Vistula-Oder Operation December 1944 - January 1945 The Great Patriotic War provided many wonderful examples of military operations. Some of them have survived to this day, while others, due to various circumstances, remained unknown. On these pages of my memories

Lithuania and the other Baltic republics were under Nazi occupation for three years. In Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, the Nazis killed more than 1 million 100 thousand people, many tens of thousands of people languished in concentration camps and prisons. For example, in Lithuania alone the Germans destroyed a quarter of the population.

In the plans for the defense of the Baltic states, the Nazis paid the greatest attention to Estonia, which had great military and political significance. Losing her would lead to sharp deterioration for Germany the situation in the Baltic Sea. The German command continued to maintain significant forces here in order to repel a possible offensive of the Red Army. The liberation of Estonia began after the defeat of the Germans near Novgorod, when the troops of the Leningrad Front reached the river in early February 1944. Narva and immediately began to cross it.

The position of the Nazi troops in the Baltic states became even more complicated as a result of the successful offensive of Soviet troops in Belarus. Army Group North found itself deeply encircled from the south and pressed against the Baltic Sea in a relatively small area.

The advance of our troops in Baltics resulted in a series of successive attacks on the fronts. The first to go on the offensive on July 10, 1944 were the troops of the 2nd Baltic Front, on July 17 the 3rd Baltic Front began the offensive, and on July 24 the troops of the Leningrad Front joined the offensive. In the southern regions of Lithuania, troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front were advancing in the Vilnius-Kaunas direction. By July 13, they liberated the capital of the Lithuanian SSR, the city of Vilnius, from the German invaders, and Kaunas on August 1, and then reached the Lithuanian border with East Prussia.

At the end of July the troops 1st Baltic Front were on the closest approaches to Riga from the south and southwest. The armies of the 2nd and 3rd Baltic Fronts continued to fight with stubbornly resisting enemy troops. Germany sought to retain the Baltic territory at all costs; the Germans there significantly expanded the construction of defensive lines and strengthened the group of their troops defending them. Already in August, eight divisions (including three tank ones) were transferred from the Reich and from other sectors of the Eastern Front to the Baltic states. The number of infantry divisions was increased to 8–9 thousand people by replenishing them with personnel from other branches of the military, as well as their mobilized citizens who were previously not subject to military conscription: the elderly and minors.

In August 1944, the most acute situation developed in the zone of the 1st Baltic Front. The enemy command, having concentrated six infantry, six tank divisions and two brigades against the Soviet troops that had broken through to the sea, launched a strong counterattack from the areas west of Riga and Siauliai. The enemy managed to push the front troops away from the coast of the Gulf of Riga and restore communications between Army Groups “North” and “Center”. The advance of Soviet units in the Riga direction was slow and bloody; an attempt to take Riga with a surprise attack from the south was unsuccessful, so the direction of the main attack was transferred from Riga to the Memel direction. Simultaneously troops of the 2nd and 3rd Baltic fronts They attacked successfully in the Riga direction.

Baltic strategic offensive operation Soviet troops (September 14 - November 24, 1944) was carried out with the aim of defeating Army Group North and complete liberation from the Nazi invaders of the territory of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. During Baltic operation provided for strikes by three Baltic fronts in converging directions on Riga with the aim of cutting off Army Group North from the rest of the German army. In total, over 47 divisions (more than 700 thousand people), including 8 tank and motorized.

The enemy prepared a strong and deeply layered defense. By the beginning of the operation, the Soviet side had troops with a total number of over 900 thousand people, about 20 thousand guns and mortars, up to 3 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, about 3.5 thousand aircraft. From the sea he supported and participated in the Baltic operation KBF(Red Banner Baltic Fleet).

The summer offensive of Soviet troops in the Baltic states led to expansion of the common front of the Red Army's strategic offensive. Favorable environment for a decisive offensive in the Baltic strategic direction was created only towards the end of the summer of 1944 during major military victories won by Soviet troops over the Wehrmacht.

The Baltic operation included four front-line and inter-front operations: Riga, Tallinn, Moonsund And Memel. In the Riga direction, the troops of the three Baltic fronts were supposed to attack the enemy group consisting of the 16th and 18th German armies, dismember it and destroy it piece by piece. The actions of the Soviet fronts in the Baltic states were coordinated and provided general management of the operation by Marshal Vasilevsky A.M.

In the first three days of the operation, the troops of the 1st Baltic Front advanced 50 km, leaving only 25 km to Riga. On September 16, the German command gave permission to begin the withdrawal of Army Group North troops along the entire front from the Gulf of Finland to the Western Dvina. In order to delay the advance of the troops of the 1st Baltic Front in the Riga direction, the German command launched two strong counterattacks (southwest of Mitava and from the Baldone area).

At the same time, the offensive in the zones of the 3rd and 2nd Baltic fronts developed much more slowly. Here our troops were able to break through only the main line of enemy defense in a number of sectors and advance only 5–6 km. German troops resisted especially stubbornly in the direction of the main attack of the troops of the 2nd Baltic Front. By September 27, the 3rd and 2nd Baltic Fronts advanced to the Sigulda defensive line, where they were stopped by the enemy. Now the troops of these fronts were 60–80 km from Riga.

From September 17 he became involved in the operation Leningrad Front. What happened was exactly what the command of the North group feared most—the enemy was hit with a powerful blow from the Tartu area. The 2nd Soviet Shock Army advancing there successfully broke through the enemy defenses west of Lake Peipsi on the first day and advanced 18 km. This created a threat of encirclement of the German units defending on the Narva Isthmus.

At the first stage of the Baltic operation (September 14-27) it was carried out Tallinn operation, as a result of which Soviet troops liberated on September 22, and by September 26, mainland Estonia was completely liberated, except for the islands of Ezel and Dago.

During the Tallinn operation, the Baltic Fleet landed several successful amphibious assaults on the coast of Estonia and adjacent islands. German losses during the operation, according to Soviet sources, amounted to more than 45 thousand people killed and wounded. At the end of September, a significant territory of the Baltic states, as well as the islands of the Moonsund archipelago, were still in enemy hands. The main forces of Army Group North were concentrated on a narrow front in the area of ​​the Riga bridgehead.

At the second stage of the Baltic operation (September 28 - November 24), the Riga operation (September 14 - October 22) was completed, the Memel (October 5 - 22) and Moonsund (September 27 - November 24) operations were carried out. The most intense battles on the approaches to the Latvian capital took place after the capture of Tartu, when the 67th Army was turned southwest towards Riga. During the Riga operation, our troops liberated most Latvia, its capital – Riga, Lithuania. As a result, a Courland Cauldron.

Moonsund operation was carried out with the aim of liberating the islands of the Moonsund archipelago from Nazi troops. The main part of the islands was liberated by Soviet paratroopers quite quickly. Only on the island of Saaremaa did the enemy manage to delay our offensive for a month and a half.

Memel offensive operation was carried out with the aim of cutting off the troops of Army Group North from East Prussia. Already on the first day of fighting, Soviet troops broke through the German defenses and by evening advanced to a depth of 15 km. On the morning of the second day of the offensive, the 5th Guards Tank Army was introduced into the breakthrough, which quickly advanced to the coast of the Baltic Sea. On the same day, the 39th Army began its offensive, striking at Taurage.

On October 6, the German command began to hastily withdraw troops from the Riga area to East Prussia along the coast of the Baltic Sea. They were pursued by units of the 3rd and 2nd Baltic Fronts.

The Soviet offensive continued successfully, and by October 10, Nazi troops were cut off from East Prussia. A gap has formed between enemy groups in East Prussia and Courland Soviet defense up to 50 kilometers wide, which the enemy could not overcome.

As a result of the entry of Soviet troops to the Baltic Sea coast, the plan of the fascist German command to withdraw Army Group North to East Prussia was thwarted. The enemy was pushed back to the Courland Peninsula and was securely blocked there. As a result of the Memel operation, Soviet units advanced a distance of up to 150 km. On October 16, the 3rd Baltic Front was disbanded, and the troops of the 2nd Baltic Front, in cooperation with the right-flank armies of the 1st Baltic Front, continued pursue the retreating enemy.

Simultaneously with the offensive of the Baltic fronts, troops of the Leningrad Front and the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, from September 29 to October 15, carried out an amphibious operation, as a result of which they captured the islands of Muhu (Moon), Vormsi, Dago (Hiuma) and most of the island of Ezel (Saaremaa). The Baltic operation was thus completed.

As a result of the Baltic operation, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia (except for the Courland Pocket) were liberated from Nazi troops. 26 divisions of Army Group North were defeated and 3 divisions were completely destroyed. The remaining 33 divisions found themselves in a cauldron, pinning down significant forces of the Red Army until the end of the war. The German group in Courland capitulated only in May 1945.

As a result Baltic operation The German fleet lost freedom of action in the Gulf of Riga, the Gulf of Finland and other areas of the Baltic Sea. With the loss of the Baltic states, Germany lost not only a profitable strategic area, but also an important industrial, raw material and food base. More than a hundred soldiers of the Red Army were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union during the Baltic operation, three of them twice, over 330 thousand people. received medals and orders.

