Crimea in 1944. Stalin's third blow. Battle for Crimea

Exactly 70 years ago, on March 16, 1944, the headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief ordered the start of the operation to liberate Crimea. The Crimean operation itself was carried out from April 8 to May 12, 1944 by the forces of the 4th Ukrainian Front and the Separate Primorsky Army in cooperation with the Black Sea Fleet and the Azov Military Flotilla.

On May 5-7, 1944, troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front (commander - Army General F.I. Tolbukhin) stormed German defensive fortifications in heavy battles; On May 9, they completely liberated Sevastopol, and on May 12, the remnants of the enemy troops at Cape Chersonesos folded.

I dedicate this photo collection to this significant event, friends.

1. The facade of the Sevastopol Palace of Pioneers damaged by shells after the liberation of the city. May 1944

2. German minesweeper in the bay of Sevastopol. 1944

3. German attack aircraft Fw.190, destroyed by Soviet aviation at the Kherson airfield. 1944

4. Meeting of Soviet partisans and boat sailors in liberated Yalta. 1944

5. The commander of the 7th Romanian Mountain Corps, General Hugo Schwab (second from left), and the commander of the XXXXIX Wehrmacht Mountain Corps, General Rudolf Conrad (first from left), at the 37-mm RaK 35/36 cannon in Crimea. 02/27/1944

6. Meeting of Soviet partisans in liberated Yalta. 1944

7. The Soviet light cruiser "Red Crimea" enters Sevastopol Bay. 05.11.1944

8. The commander of the 7th Romanian Mountain Corps, General Hugo Schwab (second from left), and the commander of the XXXXIX Wehrmacht Mountain Corps, General Rudolf Conrad (center right) pass by a mortar crew during a review in the Crimea. 02/27/1944

9. The Black Sea squadron returns to liberated Sevastopol. In the foreground is the guards light cruiser "Red Crimea", behind it the silhouette of the battleship "Sevastopol" is visible. 05.11.1944

10. Soviet soldiers with a flag on the roof of the destroyed Panorama building “Defense of Sevastopol” in liberated Sevastopol. 1944

11. Tanks Pz.Kpfw. 2nd Romanian Tank Regiment in Crimea. 03.11.1943

12. Romanian General Hugo Schwab and German General Rudolf Conrad in Crimea. 02/27/1944

13. Romanian artillerymen fire from an anti-tank gun during a battle in Crimea. 03/27/1944

14. The commander of the XXXXIX Mountain Corps of the Wehrmacht, General Rudolf Conrad, with Romanian officers at an observation post in Crimea. 02/27/1944

15. Pilots of the 3rd squadron of the 6th Guards Fighter Aviation Regiment of the Black Sea Fleet Air Force study a map of the combat area at the airfield near Yak-9D aircraft. In the background is the plane of Guard Lieutenant V.I. Voronov (tail number “31”). Saki airfield, Crimea. April-May 1944

16. Chief of Staff of the 4th Ukrainian Front, Lieutenant General Sergei Semenovich Biryuzov, member State Committee Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union Kliment Efremovich Voroshilov, Chief of the General Staff Marshal of the Soviet Union Alexander Mikhailovich Vasilevsky at the command post of the 4th Ukrainian Front. April 1944

17. Representative of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, Marshal of the Soviet Union S.K. Tymoshenko with the command of the North Caucasus Front and the 18th Army is considering the plan for the operation to cross the Kerch Strait. From left to right: Marshal of the Soviet Union S.K. Timoshenko, Colonel General K.N. Leselidze, Army General I.E. Petrov. 1943

18. The Black Sea squadron returns to liberated Sevastopol. In the foreground is the guards light cruiser "Red Crimea", behind it the silhouette of the battleship "Sevastopol" is visible. 05.11.1944

19. Soviet boat SKA-031 with a destroyed stern, abandoned at low tide in Krotkovo, awaiting repairs. A boat from the 1st Novorossiysk Red Banner Sea Hunter Division of the Black Sea Fleet. 1944

20. Armored boat of the Azov military flotilla in the Kerch Strait. Kerch-Eltingen landing operation. December 1943

21. Soviet troops transport military equipment and horses through Sivash. In the foreground is a 45 mm anti-tank gun. December 1943

22. Soviet soldiers transport a 122-mm M-30 model 1938 howitzer on a pontoon across the Sivash Bay (Rotten Sea). November 1943

23. T-34 tanks on the street of liberated Sevastopol. May 1944

24. Marine soldiers at the arch of Primorsky Boulevard in liberated Sevastopol. May 1944

25. The Black Sea squadron returns to liberated Sevastopol. In the foreground is the guards light cruiser "Red Crimea", behind it the silhouette of the battleship "Sevastopol" is visible. 05.11.1944

26. Partisans who participated in the liberation of Crimea. The village of Simeiz on the southern coast of the Crimean Peninsula. 1944

27. Sapper, Lieutenant Ya.S. Shinkarchuk crossed Sivash thirty-six times and transported 44 guns with shells to the bridgehead. 1943.

28. Architectural monument Grafskaya pier in liberated Sevastopol. 1944

29. Fireworks at the grave of fellow pilots who died near Sevastopol on April 24, 1944. 05/14/1944

30. Armored boats of the Black Sea Fleet are landing Soviet troops on the Crimean coast of the Kerch Strait on the bridgehead near Yenikale during the Kerch-Eltigen landing operation. November 1943

31. The crew of the Pe-2 dive bomber “For the Great Stalin” of the 40th Bomber Aviation Regiment of the Black Sea Fleet after completing a combat mission. Crimea, May 1944. From left to right: crew commander Nikolai Ivanovich Goryachkin, navigator - Yuri Vasilyevich Tsyplenkov, gunner-radio operator - Sergei (nickname Knopka).

32. Self-propelled gun SU-152 of the 1824th heavy self-propelled artillery regiment in Simferopol. 04/13/1944

33. Soviet soldiers cross Sivash in December 1943.

34. A Marine installs the Soviet naval flag in liberated Sevastopol. May 1944

35. T-34 tank on the street of liberated Sevastopol. May 1944

36. Transportation of Soviet equipment during the Kerch-Eltigen landing operation. November 1943

37. Destroyed German equipment on the shore of Cossack Bay in Sevastopol. May 1944

38. German soldiers killed during the liberation of Crimea. 1944

39. Transport with German soldiers evacuated from Crimea docks in the port of Constanta, Romania. 1944

40. Partisans in Yalta. 1944

41. Armored boat. The Crimean coast of the Kerch Strait, most likely a bridgehead near Yenikale. Kerch-Eltigen landing operation. Late 1943

42. Yak-9D fighters over Sevastopol. May 1944

43. Yak-9D fighters over Sevastopol. May 1944

44. Yak-9D fighters, 3rd squadron of the 6th GvIAP of the Black Sea Fleet Air Force. May 1944

45. Liberated Sevastopol. May 1944

46. ​​Yak-9D fighters over Sevastopol.

47. Soviet soldiers pose on a German Messerschmitt Bf.109 fighter abandoned in the Crimea. 1944

48. Soviet soldier breaks Nazi swastika from the gates of the metallurgical plant named after. Voykova in liberated Kerch. April 1944

49. At the location of the Soviet troops - a unit on the march, washing, dugouts. Crimea. 1944

57. Liberated Sevastopol from a bird's eye view. 1944

58. In liberated Sevastopol: an announcement at the entrance to Primorsky Boulevard, left over from the German administration. 1944

59. Sevastopol after liberation from the Nazis. 1944

60. In liberated Sevastopol. May 1944

61. Soldiers of the 2nd Guards Taman Division in liberated Kerch. Soviet troops began crossing the Kerch Strait following the Germans fleeing the Taman Peninsula on October 31, 1943. On April 11, 1944, Kerch was finally liberated as a result of a landing operation. April 1944

62. Soldiers of the 2nd Guards Taman Division in the battles to expand the bridgehead on the Kerch Peninsula, November 1943. With the defeat of German troops on the Taman Peninsula, the path to the Kerch Strait opened, which the guards took advantage of when landing to seize the bridgehead in the Crimea still occupied by the Germans . November 1943

63. Marine landing in the Kerch area. On October 31, 1943, Soviet troops began crossing the Kerch Strait. As a result of the landing operation on April 11, 1944, Kerch was finally liberated. The severity and fierceness of the battles during the defense and liberation of Kerch is evidenced by the fact that for these battles 146 people were awarded the high title of Hero of the Soviet Union, and 21 military unit and the formation were awarded the honorary title “Kerch”. November 1943

On May 9, 1944, 70 years ago, after a general assault, Sevastopol was liberated. By May 12, the remnants of the German 17th Army, who fled to Cape Chersonesus, were completely defeated. "Third Stalin's blow» - Crimean offensive, led to the complete liberation of the Crimean Peninsula from the Nazis. Having recaptured Crimea and Sevastopol, the Soviet Union regained control of the Black Sea.

Soviet soldiers salute in honor of the liberation of Sevastopol

General situation before the start of the operation. Previous operations

1943 The German military-political leadership clung to Crimea until the last opportunity. The Crimean peninsula had enormous military-strategic and political significance. Adolf Hitler demanded to hold Crimea at any cost. Berlin needed the Crimean peninsula not only for operational reasons (a base for the air and sea fleet, a forward outpost of ground forces allowing to stabilize the position of the southern flank of the entire front), but for political ones. The surrender of Crimea could affect the position of Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey, and the general situation on the Balkan Peninsula. The loss of Crimea strengthened the capabilities of the Soviet Air Force and Black Sea Fleet.

On August 13 - September 22, 1943, troops of the Southwestern Front under the command of General F.I. Tolbukhin, during the Donbass offensive operation, reached the line of the Dnieper and Molochnaya rivers. Conditions appeared for the liberation of Northern Tavria and the Crimean Peninsula. From September 9 to October 9, 1943, the Novorossiysk-Taman operation was carried out (). During this operation, Soviet troops liberated Novorossiysk, the Taman Peninsula and reached the coast of the Kerch Strait. Successful completion operations created favorable opportunities for attacks on the Crimean Wehrmacht group from the sea and through the Kerch Strait.

