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Baltic strategic offensive operation (September 14 – November 24, 1944)

Soviet infantrymen in battle. October 1944, Riga area

The Baltic states have always been in the plans of the German leadership important place. It covered East Prussia from the northeast. Control over it allowed the German fleet to operate in the eastern part of the Baltic Sea and maintain contact with Scandinavian countries, which supplied Germany with strategic materials. The Baltic states were themselves a supply base. For example, oil shale processing plants operated in Estonia, providing Germany with about 500 thousand tons of petroleum products per year. The Germans received a significant amount of agricultural raw materials and food from the Baltic states.

Baltic strategic offensive operation Soviet troops was carried out from September 14 to November 24, 1944 with the aim of defeating the group of German troops in the Baltic states and completing the liberation of the territory of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania from German troops. The operation lasted 71 days, the width of the front reached 1000 km, and its depth - 400 km.

Baltic strategic offensive operation.
September 14 - November 24, 1944

By the end of August 1944, the general situation in the Baltic states was determined by the results of the Red Army. The German Army Group North (Colonel General F. Scherner) found itself deeply enveloped from the south and pressed against the Baltic Sea. A real threat loomed over her of being cut off from the main forces of the Wehrmacht, that is, of falling into a position that the Germans had not so long ago imposed on the Anglo-French armies in Dunkirk or the Soviet troops in Leningrad. At the same time, the configuration of the front allowed Army Group North to launch a flank attack on the troops of the Soviet fronts rushing to the Baltic Sea. But this was not 1941. Now the German leadership had to think not about an offensive, but about how to hold on to what it had. In an effort to stabilize the front in the Baltic direction, the enemy urgently erected additional defensive lines and structures here and strengthened his troops.

The strongest enemy group, which included 5 tank divisions, was located in the Riga area. This direction was considered, in the opinion of the German command, insurmountable for the Soviet troops. On the approaches to the city from the northeast and east, 4 defensive lines were equipped.

The enemy also created a strong defense in the Narva direction, especially between the Gulf of Finland and Lake Peipsi. The line previously built here, which Soviet troops were unable to overcome during the course, was significantly strengthened. Now it included three defensive lines with a total depth of 25 - 30 km.

As a rule, the main line of the main defensive lines consisted of 2 - 3 positions. The first had 2 - 3 trenches with a developed network of communication passages. Ahead of the line are barbed wire barriers and minefields. The second position was located 2 - 4 km from the first, and the third was located at the same distance from the second. The positions consisted of 1 - 2 trenches. 5 - 10 km behind the main stripe, another one - the rear stripe - was being prepared. Between the main defensive lines, the German command created, mainly with the help of penal units and the local population, intermediate lines.

Various obstacles that made actions difficult Baltic Fleet, the enemy installed in the Gulf of Finland. Both fairways along the southern and northern shores of the Gulf of Finland were mined, with the Narva Bay and Tallinn Bay being the most dense.

In August, several infantry and tank divisions were transferred from Germany, as well as from other sectors of the front, to the Baltic states. a large number of tanks and assault guns. The infantry divisions were replenished with up to 8 thousand personnel from the aviation and navy, as well as through the disbandment of various rear units and institutions, and the mobilization of the elderly and adults. A significant part of Nazi Germany's resources in manpower and military equipment was spent on replenishing the troops of Army Group North.

The troops of the left wing of the Leningradsky (Marshal of the Soviet Union), the 3rd Baltic (army general), the 2nd Baltic (army general), the 1st Baltic (army general), and part of the forces of the 3rd Belorussian ( general of the army) of the fronts, the forces of the Baltic Fleet (Admiral V.F. Tributs) and long-range aviation. In total, they consisted of 900 thousand people, about 17.5 thousand guns and mortars, over 3 thousand tanks and self-propelled artillery units, and more than 2.6 thousand combat aircraft. The coordination of the actions of the three Baltic fronts was carried out by the representative of the Supreme Command Headquarters, Marshal of the Soviet Union, while the Headquarters retained the leadership of the actions of the Leningrad Front.

The enemy group opposing the Soviet troops in the Baltics included the Narva operational group, the 18th and 16th field, the 3rd tank army (transferred on September 20 from Army Group Center to Army Group North) army - a total of 730 thousand. people, 7 thousand guns and mortars, over 1.2 thousand tanks and assault guns, up to 400 combat aircraft.

The combat effectiveness of German troops in the Baltic states was higher than in other groups. It was supported by brutal discipline and Gestapo surveillance of soldiers and officers. Behind the combat units, to “maintain their morale,” there were SS troops barrage detachments, who, using machine gun fire, prevented the infantry from retreating from their positions. Fascist propaganda persistently tried to convince the soldiers that a turning point in the war would soon come. It was said that by declaring total mobilization, Germany would form many new divisions and be able to launch a decisive offensive. Non-existent super-powerful weapons were praised in every possible way. It was clear from everything that Hitler not only did not think of withdrawing his troops from the Baltic states, but, on the contrary, tried in every possible way to strengthen them.