Baltic operation

The general situation in the Baltic states at the beginning of the operation was determined by the results of the Belarusian operation carried out by the Red Army: the German Army Group North (Colonel General F. Schörner) found itself deeply covered from the south and pressed against the Baltic Sea in a relatively small area. At the line from the Narva Bay to the city of Dobele, the Narva operational group, the 18th and 16th armies defended, from Dobele to the Neman River - the 3rd Tank Army of Army Group Center, transferred to Army Group North on September 20 " The enemy ground forces were supported by aviation from the 1st Air Fleet and part of the forces of the 6th Air Fleet. This group consisted of 730 thousand people, 7 thousand guns and mortars, 1216 tanks and assault guns, and up to 400 combat aircraft.

The Baltic operation involved troops of the left wing of Leningrad (Marshal of the Soviet Union L.A. Govorov), 3rd Baltic (Army General I.I. Maslennikov), 2nd Baltic (Army General A.I. Eremenko), 1st Baltic (Army General I.Kh. Bagramyan), part of the troops of the 3rd Belorussian (Army General I.D. Chernyakhovsky) fronts, forces of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet (Admiral V.F. Tributs) and long-range aviation - a total of 900 thousand people , about 17.5 thousand guns and mortars, 3080 tanks and self-propelled artillery units, 2640 combat aircraft.

The coordination of the actions of the three Baltic fronts until October 1, 1944 was carried out by the representative of the Supreme Command Headquarters, Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky. On October 1, he was entrusted with leadership of the operations of the 1st Baltic and 3rd Belorussian fronts, and Marshal of the Soviet Union L.A. Govorov (reserving his duties as commander of the Leningrad Front) - operations of the 2nd and 3rd Baltic fronts.

The plan of the Soviet command provided for the cutting off of the enemy group defending in the Baltic States from East Prussia by attacks by troops of the Baltic fronts in converging directions towards Riga and troops of the Leningrad Front together with the Red Banner Baltic Fleet in the Tallinn direction, with the subsequent dismemberment of the Wehrmacht group and its destruction in parts.

The Baltic operation included four operations united by a common plan - Riga, Tallinn, Moonsund landing and Memel.

On September 14, troops of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Baltic Fronts began an offensive. During the Riga operation, Soviet troops forced the enemy to retreat to the Sigulda defensive line (25-60 km from Riga, north of the Daugava River) and jeopardized its communications leading to East Prussia. The German command began to withdraw troops from Estonia, while at the same time strengthening the defense on the approaches to Riga. Enemy troops launched strong counterattacks in the Baldone and Dobele areas. Due to the fierce resistance of German troops at this point, the Supreme High Command Headquarters decided on September 24 to transfer the efforts of the 1st Baltic Front from Riga to the Memel direction, where the enemy group was much weaker. The troops of the Leningrad Front, in cooperation with the forces of the Baltic Fleet, carried out the Tallinn operation on September 17-26, which ended with the defeat of the enemy task force “Narva”, the liberation of Tallinn and the entire mainland of Estonia.

To carry out the Memel operation, the 1st Baltic Front carried out a secret regrouping of its troops from the Riga direction to the Siauliai area. The offensive in the Memel direction was ensured from the north by active actions towards Liepaja by the 4th Shock Army and from the south by the attack of the 39th Army of the 3rd Belorussian Front from the Raseiniai region in the direction of Taurage. In connection with the Moonsund landing operation of the troops of the Leningrad Front and the forces of the Baltic Fleet, which began on September 27, as well as the active actions of the troops of the 3rd and 2nd Baltic fronts in the Riga area, the enemy was unable to transfer significant forces from the Sigulda line to repel the Soviet offensive troops in the Memel direction. As a result of the Memel operation, Soviet troops reached the Baltic coast, penetrated the territory of East Prussia and cut off Army Group North from it. While the 1st Baltic Front launched an offensive in the Memel direction, the troops of the 3rd and 2nd Baltic Fronts on October 6 began pursuing the enemy, who began a hasty retreat from the Riga section of the front to the Courland Peninsula. On October 13, Soviet troops liberated Riga. The destruction of the Courland group of fascist German troops was entrusted to the troops of the 2nd and 1st Baltic Fronts. Coordination of the actions of the two Baltic and 3rd Belorussian fronts was entrusted to Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky. Marshal of the Soviet Union L.A. Govorov remained commander of the troops of the Leningrad Front.

On October 18, the Headquarters pointed out the exceptional importance of the speedy liquidation of German troops northeast of Liepaja and in the Memel (Klaipeda) area, demanding that all the efforts of the troops of the 1st and 2nd Baltic Fronts be directed towards their defeat, and the involvement of long-range aviation and the Baltic Fleet Air Force, intensify submarine operations on enemy sea lanes. Using the offensive of the Baltic fronts in the Riga and Memel directions, the troops of the Leningrad Front, together with the Baltic Fleet, liberated the islands of the Moonsund archipelago from September 27 to November 24 as a result of the Moonsund landing operation.

As a result of the offensive of the Soviet troops, Army Group North was expelled from almost the entire Baltic region and lost communications connecting it by land with East Prussia. Of the 59 divisions, 26 were defeated, and three were completely destroyed. The remaining forces of this group found themselves pinned to the sea in Courland and in the Memel area. The length of the front line in the Baltic sector was reduced to 250 km, which made it possible to free up significant forces of Soviet troops and use them in offensive operations in the winter of 1944/1945. With the loss of the Baltic states, Germany lost a profitable strategic area, which provided its fleet with freedom of action in the eastern part of the Baltic Sea, as well as an important industrial, raw material and food base.

Strategic will come operation of the troops of Leningrad, 3rd, 2nd and 1st Baltic, 3rd Belorussian. fr. and forces Balt. fleet, carried out on September 14. - Nov 24 The goal is the defeat of the German fascists. troops in the Baltic states and the completion of the liberation of the Baltic states. owls republics As a result of the successful offensive of the Owls. troops in the summer of 1944 German-fascist. the troops defending the Baltic states found themselves pressed against the Baltic. m. on a limited territory, and their ch. forces - deeply covered from the South to the beginning. By. at the turn from Narva Hall. to Dobele, the troops of Army Group North (operational group "Narva", 18th and 16th A; Colonel General F. Schörner) defended, from Dobele to the river. Neman - 3rd TA of Army Group Center, transferred on September 21. to Army Group North (56 divisions, including 5 tanks and 2 motorized units, 3 motorized brigades; 730 thousand people, 7 thousand guns and mortars, 1216 tanks and assault guns). They were supported by aviation from the 1st and 6th Air Forces. fleets (400 aircraft). The pr-k, using a large number of rivers, lakes, wooded and swampy areas, created a deeply layered defense, especially strong in the Riga direction. Many people points were turned into nodes of resistance.

Basic owls Baltic grouping. direction - troops lion. wing Leningrad. (Marshal of the Soviet Union L.A. Govorov), 3rd Baltic, (Army General I.I. Maslennikov), 2nd Baltic. (Army General A.I. Eremenko) and the 1st Baltic. (Army General I. Kh. Bagramyan) French. - consisted of 15 combined arms, 1 tank. and 4 air. army (125 rifle divisions, 7 UR, 5 tank departments and 1 mechanized corps; 900 thousand people, about 17.5 thousand guns and mortars, 3080 tanks and self-propelled guns, 2640 aircraft). The 39th A of the 3rd Belorus was also involved in the operation. fr., forces Balt. fleet (Adm. V.F. Tributs), long-range aviation; it was attended by the 8th Est. and 130th Latv. shooter Corps and 16th Lithuania. sd.

By the intention of the owls. command, it was envisaged to cut off the pr-ka group defending in the Baltic States from the East. Prussia, attacks by Baltic troops. fronts in converging directions towards Riga and Leningrad troops. fr. joint from Balt. fleet in the Tallinn direction to dismember it and destroy it in parts. Ch. efforts were concentrated on defeating the main. forces of the 18th and 16th A, operating in the Riga region. By. included 4 operations united by a common plan: Riga, Tallinn, Moonsund landing and Memel.

14 Sep. troops of the 3rd, 2nd and 1st Baltic states. fr. started the attack. The actions of the fronts were coordinated by the beginning. General Staff Marshal Sov. Union A. M. Vasilevsky.

During the Riga operation of 1944 Owls. The troops forced the pr-ka to retreat to defense. line "Sigulda" (60 km from Riga north of the Daugava) and threatened its communications leading to the East. Prussia. German-fascist The command began to withdraw troops from Estonia, but at the same time, a number of measures strengthened the defense on the approaches to Riga. The pr-ka's troops launched strong counterattacks in the Baldone and Dobele districts. In order to avoid heavy losses in the Riga direction and quickly cut off Army Group North from the East. Prussia, Supreme Command Headquarters 24 September. decided to postpone Ch. attack on the Memel direction, where the grouping of enemy troops was much weaker. The strike was to be carried out by the troops of the 1st Baltic States. and part of the forces of the 3rd Belorussian. fr. The Headquarters entrusted the coordination of the actions of these fronts to Marshal Sov. Union of A. M. Vasilevsky, and coordination of the actions of the 3rd and 2nd Baltic states. fr. - to Marshal Sov. Union of L. A. Govorov, which remained in command. Leningr. fr.

