Crimean War. Russian Armed Forces before the Crimean War

The naval battle of Sinop took place at the very beginning of the Crimean War. This war began in October 1853 between Russia and Turkey, but soon developed into an armed conflict between serf Russia and a strong coalition of England, France, Turkey, and Sardinia. In Russia in the first half of the 19th century, the crisis of the feudal-serf system intensified from year to year. The country experienced an increase in productive forces, which inevitably and naturally led to the gradual formation of a new basis - new, progressive for that time, capitalist production relations. The formation of the capitalist system undermined and destroyed feudal foundations, but the further economic, political and cultural development of the country was strongly affected by the reactionary role of the autocracy - the political superstructure of the old, outdated feudal-serf base.

On the eve of the Crimean War, Russia had a stronger industrial base than at the beginning of the 19th century; the number of large manufactories and factories increased, the domestic market expanded, and commodity-money relations developed. Bread exports increased significantly. However, the dominance of the serf-dominated economy predetermined the backwardness of Russia, and by the 50s of the 19th century the country lagged significantly behind the states of Western Europe, which had embarked on the path of capitalist development much earlier.

The autocratic-serf system that dominated the country hampered the development of industry, agriculture, transport, and navigation. Russia's lag was especially evident in the ferrous metallurgy industry. If at the end of the 18th century Russia produced more cast iron than England, then by the middle of the 19th century it produced 10 times less of it compared to England. The use of free labor of serfs did not stimulate, but rather hindered the introduction of machines, new processes and production methods into various industries. At the same time, Russia's advanced scientific and technical thought was ahead of foreign thought; There was no field in science and technology that did not have outstanding contributions from domestic scientists. However, scientific discoveries and inventions were not widely practical application in feudal Russia.

The whole move economic development countries pushed towards the abolition of serfdom. In response to increased exploitation, the working masses increasingly launched their struggle against serfdom. In the second quarter of the 19th century alone, over 700 outbreaks of peasant unrest occurred in the country, which is clear evidence of the intensification of the class struggle during that period. Unrest broke out more and more often in the army and navy. They protested angrily against serfdom best representatives Russian revolutionary democracy - Belinsky, Herzen and later Chernyshevsky and Dobrolyubov.

The government of Nicholas I pursued a reactionary course in both domestic and foreign policy. One of the most convenient ways Tsarism considered the strengthening of autocracy within the country a successful war of conquest against the Turkish Empire. The desire of tsarism for this war was entirely determined by the interests of the ruling class and was caused by the need of the military-feudal-merchant elite of Russia for access to the seas, seaports, expansion of foreign trade and the capture of strategic points.

The international situation during this period was characterized by aggravation of contradictions in the “Eastern Question” between the largest European states. The Middle East and the Balkans in the mid-19th century were the scene of fierce struggle, primarily between England, France, Russia, Austria, and Prussia. The intensification of Russia's policy on the “eastern question” was a serious obstacle to the implementation of the aggressive plans of the Western European powers. England, France, Austria, Prussia, despite the presence of contradictions among themselves, joined forces in the fight against Russia in order to provide themselves with a path for further colonial expansion in the countries of the East.

During the same period, the United States began to become “interested” in the Middle East. In the summer of 1853, Engels noted that “American intervention in European affairs begins precisely with the Eastern question.” On the eve of the Crimean War, the ruling circles of the United States agreed with Turkey to provide it with a loan in exchange for one of the military bases in the Mediterranean; Subsequently, the American banker Rothschild specially arrived in Turkey, setting out to speed up the formation of a mercenary corps for the war against Russia.

In the complex set of international contradictions in the “Eastern Question,” Anglo-Russian contradictions prevailed, the aggravation of which was the main cause of the Crimean War.

In England, along with the rapid growth of capitalist production, the aspirations of the English bourgeoisie for new territorial conquests also intensified. If until the 40s of the 19th century Russia occupied an almost monopoly position on the Turkish market, then on the eve of the Crimean War the palm in exporting goods to Turkey passed to England; Russian exports to Turkish possessions decreased by 2.5 times. Marx noted in this regard that “Russian trade, which previously reached the border in the East English possessions, is now limited to the defense of the extreme borders of its own customs area."

The ruling circles of the British Empire on the eve of and during the Crimean War pursued the most reactionary policies. The English bourgeoisie was the organizer and inspirer of the suppression of the national liberation movement of the Balkan peoples, who were under the cruelest Turkish yoke. English capital penetrated into all spheres of economic and political life Turkey, which was steadily losing its independence and turning into an instrument of British policy. At the same time, the English bourgeoisie headed the preparations for war against its main rival and competitor - Russia.