Radio reconnaissance provided valuable information about the enemy, the composition of his troops and their location. At that time, radio reconnaissance units, by the handwriting of enemy radio operators, by the power of the stations, call signs and special signs of work, quickly and accurately determined the location of headquarters of all levels, and accurately indicated the defense areas of divisions and regiments. These data, as a rule, were confirmed by the capture of control prisoners.

The plan of the Soviet command was to cut off the enemy group defending in the Baltic States from East Prussia by striking the troops of the Baltic fronts in converging directions towards Riga and the troops of the Leningrad Front together with the Baltic Fleet in the Tallinn direction, dismembering it and destroying it piece by piece. At the same time, the main efforts were concentrated against the enemy grouping in the Riga region (the main forces of the 16th and 18th German armies), where the troops of the three Baltic fronts were supposed to strike in converging directions. The liquidation of the enemy group in Estonia (Operational Group "Narva") and the liberation of the Estonian SSR was planned to be carried out by the troops of the Leningrad Front with the assistance of the Baltic Fleet.

The Leningrad Front was ordered to strike from the Tartu region in the direction of Rakvere and, moving with the main forces to the rear of the Narva enemy group, encircle and destroy it. Subsequently, develop an offensive against Tallinn, liberate the capital of Estonia and reach the eastern coast of the Baltic Sea.

The Baltic Fleet was obliged to cover the flanks of the groups of the Leningrad Front, prevent the landing of enemy troops and the withdrawal of enemy forces from Estonia by sea.

The 3rd Baltic Front delivered the main blow on its right wing and in cooperation with the 2nd Baltic Front, which was attacking Riga from the east, with the aim of defeating the enemy group opposing them.

The 1st Baltic Front was ordered to advance with its main forces along the left bank of the Western Dvina towards Riga with the task of reaching the coast of the Gulf of Riga in the area of ​​the Latvian capital, preventing the withdrawal of the troops of Army Group North towards East Prussia.

Thus, the main blow of the three Baltic fronts was aimed at the capital of Latvia, Riga, the most important political, administrative and industrial center, the intersection of land and sea communications.

In terms of its scope, the Baltic offensive operation was one of the largest strategic operations of the autumn of 1944, because 12 armies were deployed on a 500-km front, which amounted to almost 3/4 of the forces of the four Soviet fronts.

The beginning of the offensive of the Baltic fronts in the Riga direction was scheduled for September 5-7, the troops of the Leningrad Front - for September 15. Fulfilling the tasks set by the Supreme Command headquarters required a very complex complex preparatory activities. Within a week, the Soviet troops had to increase the total number of tanks and self-propelled guns in the breakthrough areas by almost 1.5 times. Particular attention was paid to tanks directly supporting the infantry. However, this problem could not be completely solved, since, according to the instructions of the Supreme Command Headquarters, tank and mechanized corps were prescribed to be used only to develop success. Therefore, out of the 287 tanks and self-propelled guns available on the 2nd Baltic Front, only 133 combat vehicles were used as direct infantry support tanks. Preparations for the offensive operation were carried out in all directions. The troops were busy accumulating ammunition, fuel, food, and supplying hospitals with everything necessary. In formations and units, combat training was underway with all categories of personnel - fighters and commanders learned to overcome the enemy’s developed defense system, overcome various engineering structures, obstacles, cross rivers and lakes.

Despite working around the clock, there was not enough time. In this regard, the Headquarters delayed the start of the operation for a week; The troops of the Leningrad Front were supposed to launch an offensive on September 17. Thanks to this, the rear forces, which did not manage to deliver the required amount of ammunition, fuel and food by the originally scheduled date, were able to make up for lost time. The engineering troops were better prepared to overcome water obstacles and completed the construction of the planned roads and column tracks. By this time, dry, sunny weather had established itself in the Baltic states. The roads finally dried out, and Soviet troops rushed to take advantage of this.

On September 14, 1944, the troops of the Baltic fronts, after artillery and air preparation, began an offensive in the Riga direction. Despite the stubborn resistance of the Germans, their first position was broken through by 2 - 4 km by the end of the day. In the zone of the 1st Baltic Front, the 43rd Army of Lieutenant General A.P. Beloborodov and the 4th Shock Army of Lieutenant General P.F. Malyshev crossed the Lielupe River and broke through the defenses of German troops. During the first 3 days of the operation, the troops of the front’s strike group advanced southeast of Riga to a depth of 50 km. The rear army defensive line of the enemy, which was the southern front of the Sigulda line, which was highly developed in engineering terms, was broken through on an 8-km front. The advanced units of the 43rd Army fought just 25 km southeast of the capital of Latvia. Success was ensured by suppressing enemy defenses with high-density artillery fire and air strikes. The dams built in the upper reaches of the Memele and Lielupe rivers also played a role. When the attack began, they were closed, as a result of which the water level dropped, and the infantry and tanks were able to quickly cross the rivers. Having broken through the Sigulda line, which was of great operational importance in the enemy’s defense system, the troops of the 1st Baltic Front created the threat of cutting off the main forces of Army Group North in the Baltics.