17-26 Sep. Leningrad troops. fr. in cooperation with the Baltic forces. The fleet carried out the Tallinn operation of 1944, as a result of which the operatives were defeated. group "Narva" and liberated the entire mainland of Est. SSR, and September 27. began the Moonsund landing operation of 1944. October 5-22. troops of the 1st Baltic. fr. and 39th A (lieutenant general I.I. Lyudnikov) delivered a sudden and powerful blow to the enemy in the Memel direction and reached the Baltic coast. m., they threw the pr-ka beyond the river. Neman and cut off Army Group North from the East. Prussia. The successful development of the operation was facilitated by the offensive of the troops of the 3rd Belorus. fr. (Army General I. D. Chernyakhovsky) October 16-27. in the Gumbinnen direction.

Under the influence of the blow in the Memel direction, the command of Army Group North became already on October 6. hastily withdraw troops from the Riga region to Courland. Troops of the 3rd and 2nd Baltic States. fr. They immediately began to pursue them and after stubborn fighting on October 13. Riga was liberated. Oct 16 3rd Balt. fr. was disbanded. Coordination of the actions of the 2nd and 1st Baltic States. and 3rd Belarusian. fr. entrusted to Marshal Sov. Union of A. M. Vasilevsky. By 22 Oct. troops are right. wing of the 2nd Baltic. fr. went to the Tukumsky defense. line of the pr-ka, completing the Riga operation, and jointly. with the troops of the 1st Baltic. fr. blocked from land in Courland main. forces of Army Group North. 24 Nov Leningrad troops. fr. and Balt forces. The fleet completed the Moonsund landing operation, during which the islands of the Moonsund archipelago were liberated.

The most important politician result of P. o. - liberation of the Sov. Baltic states (except Courland). 26 divisions of Army Group North were defeated, 3 were completely destroyed, the rest were blocked in Courland and in the Memel region. As a result, P. o. the preconditions were created for the development of the Soviet offensive. troops in the East Prussia.

Liberation of the Soviet Baltic states. Expulsion of the enemy from the Arctic

The situation in the Baltic states. Preparing the operation

By mid-September 1944, the Soviet Armed Forces had almost completely liberated the territory of the USSR and were fighting far beyond the country's borders. Only a small part of the Soviet Baltic states and the Far North were still ruled by the Nazi invaders.

More than three years of occupation brought untold disasters to the peoples of the Baltic republics. Carrying out its savage “General Plan Ost”, the fascist leadership sought “through the Germanization of racially suitable elements, colonization by representatives of the German race and the destruction of undesirable elements” to transform Soviet Baltic states V component fascist Germany. In Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, the Nazis killed more than 1 million 100 thousand Soviet citizens, many tens of thousands of people languished in concentration camps and prison dungeons. The Nazis sought to undermine the friendship of Lithuanians, Latvians and Estonians with other peoples of the Soviet Union, to deprive them of the benefits that Soviet power gave them in 1940-1941.

However, no atrocities of Hitler's executioners could break the will of the working people of the Soviet Baltic republics to liberate. Inspired by the victories of the Soviet army, they increasingly opposed the Nazi occupiers and their agents - local bourgeois nationalists. Workers of factories and factories, despite brutal repression, sabotaged the orders of entrepreneurs and reduced production output. Peasants burned the farms of German colonists and disrupted the supply of agricultural products. The partisan struggle expanded.

Under the influence of the victories of the Soviet Armed Forces, many of those who had recently collaborated with the Nazis for various reasons began to move away from them. Desertion in local nationalist formations increased. According to the headquarters of Army Group North, on September 10, 1944, there were about 5 thousand “local deserters” in the rear of Hitler’s troops, who, according to the fascist German command, posed a potential danger to it. Some of them left nationalist military units with weapons and, joining the partisans, joined the fight against the Nazi invaders.

The position of the Nazis in the Baltic states further deteriorated as a result of the successful offensive of Soviet troops in Belarus. Army Group North found itself deeply encircled from the south and pressed against the Baltic Sea in a relatively small area.

By mid-September 1944, the 940 km front line in the Baltic states ran from the Gulf of Finland to the Neman River through the Narva Isthmus and further in the direction of Lake Peipsi, Tartu, Gulbene, Gostini, Bauska, Dobele, Raseiniai. At the line from the Gulf of Finland to Dobele, the troops of Army Group North under the command of General F. Scherner defended. It included the 16th and 18th armies, the Narva operational group. To the south, in the area from Dobele to the Neman River, troops of the 3rd Tank Army of Army Group Center occupied the defense. In total, the Baltic Nazi group consisted of 56 divisions, including 5 tank and 2 motorized, and 3 motorized brigades, it had 730 thousand soldiers and officers, 7 thousand guns and mortars, 1216 tanks and assault guns. From the air it was supported by 400 aircraft of the 1st and partially 6th air fleets. In August, Army Group North received three divisions, hundreds of tanks and assault guns, and about 42,000 reinforcements. The strength of the infantry division was increased to 8 thousand people. The light forces of the fascist German navy operated in the Gulf of Finland.

Hitler's command sought to retain the Baltic states at all costs. It clearly understood that the loss of this strategically important area would further worsen the military-political and economic situation of Germany and would adversely affect its relations with Sweden, from where the Reich received high-quality steel, iron ore and other strategic raw materials. The loss of the Baltic states led to a sharp deterioration in basing and difficulty in the combat activities of the Nazi fleet in the Baltic Sea. Having liberated Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, Soviet troops received convenient starting points for entering East Prussia.

The enemy expected the main attacks of the Soviet troops at Madona and Valga and hoped that he would be able to maintain his positions here. On September 5, 1944, in response to Hitler’s question about the prospects for the fight for the Baltic States, General Guderian stated: “... based on the existing relationship between the enemy forces and the German troops, it can be assumed that the enemy will not be able to break through either at Madona or at Valga.” . At the same time, the leadership of Army Group North feared an attack by troops of the 1st Baltic Front on Riga from the Jelgava, Dobele region. By moving here along the shortest route, they could intercept all land communications leading to East Prussia and isolate the Nazi troops in the Baltic States from it. Considering the likelihood of such a strike, the Nazi command concentrated the strongest group southwest of Jelgava, including all five tank divisions that it had in the Baltic states.

In this area, large measures were taken to strengthen the engineering defense. A significant part of the aviation was also aimed here. This group was given the task of firmly holding defensive lines, expanding the corridor south of Tukums and ensuring freedom of communications for Army Group North with Courland and East Prussia. The Nazis also feared for the section of the front adjacent directly to the Daugava River from the north, where Soviet troops could strike at Riga from the east. They were also concerned about the situation of the Narva task force. In case of extreme aggravation of the situation, it was planned to withdraw its troops to the Cesis defensive line.

In an effort to disrupt the offensive of the Soviet troops, the Nazi command created deep positional defenses. It received especially great development in the Riga direction north of the Daugava, where four defensive lines were prepared, two of which had two lanes. In this case, the abundance of rivers, lakes, wooded and swampy areas of the area, as well as numerous estates and farmsteads with stone buildings were used. All strips and positions were covered with minefields and barbed wire.

To defeat the Baltic group of fascist German troops, the Soviet command attracted the forces of the left wing of the Leningrad Front and the troops of the 3rd, 2nd and 1st Baltic fronts - 14 combined arms, 1 tank and 4 air armies. In total, these fronts had 125 rifle divisions, 7 fortified areas and 5 separate tank and mechanized corps. The rifle divisions of the Baltic fronts consisted of an average of 4-4.5 thousand people. The forces of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet also took part in the operation. Soviet troops outnumbered the enemy: in men - by 1.3 times, in artillery, tanks and self-propelled artillery units - by 2.5 times, and in aircraft - by 6.6 times.

On August 29, the troops of the three Baltic fronts received the task of crushing the opposing enemy forces and continuing the liberation of the territory of the Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian Soviet republics. The general management of their operations was entrusted to the representative of the Headquarters, the Chief of the General Staff of Marshal of the Soviet Union A. M. Vasilevsky.

The task of the troops of the 3rd Baltic Front, commanded by General I. I. Maslennikov, was to strike with the main forces from the Sangaste area in the direction of Valmiera, Riga. At the same time, they were supposed to launch an offensive towards the troops of the 2nd Baltic Front. The 2nd Baltic Front under the command of General A.I. Eremenko, which delivered the main blow in the direction of Nitaure, Riga, had to, in cooperation with other Baltic fronts, defeat the enemy directly north of the Daugava River and capture Riga. Before the troops of the 1st Baltic Front, commanded by General I. Kh. Bagramyan, Headquarters set the task of attacking with the forces of the right wing from the Bauska region in the direction of Vecmuiža, Iecava, the mouth of the Daugava River, in cooperation with other Baltic fronts, to defeat the Riga enemy group operating to the south Daugava, and reach the Daugava and the coast of the Gulf of Riga in the Riga region, cutting off the escape routes for the troops of Army Group North towards East Prussia. On the left wing, they were supposed to exhaust the Nazi tank group in defensive battles and in no case allow it to break through in the Jelgava and Siauliai directions. In addition, in order to achieve the greatest strength of the encirclement ring of the enemy Baltic group, the commander of the 1st Baltic Front, with the consent of the Headquarters representative, decided to prepare an additional strike in general direction on Juksta, Kemeri with the task of defeating the Tukums group of Nazis, cutting the railway and highway Riga - Tukums and reaching the coast of the Gulf of Riga.

On September 2, 1944, the task was assigned to the Leningrad Front, commanded by Marshal of the Soviet Union L. A. Govorov. He had to redeploy one army command and eight rifle divisions from the Narva sector of the front to the Tartu region, strike from the Tartu region in the direction of Rakvere, go to the rear of the Narva enemy group and then advance on Tallinn. In solving these problems, the front was assisted by the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, which was under its operational subordination, under the command of Admiral V.F. Tributs.