The position of German troops on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front continued to deteriorate further. From September 26 to November 5, 1943, the Southern Front (from October 20, 1943 - the 4th Ukrainian Front) carried out the Melitopol offensive operation. October 24-25, 1943 19th Tank Corps of General I.D. Vasiliev, Guards Kuban Cossack Cavalry Corps of General N.Ya. Kirichenko and rifle units broke through the German defenses. The Red Army was rapidly advancing towards Perekop, Sivash and the lower reaches of the Dnieper. As a result of the Melitopol operation, the Red Army defeated 8 enemy divisions and inflicted heavy damage on 12 divisions. Soviet troops advanced 50-230 km, liberating almost all of Northern Tavria and reaching the lower reaches of the Dnieper. German troops in Crimea were cut off from other troops. By the end of the day on October 31, the advanced units of the 19th Tank Corps and Cavalry Corps approached the Turkish Wall and broke through it on the move. On November 1, Soviet soldiers fought in the Armyansk area. The attack of Soviet tankers and cavalrymen on the Turkish Wall was so sudden that the Nazis did not have time to organize a powerful defense.

The problem of the advanced units was that they did not have enough artillery, ammunition, and besides, the rifle units lagged behind. The German command, realizing that the Turkish Wall had been broken, organized a powerful counterattack. There was a stubborn battle all day. On the night of November 2, the Nazis again occupied the Turkish Wall with an attack from the flanks. The advanced Soviet units were forced to fight surrounded. German attacks followed one after another. Komkor Vasiliev was wounded, but remained in service and continued to lead the troops. As of November 3, units had 6-7 rounds per gun and 20-25 rounds per rifle left. The situation was critical. The front headquarters ordered to leave the encirclement, but if possible, to hold the bridgehead. Commander of the 19th Tank Corps Ivan Vasilyev (by Decree of the Presidium Supreme Council On November 3, 1943, the USSR awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union to Lieutenant General of the Tank Forces Vasiliev) decided to hold the bridgehead and, with a strike from it (from the south), again break through the German positions on the rampart. At night, two small assault detachments (each with 100 soldiers) made up of tankers, dismounted cavalrymen, sappers, signalmen and drivers broke through the German defenses. Thus, they were able to hold a bridgehead south of the Turkish Wall, 3.5 km wide and up to 4 km deep.

At the same time, units of the 10th Rifle Corps of Major General K.P. Neverov crossed Sivash and captured another important bridgehead. The German command, realizing the danger of this breakthrough, sent reinforcements with tanks and artillery into the battle. However, Soviet troops also received reinforcements. The bridgehead was retained and expanded to 18 km along the front and 14 km in depth. Thus, the operation ended with the capture of bridgeheads on Perekop and south of Sivash, which played a vital role during the Crimean operation.

The commander of the 17th Army, General Erwin Gustav Jäneke, fearing a “new Stalingrad”, drew up a plan for the evacuation of German troops from the peninsula through Perekop to Ukraine (“Operation Michael”). The evacuation was planned to take place on October 29, 1943. However, Hitler last moment prohibited this operation. Hitler proceeded from the strategic and military-political importance of the peninsula. He was also supported by the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Grand Admiral K. Doenitz. The German Navy needed Crimea to control a significant part of the Black Sea; the loss of the peninsula sharply worsened the capabilities of the German fleet. The admiral promised that in a critical situation the fleet would evacuate 200 thousand people. 17th Army in 40 days (in bad weather - 80). However, the naval command was mistaken in its forecasts and assessment of the capabilities of the Navy and Soviet troops. When the need arose, the 17th Army could not be quickly evacuated, which became the reason for its destruction.

From October 31 to November 11, 1943, Soviet troops conducted the Kerch-Eltigen landing operation. The Soviet command planned to liberate the Kerch Peninsula. It was not possible to liberate the peninsula, but an important bridgehead was captured and significant enemy forces were attracted to this direction. The German command was forced to transfer troops from the northern (Perekop) direction, where the Nazis planned to launch a strong counterattack on the advancing troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front. The German 17th Army became even more bogged down in the Crimea, now under threat of attacks from two directions. The Romanian leadership, having lost confidence in the Germans, began to evacuate its troops from Crimea.

1944 German forces and defense

The 17th Army of Yeneke (Yeneke) was still a powerful and quite combat-ready group. It consisted of up to 200 thousand soldiers, 215 tanks and assault guns and about 360 thousand guns and mortars, 148 aircraft. The headquarters of the 17th Army was located in Simferopol.

The army received orders from Adolf Hitler to stay on the peninsula. Subsequently, the 17th Army, together with the 6th Army located in the Nikopol area, was to launch a counterattack against the Red Army and restore land connections with the rest of the German troops cut by Soviet troops. The 17th Army was to play an important role in disrupting the Soviet offensive on the southern flank of the Eastern Front. Back in November 1943, plans for “Litzmann” and “Ruderboot” were developed. They provided for the breakthrough of most of the 17th Army from Crimea through Perekop to join the 6th Army holding the Nikopol bridgehead, and the evacuation of a smaller part of the army by naval forces.

However, the actions of the Soviet troops thwarted these plans. Units of the 10th Rifle Corps, which held the bridgehead south of Sivash, improved their tactical position and expanded the bridgehead during several local operations. The troops of the Separate Primorsky Army in the Kerch region also carried out a number of local operations, improving their position and expanding the bridgehead. The 17th Army found itself in an even more difficult situation. As General E. Jenecke noted on January 19, 1944: “... the defense of Crimea hangs on a “silk thread” ....”

The situation of the 17th Army was also aggravated by the actions of the Crimean partisans. On December 20, 1943, the operational and intelligence departments of the 5th Army Corps recognized the futility of fighting partisan detachments, since: “the complete destruction of large gangs in the mountains is possible only with the involvement of very large forces.” The command of the 17th Army also recognized the hopelessness of fighting the partisans. The partisan detachments were supported by an “air bridge” with the USSR. The Germans tried to suppress resistance through terror, including exterminating the population of foothill villages among which the partisans were hiding. However, punitive measures did not produce the expected results. In addition, Crimean Tatars were brought in to fight the partisans, who massively collaborated with the occupiers.

By April 1944, three partisan formations were actively operating in Crimea, with a total number of up to 4 thousand fighters. The most powerful was the Southern partisan unit under the command of I. A. Makedonsky. The southern detachment was located in the reserve of the Southern Coast of Crimea, in the Alushta - Bakhchisarai - Yalta region. The northern formation under the command of P.R. Yampolsky was stationed in the Zuysky forests. The Eastern Union under the leadership of V.S. Kuznetsov was based in the Old Crimean forests. In fact, Soviet partisans controlled the entire mountainous and forested part of the peninsula. Throughout the occupation they strengthened their positions. Even some invaders went over to them. So, a group of deserted Slovaks fought on the side of the partisans.

On January 22-28, the Separate Primorsky Army conducted another local operation. The offensive did not lead to success, but showed the precarious position of the 17th Army. The German command had to transfer reserves from the northern direction, which thwarted the possibility of a counterattack at Perekop. From January 30 to February 29, 1944, troops of the 3rd and 4th Ukrainian Fronts conducted the Nikopol-Krivoy Rog operation (). The Nikopol bridgehead was liquidated, which finally deprived the Germans of hope of restoring land communications with the 17th Army encircled in the Crimea. The 4th Ukrainian Front was given the opportunity to direct all its forces to the liberation of the Crimean Peninsula.

True, in January-February, the 73rd Infantry Division from the 44th Separate Army Corps was airlifted to Crimea from the south of Ukraine, and in March, the 111th Infantry Division from the 6th Army of Army Group “A”. The German high command still wanted to hold Crimea. However, the command of the 17th Army understood that reinforcements were not capable of changing the situation, they would only prolong the agony. Jenecke and his staff repeatedly reported to the high command about the need for a speedy evacuation of the army.

By April, the 17th Army had 12 divisions: 5 German and 7 Romanian, 2 brigades of assault guns. In the Perekop area and against the bridgehead on Sivash, the defense was held by the 49th Mountain Rifle Corps (50th, 111th, 336th Infantry Divisions, 279th Assault Gun Brigade) and the Romanian Cavalry Corps (9th Cavalry, 10th -I and 19th Infantry Divisions). In total, the Northern group consisted of about 80 thousand soldiers. The group's headquarters were located in Dzhankoy.

The German defense in the Perekop area consisted of three stripes up to 14 km long and up to 35 km deep. They were occupied by the 50th Infantry Division, reinforced by several separate battalions and units (in total about 20 thousand bayonets, up to 50 tanks and assault guns and 325 guns and mortars). The main defensive line was up to 4-6 km deep, had three defensive positions with full-profile trenches and long-term firing points. The main defense center was Armyansk. From the northern direction, the city was covered by a deep anti-tank ditch, minefields and anti-tank guns. The city was prepared for a perimeter defense, the streets were blocked with barricades, and many buildings were turned into strongholds. Communication passages connected Armyansk with the nearest settlements.

The second line of defense took place in the southern part of the Perekop Isthmus between Karkinitsky Bay and lakes Staroe and Krasnoe. The depth of the second defense line was 6-8 km. Here the Germans built two defensive positions, covered by an anti-tank ditch, minefields and other obstacles. The defense was based on the Ishun positions, which blocked access to the steppe regions of the peninsula. The third line of defense, the construction of which was not completed at the beginning of the Red Army's offensive, ran along the Chartylyk River. In the gaps between the defense lines there were separate resistance centers and strongholds and minefields. An anti-landing defense was prepared on the coast of Karkinitsky Bay. The command of the 17th Army expected the main attack of the Red Army in the Perekop area.

On the southern bank of Sivash, the Germans built 2-3 defensive lines up to 15-17 km deep. They were occupied by the 336th German and 10th Romanian infantry divisions. The defensive positions ran along the shores of four lakes and had a land length of only 10 km. Due to this, a high density of defense was achieved, rich in manpower and firing points. In addition, the defense was strengthened by numerous engineering barriers, minefields, pillboxes, and bunkers. The 111th German Infantry Division, the 279th Assault Gun Brigade and part of the 9th Romanian Cavalry Division were in reserve at Dzhankoi.