The German command took all measures to stop the advance of the troops of the 1st Baltic Front in the Riga direction at any cost and to withdraw the troops of Army Group North, defending north of the Western Dvina River, to the rear defensive line of Sigulda. To eliminate the threat to Riga from the south, the enemy decided to carry out two counterattacks: the first with the forces of the 3rd Tank Army in the direction of Jelgava, the second with 2 tank and 4 infantry divisions against the advancing 43rd Army. On September 17, especially bloody battles began in these areas. Some positions changed hands several times. More and more reinforcements were approaching the Germans. The German command transferred part of its forces from the 2nd Baltic Front. Despite persistent attacks, the enemy failed to achieve their goal. On September 22, he stopped offensive operations.

Events unfolded much more slowly in the zones of the 3rd and 2nd Baltic fronts. North of the Western Dvina they encountered stubborn enemy resistance. It was on this section of the front that General Scherner threw all his available forces. In the first 3 days, the offensive of both fronts took on the character of protracted battles with little progress within the main enemy defense line.

At the command post of the 2nd Baltic Front.
From right to left: front commander A. I. Eremenko, chief of staff L. M. Sandalov, head of the political department A. P. Pigurnov
and member of the Military Council V.N. Bogatkin. Autumn 1944

At the same time, the German command was forced to use up all available reserves. The divisions defending here were drained of blood and were reduced to battle groups. General Scherner reported to Hitler that the German troops in the Baltic States, who had lost almost half of their strength, had come last moment. Army Group North was unable to conduct long-term defensive operations, so only one option remains for it - to leave. The next day, Scherner received permission to withdraw troops to East Prussia.

On September 17, when all the attention of the German command was focused on the Riga direction, the troops of the left wing of the Leningrad Front (8th and 2nd shock armies), with the participation of the Baltic Fleet, began an attack on Tallinn. A complete surprise for the German command was the appearance of the 2nd Shock Army of Lieutenant General in the Tartu area. Just a few days before the start of the offensive, she was behind Lake Peipsi. However, thanks to a bold maneuver, in half a month it was possible to transport more than 100 thousand people, 1000 guns, 4 thousand cars, more than 13 thousand horses, 14 thousand tons of ammunition and 67 thousand tons of food across the lake.

Operating against the troops of the left wing of the Leningrad Front, the Narva operational group, due to the unfavorable operational-strategic situation, was preparing for the withdrawal of its troops from Estonia, which was scheduled for the evening of September 19. However, the breakthrough by Soviet troops of the enemy’s defenses in the Tartu region with the further development of the offensive of the 2nd Shock Army in the northern direction created a threat of encirclement of the Nazi troops defending on the isthmus between Narva Bay and Lake Peipus, and thwarted the plans of the enemy command for the systematic withdrawal of troops from Estonia . Therefore, the troops of the Narva operational group were forced to begin their retreat a day earlier than planned.

Subsequently, the troops of the Leningrad Front developed a rapid pursuit of the enemy in the western and southwestern directions. The 2nd Shock Army, after reaching the Rakvere area, deployed its main forces to the southwest and by September 24 reached the coast of the Gulf of Riga. To the south, troops of the 67th Army (Lieutenant General V.Z. Romanovsky) of the 3rd Baltic Front reached the coast. The troops of the 8th Army of Lieutenant General F.N. Starikov, to which the 8th Estonian Rifle Corps was transferred, advancing at a pace of up to 40 km per day on September 22 liberated the capital of the Estonian SSR Tallinn - an important naval base and a major port on the Baltic Sea. As part of the 8th Army, the 7th Estonian Division under the command of Colonel K. A. Allikas entered Tallinn.

Soldiers of the 8th Estonian Corps enter Tallinn after the liberation of the city from German troops. September 1944

Fighting front were carried out jointly with the Baltic Fleet, whose ships, with their fire, landing reconnaissance groups and landing troops, supported the offensive of troops along the coast of the Gulf of Finland. The aviation of the 13th Air Army under Lieutenant General S. D. Rybalchenko and the fleet aviation under the command of Lieutenant General M. I. Samokhin were active.

In the following days (until September 26), the troops of the Leningrad Front reached the Baltic Sea coast all the way from Tallinn to Pärnu, thereby completing the clearing of the enemy from the entire territory of Estonia, with the exception of the islands of Dago and Ezel. By the directive of the Supreme Command Headquarters of September 27, the 2nd Shock Army, consisting of 9 divisions, was withdrawn to the Headquarters reserve.

During the Tallinn operation, which lasted only 10 days, the troops of the Leningrad Front defeated 4 infantry divisions, 5 artillery regiments, and a number of other units and subunits, and 3 divisions and 1 brigade were greatly weakened. During the operation, over 30 thousand were killed and about 16 thousand enemy soldiers and officers were captured.