The Headquarters scheduled the start of the offensive of the Baltic fronts for September 14, and for the Leningrad Front, in connection with the implementation of a large and complex regrouping of troops in the Tartu sector, for September 17. The tight deadlines for preparing the offensive were set with the goal of not giving the enemy time to further strengthen the defense, overcoming which in the conditions of impending autumn weather and difficult wooded and swampy terrain, crossed by many rivers and lakes, was a very difficult task.

Thus, the main efforts of the Soviet troops in the operation were concentrated on the defeat of the enemy group in Riga. The three Baltic fronts, advancing in the general direction of Riga, were supposed to envelop and destroy the main forces of Army Group North. The offensive was planned in a strip up to 500 km wide, which was about half the entire length of the front line in the Baltic states. The defense of the fascist German troops broke through in seven sectors, amounting to 76 km, where the Soviet command concentrated about 80 percent of the advancing rifle divisions with reinforcements.

Following the instructions of the Headquarters, the fronts launched preparations for the operation. They concentrated their main forces in the breakthrough areas. The artillery preparation for the attack was planned to last from one to two hours. However, the created density of artillery was low - for 1 km of the front being broken through, most armies had only 120-160 guns and mortars. Tank and mechanized troops made up mobile groups of the fronts and some armies, some tanks and self-propelled guns were allocated for direct support of the infantry. The tasks of aviation were to conduct aerial reconnaissance, cover strike groups of fronts both in the initial areas and during the offensive, strike at Nazi reserves, disrupt enemy command and control and the operation of transport, fight enemy aircraft, and maintain air supremacy. .

During the offensive, the strike groups of the fronts and armies had to cross a number of water barriers. Therefore, due attention was paid to the engineering support of their actions. Soviet troops intensively conducted reconnaissance, and the command had fairly complete data about the enemy. The fronts also carried out operational camouflage measures. However, only the 1st Baltic Front managed to achieve surprise in the offensive and mislead the Nazis about the direction of the main attack.

During the preparatory period, the fronts carried out a significant regrouping of troops. The Leningrad Front received great assistance in this regard from the 25th separate brigade of river boats of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet on Lake Peipsi. It transported more than 100 thousand people, over 1 thousand guns and mortars and up to 4 thousand vehicles across the strait between Lake Peipus and Pskov Lake. This greatly accelerated the transfer of the 2nd Shock Army from the Narva sector to the Tartu region. This turned out to be unexpected for the enemy and subsequently put his Narva group in a difficult situation.

The fronts accumulated ammunition, fuel and lubricants, and food; The medical and sanitary service launched extensive preparations for the operation.

In combat training of personnel, the main attention was paid to practicing a quick breakthrough of enemy defenses and crossing water barriers. The training was conducted on terrain similar to that on which the troops were to operate.

Party political work in units and on ships was carried out under the motto “Let us liberate the Soviet Baltic states from the Nazi invaders!” It was built taking into account the situation that was developing at the fronts, the combat missions facing the troops, and was aimed at instilling in soldiers a high offensive impulse, mobilizing their efforts for the final defeat of the enemy in the Baltics, overcoming moods of complacency and carelessness. Commanders, political workers, communists and Komsomol members explained to the personnel that the complete and final defeat of the Nazi invaders would still require a huge effort.

Issues of ensuring close interaction between the ground forces, aviation and navy occupied a large place in party political work. Thus, in the troops of the Leningrad Front, during the preparation of the Tallinn offensive operation, the political organs of tank, artillery and aviation formations and units established close contact with the political organs of combined arms formations, which had a beneficial effect on the performance of combat missions.

While seeking to strengthen the influence of the communists on personnel, political agencies showed concern for the growth of party ranks at the expense of advanced fighters who distinguished themselves in battle. As a result, the party layer in the troops became significant.

By the beginning of the offensive, there were 173,190 communists on the 1st Baltic Front, 113,970 on the 2nd Baltic Front, and 173,433 members and candidate members of the CPSU (b) on the Leningrad Front.

Commanders and political workers paid a lot of attention to preparing new reinforcements for the upcoming operation, especially soldiers drafted from the western regions of Ukraine, Belarus and the Baltic states, who had long been influenced by fascist propaganda. Newly arriving soldiers were introduced to the goals and objectives of the upcoming battles, and the heroic traditions of the units and formations. Experienced warriors shared their combat experience with them.

Taking into account the nature of the operation being prepared, political agencies published special leaflets and leaflets that summarized combat experience and contained advice and recommendations to soldiers. The political department of the 2nd Shock Army of the Leningrad Front, in particular, issued a “Memo to a soldier during an offensive in a wooded and swampy area” and “Memo to a soldier when crossing water barriers.”

In the liberated territory of the Soviet Baltic states, political agencies carried out extensive propaganda work among the local population. They explained to the working people the internal and international situation of the Soviet Union, exposed the misanthropic policies of Nazi Germany and the falsity of Nazi propaganda.

The troops of the fronts were comprehensively preparing to carry out new combat missions. Overall, they had the necessary capabilities to successfully carry out the operation.

Breakthrough of the defense of fascist German troops in the Tallinn and Riga directions

The offensive of all the Baltic fronts began simultaneously on the morning of September 14, 1944. The 1st Baltic Front achieved the greatest results on this day. Powerful artillery preparation and air strikes of the 3rd Air Army in the Bauska area proved to be particularly effective. The troops of the 43rd Army of General A.P. Beloborodov and the 4th Shock Army of General P.F. Malyshev, who went on the offensive, moved forward, almost without encountering organized resistance. Coordinated and effective actions allowed the strike groups to overcome the enemy’s main defensive line in an hour and a half, and the advanced units to cross the Lielupe and Memele rivers. By the end of the day, the troops of the 1st Baltic Front broke through the enemy defenses in a 25 km area and advanced up to 14 km in some directions.

While carrying out combat missions, Soviet soldiers showed massive heroism and high skill. When crossing the Memele River in the Bauska area, the 4th company of the 423rd Infantry Regiment of the 166th Infantry Division of the 4th Shock Army especially distinguished itself. Under the command of Senior Lieutenant A.E. Shishinashvili, the fighters immediately crossed a not wide, but deep water barrier and, going behind enemy lines, broke into the village of Bruneri, and then captured the village of Streli. During the ensuing battle, they repelled three counterattacks of the Nazis and held the liberated settlements until the main forces of the regiment arrived. At the same time, they destroyed five guns and many Nazi soldiers and officers. The company commander died heroically in the battle. For military valor and courage, communist senior lieutenant A.E. Shishinashvili was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. The hero's ashes rest in a brotherly cemetery in the ancient Latvian city of Bauska. An obelisk was erected on his grave.

The onslaught of Soviet troops grew more and more. The chief of staff of the 16th German Army reported to the headquarters of Army Group North about the offensive of the 1st Baltic Front in the Bauska area: “Enemy tanks are operating everywhere. The artillery fires very intensely, reaching the artillery positions. The enemy has thrown a particularly large number of attack aircraft into battle, which strike right up to the division command posts.”

Events developed differently north of the Daugava, where troops of the 2nd and 3rd Baltic Fronts operated. Before the start of artillery preparation, the fascist German command managed to withdraw the bulk of its troops from the front line to the second position of the main defensive line. The lack of shells and tanks for direct infantry support also had an impact. The 3rd Baltic Front also had to force a major water line - the Emajõgi River. Therefore, on the first day of the operation, front troops, despite the active assistance of the 14th Air Army (commander General I.P. Zhuravlev) and the 15th Air Army (commander General N.F. Naumenko), were able to overcome only the first position of the main defense line enemy and move forward up to 1-3 km.

The troops of the 43rd Army of the 1st Baltic Front, building on the success achieved on September 14, broke through the rear defensive line on the second day of the operation. The advance detachment of the 3rd Guards Mechanized Corps, rushing into the breakthrough, by the end of September 16 advanced forward up to 50 km and broke through to the Daugava, and the rifle formations of the 43rd Army reached the approaches to Baldone. At the same time, the 4th Shock Army, breaking into enemy defenses, reached the Ietsava River. The general breakthrough front here was expanded to 80 km. The exit of Soviet troops to the Daugava and Baldone created a real opportunity for a subsequent attack on Riga from the south by the forces of the right wing and center of the 1st Baltic Front.

Great assistance to the ground forces was provided by the 3rd Air Army, commanded by General N.F. Papivin. On the first day of the offensive alone, she flew 1,530 sorties. In 32 air battles, 67 German aircraft were shot down.

Meanwhile, the situation on the 2nd and 3rd Baltic fronts had not improved significantly even by the end of the third day of the operation. Despite the introduction into battle of the majority of the rifle divisions that made up the second echelons of the rifle corps, the troops could not yet overcome the enemy’s main line of defense, although he suffered significant losses in heavy defensive battles. The commander of Army Group North, General Scherner, reported to his senior leadership that the German troops in the Baltic States had come last moment: all reserves have already been brought into battle, unattacked areas of defense have been exposed to the limit, in the directions of the main attacks of the Soviet troops, losses amount to from one third to half of the total strength of German divisions, the combat effectiveness of the troops is catastrophically falling, that the forces of Army Group North have already been exhausted and it unable to fight long defensive battles. In his opinion, there was only one option left - to retreat. The general begged Hitler and Guderian to agree to the withdrawal of troops in the Baltic states along the entire front. On September 16, Hitler's headquarters allowed the withdrawal of the Narva task force. The troops of the 18th Army were ordered to leave the Valga line and, together with the formations of the Narva group that joined it, take up defense at the Cesis line. However, the onslaught of Soviet troops forced the enemy to retreat even further - to the Sigulda defensive line.