The plans of colonial aggression of the English bourgeoisie at that time went much further than those of other states. Along with predatory wars in China and India, the ruling circles of England set as their goal the achievement of monopoly domination in the Balkans, Turkey, and the Black Sea basin; they sought to seize the Crimea and the Caucasus from Russia, weaken its position in the Baltic and Far East. By pursuing such an aggressive policy, the English bourgeoisie tried to hide its true goals, hypocritically explaining its own military preparations and aggressive diplomatic measures as actions of a “defensive” nature. Already at that time, the English capitalists “broke a record not only in the number of plundered colonies, but also in the sophistication of their disgusting hypocrisy.”

Russia's seizure of the Crimean Peninsula was regarded in England as a top priority; If this “task” is successfully solved, the English bourgeoisie could take a dominant position in the Black Sea, eliminate the results of the historical victories of Russian weapons of the 18th-19th centuries, push Russia away from the Black Sea coast and thereby deal a very serious blow to the economy of the Russian state.

In the years preceding the Crimean War, England's aggression in the Caucasus was also a clear and obvious manifestation of the aggressive aspirations of the English bourgeoisie. The ruling circles of England considered the Caucasus as one of the important objects of their colonial expansion. Both western and eastern Transcaucasia attracted them not only with its natural resources, but also as an important strategic area for further penetration into Central and Western Asia. In order to assert its dominance, the English bourgeoisie incited and supported in the Caucasus the anti-people nationalist movement of the feudal elite and the fanatically religious part of the mountain tribes under the leadership of Shamil. Many years before the Crimean War, numerous groups of English agents were sent to the Caucasus with the task of expanding the struggle of the reactionary mountaineer detachments against Russia.

Shamil was a protégé of the English bourgeoisie and Turkish feudal lords. The policy he pursued was aimed at separating the Caucasus from Russia and at enslaving the Caucasus by England and Turkey. These aspirations were deeply alien to the interests of the broad masses of the Caucasian highlanders, who actively fought against the nationalist bands of Shamil and sought to strengthen ties and friendship with the Russian people, to jointly ensure the security of their native land.

The ruling circles of England in the Crimean War, as before in their numerous other colonial and European wars, hoped to fight by proxy and, first of all, to use the Turkish armed forces to fight against Russia. To this end, Western European capitalists provided “assistance” to Turkey, providing it with the latest weapons and equipment.

Many years before the war, Turkey was flooded with English, French, American, Austrian, Prussian military specialists who trained Turkish troops, built fortifications, and supervised the development of plans for an attack on Russia.

The Turkish Navy was actually created under the leadership of foreign specialists. Almost all the artillery of the Turkish fleet was of English production. American engineers built several warships for Turkey. The mechanical workshops that served the Turkish fleet were staffed exclusively by foreigners. The British served as mechanics on Turkish ships. One of the English officers, Adolf Slade, was assistant to the chief of the Turkish Naval Staff. Before the war, the Turkish naval forces were continuously replenished with ships built in Marseille, Venice, and Livorno.

Since the Crimea, the Caucasus, and the Balkans occupied the first place in the extensive colonial plans of the British Empire, the British bourgeoisie took all measures to destroy the Russian Black Sea Fleet and thereby remove a serious obstacle to the implementation of their aggressive plans in the Black Sea basin.

In the mid-19th century, the Russian Black Sea Fleet, like all Russian armed forces, was greatly affected by the political and economic backwardness of the feudal country. The Russian fleet consisted mainly of sailing ships, while the construction of steam ships was widely deployed in foreign fleets. Just as in other branches of science and technology, in military affairs the successes of outstanding Russian scientists were ahead of the military-technical thought of Europe and America; in Russia, for example, back in 1817, the world's first military steam ship was built; however, under the autocratic-serf system there was no necessary production base for the construction of a steam fleet, which negatively affected the combat effectiveness of the Russian naval forces. By the beginning of the war, the Black Sea Fleet consisted of over 150 combat and auxiliary ships, but among them there were only 6 steamship frigates.

The situation was different with the combat training of Black Sea Fleet personnel. The main fighting force of the fleet - Russian sailors, who made up the crews of battleships, frigates, brigs and other ships, were well prepared to fight the enemy at sea and on land. Contrary to the reactionary course of tsarism, which imposed cane discipline and parade drill in the army and navy, in the Black Sea Fleet, far from St. Petersburg, the best traditions of Suvorov and Ushakov, the creators of an advanced system of military training and education, were preserved. The Black Sea sailors were constantly tempered in long voyages and campaigns, continuously improving their combat skills under the leadership of outstanding Russian admirals M.P. Lazarev, V.A. Kornilov, P.S. Nakhimov.