At the same time, the offensive of Soviet troops in the Riga direction stalled. The enemy group here was replenished by forces that had withdrawn from Estonia. It now consisted of 33 divisions, including 4 tank divisions. The Supreme High Command headquarters, taking into account that further fighting in the Riga area would be associated with heavy losses, on September 24 decided to transfer the main efforts to a new direction - Memel, where 7 - 8 enemy divisions were operating.

On the same day, preparations began for the Memel operation, which was to be carried out by troops of the 1st Baltic Front and the 39th Army of the 3rd Belorussian Front. The main objective of this operation was the defeat of the enemy group operating in the Memel direction (formations of the 3rd Tank Army), the exit of our troops to the coast of the Baltic Sea, which achieved the isolation of all troops of Army Group North from the rest of the forces of the Nazi army, pinning it down to the sea and creating conditions for its complete destruction. The start of the offensive was scheduled for October 5.

Headquarters ordered General I. Kh. Bagramyan to regroup all front forces in the Siauliai area. At the same time, General A.I. Eremenko was ordered to relieve the troops of the right wing of the 1st Baltic Front in a 60-km section from the Western Dvina River to Bene inclusive.

The troops of the 2nd and 3rd Baltic Fronts were supposed to, having regrouped, resume active operations in the Riga-Libau direction on October 7, liberate Riga and clear the coast of the Gulf of Riga from Riga to Libau from the enemy. The offensive in the Memel direction was ensured from the north by active actions towards Liepaja by the 4th Shock Army and from the south by an attack by the 39th Army of the 3rd Belorussian Front from the Raseiniai area in the direction of Taurage. In connection with the Moonsund landing operation of the troops of the Leningrad Front and the forces of the Baltic Fleet, which began on September 27, as well as the active actions of the troops of the 3rd and 2nd Baltic fronts in the Riga area, the enemy was unable to transfer significant forces from the Sigulda line to repel the Soviet offensive troops in the Memel direction.

On the morning of October 5, after powerful artillery and air preparation, the troops of the 1st Baltic Front began an offensive. Due to the suddenness of the attack, the enemy was unable to offer any serious resistance.

Using the success achieved on the first day of the offensive, the front commander, General Bagramyan, decided to introduce the armies of the second echelon of the front into battle the next day. This decision was determined by the need to quickly defeat the enemy troops and prevent an organized approach of his reserves. In 4 days, the enemy defenses were broken through to a depth of 60 - 70 km, and the total width of the breakthrough front was about 200 km. German troops suffered heavy losses. Formations of the 5th Guards Tank Army under the command of Lieutenant General V.T. Volsky, operating in operational depth, on the sixth day of the offensive they reached the Baltic Sea coast in the Palanga area, thereby cutting off Army Group North from communications connecting it with Germany.

On October 9, 1944, an order was heard on the radio Supreme Commander-in-Chief. It said that the troops of the 1st Baltic Front, with the assistance of the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front, broke through the heavily fortified enemy defenses and in 4 days of offensive battles advanced up to 100 km. During the offensive, they captured a number of important strongholds of enemy defense and liberated over 2,000 settlements in battle. At 20:30, to commemorate the victory, the capital of our Motherland, Moscow, saluted the troops of the 1st Baltic Front with 20 salvos from 224 guns.

Salute to the soldiers of the Red Army,
reaching the coast of the Baltic Sea. Autumn 1944

However, the advance of the 43rd Army was soon stopped on the approaches to Memel, where the Germans erected powerful defensive structures. They were fortress-type forts with reinforced concrete structures in the form of pillboxes, connected by underground communication passages. The enemy brought in coastal defense artillery and warships brought into the port of Memel to defend the city. The defensive structures were occupied by withdrawn formations, as well as units transferred to Memel by sea. The 43rd Army was unable to overcome such a powerful defense on its own. The front commander was not able to provide assistance due to the fact that the main forces of the front were involved in the destruction of the Courland group pressed to the sea. The further struggle for Memel in October 1944 did not produce positive results. The city was liberated only in 1945.

While the troops of the 1st Baltic Front advanced towards the sea, the 2nd and 3rd Baltic Fronts attacked Riga north of the Daugava. As our troops approached the capital of Latvia, the enemy increasingly used all kinds of barriers, especially in the wooded and swampy areas along the banks of the Maza-Jugla River, but this could no longer stop the formations of the Red Army.

At dawn on October 10, troops of the 2nd and 3rd Baltic Fronts from the Gulf of Riga to the city of Jelgava attacked the enemy and, having knocked him off the intermediate defensive line, approached Riga another 8 - 12 km. In all areas they approached the last defensive line in front of the city - the city perimeter. On October 12, fighting broke out on the outskirts of the Latvian capital. The next day, formations of the 1st Shock Army of Lieutenant General N.D. Zakhvataev and the 67th Army of General V.Z. Romanovsky cleared the eastern part of the city from the enemy. In the afternoon, the advance detachment of the 374th Infantry Division, Colonel Gorodetsky, managed to cross to the left bank of the Daugava and seize a bridgehead there, which was immediately expanded. Panic began among the Germans. Fearing that they would be cut off from the Daugava, they moved towards the river.