The fascist German command simultaneously took urgent measures to localize the dangerous breakthrough of the 1st Baltic Front in the Bauska area. On September 16, the 3rd Tank Army of Army Group Center, with the forces of 12 motorized battalions, supported by 380 tanks and assault guns, began to launch a counterattack from the area southwest of Dobele to the flank and rear of the troops of the 5th Guards Tank and 51st Armies, which were preparing to attack . The 16th Army of Army Group North with the forces of 6 divisions, including 2 tank and 1 motorized, was preparing to launch a counterattack against the 43rd Army in the Baldone area. However, these measures did not help. The position of the Nazi troops continued to deteriorate. Under the attacks of the Soviet armies, they left their borders between the Gulf of Finland and the Daugava and retreated to considerable depth.

On the morning of September 17, on the fourth day of the operation, the troops of the Leningrad Front went on the offensive in the Tartu area. Here, too, the enemy withdrew the bulk of manpower and artillery from the front line for the period of artillery preparation. But this time he did not achieve a significant gain. Powerful artillery preparation disorganized its defense. The infantry and tanks of the 2nd Shock Army under the command of General I. I. Fedyuninsky quickly broke through the main line of enemy defense, successfully crossing the deep and wide Emajõgi River. By the end of the day they had advanced to a depth of 5 to 18 km. The greatest success was achieved by the 8th Estonian Rifle Corps of General L.A. Parn, which advanced with the active support of the 25th separate brigade of river ships along the western shore of Lake Peipsi.

The troops of the 2nd Shock Army were effectively assisted by the 13th Air Army under the command of General S. D. Rybalchenko and the air force of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, commanded by General M. I. Samokhin. On the first day of the offensive, the pilots flew more than 600 sorties, causing significant damage to the enemy.

The offensive of the troops of the Leningrad Front forced the fascist German command to accelerate the withdrawal of the Narva task force. On September 18, the 2nd Shock Army began pursuing the retreating enemy. On the night of September 19, the 8th Army, commanded by General F.N. Starikov, began pursuing the enemy. Her troops advanced up to 90 km in two days and reached the Rakvere region. Therefore, the further advance of the 2nd Shock Army in the northern direction became impractical, and the front commander turned its main forces to the west, and transferred the army’s mobile group and the 8th Estonian Rifle Corps to the 8th Army, which was developing an attack on Tallinn.

Pursuing the retreating enemy, the troops of the Leningrad Front quickly advanced in the western and southwestern directions. On September 22, the 8th Army liberated the capital of the Estonian SSR, Tallinn. In two days of fighting, the troops of the 2nd Shock Army advanced from 40 to 60 km and on September 23 expelled the enemy from the cities of Viljandi and Pärnu. On September 26, the army reached the Baltic Sea and entered the territory of the Latvian SSR.

The aviation of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet intensified its operations on enemy communications in the Gulf of Finland and the Baltic Sea in order to prevent the evacuation of Nazi troops from Tallinn. The 1st brigade of torpedo boats, assisting the 8th Army, landed troops in the ports of Kunda, Loksa and Tallinn. North-west of Tallinn, sailors captured the island of Naissar.

Events also unfolded rapidly on the 3rd Baltic Front. Using the success of the Leningrad Front, the 67th Army, commanded by General V.Z. Romanovsky, and the 1st Shock Army of General N.D. Zakhvataev on September 21 completed a breakthrough of the enemy defense to the entire tactical depth. On September 23, formations of the 10th Tank Corps liberated Valmiera, and the 61st Army under the command of General P. A. Belov, operating on the left wing of the front, reached the Smiltene area. Its troops, in cooperation with formations of the 54th Army of General S.V. Roginsky, liberated the city of Cesis by the morning of September 26.

The situation on the 2nd Baltic Front remained difficult as before. His troops, during intense battles, were able to advance only 18 km. In a report to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief on the progress of the operation in the Baltic States, Marshal A. M. Vasilevsky explained this not only by the difficult terrain conditions and stubborn resistance of the Nazis, but also by the fact that the front weakly maneuvered infantry and artillery, put up with the attachment of troops to the roads, and excessively reserved infantry formations .

The troops of the 1st Baltic Front at this time were busy repelling strong enemy counterattacks. On September 22, the 43rd Army managed to drive the Nazis out of Baldone and throw them back to the north a considerable distance. Only in the zone of the 6th Guards Army, which covered the left flank of the front’s strike group aimed at Riga from the south, did the enemy manage to penetrate the defenses of the Soviet troops up to 6 km.

Thus, during the operation, Army Group North suffered a heavy defeat. The troops of the Leningrad, 3rd and 2nd Baltic fronts reached the Sigulda defensive line north of the Daugava and found themselves 60 km from Riga. The 43rd Army of the 1st Baltic Front approached the city from the southeast to a distance of about 20 km. The troops of the Leningrad and 3rd Baltic fronts liberated the entire mainland of Estonia.

The losses suffered by the enemy over nine days of fighting forced him to completely disband 37 battalions in the divisions of the 16th and 18th armies; in most of the battalions there were only 150 people left, and in the companies there were 20-25. At the same time, as a result of the withdrawal of the main forces of the group, the front was reduced by 300 km. This allowed her command to significantly tighten the combat formations of troops in the Riga direction. At the Sigulda line, 105 km long between the Gulf of Riga and the northern bank of the Daugava, 17 divisions were defending, and on approximately the same front south of the Daugava to Auce - 14 divisions, including 3 tank divisions. With these forces, which occupied pre-prepared defensive lines, the Nazi command sought to delay the further advance of Soviet troops, and in case of failure, to withdraw Army Group North to East Prussia.

The Soviet command was increasingly convinced that continuing the offensive in the previous directions could lead to large losses and would not ensure the cutting off of Nazi troops from East Prussia and their final destruction. And the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command found the right way out of this situation. On September 24, she decided to move the main attack from the area north of the Daugava to the Memel direction in order to cut off Army Group North from East Prussia with a powerful offensive and put an end to it. In this regard, the commander of the 2nd Baltic Front received an order, without stopping the advance north of the Daugava, by October 3 to transfer the 3rd shock army of General M.N. Gerasimov and the 22nd army, commanded by General G.P. Korotkov, to the southern bank of the river and replace the 4th shock and 51st armies of the 1st Baltic Front here. The troops of the 2nd Baltic Front, in cooperation with the 3rd Baltic Front, were supposed to defeat the opposing enemy forces, capture Riga and clear the enemy from the Baltic Sea coast from Riga to Libau (Liepaja). The 1st Baltic Front had to carry out a new offensive operation in order to break through the Nazi defenses to the west and southwest of the city of Siauliai and reach the Baltic Sea coast in the Palanga, Memel (Klaipeda) area, the mouth of the Neman River, thereby cutting off the Baltic group the enemy's escape route to East Prussia. The start of the operation was set by Headquarters for October 1-2. The 39th Army of the 3rd Belorussian Front was also involved in it.

The troops of the Leningrad Front were supposed to, in cooperation with the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, clear the islands of the Moonsund Archipelago from the Nazis and complete the liberation of Soviet Estonia. On October 3, the 3rd Belorussian Front received an order from Headquarters to prepare and conduct an offensive operation in the Gumbinnen direction, in cooperation with the 1st Baltic Front, to defeat the enemy group and capture the Konigsberg (Kaliningrad) region. This blow was supposed to be not only significant assistance to the 1st Baltic Front, but also the beginning of the struggle for East Prussia.

The leadership of the operation of the 1st Baltic and 3rd Belorussian fronts was entrusted by the Headquarters to Marshal A. M. Vasilevsky, and the operation of the 2nd and 3rd Baltic fronts to Marshal L. A. Govorov, without removing his duties as commander of the Leningrad Front .

These decisions of the Headquarters marked the beginning of a new stage in the strategic offensive operation of the Soviet troops in the Baltic states.

Cutting off Army Group North from East Prussia

At the end of September, the 1st Baltic Front began preparing an offensive operation in the Memel direction. It was to be carried out in a strip of 145 km and to a depth of 130 km. A breakthrough in the defense of the Nazi troops was planned in two sections, the total length of which was 31 km.

By concentrating the main forces and means of the front in the breakthrough areas, which accounted for only 13 percent of the total width of the offensive zone, high operational density was achieved.

The operation plan provided for powerful artillery and air preparation. In engineering support for the offensive, the main attention was paid to creating passages in minefields and preparing means of crossing the Venta and Dubisa rivers. In accordance with the plan of the operation, the front command with great skill carried out a major regrouping of troops, involving about half a million people, a huge mass of weapons and military equipment. The secrecy measures taken were effective: the enemy was unable to detect in advance the concentration of strike forces south and southwest of the city of Siauliai. The success of the regrouping was largely due to the clear leadership of the front headquarters (chief of staff General V.V. Kurasov).