The Kerch direction was defended by the 5th Army Corps: the 73rd, 98th Infantry Divisions, the 191st Assault Gun Brigade, the Romanian 6th Cavalry Division and the 3rd Mountain Rifle Division. In total, the group numbered about 60 thousand soldiers. Coastal defense in the area from Feodosia to Sevastopol was entrusted to the Romanian 1st Mountain Rifle Corps (1st and 2nd Mountain Rifle Divisions). The same corps was engaged in the fight against partisans. The coast from Sevastopol to Perekop was controlled by two cavalry regiments from the Romanian 9th Cavalry Division. In total, about 60 thousand soldiers were allocated for anti-landing defense and the fight against partisans. The headquarters of the 17th Army and the Romanian 1st Mountain Rifle Corps were located in Simferopol. In addition, the 17th Army included the 9th Air Force Anti-Aircraft Division, an artillery regiment, three coastal defense artillery regiments, the Crimea mountain rifle regiment, a separate Bergman regiment and other units (security, engineer battalions, etc. .).

There were four defense lines on the Kerch Peninsula. Their total depth reached 70 kilometers. The main line of defense rested on Kerch and the heights surrounding the city. The second line of defense ran along the Turkish Wall - from Adzhibay to Lake Uzunlar. The third lane ran near the settlements of Seven Kolodezei, Kenegez, Adyk, Obekchi and Karasan. The fourth band covered the Ak-Monai Isthmus (“Perpach position”). In addition, the Germans equipped rear defense lines on the line Evpatoria - Saki - Sarabuz - Karasubazar - Sudak - Feodosia, Alushta - Yalta. They covered Simferopol. Sevastopol was a powerful defensive hub.

Operation plan and Soviet forces

The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command (SHC) considered the Crimean Peninsula as a strategically important area. The liberation of Crimea restored the capabilities of the Black Sea Fleet. Sevastopol was the main base of the Soviet fleet. In addition, the peninsula was an important base for the German fleet and aviation, covering the enemy’s southern strategic flank. Crimea was important in determining the future of the Balkan Peninsula and influenced Turkish policy.

The operation to liberate Crimea began to be prepared in February 1944. On February 6, Chief of the General Staff A.M. Vasilevsky and the Military Council of the 4th Ukrainian Front presented the plan for the Crimean operation to Headquarters. On February 22, 1944, Joseph Stalin approved the decision to direct the main attack from Sivash. For this purpose, crossings were organized through Sivash, through which they began to transfer manpower and equipment to the bridgehead. The work took place in difficult conditions. The sea, German air raids and artillery strikes more than once destroyed the crossings.

The date for the start of the operation was postponed several times. From the beginning, this was due to the expectation of liberation of the Dnieper coast to Kherson from the Nazis, then due to weather conditions (because of them, the start of the operation was postponed for the period between March 15 and 20). On March 16, the start of the operation was postponed in anticipation of the liberation of Nikolaev and the entry of the Red Army to Odessa. On March 26, the Odessa offensive operation began (). However, even after Nikolaev was liberated on March 28, the operation could not begin. Bad weather conditions got in the way.

General idea The Crimean operation consisted of the troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front under the command of Army General Fyodor Ivanovich Tolbukhin from the north - from Perekop and Sivash, and the Separate Primorsky Army of Army General Andrei Ivanovich Eremenko from the east - from the Kerch Peninsula, delivering a simultaneous attack in the general direction to Simferopol and Sevastopol. They were supposed to break through the German defenses, dismember and destroy the German 17th Army, preventing its evacuation from the Crimean Peninsula. The offensive of the ground forces was supported by the Black Sea Fleet under the command of Admiral Filipp Sergeevich Oktyabrsky and the Azov Flotilla under the command of Rear Admiral Sergei Georgievich Gorshkov. The naval forces included a battleship, 4 cruisers, 6 destroyers, 2 patrol boats, 8 base minesweepers, 161 torpedo, patrol and armored boats, 29 submarines and other ships and vessels. From the air, the offensive of the 4th UV was supported by the 8th Air Army under the command of Colonel General of Aviation Timofey Timofeevich Khryukin and the aviation of the Black Sea Fleet. The 4th Air Army under the command of Colonel General of Aviation Konstantin Andreevich Vershinin supported the offensive of the Separate Primorsky Army. In addition, the partisans were supposed to hit the Germans from the rear. Representatives of the Supreme Command Headquarters, Marshals of the Soviet Union, K. E. Voroshilov and A. M. Vasilevsky, were responsible for the coordination of the troops. In total, about 470 thousand people, about 6 thousand guns and mortars, 559 tanks and self-propelled artillery units, and 1,250 aircraft took part in the operation.

The main blow was dealt by the 4th UV. It included: the 51st Army, the 2nd Guards Army and the 19th Tank Corps. The main blow from the Sivash bridgehead was delivered by the 51st Army under the command of Hero of the Soviet Union, Lieutenant General Yakov Grigorievich Kreiser and the reinforced 19th Tank Corps under the command of Hero of the Soviet Union, Lieutenant General of Tank Forces Ivan Dmitrievich Vasiliev. Ivan Vasiliev will be wounded during reconnaissance, so the offensive of the corps will be led by his deputy I. A. Potseluev. They received the task of advancing in the direction of Dzhankoy - Simferopol - Sevastopol. In the event of a breakthrough of the German defense and the capture of Dzhankoy, the main group of the 4th UV went to the rear of the German positions at Perekop. It could also develop an attack on Simferopol and behind the Kerch enemy group. The 2nd Guards Army under the command of Lieutenant General Georgy Fedorovich Zakharov launched an auxiliary attack on the Perekop Isthmus and was supposed to advance in the direction of Evpatoria - Sevastopol. Zakharov’s army also had to clear the western coast of Crimea from the Nazis. The separate Primorsky Army received the task of breaking through the German defenses near Kerch and advancing towards Vladislavovka and Feodosia. In the future, part of the forces of the Primorsky Army was supposed to advance in the direction of Simferopol - Sevastopol, the other part - along the coast, from Feodosia to Sudak, Alushta, Yalta and Sevastopol.

The Black Sea Fleet received the task of disrupting enemy sea communications. Submarines and torpedo boats were supposed to attack enemy ships on the near and distant approaches to Sevastopol. Aviation (more than 400 aircraft) was supposed to operate along the entire length of German maritime communications - from Sevastopol to Romania. Large surface ships did not participate in the operation. Headquarters ordered them to be preserved for future naval operations. The actions of the Black Sea Fleet were coordinated by a representative of the Headquarters - the Commander-in-Chief of the USSR Naval Forces, People's Commissar of the Navy, Admiral N.G. Kuznetsov. The Azov flotilla transported troops and cargo through the Kerch Strait and supported the advance of the Separate Primorsky Army from the sea.

Long-range aviation under the command of Air Marshal A.E. Golovanov (more than 500 aircraft) was supposed to paralyze the work of railway junctions and ports with massive night strikes, strike important enemy targets, and sink German ships and vessels. Long-range aviation was supposed to strike the most important Romanian ports of Galati and Constanta.

Crimean partisans received the task of disrupting German traffic on the roads, interrupting wire communications, organizing attacks on enemy headquarters and command posts, preventing the Nazis from destroying cities and settlements during retreat, to prevent the destruction and hijacking of the population. They were also supposed to destroy the Yalta port.

To be continued…

Liberation of Crimea in 1944

The troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front (commander - Army General F.I. Tolbukhin) during the Melitopol operation on October 30, 1943 occupied Genichesk and reached the coast of Sivash, crossed the bay and captured a bridgehead on its southern shore. And on November 1, having overcome the fortifications of the Turkish Wall, they broke into the Perekop Isthmus. 19th Tank Corps under the command of Lieutenant General of Tank Forces I.D. Vasilyev managed to fight his way through the fortifications on the Turkish Wall and reach Armyansk. Using the separation of the tankers from the cavalry and infantry, the German command managed to close the gap in its defense and temporarily block the tank corps. But by November 5, the main forces of the 51st Army, Lieutenant General Ya.G. The cruisers also overcame Perekop and linked up with the tankers fighting in the encirclement. The fighting in this direction gradually ceased. Thus, by November 1943, Soviet troops reached the lower reaches of the Dnieper, captured a bridgehead in Crimea on the southern bank of the Sivash and the approaches to the Crimean isthmuses.

The entry of Soviet troops to the immediate approaches to the Crimean Peninsula put on the agenda the task of liberating it from Nazi invaders. Back in early February 1944, when Soviet troops were fighting for the Nikopol bridgehead, Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky presented to the Supreme Command Headquarters ideas developed jointly with the command of the 4th Ukrainian Front for organizing an offensive operation to liberate Crimea. They believed that such an operation could begin on February 18-19. However, the Supreme High Command decided to carry it out after the lower reaches of the Dnieper to Kherson were cleared of the enemy and the 4th Ukrainian Front was freed from solving other problems.

In connection with the defeat of the Nikopol enemy group on February 17, Headquarters ordered the start of an offensive in Crimea no later than March 1, regardless of the progress of the operation to liberate the right bank of the Dnieper. However, due to inclement weather and storms in the Sea of ​​Azov, which delayed the regrouping of front troops and their crossing of the Sivash, the operation had to be postponed. Therefore, the Supreme Command Headquarters decided to begin active actions to liberate Crimea after the troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front captured the Nikolaev region and access to Odessa.

The Supreme High Command headquarters planned joint participation in the operation to liberate Crimea by the troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front, the Separate Primorsky Army, the Black Sea Fleet, the Azov Military Flotilla and the Crimean partisans.

During the Kerch-Eltigen landing operation, carried out from November 1 to November 11, 1943, although the troops of the North Caucasus Front did not achieve the planned result, they created an operational bridgehead north of Kerch. After its completion, the North Caucasus Front was liquidated, and the 56th Army located on the bridgehead was transformed into the Separate Primorsky Army. Its troops were supposed to attack the enemy from the east.