On October 14, fighting began on the southern approaches to Riga. After fierce fighting, the 10th Guards Army of Lieutenant General M.I. Kazakov and the 130th Latvian Rifle Corps, advancing in this direction, cleared the western part of the city from the enemy on October 15, thereby completing the liberation of Riga.

Soldiers of the 130th Latvian Rifle Corps
pass through liberated Riga. October 1944

At this time, the 43rd Army and the tank corps of the 5th Guards Tank Army of the 1st Baltic Front bypassed Memel from the north and south and blocked the city from land, and the troops of the 2nd Guards Army of Lieutenant General P. G. Chanchibadze left to the border with East Prussia.

The troops of the 39th Army of Colonel General I.I. Lyudnikov from the 3rd Belorussian Front, using the success of the 1st Baltic Front, also reached East Prussia by October 11 and wedged into its borders. Subsequently, these armies continued their offensive in the Tilsit direction and by the end of October they had completely cleared the northern bank of the Neman River from the enemy.

As a result of the Memel and Riga operations, Soviet troops reached the Baltic coast, penetrated the territory of East Prussia and cut off Army Group North from it. Despite the major defeat, the Nazis managed to withdraw the main forces of Army Group North (about 34 divisions) to the Courland Peninsula and organize stubborn resistance there.

The Supreme Command Headquarters directive of October 16 abolished the 3rd Baltic Front, its administration, front-line units, institutions and the 54th Army were transferred to the Headquarters reserve, and the remaining troops were transferred to the Leningrad (67th Army), 1st (61st 1st Army) and 2nd (1st Shock Army, 14th Air Army) Baltic Fronts. The destruction of the Courland group was entrusted to the troops of the 2nd and 1st Baltic fronts. Coordination of the actions of the two Baltic and 3rd Belorussian fronts was entrusted to A. M. Vasilevsky. L. A. Govorov remained commander of the troops of the Leningrad Front.

On October 17, the troops of the two Baltic fronts continued their offensive. The enemy was well aware of the area from which the main attack was being launched and the direction of the attack. The German command left an extensive intelligence network on the territory of Latvia. In addition, radio and air reconnaissance established the regrouping of the main forces of the 2nd Baltic Front to the left flank, and the troops of the 1st Baltic Front to the right. Therefore, the advance of the fronts on this day did not exceed 2 - 4 km.

On October 18, the Supreme High Command Headquarters pointed out the exceptional importance of the speedy liquidation of German troops northeast of Liepaja and in the Memel area, demanding that all the efforts of the troops of the 1st and 2nd Baltic Fronts be directed towards their defeat, to attract long-range aviation and aviation of the Baltic Fleet, and to intensify actions submarines on sea lanes.

Using the offensive of the Baltic fronts in the Riga and Memel directions, the troops of the Leningrad Front, together with the Baltic Fleet, successfully completed the Moonsund landing operation to liberate the Moonsund archipelago. Hitler, in a special directive, ordered the defense of the Moonsund archipelago at all costs. The islands' garrisons were tasked with preparing an insurmountable defense at the most likely sites for Soviet landings. The enemy had almost 14 thousand people on the Moonsund Islands, most of of which it defended the largest island of Saaremaa (Ezel). The defensive group was supported by the fire of 10 artillery battalions and air strikes based at the airfields of Courland. In addition, the defenders were supported by naval forces consisting of destroyers, self-propelled artillery barges, minesweepers, torpedo and patrol ships.

The task of liberating the island part of Estonia was entrusted to the 8th Army of the Leningrad Front under the command of General I. O. Starikov. From the Baltic Fleet, 58 torpedo boats, 13 patrol ships, 13 minesweepers, 8 naval armored boats, 40 tenders and 2 assault divisions of naval aviation were allocated for the operation.

On September 27, the troops of the 8th Army, with the participation of naval forces, occupied the island of Vormsi with landing units, and on September 30, the island of Muhu, thereby preparing a springboard for the deployment of the main forces to capture the islands of Hiiumaa (Dago) and Ezel. On October 3, Dago was cleared of the enemy. From October 5 to October 9, there was a struggle for Ezel, which ended with our troops reaching the isthmus in the southern part of the island.

The liquidation of the remnants of the Nazi troops entrenched in the southern part of the island of Ezel, due to a significant strengthening of the enemy, as well as due to a lack of artillery, ammunition and a number of shortcomings in command and control, was completed only on November 24, 1944.

With the completion of this task, as well as with the entry of our troops to the Baltic Sea coast south of Libau, the conditions for the operations of ships and submarines of the Baltic Fleet on the enemy’s communications, connecting his Courland group with Germany, significantly improved.