Black Sea squadron on the Sevastopol roadstead (1846). From a painting by the artist I.K. Aivazovsky.

The remarkable words of the outstanding Russian naval commander P. S. Nakhimov - “the sailor is the main engine on a warship” - were the main motto in the combat training of the Black Sea Fleet. The military educational activities of Nakhimov, Kornilov, Istomin and other leading figures in the fleet were based on steady and constant concern for the sailor, which, under the conditions of the serfdom, ran counter to the official course of tsarism.

The military educational activities of talented naval commanders were a great contribution to Russian naval art. They inherited from Ushakov and Suvorov the correct view of great value combat training to achieve victory in battles. The cornerstone of their educational system was a negative attitude towards the serfdom that reigned in the navy. Nakhimov’s words: “It’s time for us to stop considering ourselves landowners and sailors serfs” clearly reflect the inner essence of the progressive educational system and allow us to understand what determined the high combat training of the sailors of the Black Sea Fleet, who achieved perfection in the use of weapons and combat equipment of the fleet.

An ardent patriot of the Motherland, Nakhimov instilled in sailors a sense of patriotism, great love to the Russian people, to their native land. He instilled in the sailors faith in their strength, in the unshakable fortitude of Russian soldiers, and raised the dignity of the sailor. The Black Sea sailors saw in him not only a boss and an admiral, but also a Russian man who loved Russia and the Russian fleet, who hated servility to foreigners, who angrily ridiculed those who “left behind the Russians, did not stick to the French, are also not like the British, and neglect their own.” , they envy someone else...”

Long before 1853, cadres of sailors—future Sinopian heroes—were forged on the Black Sea. Aristocrats and careerists, of whom there were many among the Russian naval officers in Nicholas's time, did not go to the provincial wilderness of the Black Sea region and Taurida. Lazarev, Nakhimov, Kornilov managed to rally around them the best officers of the fleet, who were imbued with their views, persistently worked to create a combat-ready fleet, and tirelessly sought to implement the behests of Suvorov and Ushakov in the combat training of Black Sea sailors. The twenty-year period preceding the Crimean War was a period of their energetic, fruitful, multifaceted activities to prepare the Black Sea Fleet for the upcoming battles.

In terms of the level of combat training, the Black Sea Fleet differed sharply from the Baltic Fleet. If in the Baltic in the middle of the 19th century, under the direct influence of the tsar and high-ranking admirals, the main attention was paid to watch parades, and the “Instructions on the passage of fleet vessels past the windows of the sovereign emperor” was almost the basis of combat training, then on the shores of Akhtiarskaya Bay, in the distance from the capital, the process of military training of sailors was built on completely different principles. Here is one example showing the practical implementation of the most important requirement - to train sailors in an environment as close as possible to combat:

“For example, in 1852, there was the commander of the 28th naval crew and the ship “Varna”, captain 1st rank Semyon Grigorievich Alekseev, who during an artillery exercise introduced the following techniques: the command is “such and such a gunner at such and such a gun, or a battery commander, killed or wounded” - then the place of the person who left had to be replaced by the person assigned to him, and the killed person had to be carried away by the people allocated to carry the wounded or killed. It happened more than once that when the commander himself was being carried “killed,” he, seeing something wrong or an omission, jumped out of the stretcher and attacked the culprits. Short-sighted sailors spread a rumor about this, that Alekseev had gone crazy, that his dead were resurrected, etc.; in the 70s, the above-mentioned techniques were introduced in our ground and naval forces, and in France these techniques were introduced in the 60s - therefore, Alekseev saw 20 years ahead.”

Among the most important factors that determined the high combat effectiveness of the Black Sea Fleet during the Crimean War are also fighting fleet off the Caucasian coast in the 30-40s of the 19th century. In the Caucasus during this period there was a stubborn struggle between Russian troops and the reactionary troops of Shamil. The Black Sea Fleet provided constant assistance to the ground forces. The ships of the fleet interacted with the coastal flank of the Russian Caucasian army, delivered reinforcements, ammunition, equipment, and suppressed enemy strongholds with naval artillery fire.

In continuous cruising off the coast of the Caucasus all year round Black Sea sailors kept a combat watch, stopping the connection of Shamil’s murids with foreign agents trying to get to the Caucasian shores. During these long and difficult voyages, the Black Sea sailors underwent an excellent schooling: constant combat readiness of ships became commonplace for them.