The Soviet Black Sea Fleet, deprived of the possibility of basing in the ports of the Crimean Peninsula, experienced great difficulties in conducting operations at sea. Therefore, the Supreme Command Headquarters, taking into account the importance of the actions of Soviet warships in the Black Sea, at the beginning of the operation to liberate the Crimean Peninsula, issued a special directive outlining the tasks of the Black Sea Fleet. The main task was to disrupt enemy communications in the Black Sea by submarines, bomber aircraft, mine-torpedo aircraft, attack aircraft and torpedo boats. At the same time, the operational zone of the Black Sea Fleet must constantly expand and consolidate. The fleet had to protect its sea communications from enemy influence, primarily by providing reliable anti-submarine defense. For the future, it was ordered to prepare large surface ships for naval operations, and fleet forces to be redeployed to Sevastopol.

In conditions when the Soviet Army cleared the entire Northern Tavria from the invaders, the Crimean enemy group threatened the Soviet troops operating in Right Bank Ukraine and pinned down significant forces of the 4th Ukrainian Front. The loss of Crimea, in the opinion of Hitler’s command, would mean a sharp decline in Germany’s prestige in the countries of South-Eastern Europe and Turkey, which were sources of valuable and critically scarce strategic materials. Crimea covered the Balkan strategic flank fascist Germany and important sea communications leading through the Black Sea straits to the ports of the western coast of the Black Sea, as well as up the Danube.

Therefore, despite the loss of Right Bank Ukraine, the 17th Army under the command of Colonel General E. Eneke was entrusted with the task of holding Crimea until the last opportunity. For this purpose, the army was increased by two divisions at the beginning of 1944. By April, it consisted of 12 divisions - 5 German and 7 Romanian, two brigades of assault guns, various reinforcement units and numbered more than 195 thousand people, about 3,600 guns and mortars, 250 tanks and assault guns. It was supported by 148 aircraft based at Crimean airfields and aviation from airfields in Romania.

The main forces of the 17th Army, the 49th German mountain rifle and the 3rd Romanian cavalry corps (four German - 50, 111, 336, 10th, one Romanian - 19th division and 279th assault gun brigade) , defended themselves in the northern part of Crimea. The 5th Army Corps (73rd, 98th German Infantry Divisions, 191st Assault Gun Brigade), 6th Cavalry and 3rd Mountain Rifle Divisions of the Romanian Army operated on the Kerch Peninsula. The southern and western coasts were covered by the 1st Mountain Rifle Corps (three Romanian divisions).

The enemy took all measures to create a strong defense, especially in the most important directions where he expected the advance of Soviet troops.

On the Perekop Isthmus, three defense lines were equipped to a depth of 35 km: the first line, the Ishun positions and the line along the Chatarlyk River. In front of the bridgeheads of the Soviet troops on the southern bank of the Sivash, the enemy equipped two or three lanes in narrow inter-lake defiles. On the Kerch Peninsula, four defensive lines were built along its entire 70-km depth. In operational depth, defense was being prepared at the line of Saki, Sarabuz, Karasubazar, Belogorsk, Stary Krym, Feodosia.

Soviet troops occupied the following position.

On the Perekop Isthmus, on the 14-km front, the 2nd Guards Army was deployed, which included 8 rifle divisions. The bridgehead on the southern bank of the Sivash was occupied by the 51st Army, which had 10 rifle divisions. The front commander's reserve included the 19th Tank Corps (four tank and one motorized rifle brigade), which located its main forces on the Sivash bridgehead. To the left of the 51st Army, the 78th fortified area was defended to Genichesk.

To support the troops on the bridgehead, the engineering troops of the 51st Army built two crossings across the Sivash: a bridge on frame supports with a length of 1865 m and a carrying capacity of 16 tons, two earthen dams with a length of 600-700 m and a pontoon bridge between them with a length of 1350 m. In February - March In 1944, the bridge and dams were strengthened, their carrying capacity increased to 30 tons, which made it possible to ensure the crossing of T-34 tanks and heavy artillery. The crossing of the tanks of the 19th Tank Corps was extremely difficult. It was held from March 13 to March 25. Several tanks were transported from the corps at night, which were carefully camouflaged and hidden from enemy observation in the shortest possible time. The German command failed to detect the crossing and concentration of the tank corps, which subsequently played a role.

The Separate Primorsky Army was concentrated on the Kerch Peninsula (commander - Army General A.I. Eremenko).

The Black Sea Fleet (commander - Admiral F.S. Oktyabrsky) was based at the ports of the Black Sea coast of the Caucasus, the Azov Military Flotilla (commander - Rear Admiral S.G. Gorshkov) - at the ports of the Taman Peninsula.

A group of Soviet partisans, numbering 4.5 thousand people, operated on the Crimean Peninsula.

In the second half of 1943, general dissatisfaction with the occupation regime began to increasingly manifest itself on the peninsula; more and more Crimean Tatars began to desire the return of the previous government. This dissatisfaction was expressed primarily in the fact that they began to support her “long arm” on the peninsula - the partisans. As Soviet troops approached the peninsula, partisan attacks on the occupiers began to intensify. All great help the Soviet command began to provide them with assistance. Constant communication with the population was established. Residents of many villages took refuge in the forests, hundreds of them joined partisan detachments. Crimean Tatars made up approximately a sixth of the number of these detachments.

In total, by January 1944, Soviet partisans in the amount of about 4 thousand people were operating on the Crimean Peninsula. But these were not scattered partisan groups and separate detachments. IN January-February In 1944, 7 partisan brigades were formed. These brigades were united into three formations: Southern, Northern and Eastern. There were two brigades in the South and East, and three in the North.

The largest in composition was the Southern Unit (commander - M.A. Makedonsky, commissioner - M.V. Selimov). This formation operated in the mountainous and forested area of ​​the southern part of Crimea and numbered more than 2,200 people. In the mountainous and forested area southwest of Karasubazar, the Northern Unit (commander - P.R. Yampolsky, commissar - N.D. Lugovoy) operated with a strength of 860 people. To the south and southwest of Old Crimea there was an area of ​​operations of the Eastern Union (commander - V.S. Kuznetsov, commissar - R.Sh. Mustafaev) in the amount of 680 people.

The partisans controlled large areas of the mountainous and wooded terrain of the south of Crimea, which gave them the opportunity to strike at units of German-Romanian troops moving along the roads leading from the southern coast to the northern and eastern regions of the peninsula.

Underground organizations of Soviet patriots operated in various cities of Crimea - Yevpatoria, Sevastopol, Yalta.

The activities of the partisans were controlled by the Crimean headquarters partisan movement, which had reliable communication with formations and detachments by radio, as well as with the help of aircraft of the 2nd Aviation Transport Regiment of the 1st Aviation Transport Division, located in the 4th Air Army. The Po-2 and P-5 aircraft of the 9th Separate Aviation Regiment of the Civil Air Fleet were most widely used for communication and supply of partisans.

The partisan formations, operationally subordinate to the command of the Separate Primorsky Army, for the period of the offensive operation received orders to strike the rear units of the invaders, destroy nodes and communication lines, preventing the systematic withdrawal of enemy troops, destroying individual sections of railways, setting up ambushes and creating blockages in mountainous areas. roads, preventing the enemy from destroying cities, industrial enterprises and railways. The main task of the Southern Connection was control over the Yalta port and disruption of its work.

By the beginning of the operation, the 4th Ukrainian Front and the Separate Primorsky Army had 470 thousand people, 5982 guns and mortars, 559 tanks and self-propelled guns. The 4th and 8th Air Armies had 1,250 aircraft. Comparing the forces of the parties, it is clear that the Soviet command was able to achieve a serious superiority over the enemy (2.4 times in personnel, 1.6 times in artillery, 2.6 times in tanks, 8.4 times in aircraft ).

The general idea of ​​defeating the enemy in Crimea was to carry out simultaneous attacks by troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front from the north, from Perekop and Sivash, and the Separate Primorsky Army from the east, from a bridgehead in the Kerch region, with the assistance of the Black Sea Fleet, DD aviation formations and partisans , in the general direction of Simferopol, Sevastopol, dismember and destroy the enemy group, preventing its evacuation from Crimea.

The main role in defeating the enemy in Crimea was assigned to the 4th Ukrainian Front, whose troops were supposed to break through enemy defenses in the northern part of the Crimean Peninsula, defeat the troops of the German group and develop a rapid offensive on Sevastopol in order to prevent the enemy from organizing a strong defense in the area of ​​​​this city .

The Separate Primorsky Army was entrusted with the task of breaking through the enemy’s defenses on the Kerch Peninsula and developing success in Simferopol and Sevastopol. The army was supposed to go on the offensive a few days later than the 4th Ukrainian Front, when a threat was created to the rear of the enemy’s Kerch group.

The Black Sea Fleet was entrusted with the task of blockading Crimea, disrupting enemy sea communications, assisting ground forces on the coastal flanks and being ready for tactical landings. The fleet was also involved in assisting the ground forces with its aviation, and in the coastal zone with naval artillery fire. Brigades of torpedo boats from Anapa and Skadovsk were supposed to destroy enemy ships on the near approaches to Sevastopol and directly in the ports; a submarine brigade - on distant approaches and aviation - along the entire length of enemy communications. The Azov military flotilla, operationally subordinate to the commander of the Separate Primorsky Army, provided all transportation through the Kerch Strait.

Aviation support in the 4th Ukrainian Front was assigned to the 8th Air Army (commander - Lieutenant General of Aviation T.T. Khryukin) and the aviation group of the Black Sea Fleet Air Force. The Air Army was supposed to support the offensive of the troops of the 51st Army and the 19th Tank Corps, and the Black Sea Fleet Air Force - the 2nd Guards Army. The troops of the Separate Primorsky Army were to be supported by aircraft of the 4th Air Army (commander - Major General of Aviation N.F. Naumenko).

In the Crimean operation, the Air Force was tasked with conducting aerial reconnaissance, striking enemy ships and transports in communications and ports, and supporting the combat operations of the 19th Tank Corps while developing success in the depths of the enemy’s defense. During the air offensive, enemy ground force groups, strongholds, and artillery were to be hit.