The headquarters of the Supreme High Command constantly delved into the preparations for the offensive operation in the Memel direction. In negotiations with Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky, Supreme Commander-in-Chief I.V. Stalin personally determined the composition of the necessary forces and means, the order of regroupings, and was concerned about their secrecy. The front received a sufficient amount of ammunition and other material resources.

Party-political work was actively carried out in the troops under the leadership of General D. S. Leonov, a member of the Front Military Council, and General M. F. Drebednev, the head of the political department. During the preparatory period main goal there was a mobilization of personnel to ensure a quick and covert regrouping and successful actions to cut off Army Group North from East Prussia. In educating soldiers in the spirit of hatred of the enemy, numerous facts of the atrocities of the Nazi invaders on Soviet soil were widely used.

The offensive of the 1st Baltic Front in the Memel direction began on the morning of October 5 after a short but powerful artillery and air preparation. An hour and a half later, troops of the 6th Guards and 43rd Armies broke through the first and second positions of the main defensive line of the Nazi troops. After the main forces of the armies were brought into battle, the offensive developed even more energetically.

The attack by Soviet troops in the Memel direction was unexpected for the enemy. The fascist German command accepted the possibility of a Soviet offensive here, but not earlier than in 10-13 days. This fact is typical. Having read the report of the 3rd Tank Army about the breakthrough of its defenses by Soviet troops, the chief of staff of Army Group North said that he considered this “unlikely.”

To develop success in the main direction, from the morning of the second day of the operation, the front commander brought the 19th Tank Corps and the 5th Guards Tank Army into the breakthrough. The 51st and 4th shock armies entered the battle. The 2nd Guards Army, which included the 16th Lithuanian Rifle Division, advanced on that day with its main forces in the Kelm direction. The 39th Army of the 3rd Belorussian Front also began hostilities. The 3rd and 1st Air Armies, actively supporting the actions of ground forces, carried out 2,102 sorties on the second day of the operation.

During the two days of the offensive, Soviet troops broke through the enemy's defenses to the entire tactical depth and put Army Group North in a critical position. The pace of the offensive was continuously increasing. On the sixth day of the operation, troops of the 1st Baltic Front reached the Baltic Sea along a 35-kilometer stretch and began fighting for Memel. The 5th Guards Tank Army under the command of General V.T. Volsky operated especially successfully.

The cutting off of Army Group North from East Prussia became a fact. However, subsequent battles became protracted. In the Memel area, the enemy put up stubborn resistance to the troops of the 5th Guards Tank and 43rd Armies. Hitler's command threw into battle here the forces of the retreating units of the 7th Panzer Division and the Panzer Division " Greater Germany", as well as the 58th Infantry Division, transferred from near Riga by sea and occupying pre-prepared defensive lines. The battles were also intense in the zones of the 6th Guards Army, commanded by General I. M. Chistyakov, and the 51st Army of General Ya. G. Kreiser, which during the offensive were deployed to the north. In the zone of the 2nd Guards Army of General P. G. Chanchibadze, as well as the 39th and 5th armies of the 3rd Belorussian Front, advancing north and south of the Neman River, enemy resistance also increased.

Despite the fact that he managed to slow down the advance of the Soviet troops, their powerful blow in the Memel direction had a decisive influence on the entire situation in the Baltic states. Under the influence of this blow, the command of Army Group North, without waiting for permission from the high command, began hastily withdrawing its forces from the Riga area on the morning of October 6. The 3rd and 2nd Baltic Fronts, by order of Marshal L.A. Govorov, immediately began pursuing them. The offensive zone of the 2nd Baltic Front was increasingly narrowing. Therefore, on October 6, Headquarters proposed to transport the 42nd Army of General V.P. Sviridov and the 10th Guards Army of General M.I. Kazakov to the southern bank of the Daugava in order to attack Riga from the south with the right wing of the front, and develop the center and left wing attack on Libau.

Soviet troops, stubbornly moving forward, reached the Riga defensive perimeter on the afternoon of October 10. Formations of the 3rd Baltic Front and the right wing of the 2nd Baltic Front, which included the 130th Latvian Rifle Corps under General D.K. Brantkaln, liberated Riga on October 13.

The Nazis, retreating under the blows of Soviet troops, caused enormous damage to the capital of the Latvian SSR, destroyed port facilities, bridges across the Daugava, a power plant, an electromechanical plant (VEF), blew up and burned many other enterprises, a post office, a telephone exchange, and disabled the city water supply. A significant part of industrial equipment was exported to Germany. The occupiers plundered museums, institutes, the ancient book depository on the Town Hall Square, and destroyed the world-famous health resorts of the Riga seaside.

The working people of Latvia warmly welcomed their liberators and actively helped Soviet troops defeat the hated Nazi invaders and drive them out of their native land.

In conditions of intense fighting and a rapidly changing situation, party-political work among soldiers acquired particular importance. Commanders and political workers sought to ensure that every soldier, sergeant and officer knew exactly his task, deeply understood the meaning of the command’s decisions and was ready to carry out any combat missions. When, in particular, the troops of the 2nd Baltic Front were tasked with disrupting the withdrawal of enemy forces to East Prussia, they concentrated their efforts on mobilizing troops to defeat the Nazis here in Courland. Measures were taken to improve the work of the rear services. The troops held meetings of command staff, party and Komsomol meetings. The front-line newspaper published an article by a member of the Front Military Council, General V.N. Bogatkin, “Stronger blows to the enemy.” It contained a call to finally put an end to the enemy grouping in the Courland cauldron, and also gave instructive advice and recommendations on actions against the encircled troops.

The headquarters in the directive of October 16 entrusted the destruction of the enemy group, tightly engulfed and pressed against the Baltic Sea in the northwestern part of Latvia (in Courland), to the troops of the 2nd and 1st Baltic fronts. The 3rd Baltic Front was abolished, and its administration, together with front-line units and institutions, was transferred to the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. Coordination of the actions of the 2nd and 1st Baltic and 3rd Belorussian fronts was entrusted to Marshal A. M. Vasilevsky. Marshal L.A. Govorov remained commander of the troops of the Leningrad Front.

Two days later, Headquarters pointed out the extreme importance of the speedy liquidation of the Nazi troops surrounded northeast of Libau and in the Memel area. She demanded that all the efforts of the troops of the 1st and 2nd Baltic Fronts be directed toward their defeat, that long-range aviation and the air force of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet be involved in this, and that submarine operations on sea communications be strengthened. On October 22, the Headquarters approved the plans offensive operations these fronts.

On October 27, Soviet troops went on the offensive. Despite the major defeat, the Nazis still managed to withdraw the main forces of Army Group North, consisting of more than 33 divisions, to Courland and organize stubborn resistance.

The Leningrad Front, following the instructions of Headquarters, together with the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, began liberating the islands of the Moonsund archipelago on September 27. For this purpose, a landing operation was organized and carried out, in which the 109th and 8th Estonian Rifle Corps of the 8th Army, as well as the Red Banner Baltic Fleet forces were involved: the 260th Marine Brigade, 2 assault aviation divisions, 92 different boats , 40 tenders. The landing units of the 8th Army, with the participation of the fleet, occupied the islands of Vormsi and Muhu on October 1, thereby preparing a springboard for the liberation of the islands of Hiuma (Dago) and Sarema (Ezel). Despite the fact that the Nazis defended themselves with exceptional tenacity, the landing operation ended on November 24 with the complete liberation of the islands of the Moonsund archipelago. At the same time, the enemy suffered significant damage in manpower and equipment. He lost up to 7 thousand people killed and about 700 people captured, all weapons and military equipment. The Red Banner Baltic Fleet sank and damaged more than 100 enemy warships, transport and auxiliary vessels.

The Moonsund landing operation, during which 78 thousand people were landed, was an important contribution to the development of military art and enriched the experience of joint actions of the fleet and ground forces in the conditions of the island region.

The expulsion of the Nazi invaders from the Moonsund archipelago completed the liberation of the entire territory of Soviet Estonia. With the liberation of these islands, the conditions for the basing and combat activities of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet significantly improved.

The offensive of the Soviet troops in the Baltic states was facilitated by the successful actions of the 3rd Belorussian Front in East Prussia. From October 16 to October 30, with the forces of five combined arms armies, he broke through the enemy’s defenses in the Gumbinnen direction and advanced to a depth of 60 km in a 100-kilometer strip, thus transferring the fighting to the territory of Nazi Germany. To repel the offensive of the 3rd Belorussian Front, the Nazi command had to turn those divisions of the Hermann Goering tank corps, which were transferred to the Tilsit (Sovetsk) area for a counterattack from the south on the left wing of the 1st Baltic Front.

Thus, as a result of the offensive of Soviet troops in the Baltic strategic direction, Army Group North suffered a new major defeat. She was expelled from almost the entire Soviet Baltic region and lost communications connecting her by land with East Prussia. During the summer and autumn of 1944, a territory of more than 170 thousand square meters was liberated from the Nazi occupiers in the Soviet Baltic states. km, on which about 6 million people lived before the war. Hitler's troops suffered huge losses in people, weapons and military equipment. Of the 59 divisions of Army Group North, 26 were defeated, and 3 were completely destroyed. The remaining forces of this group found themselves pressed to the sea from land in Courland and in the Memel area.

With the loss of the Baltic states, Nazi Germany lost a profitable strategic area, which provided its fleet with freedom of action in the eastern part of the Baltic Sea, as well as an important industrial, raw material and food base. The successful offensive of Soviet troops in the Baltic direction further worsened the position of the German army and navy on the eastern front.