The offensive of the Soviet troops in the Baltic states was facilitated by the successful actions of the 3rd Belorussian Front. In the period from October 16 to October 30, his troops with the forces of 5 combined arms armies broke through the enemy's long-term defense in depth, covering the border of East Prussia, and invaded its borders on a 100-km front and to a depth of 60 km. The fighting was transferred directly to German territory.

The significance of the operation of the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front was that it pinned down long time large enemy forces, not allowing them to be used for an attack against the 1st Baltic Front, which reached the coast of the Baltic Sea and the Neman River. Moreover, the divisions of the SS Panzer Corps "Hermann Goering", transferred from reserve to the Tilsit area to launch a counterattack on the left wing of the troops of the 1st Baltic Front, were turned in the direction of the latter with the beginning of the offensive of the 3rd Belorussian Front.

As a result of the offensive of Soviet troops in the Baltic strategic direction Army Group North was expelled from almost the entire Baltic region and lost communications connecting it by land with East Prussia. Of the 59 divisions, 26 were defeated, and 3 were completely destroyed. The remaining forces of this group found themselves pinned to the sea in Courland and in the Memel area. The length of the front line in the Baltic sector was reduced to 250 km, which made it possible to free up significant forces of Soviet troops and use them in the offensive in the winter of 1945.

With the loss of the Baltic states, Germany lost a profitable strategic area, which provided its fleet with freedom of action in the eastern part of the Baltic Sea, as well as an important industrial, raw material and food base.

The struggle for the Baltic states was long and extremely fierce. The enemy, having a well-developed road network, actively maneuvered with its forces and means, put up stubborn resistance to the Soviet troops, often launching counterattacks and delivering counterattacks. On his part, up to 25% of all forces on the Soviet-German front took part in the fighting.

The success of such a large strategic operation in the coastal area was largely ensured by the organization of close interaction between the ground forces and aviation and naval forces. The main efforts of the air armies were aimed at supporting ground forces in the direction of the main attacks of the fronts. Only the 14th, 15th and 3rd Air Armies, operating as part of the Baltic fronts, carried out 55 thousand combat sorties during the operation.

Wide circle The Baltic Fleet carried out its tasks: landing troops, covering the flanks of ground forces from enemy attacks from the sea, providing fire support to the troops operating on the islands, carrying out military transportation, and disrupting enemy sea communications. Partisans and underground fighters were actively fighting behind enemy lines and closely interacting with the advancing troops. The enemy was forced to divert significant forces from the front to fight against the partisans and protect their communications.

The distinctive features of the military art of the Soviet troops in the Baltic operation were the transfer of the main efforts during the offensive from one direction to another, the secret regrouping of large forces over long distances, the preparation of a new offensive operation in a short time during the offensive, the blocking of enemy groups in a limited space by pressing them to the sea, the skillful massive use of artillery, tanks and aircraft in the direction of the main attack. As a result of the Baltic operation, the preconditions were created for the development of the offensive of Soviet troops in East Prussia, which was then carried out during the East Prussian offensive operation of 1945.

During the Baltic operation, 112 Soviet soldiers were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, three were awarded the second Gold Star medal, over 332 thousand were awarded orders and medals, 131 units and formations received honorary names of Riga, Tallinn, Valgin and others, 481 - state awards.

As a result of the offensive of the Soviet troops in July - August 1944, German troops in the Baltic states found themselves pressed against the Baltic Sea in a limited area, and their main forces were deeply encircled from the south.

This made it possible to carry out the Baltic strategic offensive operation with the goal of the final defeat of the German group, which consisted of Army Group North (commander - Colonel General F. Scherner), the 3rd Tank Army of Army Group Center (on September 20, included in Army Group "North"), the 1st Air Fleet and part of the forces of the 6th Air Fleet.

This group numbered 730,000 people and had 7 thousand guns and mortars, more than 1.2 thousand tanks and assault guns and 400 aircraft. The enemy occupied a strong, multi-lane, equipped defense, echeloned throughout the entire depth from the front line to the Baltic Sea coast.

The liquidation of a large and well-armed group required a series of successive operations to dismember and destroy piece by piece the main enemy forces. To do this, the troops of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Baltic Fronts, as well as the Leningrad Front in the Tallinn direction, together with the Baltic Fleet, had to cut off the Baltic enemy group from East Prussia and deliver powerful attacks on converging directions in general direction to Riga.

The main efforts should have been concentrated on defeating the main forces of the 18th and 16th armies operating in the Riga area. Baltic operation included four combined general plan operations: Riga, Tallinn, Moonsund landing and Memel.

The Soviet troops participating in the operation numbered: 900 thousand people and had about 17,500 guns and mortars, 3,000 tanks and self-propelled artillery, over 2,500 combat aircraft (excluding the involved Baltic Fleet and Long-Range aviation).