Crimean partisans received the task of smashing the rear of the invaders, destroying their nodes and communication lines, disrupting control, preventing the organized withdrawal of fascist troops, disrupting the work of the Yalta port, and also preventing the enemy from destroying cities, industrial and transport enterprises.

The coordination of the actions of all forces and means involved in the operation was carried out by the representative of the Supreme Command Headquarters, Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky. The representative of the Headquarters in the Separate Primorsky Army was Marshal of the Soviet Union K.E. Voroshilov. General F.Ya. was appointed as the representative for aviation. Falaleev.

In accordance with the plan of the operation, the commander of the 4th Ukrainian Front, Army General F.I. Tolbukhin decided to break through the enemy’s defenses in two directions - on the Perekop Isthmus with the forces of the 2nd Guards Army and on the southern bank of the Sivash with the forces of the 51st Army. The front delivered the main blow in the 51st Army zone, where, firstly, the enemy considered the delivery of the main blow to be unlikely; secondly, the attack from the bridgehead would lead to the rear of the enemy fortifications on the Perekop Isthmus; thirdly, a strike in this direction made it possible to quickly capture Dzhankoy, which opened up freedom of action towards Simferopol and the Kerch Peninsula.

The operational formation of the front was single-echelon. The mobile group consisted of the 19th Tank Corps, which was supposed to enter the breakthrough in the 51st Army zone with fourth day operations, after breaking through the enemy’s tactical and operational defenses. Developing success in the general direction of Dzhankoy, Simferopol on the fourth day after entering the breakthrough, the corps was supposed to capture Simferopol. Having moved part of its forces to Seitler, Karasubazar, the corps was supposed to protect the left flank of the front from a possible attack by the enemy group from the Kerch Peninsula.

The entire operation of the 4th Ukrainian Front was planned at a depth of up to 170 km, lasting 10-12 days. The average daily rate of advance was planned for the rifle troops to be 12-15 km, and for the 19th Tank Corps - up to 30-35 km.

Commander of the 2nd Guards Army, General Zakharov G.F. The basis of his decision was the idea of ​​​​cutting the enemy group defending in Perekop positions into two parts, and then, by developing an offensive in the south-eastern and south-western directions, press these groups to Sivash and Perekop Bay, where they would be destroyed. It was planned to land troops on boats in the rear of the enemy defending in Perekop positions as part of a reinforced rifle battalion.

Commander of the 51st Army, General Kreiser D.G. decided to break through the enemy’s defenses, delivering the main blow with two rifle corps on Tarkhan and auxiliary attacks by the 63rd Rifle Corps on Tomashevka and Pasurman 2; subsequently develop success with the 10th Rifle Corps on Ishun, in the rear of the Ishun positions, and with the 1st Guards Rifle Corps on Voinka (10 km south of Tarkhan) and on Novo-Alexandrovka. With the forces of one rifle division it was planned to develop an offensive from Pasurman 2nd to Taganash.

In the 2nd Guards Army, it was planned to break through the main defense line to a depth of 20 km in the first two days, then, developing an offensive, in the next two days break through the second and army lines to a depth of 10-18 km.

In both armies, to increase efforts and develop success, the corps built battle formations in two or three echelons, and the first echelon divisions had the same formation.

Almost 100% of all forces and assets were concentrated in breakthrough areas, creating densities of 3 to 9 rifle battalions, from 117 to 285 guns and mortars, 12-28 tanks and self-propelled guns per 1 km of breakthrough area. At such densities, rifle corps outnumbered the enemy by 1.8-9 times in rifle battalions, by 3.7-6.8 times in guns and mortars, and by 1.4-2.6 times in tanks and self-propelled guns.

The commander of the Separate Maritime Army decided to launch two strikes. One blow, the main one, was planned to be delivered by the adjacent flanks of two rifle corps, breaking through the defenses north and south of the strong stronghold of Bulganak and developing an offensive in the direction of Kerch-Vladislavovka. The second strike with the forces of one rifle corps was planned on the left flank, along the Black Sea coast, and with the joint efforts of the two groups, defeat the enemy and liberate the Kerch Peninsula. After this, the main forces of the army should attack Simferopol, and the rest of the forces should continue the offensive along the coast, cutting off the enemy’s escape route to the sea coast.

The offensive zones of rifle formations were narrow: 2.2-5 km for rifle corps, 1-3 km for rifle divisions. There were also areas for breakthrough of formations: 2-3 km of rifle corps and 1-1.5 km of rifle divisions.

During the preparation of the operation, the command and political agencies, party and Komsomol organizations carried out extensive educational and propaganda work with personnel. In this work, much attention was paid to the heroic past associated with the struggle for Crimea during the Civil War, with the defense of Perekop and Sevastopol in the first period of the Great Patriotic War. Examples were given from the experience of battles of the troops of the Southern Front under the command of M.V. Frunze in 1920, recalled the heroic defense of Sevastopol in 1941-1942. Participants in the assault on Perekop, heroic Sevastopol residents who defended the city at the beginning of the war, were invited for such conversations. Rallies of personnel, party and Komsomol meetings were held.

The transition of the troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front to the offensive was preceded by a period of destruction of long-term enemy structures on the Perekop Isthmus. Heavy artillery fired at them for two days. The use of 203 mm guns here convinced the enemy command that the main attack of the Soviet troops would come from the Perekop area. General E. Eneke wrote in his memoirs: “The longer time dragged on, the more clearly the grandiose preparatory measures of the Russians for the offensive near Perekop and somewhat less at the Sivash bridgehead emerged.”

On April 7 at 19.30, reconnaissance in force was carried out throughout the entire front line, as a result of which it was possible to clarify the enemy’s fire system, and in the zone of the 267th Infantry Division (63rd Rifle Corps) - to capture a section of its first trench, where three rifle battalions advanced from composition of the main forces of the first echelon regiments.

On April 8 at 10.30, after 2.5 hours of artillery and aviation preparation, the troops of the 2nd Guards and 51st Armies simultaneously went on the offensive. During the artillery preparation, carried out with a number of false fire transfers, part of the enemy's fire weapons were destroyed or suppressed. In the 2nd Guards Army, when a false transfer of fire was carried out, 1,500 soldiers with scarecrows rushed forward along the previously dug “whiskers”. The enemy, deceived by this false attack, took up their positions in the first trench and was immediately covered by artillery fire.

On the Perekop Isthmus, during the first day, the enemy was driven out of the first two trenches of the main defense line; units of the 3rd Guards and 126th Rifle Divisions captured Armyansk. In the center of the Perekop Isthmus, the enemy’s defenses were broken through to a depth of 3 km. By the end of the second day of the operation, the troops of the 2nd Guards Army had completely broken through the enemy's first defensive line. The enemy began, under the cover of rearguards, a gradual withdrawal of troops to the Ishun positions. The success of the offensive by the troops of the 2nd Guards Army was facilitated by the decisive actions of the troops of the 51st Army on its left flank, as well as the landing behind enemy lines as part of a reinforced rifle battalion from the 387th Rifle Division.

This landing was prepared in the 1271st Infantry Regiment as part of the 2nd Infantry Battalion under the command of Captain F.D. Dibrov, reinforced by personnel from other units who had combat experience. The battalion had more than 500 personnel, two 45-mm cannons, six 82-mm mortars, 45 machine guns, rifles, and machine guns. The fighters had fragmentation and anti-tank grenades. They were transported on boats by designated sappers. At midnight on April 9, the boats set sail from the piers, and at 5 a.m. the battalion in full force landed on shore at the appointed place. Having landed, the battalion began striking the enemy. A battery of six-barreled mortars was captured, three tanks were knocked out, and damage was caused to manpower. Having discovered the retreat of the enemy infantry, the battalion commander began pursuit and defeated a large group of the enemy. At the end of the day, the battalion linked up with the advancing units of the 3rd Guards Rifle Division. For their courage, all soldiers and officers were awarded orders and medals. The battalion commander, Captain Dibrov, was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

In the 51st Army zone, the enemy put up strong resistance. The main strike group of the army, consisting of the 10th and 1st Guards Rifle Corps, advancing in the Tarkhan direction, during the first day of the operation, due to insufficient suppression of the enemy’s defense by artillery fire, was able to capture only its first trench.

The greatest success on April 8 was achieved by units of the 63rd Rifle Corps, advancing on Karanki and Pasurman 2nd, where the enemy was knocked out of all three trenches of the first line and the advance was more than 2 km.

The results of the first day of the offensive made it possible to identify the places of the most stubborn enemy resistance. The front commander immediately gave instructions to reinforce the troops in the Karankino direction, which had previously been considered auxiliary. To develop the success, it was decided to introduce into the battle the second echelon (417th Rifle Division) of the 63rd Rifle Corps and the 32nd Guards Tank Brigade from the 1st Guards Corps.

In addition, two self-propelled artillery regiments were transferred here. To assist units in this direction, part of the forces of the 346th Infantry Division was supposed to cross Lake Aigul and go to the flank of the defending enemy troops. The main forces of the 8th Air Army were aimed at the same direction and almost four artillery brigades were transferred. The density of guns and mortars increased by one and a half times.

The transfer of the main efforts to the Karankino-Tomashevsky direction, where the less stable units of the 10th Romanian Infantry Division were defending, allowed the troops of the 51st Army to build on their success on April 9. The divisions of the 63rd Rifle Corps (commander - Major General P.K. Koshevoy), overcoming the resistance of the Romanians, repelling the counterattacks of their infantry, supported by assault guns, advanced from 4 to 7 km. This was helped by the actions of the 1164th Infantry Regiment of the 346th Infantry Division, which forded Lake Aigul and struck the enemy’s flank, and the timely introduction into battle of the second echelon division of the corps, reinforced by the 32nd Guards Tank Brigade. The main line of enemy defense was broken through, and the troops of the 63rd Corps reached its second line.

As a result of intense fighting by the troops of the 2nd Guards and 51st armies, a maneuver to shift efforts to the direction of the designated success, on April 10, a turning point was outlined in the course of hostilities in the northern part of Crimea. The troops of the 2nd Guards Army reached the approaches to the Ishun positions. To quickly capture these positions, the army commander ordered the divisions of the 13th Guards and 54th Rifle Corps to form mobile forward detachments consisting of rifle battalions and anti-tank fighter regiments in vehicles. But the composition of these advanced detachments turned out to be weak, and they did not fulfill their task. By the end of April 10, the army troops were detained in front of the Ishun positions and began to prepare for their breakthrough.