To commemorate the victories won by Soviet troops in the Baltic states and East Prussia, in September - October 1944, the sky of Moscow was illuminated eight times with a solemn artillery salute. For outstanding military successes, 131 units and formations received the honorary names of Tallinn, Valginsky, Riga and others. 481 units and formations and many thousands of soldiers and officers received high awards. For exceptional heroism shown during the liberation of the Soviet Baltic states, in July - November 1944. Presidium Supreme Council The USSR awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union to 112 soldiers. Naval pilots Lieutenant Colonels A. E. Mazurenko, V. I. Rakov and N. V. Chelnokov were awarded the Gold Star medal for the second time.

Soldiers of Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian national units and formations took an active part in the battles for the liberation of the Baltic states. Their valor and heroic deeds were repeatedly noted in the orders of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. All Estonian and Latvian corps and divisions, the Lithuanian division and many of their units were awarded honorary titles or orders. These and other evidence of the selfless struggle of Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians against the Nazi invaders refute the fabrications of bourgeois propaganda that these peoples allegedly welcomed the German troops “as their liberators.” The loyalty of the peoples of the Baltic republics to the Soviet system remained unshakable. The Nazis themselves and their local henchmen were forced to admit this. Thus, in a report to the chief of police of the Ventspils district on February 14, 1944, it was reported that the majority of the population of the Antsen volost was “unreliable.”

The struggle for the Soviet Baltic states was long and extremely fierce. The enemy had a fairly large group here. Having a well-developed road network, he actively maneuvered the forces and means at his disposal through internal communications and put up stubborn resistance in one direction or another, often launching counterattacks with significant forces. The fascist German command managed to create a deep multi-line positional defense and organize counteraction to Soviet troops. Therefore, despite the heroism and courage of the soldiers and officers, the 2nd and 3rd Baltic Fronts were unable to fully fulfill the tasks set by Headquarters for the period of the offensive in the Baltic States.

The Red Banner Baltic Fleet had to conduct combat operations in difficult conditions. Numerous enemy minefields in the Gulf of Finland and the lack of equipped bases on the Estonian coast did not allow him to attract enough forces, in particular large surface ships, for a reliable blockade of fascist troops from the sea. The enemy had the opportunity to receive assistance and, if necessary, evacuate troops by sea.

In general, in the strategic operation to liberate the Baltic states, the Soviet command gave examples of high military art. This was most clearly manifested in the Memel operation, which is characterized primarily by the transfer of efforts of the 1st Baltic Front from the Riga direction to the Memel direction, a significant shift of troops of the 3rd and 2nd Baltic fronts to the south without a pause in the offensive, as well as the surprise of the attack on the sector , where the enemy expected him at a later date. The most important result of the Memel operation, as well as the entire offensive in the Baltic states, was the cutting off of the main forces of Army Group North from East Prussia and its blocking from land in the coastal region. This was achieved as a result of a frontal attack and outflanking maneuver by all forces of the 1st Baltic Front in cooperation with neighboring fronts. The combat operations of the troops of the Leningrad Front were distinguished by great maneuverability.

During the offensive of Soviet troops in the Baltic states, a number of landing operations. The largest of them was Moonsundskaya.

A wide range of tasks in the Baltic operation were carried out by the Red Banner Baltic Fleet: landing troops, covering the flanks of ground forces from enemy attacks from the sea, providing fire support to the troops operating on the islands, carrying out military transportation, and disrupting enemy sea communications.

As a result of the Baltic strategic operation, carried out in September - November 1944, important prerequisites were created for the development of a further offensive by Soviet troops in East Prussia.

Expulsion of Nazi troops from the Soviet Arctic. Liberation of northern Norway

The defeat of fascist German troops on the Karelian Isthmus and in South Karelia, as well as the defeat of Army Group North in the Baltic States, had a decisive influence on the entire situation in the north of the Soviet-German front. After Finland left the war, the fascist German command was forced to withdraw its troops from Finnish territory. Only in the Arctic did the Nazis continue to hold the insignificant Soviet territory they had captured in 1941.

By the fall of 1944, the front line in the Arctic ran from Malaya Volokovaya Bay along the isthmus of the Sredny Peninsula and further from Bolshaya Zapadnaya Litsa Bay to lakes Chapr and Koshkajärv. Over the course of three years, the occupiers created a powerful defense here, consisting of three defensive lines; the second and third defense lines ran along the western banks of the Titovka and Petsamojoki rivers.

In October 1944, at the beginning of the offensive of Soviet troops in the Far North, the 19th Mountain Rifle Corps of the 20th Mountain Army, commanded by General L. Rendulic, was defending in a strip about 60 km wide. The corps consisted of 3 divisions and 4 brigades, 53 thousand soldiers and officers, more than 750 guns and mortars.

The Nazi command had high hopes for this army. Its actions were supported by the 5th Air Fleet and significant forces of the German Navy. The fascist German command demanded that its troops hold their occupied lines at all costs and thus retain sources of important strategic raw materials, especially nickel, copper and molybdenum, as well as ice-free northern seaports, based on which large forces of the German fleet led active actions on Soviet internal and external communications.

The task of defeating the Nazi troops in the Arctic was entrusted by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command to the Karelian Front under the command of General K. A. Meretskov and the Northern Fleet, commanded by Admiral A. G. Golovko.

The 14th Army under the command of General V.I. Shcherbakov (7 rifle divisions, 4 rifle brigades, 1 tank brigade, 2 tank and 2 heavy self-propelled artillery regiments and other means) was involved in direct participation in the operation, called Petsamo-Kirkenes reinforcements; 97 thousand people, 2.1 thousand guns and mortars and 725 aircraft), as well as the forces of the Northern Fleet (6 destroyers, 8 submarines, 20 torpedo boats, 23 large and small hunters, units of marines and coastal artillery). ). From the air, the offensive of the Soviet troops was supported by a thousand aircraft of the 7th Air Army of the front under the command of General I.M. Sokolov and the air force of the Northern Fleet. Soviet troops significantly outnumbered the enemy in men and military equipment.

The idea of ​​the operation was to encircle and destroy the main forces of the 19th Mountain Rifle Corps by deep encircling them from the south and simultaneous attack from the north. Then it was planned to capture the city of Petsamo (Pechenga) and develop an offensive towards the Soviet-Norwegian border.

According to the plan developed by the Military Council of the Karelian Front and approved by Headquarters on September 29, 1944, the main attack was delivered by the left flank of the 14th Army from the area south of Lake Chapr in the general direction of Luostari, Petsamo with the goal of reaching the rear of the main enemy group. On the right flank of the 14th Army, an auxiliary attack was carried out by a specially created task force with the task of pinning down Nazi troops in the area from Bolshaya Zapadnaya Litsa Bay to Lake Chapr, preventing them from being transferred to the direction of the main attack, and then going on the offensive in the general direction of Petsamo. An offensive by two brigades of the Northern Fleet marines was planned in the same direction. In order to mislead the Nazis, a demonstrative landing was planned in the area of ​​Cape Pikshuev in Motovsky Bay. For the period from October 8 to October 28, 1944, it was planned to intensify submarine operations to the northwest of the island of Vardø, blockade the ports of Petsamo and Kirkenes from the sea, and strengthen the protection of Soviet shipping in the Barents Sea.

The troops had to conduct offensive operations in the difficult region of the Far North, where granite rocks and mountains with steep slopes and sheer cliffs, gorges and abysses alternate with wetlands. This area is crossed by many mountain rivers and streams, small and large lakes. In addition, October 1944 turned out to be especially rainy. Heavy rainfall caused a significant rise in water in rivers, lakes and swamps. The average air temperature ranged from -2 to +2°, and the duration of daylight hours decreased noticeably. Due to low clouds, frequent and dense fogs, and heavy precipitation, aviation could operate on rare days and, moreover, no more than 2-3 hours a day. Magnetic and ionospheric storms complicated the operation of communications.

The operation was planned at a depth of 50-60 km. It took 10-15 days to implement it. Due to the extremely difficult conditions of combat operations in the Arctic, the average daily rate of attack was planned within 4-6 km. The start of the offensive was scheduled for October 5-7.

During the preparatory period, the front and navy commands carefully thought through and resolved all issues of the combat use of ground forces, aviation and naval forces, the organization of their interaction and the logistics of the operation. By the beginning of the war, the 14th Army had 2-3 sets of ammunition, 2-3 refills of fuel and lubricants, 7 daily supplies of food and 14 forage. Due to the peculiarities of the combat area, in addition to the three automobile battalions it had, a detachment of sled teams with reindeer was allocated to it. Medical institutions took measures to prevent frostbite among soldiers.

Commanders, political agencies, party and Komsomol organizations of the Karelian Front and the Northern Fleet carried out a lot of party-political work to mobilize soldiers for the successful conduct of the operation, strengthening the ranks of party organizations, primarily company and equal ones. It took into account the peculiarities of the offensive in the Far North. Forms of oral propaganda and agitation were actively used, and leaflets were issued dedicated to the soldiers who distinguished themselves in battle. The influx of the best warriors into the ranks of the party increased significantly. Thus, in September, 1002 people were accepted as members of the CPSU (b) in the 14th Army and 1055 as candidates for party membership.