On September 14, the troops of the 1st (commander - Army General I.Kh. Bagramyan), 2nd (commander - Army General A.I. Eremenko) and 3rd (commander - Army General I.I. Maslennikov) Baltic fronts began Riga offensive operation.

The troops of the 1st Baltic Front successfully broke through the enemy’s defenses and, developing the offensive with battles, advanced to a depth of 50 km by the end of the third day, threatening to cut communications leading to East Prussia. The German command began to withdraw the Narva group from Estonia and the left flank of the 18th Army from the area of ​​Lake Võrtsjärv in order to strengthen the group near Riga. On September 16, the enemy tried to ease the position of his troops south of Riga and launched two counterattacks in the area southwest of Dobele and from the area northwest of Baldone, but was unsuccessful. In the first three days, the troops of the 3rd and 2nd Baltic Fronts were unable to advance further than the enemy’s main line of defense.

On September 17, the troops of the Leningrad Front (commander - Marshal of the Soviet Union L.A. Govorov), with the support of the forces of the Baltic Fleet, began the Tallinn operation. They successfully broke through the enemy's defenses and occupied the capital of Estonia, Tallinn, on September 22. 23 September 18th

The German army began to retreat to the Sigulda line, located 60-80 km around Riga, and the troops of the 3rd Baltic Front began pursuing the enemy. On September 22, the troops of the 2nd Baltic Front also managed to overcome the enemy’s defenses, but on September 27, the troops of both fronts were stopped by the enemy at the Sigulda line. The troops of the Leningrad Front, successfully developing the offensive, liberated the entire territory of Estonia by September 26, except for the Moonsund Islands.

Due to the withdrawal of the 18th Army and the Narva operational group, the German command managed to concentrate a large group in the Riga area - over 30 divisions. At the same time, the section of the front from Auce to Neman in the Memel direction turned out to be weakened - at that time there were no more than 8 divisions of the 3rd Tank Army on it. Based on the current situation, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command decided on September 24 to shift the direction of the main attack to the Memel direction, with the goal of cutting off Army Group North and defeating it. In accordance with the new tasks, the troops of the 1st Baltic Front began to regroup in the Siauliai region. The troops of the 2nd and 3rd Baltic Fronts also regrouped their forces to resume the offensive on Riga.

On October 5, troops of the 1st Baltic Front, with the assistance of the 39th Army of the 3rd Belorussian Front, began the Memel operation. Having broken through the enemy’s defenses and developing an offensive in depth, the mobile forces of the front on October 10 broke out onto the Baltic Sea coast north and south of Memel (Klaipeda) and blocked the port city from land; Another group of front troops at that time reached the border with East Prussia at Taurags. Under the influence of the blow in the Memel direction, the command of Army Group North began a hasty withdrawal of troops from the Riga area to Courland on October 6.

On the night of October 5–6, the troops of the 2nd and 3rd Baltic Fronts resumed their attack on Riga and, while pursuing the retreating enemy, reached the outer defensive perimeter by October 10; on October 12, battles for the city began. On October 13, troops of the 3rd Baltic Front liberated the right bank part of the city, and on October 15, troops of the 2nd Baltic Front liberated the left bank.

From September 27 to October 10, troops of the Leningrad Front, in cooperation with the Baltic Fleet, carried out the main part of the Moonsund operation. The successful solution of problems was ensured by the close interaction of the ground forces, aviation and navy.

On October 16, the 3rd Baltic Front was disbanded, and the troops of the 1st and 2nd Baltic Fronts continued their offensive in the directions of Tukums and Saldus. By October 22, the troops of the right wing of the 2nd Baltic Front reached the enemy’s Tukum defensive line, completing the Riga operation, and together with the troops of the 1st Baltic Front blocked the main forces of Army Group North in Courland. On the same day, the 39th Army of the 3rd Belorussian Front pushed the enemy back beyond the Neman. On November 24, the troops of the Leningrad Front and the forces of the Baltic Fleet completed the Moonsund landing operation, during which they liberated the islands of the Moonsund archipelago.

As a result of the Baltic operation, German troops were expelled from the Baltic states, 26 divisions of Army Group North were defeated and 3 divisions were completely destroyed. The main forces of this group - 27 divisions and 1 brigade - were pressed to the sea on the Kurland Peninsula and lost their strategic importance. The surrounded Courland group capitulated on May 8, 1945. As a result of the operation, favorable conditions were created for the development of the offensive in East Prussia.