On the same day, the 10th Rifle Corps, advancing on Karpova Balka (11 km southeast of Armyansk), broke through the main enemy defense line and linked up in the area of ​​Karpova Balka with the left flank units of the 2nd Guards Army.

On the morning of April 11, the troops of the 63rd Rifle Corps went on the offensive. In the resulting breakthrough in the direction of Karanka, a mobile front group consisting of the 19th Tank Corps, two regiments of the 279th Infantry Division (mounted on vehicles) and the 21st Anti-Tank Artillery Brigade was brought into battle. Infantry vehicles in the amount of 120 units were allocated from the front rear.

The mobile group, and above all the 19th Tank Corps, defeated the opposing enemy troops and launched a rapid offensive. This forced the enemy command to begin a hasty withdrawal of units of the 19th Romanian Infantry Division holding positions on the Chongar Peninsula.

Already at 11 o'clock on April 11, the forward detachment of the 19th Tank Corps (202nd Tank Brigade of Colonel M.G. Feshchenko, 867th Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment of Major A.G. Svidersky) and the 52nd Motorcycle Regiment of Major A.A. . Nedilko reached the northern outskirts of Dzhankoy. Fighting ensued to capture the city. The enemy, with the strength of up to an infantry regiment with artillery, supported by the fire of an armored train, offered stubborn resistance. The battle dragged on. But then the 26th motorized rifle brigade under Lieutenant Colonel A.P. reached the southwestern outskirts. Khrapovitsky, which struck the southern outskirts of the city. The pilots of the 6th Guards Bomber Air Division carried out their air strikes. This predetermined the end of enemy resistance. Having suffered heavy losses, abandoning artillery, warehouses with ammunition, food, the remnants of the Dzhankoy garrison began a hasty retreat to the south. Almost simultaneously, the 79th Tank Brigade destroyed the enemy airfield in the Veseloye area (15 km southwest of Dzhankoy), and the 101st Brigade captured railway bridge 8 km southwest of Dzhankoy.

With the capture of Dzhankoy, the enemy’s defenses in the northern part of the Crimean Peninsula finally collapsed. In the steppe expanses of Crimea, the enemy was not able to hold Soviet troops. The German command still had hopes of stopping the advance of Soviet troops at the Evpatoria-Saki-Sarabuz-Karasubazar-Feodosiya line. But the enemy did not have the opportunity to implement this decision.

The success of the troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front in the northern part of Crimea and access to the Dzhankoy area threatened the encirclement of the enemy group on the Kerch Peninsula. The enemy command was forced to make a decision to withdraw troops from the Kerch Peninsula to the Akmonai positions. The removal of military property and the destruction of the remaining part began. The enemy artillery intensified its activity.

Intelligence of the Separate Primorsky Army discovered enemy preparations for withdrawal. In this regard, the army commander decided to launch a general offensive on the night of April 11. It was supposed to begin on the evening of April 10 with an attack by the enemy with the forces of the advanced battalions, and the advanced detachments and mobile groups at that time were preparing to pursue the enemy. The 4th Air Army received an order to intensify reconnaissance of the enemy.

At 22:00 on April 10, the forward battalions, after a fire raid, attacked the front line of the enemy’s defense. At 4 o'clock in the morning on April 11, following the advanced battalions, the advanced detachments and mobile groups of divisions, corps and the army entered the battle.

In the zone of the 11th Guards Corps (commander - Major General S.E. Rozhdestvensky), by 4 o'clock in the morning on April 11, they captured the entire first enemy defense position. Then, with the support of artillery fire, a mobile group of the corps was brought into battle, which overcame the resistance of the covering units and began pursuing the retreating enemy.

Events in the offensive zone of the 3rd Mountain Rifle Corps (commander - Major General N.A. Shvarev) developed in a similar way.

The 16th Rifle Corps (commander - Major General K.I. Provalov), operating on the left flank of the army, liberated the city of Kerch by 6 a.m. on April 11. The 318th Mountain Rifle Division under Major General V.F. took part in the liberation of Kerch. Gladkova, who distinguished herself as part of the Eltigen landing force in 1943.

The captured commander of the 9th Cavalry Regiment of the 6th Romanian Cavalry Division testified: “My regiment occupied the defense south of the city of Kerch. When the Russians broke through the German defenses and reached the Kerch-Feodosia highway, the threat of encirclement loomed over the regiment. The Germans ran away headlong, and I gave the order to retreat to the Turkish Wall line. Before we had time to take up defense in a new place, Russian tanks appeared on the left flank. Seeing that the Germans had fled, the Romanian soldiers began to surrender in entire squadrons... The 9th Cavalry Regiment was completely destroyed, not a single soldier left the Kerch Peninsula. All the equipment of the regiment and the artillery attached to it were captured by the Russians.”1

Restoration began in the liberated cities and villages of Crimea normal life. So, Kerch again became Soviet at 4 a.m. on April 11. On the first day after liberation, there were only about three dozen residents in the city. Gradually, people began to return to the city from the liberated regions of Crimea. Families hiding in the quarries were taken out. The city authorities were faced with difficult problems of resettling returning people, restoring destroyed houses, water supply, electrical network. And by the end of the month the post office and telegraph were operational. Then an ever-increasing number of the population began to receive bread from the restored bakery, and a canteen and fish shop opened their doors. Water supply has improved. We received our first electricity in April. The Kerch shipyard was cleared of mines, the surviving equipment began to be transported there, and 80 workers were recruited.

We began to restore the iron ore plant, the coking plant, and the Kerch-Feodosia railway. Enterprises serving the needs of the population began to operate: shoemakers, carpenters, tinsmiths, saddlers, sewing workshops, and a bathhouse began to operate. Fishing and fish processing enterprises are being restored. The shipyard began work on lifting and repairing ships. Three hospitals and consultations began to function in the city.

The whole country provided assistance to the heroic city. Cars with timber, cement, food, and repair materials went from different areas to Kerch. The command of the Black Sea Fleet donated a ship to the city, from which the restoration of the fishery began.

Starting from April 11, the pursuit of retreating enemy troops began throughout Crimea. The enemy rearguards tried to cover the withdrawal of troops and the evacuation of military equipment. The enemy sought to break away from the Soviet troops, retreat to Sevastopol and organize a defense there. However, Soviet troops quickly moved forward, trying to reach the flanks behind the enemy rearguards and prevent the enemy from accomplishing their plans.

The 2nd Guards Army, having completed the breakthrough of the Ishun positions, began pursuing the enemy with strong forward detachments, placing infantry on vehicles and reinforcing it with tanks and artillery. Having reached the second line of enemy defense on the Chatarlyk River, the army troops began to prepare for its breakthrough. But there was no need to break through it, since as a result of the successful actions of the troops of the 51st Army, a threat was created for the entire Perekop enemy group, and on the night of April 12 it was forced to begin withdrawing across the Chatarlyk River. Mobile detachments of the right-flank corps, having crossed Chatarlyk and fought more than 100 km, captured the city and port of Yevpatoria on the morning of April 13. Units of the 3rd Guards Rifle Division liberated the city of Saki on the morning of April 13. On April 14, the cities of Ak-Mosque and Karaja were liberated. The entire western part of Crimea was cleared of the enemy, and the 13th Guards Rifle Corps, which liberated this area, was withdrawn to reserve.

The main forces of the 2nd Guards Army (54th and 55th Rifle Corps) continued to develop their offensive in the general direction of Sevastopol. They immediately crossed the Alma and Kacha rivers and on April 15 reached the Belbek River, where they met stubborn enemy resistance on the approaches to Sevastopol.

In the 51st Army zone, the enemy was pursued by a front mobile group. The pursuit took place along the railway and the Dzhankoy-Simferopol-Bakhchisarai highway. To the left, two more advanced detachments were pursuing the enemy. One advanced on Zuya, the second - through Seitler to Karasubazar. Both of these detachments had the task of cutting the Feodosia-Simferopol road and blocking the enemy’s escape route from the Kerch Peninsula.

By the end of April 12, the front mobile group was reaching the approaches to Simferopol. The first advance detachment in the Zuya area defeated a large enemy column and, having captured Zuya, organized a perimeter defense, preventing the movement of enemy troops to the west. The second advanced detachment captured Seytler that day.

The main forces of the 19th Tank Corps on the morning of April 13 approached Simferopol. Having burst into the city, the tankers, together with the partisans of the 1st brigade (commander - F.I. Fedorenko) of the Northern Unit (17th detachment under the command of F.Z. Gorban and the 19th detachment under the command of Y.M. Sakovich) by 16 Hours later, the city was completely liberated from the occupiers. In honor of the liberation of Simferopol from the fascist invaders, an artillery salute was given in Moscow.

After capturing Simferopol, the mobile group continued to pursue the retreating enemy. On the morning of April 14, two tank brigades of the 19th Tank Corps, together with the partisans of the 6th Brigade of the Southern Unit (commander - M.F. Samoilenko), after a short battle, liberated the city of Bakhchisaray. The 26th motorized rifle brigade from Simferopol was sent through the mountains to Alushta to assist the troops of the Separate Primorsky Army in capturing the southern coast of Crimea. The 202nd Tank Brigade from Simferopol was sent to the city of Kacha, which it captured by 18:00, defeating the enemy garrison and joining forces with the troops of the 2nd Guards Army.

Units of the 19th Tank Corps advanced detachments reached the Belbek River east of Mekenzia, where the enemy put up stubborn resistance. The troops of the 51st Army soon arrived here.

It should be noted that during the pursuit, the troops of the 51st Army and the 19th Tank Corps were actively exposed to enemy aircraft, which caused losses in personnel and equipment and slowed down the pace of the offensive. The actions of Soviet aviation were hampered by limited fuel supplies.