On the morning of October 7, after a powerful artillery barrage that lasted 2 hours and 35 minutes, the troops of the 14th Army went on the offensive. Overcoming stubborn enemy resistance, the 131st Rifle Corps, with the forces of the 14th Guards Division, broke through the main line of enemy defense by 15:00. The brunt of the offensive that day fell on the infantry and escort guns, since the attached tanks and divisional artillery fell behind due to poor roads. Due to inclement weather, aviation was able to carry out only 229 sorties on the first day of fighting. Nevertheless, the offensive developed successfully. Warriors of the 14th Guards Rifle Division chest-deep ice water crossed the Titovka River on the move. At the same time, the 126th Light Rifle Corps crossed it. Without encountering resistance from Nazi troops, he began to cover them from the south. The situation was more difficult for the neighbor on the right - the 99th Rifle Corps.

By the end of the day, the troops of the 14th Army had broken through the enemy’s defenses on a section of up to 6 km along the front and advanced up to 8 km in depth. This created a real threat to the main forces of the 19th German Mountain Rifle Corps, located north of lakes Chapr and Kuosmejärvi. Hitler's command decided to take them to the Petsamo area and to the west of it.

During the three-day battles, the 14th Army completed a breakthrough of the enemy's tactical defense zone at a front of up to 20 km and advanced to a depth of 16 km. The 126th Light Rifle Corps, with a flanking maneuver, created a threat to the enemy in the Luostari area and forced him to begin a retreat.

On the evening of October 9, the front commander clarified the combat missions of the troops. From the morning of the next day, the 14th Army continued its offensive operations. On the night of October 10, troops were landed as part of the 63rd Naval Brigade in the area of ​​Malaya Volokovaya Bay. In the morning, the 12th Marine Brigade went on the offensive on the isthmus of the Sredny Peninsula. Soon its units joined forces with the amphibious assault and launched a joint attack on Petsamo. To speed up the liberation of Petsamo, on the evening of October 12, a detachment of sailors consisting of 660 people under the command of Major I. A. Timofeev, bold in design and execution, was carried out at the port of Linahamari. Torpedo boats and small hunters were used as landing craft, on which they could quickly break through an intensively shot zone. Acting boldly and decisively, the boats rushed into the bay. At the same time, the boatmen under the command of the Hero of the Soviet Union, Captain-Lieutenant A. O. Shabalin and Lieutenant E. A. Uspensky, especially distinguished themselves. By 24 o'clock the landing was completed. The battles for Linahamari were fierce and often turned into hand-to-hand combat. Under the onslaught of Soviet paratroopers, the Nazis, having suffered significant losses, were forced to retreat.

Fleet aviation provided great assistance to the paratroopers. As a result of its assault attacks, up to 200 Nazis and 34 vehicles were destroyed. On October 13, the port of Linahamari was cleared of Nazi troops. This greatly facilitated the advance of the 14th Army and Marine brigades on Petsamo.

For exceptional heroism shown in the battles for Linahamari, the foreman of the group of motorists of the torpedo boat, foreman of the 1st article G. D. Kurbatov and senior sergeant I. P. Katorzhny were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

As a result of stubborn fighting, the troops of the 14th Army, in cooperation with the forces of the Northern Fleet, liberated Petsamo on October 15 and pushed the enemy back to the west and northwest of Petsamo and Luostari. During the operation, they advanced up to 60-65 km, captured 217 guns and mortars, more than 450 machine guns and created favorable conditions for the development of an offensive towards the borders of Norway.

On October 15, the commander of the Karelian Front, K. A. Meretskov, decided to clear the enemy from the area northwest of Petsamo and west to the border with Norway, eliminate enemy coastal defenses, and capture the nickel mining area. The next day, Headquarters approved this decision. After some regrouping and others preparatory activities on the morning of October 18, the 14th Army resumed its offensive. The Northern Fleet landed troops that launched operations east of Vuoremi along the coast of the Varanger Fjord. By October 21, Soviet troops reached the border with Norway and on October 22 captured the nickel mining area - the village of Nikel. During the five-day battles, breaking the resistance of the Nazis and performing skillful outflanking maneuvers, Soviet troops advanced 25-35 km. Under their attacks, the enemy retreated to the west.

In order to defeat the enemy group and assist the Norwegian people in liberation from Nazi oppression, it was decided to cross the Soviet-Norwegian border. In this regard, the commander of the Karelian Front set the 14th Army the task of developing an offensive in the northwestern and southwestern directions, capturing the cities and ports of Kirkenes and Neiden and reaching the Nautsi region. Pursuing the enemy, the 131st Rifle Corps began the battle for the Norwegian city of Tarnet on October 22. Among those who were the first to set foot on Norwegian soil on October 18 were soldiers of the 253rd Infantry Regiment of the 45th Infantry Division, commanded by General I.V. Panin.

The troops of the 14th Army moved forward, as a rule, along roads with light units or specially created mobile detachments (company - battalion). On October 25, the 131st Rifle Corps, in cooperation with the 99th Rifle Corps, with the support of the Northern Fleet landing force, liberated the city of Kirkenes. On October 27, the 126th Light Rifle Corps cleared the city of Neiden from the Nazis, and the 31st Rifle Corps entered the Nautsi area.

During the retreat, the occupiers barbarously destroyed Norwegian cities and villages, blew up administrative buildings and residential buildings, and caused severe suffering to the local population.

Residents of Norwegian cities enthusiastically greeted the Soviet liberator soldiers.

By expelling the Nazis from Kirkenes and reaching the Neiden, Nautsi line, the 14th Army and the Northern Fleet completed their tasks in the Petsamo-Kirkenes operation. On November 9, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command ordered the army troops to go on the defensive here. The offensive in the Arctic ended with a new victory for the Soviet troops. During the nineteen-day battles, they advanced westward up to 150 km, liberating the Pechenga region and the northern regions of Norway. The loss of Petsamo and Kirkenes sharply limited the actions of the enemy fleet on the Soviet northern communications and deprived Nazi Germany of the opportunity to obtain nickel ore.

The Nazi troops suffered heavy losses in manpower, weapons and military equipment. The 19th Mountain Rifle Corps lost only about 30 thousand soldiers and officers killed. The Northern Fleet sank 156 enemy ships and vessels. The losses of Soviet troops amounted to 15,773 people killed and wounded, including 2,122 in Norway.

The actions of the troops of the 14th Army of the Karelian Front and the sailors of the Northern Fleet, who fought in the extremely difficult conditions of the Arctic, were highly appreciated by the Motherland. Their victories were celebrated three times during the operation with ceremonial fireworks in Moscow. 51 units and formations received the honorary names of Pechenga and Kirkenes, 70 units and formations were awarded military orders. Many of the most distinguished soldiers were awarded the high title of Hero of the Soviet Union. In the Northern Fleet alone, it was awarded to 26 soldiers, and the commander of the torpedo boat detachment, Lieutenant Commander A. O. Shabalin, was awarded the second Gold Star medal. The Motherland recognized the military valor of many soldiers with orders and medals of the Soviet Union. To reward all participants in the battles for the Far North, the medal “For the Defense of the Soviet Arctic” was established. For skillful leadership of troops, the commander of the Karelian Front K. A. Meretskov was awarded the military rank Marshal of the Soviet Union.

Soviet soldiers not only brought freedom to the population of Northern Norway, but also sought to alleviate the situation of the Norwegians, to whom the occupiers caused untold misfortunes. The Soviet command supplied the Norwegians with food and fuel, and assisted them in creating national military formations. Touring the newly liberated Soviet army areas, the Norwegian Minister of Justice T. Wold reported to his government in London that “in the evenings one could see hundreds of small fires around which soldiers slept” and that “Soviet troops provided the Norwegian population with the opportunity to use the few houses that survived the general destruction.” .

On June 30, 1945, during the Allied Day celebrations in Oslo, King Haakon VII of Norway said: “The Norwegian people followed with enthusiasm the heroism, courage and powerful blows that the Red Army inflicted on the Germans... The war was won by the Red Army on the Eastern Front. It was this victory that led to the liberation of Norwegian territory in the north by the Red Army... The Norwegian people accepted the Red Army as a liberator.”

During the offensive in the Far North, the high military art of the Soviet command was demonstrated with renewed vigor, and above all in the organization of close operational-tactical interaction between the ground forces and the naval forces. Complex nature The terrain determined the development of combat operations on land along directions, as a rule, without ulnar communication between units and formations. Under these conditions, the troops of the 14th Army showed the ability to flexible and bold maneuvering, using light rifle corps, specially trained and organizationally adapted for operations in the Arctic. The engineering support for the combat operations of the Soviet troops during the operation was distinguished by a high level.

Thus, the offensive of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Baltic states and the Arctic in the fall of 1944 brought to the Soviet people new glorious victories. It ended with the expulsion of the Nazis from many areas of the Soviet Baltic republics. During the operation in the Far North, Soviet troops liberated the occupied areas of the Soviet Arctic and provided great assistance to the Norwegian people in liberation from the Nazi occupiers. Norway became the seventh country where Soviet liberation soldiers came in 1944.

Victories in the Baltic states and the Far North greatly complicated the position of Nazi Germany and played an important role in creating conditions for conducting offensive operations of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Berlin direction.

During the battles in the Baltic states and the Arctic, Soviet soldiers showed massive heroism and high military skill, unshakable loyalty to the socialist Fatherland, and the great ideals of the Communist Party.