, the Central Front numbered 538.4 thousand people, 920 tanks, 7.8 thousand guns and 660 aircraft; at the beginning of July - 711.5 thousand people, 1,785 tanks and self-propelled guns, 12.4 thousand guns and 1,050 aircraft. Model's 9th Army in mid-May had 324.9 thousand people, about 800 tanks and assault guns, 3 thousand guns. At the beginning of July, the 9th Army reached 335 thousand people, 1014 tanks, 3368 guns. In addition, it was in May that the Voronezh Front began to receive anti-tank mines, which would become a real scourge of German armored vehicles in the Battle of Kursk. The Soviet economy worked more efficiently, replenishing troops with equipment faster than German industry.

The plan for the offensive of the 9th Army troops from the Oryol direction was somewhat different from the typical method for the German school - Model was going to break through the enemy’s defenses with infantry, and then introduce tank units into battle. The infantry would attack with the support of heavy tanks, assault guns, aircraft and artillery. Of the 8 mobile formations that the 9th Army had, only one was immediately brought into battle - the 20th Tank Division. The 47th Panzer Corps, under the command of Joachim Lemelsen, was to advance in the main attack zone of the 9th Army. His offensive line lay between the villages of Gnilets and Butyrki. Here, according to German intelligence, there was a junction between two Soviet armies - the 13th and 70th. The 6th Infantry and 20th Tank Divisions advanced in the first echelon of the 47th Corps and struck on the first day. The second echelon housed the more powerful 2nd and 9th tank divisions. They should have been brought into the breakthrough after the Soviet defense line had been breached. In the direction of Ponyri, on the left flank of the 47th Corps, the 41st Tank Corps was advancing under the command of General Joseph Harpe. The first echelon included the 86th and 292nd infantry divisions, and the 18th tank division in reserve. To the left of the 41st Panzer Corps was the 23rd Army Corps under the command of General Friesner. He was supposed to deliver a diversionary strike with the forces of the 78th assault and 216th infantry divisions on Maloarkhangelsk. On the right flank of the 47th Corps, the 46th Panzer Corps of General Hans Zorn was advancing. In its first strike echelon there were only infantry formations - the 7th, 31st, 102nd and 258th infantry divisions. Three more mobile formations - the 10th motorized (tankgrenadier), 4th and 12th tank divisions were in the reserve of the army group. Von Kluge was supposed to give them to Model after the breakthrough strike forces to operational space behind the defensive lines of the Central Front. There is an opinion that Model initially did not want to attack, but was waiting for the Red Army to attack, and even prepared additional defensive lines in the rear. And he tried to keep the most valuable mobile formations in the second echelon so that, if necessary, they could be transferred to an area that would collapse under the blows of Soviet troops.

The command of Army Group South was not limited to the attack on Kursk by the forces of the 4th Panzer Army of Colonel General Hermann Hoth (52nd Army Corps, 48th Panzer Corps and 2nd SS Panzer Corps). Task Force Kempf, under the command of Werner Kempf, was to advance in the north-east direction. The group stood facing east along the Seversky Donets River. Manstein believed that as soon as the battle began, the Soviet command would throw into battle strong reserves located east and northeast of Kharkov. Therefore, the attack of the 4th Tank Army on Kursk should have been secured with east direction from suitable Soviet tank and mechanized formations. Army Group "Kempf" was supposed to hold the line of defense on the Donets with one 42nd Army Corps (39th, 161st and 282nd Infantry Divisions) of General Franz Mattenklot. Its 3rd Panzer Corps under the command of Panzer General Hermann Breit (6th, 7th, 19th Panzer and 168th Infantry Divisions) and the 11th Army Corps of Panzer General Erhard Routh, before the start of the operation and until July 20, it was called the Reserve of the Main Special Purpose Command of Routh (106th, 198th and 320th Infantry Divisions), and were supposed to actively support the offensive of the 4th Tank Army. It was planned to subordinate another tank corps, which was in the reserve of the army group, to the Kempff group after it had captured a sufficient area and ensured freedom of action in the north-east direction.

The command of Army Group South did not limit itself to this innovation. According to the recollections of the chief of staff of the 4th Panzer Army, General Friedrich Fangor, at a meeting with Manstein on May 10-11, the offensive plan was adjusted at the suggestion of General Hoth. According to intelligence data, a change in the location of Soviet tank and mechanized troops was observed. The Soviet tank reserve could quickly enter the battle by moving into the corridor between the Donets and Psel rivers in the Prokhorovka area. There was a danger of a strong blow to the right flank of the 4th Tank Army. This situation could lead to disaster. Hoth believed that it was necessary to introduce the most powerful formation that he had into the oncoming battle with the Russian tank forces. Therefore, the 2nd SS Panzer Corps of Paul Hausser, consisting of the 1st SS Panzergrenadier Division "Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler", the 2nd SS Panzergrenadier Division "Reich" and the 3rd SS Panzergrenadier Division "Totenkopf" (" Death's Head") should no longer advance directly north along the Psel River, but should turn northeast to the Prokhorovka area to destroy Soviet tank reserves.