A separate Primorsky Army pursued the enemy with advanced detachments. In the middle of the day on April 12, they approached the Ak-Monay positions and tried to break through them on the move. The attempt failed. It was necessary to quickly transfer rifle units, bring up artillery and launch a concentrated air strike. After strong artillery preparation, a powerful air bomb attack, and an attack by infantry and tanks, the last fortified enemy position was broken through. Having broken through the Ak-Monai positions in stubborn 8-hour battles, the troops of the Separate Primorsky Army rushed to Feodosia, which they liberated on April 13. The Kerch Peninsula was completely liberated from the invaders. In honor of this victory, artillery salutes were fired again in Moscow.

After the liberation of the Kerch Peninsula, the troops of the Separate Primorsky Army began to develop an offensive with the main forces in the general direction of Old Crimea, Karasubazar, and with part of the forces along the coast along the Primorskoye Highway to Yalta, Sevastopol. On April 13, its troops liberated Old Crimea and, together with the troops of the 51st Army, with the assistance of partisans (5th partisan brigade of the Northern Union under the command of F.S. Solovey), on April 13 they liberated Karasubazar. In this area there was a connection between the troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front - the 51st Army and the Separate Primorsky Army.

Developing an offensive along the Primorskoye Highway, part of the troops of the Separate Primorsky Army occupied Sudak on April 14, Alushta and Yalta on April 15, Simeiz on April 16, and by the end of the 17th they reached fortified enemy positions near Sevastopol. The troops fought more than 250 km in 6 days. During the liberation of Yalta, partisans of the 7th brigade of the Southern Unit under the command of L.A. acted together with the troops. Vikman.

By order of the Supreme Command Headquarters, on April 18, the Separate Primorsky Army was transferred to the 4th Ukrainian Front and renamed the Primorsky Army. Lieutenant General K.S. became the commander of the army. Miller.

As a result of the pursuit of the retreating enemy, the troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front and the Separate Primorsky Army, with the assistance of ships and aviation of the Black Sea Fleet, advanced to the approaches to Sevastopol. Attempts by the German command to delay the advance of Soviet troops at intermediate lines in the central part of Crimea were a complete failure.

Hitler's command, having been defeated in a defensive battle, decided to evacuate its troops and rear forces from the peninsula. In the current situation, there could be no talk of a systematic evacuation of the troops of the 17th Army without organizing a strong defense of Sevastopol. With a strong defense on the approaches to the city and in the city itself, during defensive battles it sought to pin down significant forces of the Soviet troops, inflict losses on them and ensure the evacuation of the remnants of its troops by sea.

For the defense of the city, the enemy prepared three defensive lines, each of which consisted of two or three trenches, cut-off positions and large quantity structures made of earth and stones. The first, most powerful, defensive line was established 7-10 km from the city and ran along heights 76, 9; 192.0; 256.2; and Mount Sugarloaf, the eastern slopes of Sapun Mountain and nameless heights west of Balaklava. Three to six kilometers from the city there was a second line and a third on the outskirts of Sevastopol. Of particular importance for holding the first line was Sapun Mountain, which was turned by the enemy into a powerful node of resistance.

The enemy group near Sevastopol consisted of eight divisions of the 49th and 5th Army Corps of the 17th Army. Their total number was more than 72 thousand soldiers and officers, 3414 guns and mortars, 50 tanks and assault guns. 70% of the forces and means were located on the first defensive line, which ensured the presence of up to 2,000 people and 65 guns and mortars along 1 km of the front in areas where the main efforts were concentrated. Having decided to hold Sevastopol, the German command strengthened its group in this area, transporting about 6 thousand German soldiers and officers by air.

Thus, the enemy had a large group on the approaches to Sevastopol, which relied on natural lines that were very advantageous for defense and well-equipped engineering positions.

Moreover, the continuous retreat of the Nazi troops forced Hitler to change the commander of the 17th Army. At the beginning of May, General E. Eneke was replaced by the commander of the 5th Army Corps, Colonel General K. Almendinger. On May 3, the new commander demanded in his order: “... that everyone defend in in every sense this word, so that no one retreats, to hold every trench, every crater, every trench... The 17th Army in Sevastopol is supported by powerful air and naval forces. The Fuhrer will give us enough ammunition, aircraft, weapons and reinforcements. Germany expects us to fulfill our duty."2

Notes

1. Grylev A.N. Dnieper - Carpathians - Crimea. M.: Nauka, 1970. P. 237.

V. Runov, L. Zaitsev.

In 1903, the French writer L. Boussenard, the author of famous adventure novels, argued: “The masters of the Crimea will always be the rulers of the Black Sea.” 40 years later, representatives of the military command of the USSR and Germany agreed with his opinion. The Crimean offensive operation of 1944 was designed to provide the Soviet fleet with unambiguous dominance in the local waters and finally turn the tide of the war in favor of the anti-Hitler coalition.

Preliminary schedule

The situation that developed in Crimea at the beginning of 1944 was somewhat reminiscent of the situation in which he found himself. The forces of the aggressive bloc were blocked from land as a result of the successful USSR carrying out two landing operations - Melitopol and Kerch-Etilgen at the end of 1943. But they had reliable fortification systems and were numerous, about 200 thousand people in total:

• 17th Army,
• several mountain rifle and cavalry corps and divisions,
• 215 tanks,
• more than 3,500 pieces of artillery.

True, almost half of the personnel represented Romanian units, and Romanian leader Antonescu protested against their use in Taurida and even demanded evacuation. The Odessa operation put an end to these demands - it became simply impossible to withdraw the Romanians from Crimea.

Disposition of forces before the start of the Crimean operation

Some German soldiers also suggested that Hitler leave Crimea. But he resisted, saying that then Romania, Bulgaria, etc. would inevitably fall away from Germany. In this he was absolutely right.

The Union troops were in a much better position than in 1920. By the beginning of the year, they already had bridgeheads in the Kerch region and on the southern shore of the Rotten Sea, and also crossed the. Important had naval capabilities - the Black Sea Fleet and the Azov flotilla operated from the sea coast.

They all had a significant advantage over the enemy in the number of soldiers who had the appropriate attitude - during the year the Red Army won significant victories. The Union sought to return Crimea as an ideal base for the Black Sea Flotilla - then it would really be possible to control the Black Sea region. Ideology also played a role - the Nazis should have “remembered” the 255 days of the Second Sevastopol Defense.

Strategic plans

The leadership of the operation was entrusted to experienced commanders. The main force was to be the 4th Ukrainian Front (under the command of General F.I. Tolbukhin) and the Primorsky Army (with General A.I. Eremenko). Troops, guardsmen and a tank corps also took part. General management and control from the headquarters was carried out by marshals K.E. Voroshilov and A.M. Vasilevsky.

Initially, the start of the operation was planned for mid-February. But then it was postponed several times - both for tactical and natural reasons. At first, it was decided to finally gain a foothold on the right bank of the Dnieper region (the Odessa operation can also be considered a part of this idea). Then a storm and prolonged heavy rains interfered, preventing the crossing of troops.

The last option for launching the offensive was a new date - April 8. By this time, Odessa was almost over: the “pearl by the sea” was taken by the Red Army on the 9th, therefore, enemy units were completely blocked in Crimea.

Wide grip

The beginning of the operation also resembled the actions of M.V. Frunze in 1920. After a powerful artillery barrage, on 8.04 the Fourth Ukrainian Front went on the offensive simultaneously from the Sivash bridgehead and on Perekop. On the 11th, the coastal army attacked and took the city on the same day.

In a week (from April 8 to April 16), our troops also liberated Armyansk and Evpatoria and Simferopol, and Dzhankoy, Belogorsk, and Sudak, and reached Sevastopol. The last city on the list required three assaults. Attempts made on April 19 and 23 did not produce tangible results, bringing only minor success. The greatest difficulty was the capture, from where the Germans were firing artillery.

The final assault was scheduled for May 5th. By this time, the USSR could already afford to regroup its troops, since a significant part of the combat missions in Crimea had already been resolved. The 2nd Guards Army went to the forefront of the attack - such detachments did not retreat. But still, the final liberation of the “pride of Russian sailors” took 4 days. The remnants of the Nazis retreated to the Chersonesus region. They were promised evacuation, but the attack aircraft of the Land of the Soviets thwarted all plans - instead of saving the Nazis, the Black Sea became the grave for 42 thousand of them.

The Crimean partisans made a huge contribution to the success of the offensive. They cut communication channels and lines of communication, obtained intelligence information, and prevented the destruction of enterprises and infrastructure. One of the formations liberated the city of Old Crimea; the partisan scouts did not give it up, although the Nazis, when attempting a counteroffensive, captured one city block and killed everyone they found there - almost 600 people. On May 12, 1944, the Crimean operation ended with the unconditional victory of the Soviet troops.

Further, to the west!

The results of the operation were impressive. In general, the aggressor's losses in Crimea are estimated at 140,000 irretrievable losses (killed and captured). Despite the fierce resistance of the enemy, the losses of the Red Army soldiers were noticeably less - about 40 thousand killed and less than 70 thousand wounded. The entire operation took 35 days. At one time, one resisted the enemy for more than 250 days.

Hitler was not mistaken - Germany's authority among the allies fell sharply after the defeat in Crimea. And the Red Army, on the contrary, once again proved its strength. Now safe rear areas and a reliable base for the fleet opened up the possibility of further advancement - to the Balkans, beyond the Danube, to the west. It’s symbolic - the day of liberation of Sevastopol is celebrated on May 9! So convincingly the Crimean operation predicted the Great Victory over fascism and Nazism!

The Crimean Peninsula is at all times first for Russian Empire, and subsequently for the USSR it was a strategic center in the Black Sea. The Crimean operation was very important for the advancing Red Army, and at the same time Hitler understood: if he gave up the peninsula, the entire Black Sea would lose. Fierce fighting lasted for more than a month and led to the defeat of the defending fascists.

On the eve of the operation

From the end of 1942 to the beginning of 1943, a radical change occurred during the Second World War: if until that moment the Red Army was retreating, now it went on the offensive. Battle of Stalingrad became a tragedy for the entire Wehrmacht. In the summer of 1943, a battle took place on Kursk Bulge, called the largest tank battle in history, in which Soviet forces strategically outplayed the Nazis, capturing them in a pincer movement, after which the Third Reich was already doomed. The generals reported to Hitler that further continuation of hostilities was becoming pointless. However, he ordered to stand and hold positions until the last.