Baltic operation of 1944, strategic offensive operation of the Soviet Union. troops in the Great, carried out September 14 - November 24 in order to defeat the Nazis. troops in the Baltic states and completion of the liberation of the Baltic republics. (For the map, see the inset to pp. 496-497.) Leningrad troops took part in the operation. (commander Marshal of the Soviet Union L.A. Govorov), 3rd Baltic. (command, army general I. I. Maslennikov), 2nd Baltic. (command, Army General A.I. Eremenko), 1st Baltic. (command, army general I. Kh. Bagramyan), part of the forces of the 3rd Belorus, fronts (command, army general I. D. Chernyakhovsky), as well as the Red Banner Balt. fleet (KBF) (command, adm. V.F. Tribune), operationally subordinate to the commander of the Leningrad troops. retention of this strategically important area, since its loss further complicated the military-political situation. the importance of military operations, studying the experience of previous operations with the breakthrough of strong enemy defenses and offensives in wooded and swampy areas. Much attention was paid to working with young recruits and educating soldiers in the spirit of friendship between the peoples of the USSR. part 4 tank. In the Memel direction (from Autse to the Neman River) 7-8 divisions of the pr-ka operated, including 4 tank ones. Based on the current situation, Sov. The troops launched a powerful frontal attack in the Memel direction, where the pr-ka grouping and its defenses were weaker than in the Riga region. They were faced with the task of cutting off the German fascists. Army Group "North" from the East. Prussia, DZI "carrying out the Memel operation of 1944. The 1st Baltic Front, secretly from the pr-ka, regrouped all its troops in the Siauliai region and on October 5 launched a strike in the direction of Memel (Klaipeda). The offensive in the Memel direction was ensured with S. active actions towards Libau (Liepaja) of the 4th Shock Army and with the southern attack of the 39th Army and the 3rd Belorussian Front from the Rossiena region (Raseiniai) in the direction of Taurage in connection with the Moonsund War that began on September 27. the landing operation of the troops of the Leningrad Front and the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, as well as the active actions of the troops of the 3rd and 2nd Baltic fronts in the Riga region, the pr-k was unable to transfer forces from the Sigulda line to repel the advance of the Soviet troops in Memel. direction. As a result of the Memel operation, the Soviet troops reached the coast of the Baltic Sea, penetrated the territory of East Prussia and cut off the entire Army Group North, while the troops of the 1st Baltic Front launched an offensive in the Memel direction. , troops of the 3rd and 2nd Baltic fronts from 6 Oct. moved on to pursue the pr-ka, which began under the threat of losing the escape route to the East. Prussia hastily retreated from the Riga sector of the front to the Courland Peninsula. October 13 owls troops liberated Riga. Oct 16 front. Coordination of actions of the Baltic states. fronts was carried out by the representative of the Supreme Command Headquarters, Marshal Sov. Union of A. M. Vasilevsky; from 24 Sep. Sov operations troops in the Baltic States was facilitated by the offensive of the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front in the East. Prussia in the Gumbinnen direction. They pinned down large forces for a long time, not allowing them to be used against the 1st Baltic. front. The most important political the result of P. o. was the completion of the liberation of the Sov. Baltic states (except Courland) from German-Fasc. invaders. Fash. Germany lost an important food and raw material base, and its army lost a profitable bridgehead from which it could threaten a flank attack by the Owls. troops advancing in the East. Prussia. Victory of the Owls. The armies in the Baltic states hastened Finland's exit from the war. As a result, P. o. the pr-ka grouping in the Baltics has lost its strategist and significance. Of the 59 formations that were there at the beginning of the Soviet offensive. troops, 29 were defeated, and the rest were isolated in Courland and blocked (3 divisions) in the Memel region. The length of the front line in the Baltic sector was reduced to 250 km, which made it possible to free up the Sov forces. troops and use them during the offensive in the winter of 1945. P. o. characterized by great scope. Troops from 5 fronts, the Red Banner Baltic Fleet and long-range aviation units were involved in the offensive. On the side of the pr-ka, up to 25% of all forces located on the Soviet-German front took part in the fighting. The depth of front-line operations at the first stage of the offensive was 250-300 km and at the second - 130 km. The total offensive zone reached 1000 km. By. showed an increased military art of Sov. Army. Most new coming operations. The secrecy of the regrouping ensured the surprise of the attack and, to a large extent, the success of the entire operation. Basic

air effort armies were sent to support the ground. troops on ch. directions of the fronts. At the first stage of P. o. only the 14th, 15th and 3rd air armies, operating as part of the three Baltic states. fronts, carried out 34 thousand, and during the entire operation 55 thousand combat sorties. During the preparation and conduct of the operation in the Baltic States, the Red Banner Baltic Fleet transported troops and equipment, covered the flanks of the advancing troops from the sea, with aviation and naval artillery forces, and provided fire support to the troops advancing in the following directions, and landed seas. landings, fought at sea.

communications. Successful actions of the owls. The troops in the Baltic States were supported by partisans and underground fighters of the Baltic States. republics The pr-k was forced to divert forces from the front to fight against the partisans and to protect its communications. Sov.

The troops showed massive heroism in battle. 112 soldiers were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Union, three - second medal "Gold Star", St. 332 thousand were awarded orders and medals. 131 units and formations received the honorary name of Riga, Tallinn, Valginsky, etc., 481 received government awards.

A. S. Galitsan.

Materials from the Soviet Military Encyclopedia in 8 volumes, volume 6 were used.

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