The experience of the war with the Red Army convinced the German command that there would definitely be strong counterattacks. Therefore, the command of Army Group South tried to minimize their consequences. Both decisions - the attack of the Kempff group and the turn of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps to Prokhorovka had a significant impact on the development of the Battle of Kursk and the actions of the Soviet 5th Guards Tank Army. At the same time, the division of the forces of Army Group South into the main and auxiliary attacks in the northeast direction deprived Manstein of serious reserves. Theoretically, Manstein had a reserve - Walter Nehring's 24th Panzer Corps. But it was an army group reserve in case of an offensive by Soviet troops in the Donbass and was located quite far from the point of attack on the southern front of the Kursk bulge. As a result, it was used for the defense of Donbass. He did not have serious reserves that Manstein could immediately bring into battle.

To carry out the offensive operation, the best generals and the most combat-ready units of the Wehrmacht were recruited, a total of 50 divisions (including 16 tank and motorized) and a significant number of individual formations. In particular, shortly before the operation, the 39th Tank Regiment (200 Panthers) and the 503rd Heavy Tank Battalion (45 Tigers) arrived in Army Group South. From the air, the strike forces were supported by the 4th Air Fleet under Field Marshal Wolfram von Richthofen and the 6th Air Fleet under Colonel General Robert Ritter von Greim. In total, over 900 thousand soldiers and officers, about 10 thousand guns and mortars, more than 2,700 tanks and assault guns (including 148 new T-VI Tiger heavy tanks, 200 T-V Panther tanks) took part in Operation Citadel and 90 Ferdinand assault guns), about 2050 aircraft.

The German command had high hopes for the use of new models military equipment. Waiting for arrival new technology became one of the reasons why the offensive was postponed to a later time. It was assumed that heavily armored tanks (Soviet researchers considered the Panther, which the Germans considered a medium tank, classified as heavy) and self-propelled guns would become a ram for Soviet defense. The medium and heavy tanks T-IV, T-V, T-VI and Ferdinand assault guns that entered service with the Wehrmacht combined good armor protection and strong artillery weapons. Their 75-mm and 88-mm cannons with a direct shot range of 1.5-2.5 km were approximately 2.5 times greater than the range of the 76.2-mm cannon of the main Soviet medium tank T-34. At the same time, due to the high initial velocity of the projectiles, German designers achieved high armor penetration. To combat Soviet tanks, armored self-propelled howitzers, the 105 mm Wespe (German Wespe - “wasp”) and 150 mm Hummel (German “bumblebee”), which were part of the artillery regiments of the tank divisions, were also used. German combat vehicles had excellent Zeiss optics. New Focke-Wulf-190 fighters and Henkel-129 attack aircraft entered service with the German Air Force. They were supposed to gain air superiority and provide assault support to the advancing troops.

The German command tried to keep the operation secret and achieve surprise in the attack. To do this, they tried to misinform the Soviet leadership. We carried out intensive preparations for Operation Panther in the zone of Army Group South. They carried out demonstrative reconnaissance, transferred tanks, concentrated transportation means, conducted active radio conversations, activated their agents, spread rumors, etc. In the offensive zone of Army Group Center, on the contrary, they tried to disguise all actions as much as possible, to hide from the enemy. The measures were carried out with German thoroughness and methodicality, but they did not give the desired results. The Soviet command was well informed about the upcoming enemy offensive.

In order to protect their rear from the attack of partisan formations, in May-June 1943, the German command organized and carried out several large punitive operations against Soviet partisans. In particular, 10 divisions were deployed against approximately 20 thousand Bryansk partisans, and 40 thousand were sent against the partisans in the Zhitomir region. grouping. However, the plan could not be fully realized; the partisans retained the ability to inflict strong blows on the invaders.

To be continued…

The Battle of Kursk is one of the largest and most important battles of the Great Patriotic War, which took place from July 5 to August 23, 1943.
The German command gave a different name to this battle - Operation Citadel, which, according to Wehrmacht plans, was supposed to counterattack the Soviet offensive.

Causes of the Battle of Kursk

Strengths of the parties

USSR
To slow down and complicate the enemy's advance, Soviet army installed approximately one and a half thousand mines on every kilometer of the front. The number of infantrymen in the Soviet Army reached more than 1 million soldiers. And the Soviet Army had 3-4 thousand tanks, which also exceeded the number of German ones. However, a large number of Soviet tanks are outdated models and are not rivals to the same “Tigers” of the Wehrmacht.
The Red Army had twice as many guns and mortars. If the Wehrmacht has 10 thousand of them, then the Soviet Army has more than twenty. There were also more planes, but historians cannot give exact figures.

Progress of the battle

Aftermath of the battle