Operation Crimea was a continuation of the glorious achievements of the Red Army. After the Lower Dnieper offensive operation, the 17th German Army found itself blocked on the Crimean Peninsula without the possibility of replenishment and reinforcement. In addition, Soviet troops managed to seize a convenient bridgehead in the Kerch region. The German high command once again recalled the hopelessness of the situation at the front. As for Crimea itself, the generals specifically said that without possible ground reinforcements, they remain there to certain death with further resistance. Hitler did not think so - he gave the order to hold the defense of this important strategic point. He motivated this by the fact that in the event of the surrender of Crimea, Romania and Bulgaria would cease to be allies with Germany. The order was given, but what was the attitude of ordinary soldiers to this instruction and to the war in general when the Crimean defensive operation began for them?

War theorists often talk only about the balance of forces of the opposing sides and their strategies, assuming by the beginning of the battle the outcome of the battle as a whole, simply by counting the number of military equipment and the number of fighters.

Meanwhile, practitioners believe that morale plays a huge role, if not a determining one. What happened to both sides?

Morale of the Red Army

If at the beginning of the war the morale of Soviet soldiers was quite low, then during its actions, and especially after Stalingrad, it grew unimaginably. Now the Red Army went into battle only for victory. In addition, our troops, unlike the first months of the war, were battle-hardened, and the command acquired the necessary experience. All this together gave us a complete advantage over the invaders.

Morale of the German-Romanian army

At the beginning of the Second World War, the car was undefeated. In less than two years, Germany managed to capture almost all of Europe, approaching the borders of the USSR. The morale of the Wehrmacht soldiers was at its best. They considered themselves invincible. And going into the next battle, they already knew in advance that it would be victorious.

However, at the end of 1941, the Nazis met serious resistance for the first time in the Battle of Moscow. During the counter-operation, the Red Army pushed them back from the city to a distance of more than 200 km. It was a blow to their pride and, most importantly, to their morale.

This was followed by the Stalingrad breakthrough of the blockade of Leningrad, and the Crimean strategic offensive operation began. The Third Reich was retreating on all fronts. Besides the fact that the German soldiers suffered defeat one after another, they were simply tired of the war. No matter how we treat them, they are people too, they had families that they loved and wanted to return home quickly. They no longer needed this war. Morale was at zero.

Strengths of the parties. USSR

Operation Crimea became one of the largest during the Second World War. The Red Army was represented by:

• 4th Ukrainian Front, commanded by F.I. Tolbukhin. It consisted of the 51st Army under the command of Ya. G. Kreiser; 2nd Guards Army under the command of G.F. Zakharov; the 8th Air Army under the command of T. T. Khryukin, as well as the 19th Tank Corps, initially under the command of I. D. Vasiliev, who was later replaced by I. A. Potseluev.
• A separate Primorsky Army, subordinate to General A. I. Eremenko, but on April 15, 1944, its command was entrusted to K. S. Melnik, who was a lieutenant general of the army.
• The Black Sea Fleet, commanded by Admiral F.S. Oktyabrsky
• 361st Sevastopol separate radio division.
• Azov military flotilla, led by Rear Admiral S.G. Gorshkov.

Strengths of the parties. Germany, Romania

The defense of the captured peninsula was carried out by the 17th Army of the Wehrmacht. On May 1, 1944, its command was entrusted to Infantry General K. Allmendinger. The army included 7 Romanian and 5 German divisions. The main headquarters is located in the city of Simferopol.

The Crimean operation by the Wehrmacht in the spring of 1944 was defensive in nature. Geographically defensive strategy The Wehrmacht can be divided into 4 parts:

1. North. The command of these forces was located in Dzhankoy, and reserves were also concentrated there. Two formations were concentrated here:

• 49th Mountain Rifle Corps: 50th, 111th, 336th Infantry Divisions, 279th Assault Gun Brigade;
• 3rd Romanian Cavalry Corps, consisting of the 9th Cavalry, 10th and 19th Infantry Divisions.

2. West. The entire coast from Sevastopol to Perekop was guarded by two regiments of the 9th Romanian Cavalry Division.

3. East. Events unfolded on Here they defended themselves:

• 5th Army Corps (73rd and 98th Infantry Divisions, 191st Assault Gun Brigade);
• 6th Cavalry and 3rd Mountain Rifle Romanian Divisions.

4. South. The entire southern coast from Sevastopol to Feodosia was patrolled and defended by the 1st Romanian Mountain Rifle Corps.

As a result, the forces were concentrated as follows: the northern direction - 5 divisions, Kerch - 4 divisions, the southern and western coast of Crimea - 3 divisions.

The Crimean operation was launched precisely with this arrangement of combat formations.

The balance of forces between the opposing sides

In addition, the Red Army had 322 units of equipment navy. These figures indicate a significant numerical superiority of the Soviet Army. The Wehrmacht command reported this to Hitler in order to obtain permission for the retreat of the forces remaining in the blockade.

Plans of the parties

The Soviet side saw Crimea, and mainly Sevastopol, as the main base of the Black Sea Fleet. With the receipt of this facility for its use, the USSR Navy could more conveniently and successfully conduct operations at sea, which was necessary for the further advancement of troops.

Germany was also well aware of the importance of Crimea for the overall balance of power. Hitler understood that the Crimean offensive strategic operation could lead to the loss of this important bridgehead. Moreover, Adolf was often informed about the impossibility of containing the Red Army in this direction. Most likely, he himself already understood the hopelessness of the situation, but he no longer had other considerations. Hitler gave the order to defend the peninsula to the last soldier, and under no circumstances to surrender it to the USSR. He saw Crimea as a force that held allies such as Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey close to Germany, and the loss of this point would automatically lead to the loss of allied support.

Thus, Crimea was very important for the Soviet army. For Germany it was vital.

The strategy of the Red Army consisted of a simultaneous massive attack from the north (from Sivash and Perekop) and east (from Kerch), followed by advance to the strategic centers - Simferopol and Sevastopol. After which the enemy had to be divided into separate groups and destroyed, without giving the opportunity for evacuation to Romania.

On April 3, using her heavy artillery, she destroyed the enemy’s defenses. On April 7, in the evening, reconnaissance in force was carried out, confirming the location of enemy forces. On April 8, the Crimean operation began. For two days, Soviet soldiers were in conditions of fierce fighting. As a result, the enemy's defenses were broken through. On April 11, the 19th Tank Corps managed to capture Dzhankoy, one of the headquarters of the enemy forces, on its first attempt. German and Romanian formations, fearing encirclement, began to retreat from the north and east (from Kerch) to Simferopol and Sevastopol.

On the same day, the Soviet army captured Kerch, after which the pursuit of the retreating enemy began in all directions using aviation. The Wehrmacht began evacuating soldiers by sea, but the forces of the Black Sea Fleet attacked the evacuating ships, as a result of which the Nazi allied forces lost 8,100 people.

On April 13, the cities of Simferopol, Feodosia, Saki, and Yevpatoria were liberated. The next day - Sudak, the next day - Alushta. The Crimean operation in the Second World War was coming to an end. The matter remained only with Sevastopol.

Partisan contribution

A separate topic of conversation is the partisan and underground activities of the Crimeans. The Crimean operation, in short, became the unity of the army and partisans in achieving a common goal. It is estimated that there were about 4,000 people in total. The objectives of their activities were the destruction of enemy rear lines, subversive activities, disruption of communications and railways, and blockages were made on mountain roads. The partisans disrupted the work of the port in Yalta, which greatly complicated the evacuation of German and Romanian soldiers. In addition to disruptive activities, the goal of the partisans was to prevent the destruction of industrial, transport enterprises and cities.

Here is one example of active partisan activity. On April 11, during the retreat of the 17th Wehrmacht Army to Sevastopol, the partisans captured the city of Old Crimea, as a result of which they cut the road to the retreating.

Kurt Tippelskirch - Wehrmacht General - last days described the battles as follows: the partisans actively interacted with the Soviet troops and provided assistance to them throughout the entire operation.

Assault on Sevastopol

By April 15, 1944, Soviet troops approached the main base - Sevastopol. Preparations for the assault began. By that time, the Odessa operation, which took place as part of the Dnieper-Carpathian operation, was completed. The Odessa (and Crimean) operation, during which the northern and northwestern coast of the Black Sea was liberated, made a significant contribution to the cause of Victory.

The first two attempts to capture the city on the 19th and 23rd were unsuccessful. The regrouping of troops began, as well as the supply of provisions, fuel and ammunition.

On May 7, at 10:30, with massive air support, the assault on the fortified area of ​​Sevastopol began. On May 9, the Red Army entered the city from the east, north and southeast. Sevastopol was liberated! The remaining Wehrmacht troops began to retreat, but were overtaken by the 19th Panzer Corps, where they took last Stand, as a result of which the 17th Army was completely defeated, and 21,000 soldiers (including officers) were taken prisoner along with a mass of equipment and other weapons.

Results

The last Wehrmacht bridgehead in Right Bank Ukraine, located in Crimea, represented by the 17th Army, was destroyed. More than 100 thousand German and Romanian soldiers were irretrievably lost. The total losses amounted to 140,000 Wehrmacht soldiers and officers.

For the Red Army, the threat to the southern direction of the front disappeared. The return of Sevastopol, the main base of the Black Sea Fleet, took place.

But the most important thing is that the USSR, after the Crimean operation, regained control in the Black Sea basin. This fact sharply shook Germany’s previously strong positions in Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey.

The most terrible grief in the history of our people in the 20th century is the Great Patriotic War. The Crimean operation, like all the others, had positive consequences for the offensive and strategies, but as a result of these clashes hundreds, thousands, and sometimes millions of our citizens died. The Crimean offensive operation was important strategic goal, supplied by the Soviet command. Germany needed it in 1941-1942. 250 days to capture Sevastopol. Soviet troops had 35 days to liberate the entire Crimean peninsula, 5 of which were required to storm Sevastopol. As a result of the successfully carried out operation, favorable conditions were created for the advance of Soviet armed forces to the Balkan Peninsula.