Thus, on the eve of the Crimean War, a cadre of experienced sailors was trained on the Black Sea under the leadership of advanced representatives of the Russian fleet. The sailors of the Black Sea Fleet were superior to any fleet in the world in their combat and moral qualities. The level of combat training of Black Sea officers was also significantly higher than in foreign fleets, where officers of the vaunted European and American “civilization” were openly proud of the whip and stick as symbols of unlimited power over the sailor.

The Sinop victory of the Black Sea Fleet in November 1853 was prepared by long and painstaking work over many years preceding the war.

* * * The situation in the Black Sea basin has become significantly more complicated since the spring of 1853. On May 9, as a result of provocative actions by British diplomacy, diplomatic relations between Russia and Turkey were broken. In June, the English and French squadrons arrived at the Dardanelles. US warships appeared in the eastern Mediterranean. The Turkish command began to concentrate large formations of its troops in the Balkans against the Russian army, which had entered the Danube principalities. At the same time, Shamil’s troops became more active in the Caucasus, having been warned in advance by British and Turkish agents about the upcoming military operations of Turkish troops against the Russian Caucasian army.

Under these conditions, the Russian naval forces on the Black Sea were put on combat readiness from the very beginning of the summer campaign of 1853. On the initiative of the Chief of Staff of the Black Sea Fleet, Vice Admiral V.A. Kornilov, Russian ships went on cruising, cordoning off the entire Black Sea from the Bosporus to the Caucasian shores.

In the instructions given to the ship commanders, Kornilov indicated that the main purpose of cruising was to monitor the Turkish fleet. Since there had not yet been an official declaration of war between Turkey and Russia, Russian ships were prohibited from entering the visibility of the Turkish coast, as well as stopping Turkish ships.

Despite the fact that Russian ships went on cruising before the declaration of war, Kornilov took into account the possibility of provocative actions by the Turks and the need for increased combat readiness of ships in case of repelling an unexpected attack by the Turkish fleet. When meeting with the Turkish fleet, which showed its intention to attack the Russian cruiser, - Kornilov wrote in the instructions to the commanders, - “the authorities fully hope for your prudence and that at such a meeting you will support the dignity of the Russian flag, and at the same time resort to extreme means in the inevitable only circumstances..."

The main forces of the Black Sea Fleet were divided into two practical squadrons. As in previous years, these squadrons had to take turns going to sea for practical voyages, the main purpose of which was to improve the combat skills of the sailors. However, in the summer campaign of 1853, Kornilov set before the practical squadrons not only the tasks of training navigation, but also tasks related to the general program of monitoring the Turkish fleet. The squadrons' sailing area was also chosen for the same purpose.

The 1st practical squadron under the command of Vice Admiral Nakhimov, consisting of six battleships and one frigate, having taken provisions for 4 months and all ammunition according to martial law, entered the Sevastopol roadstead on May 15. By order of Kornilov, the squadron was to move to the area between Sevastopol and the line of cruisers observing the Bosporus. Upon receiving news from the cruisers about the movement of enemy ships, Nakhimov had to act in accordance with the situation and, “pulling the cruisers to himself, send news to Nikolaev through Odessa or Sevastopol with a messenger courier and await further orders at the height of Chersonesos or ascend to Sevastopol to join the rest of the ships Black Sea Fleet". On May 19, Nakhimov’s squadron left Sevastopol and headed to the designated navigation area.

The 2nd practical squadron of the Black Sea Fleet, consisting of six ships, two frigates and one corvette, entered the Sevastopol roadstead on May 28. The squadron commander, Kornilov, ordered “to take provisions for 4 months and have everything according to martial law, except gunpowder, so as to be ready to go to sea at the first request.” This squadron, which remained in Sevastopol in full combat readiness, ensured the security of the main base of the Black Sea Fleet and was ready to meet the Turkish fleet in the event of hostilities.

In early June, news began to arrive in Sevastopol about the activity of Shamil’s troops in connection with the impending war. By order of Kornilov, cruising off the Caucasian shores of the Black Sea was strengthened by the formation of two detachments of cruising ships.

In addition to the ships that had previously cruised there, Kornilov allocated several more brigs and corvettes. The southern detachment of ships was based at Sukhum-Kala; Northern - to Novorossiysk. One of the corvettes was specially allocated for cruising in the Sinop area.

The 1st practical squadron under Vice Admiral Nakhimov continued sailing until June 29, when it was replaced by the 2nd practical squadron under the flag of Rear Admiral Novosilsky. The 2nd practical squadron was at sea until July 29. In July, new battleships “Empress Maria” and “Grand Duke Konstantin” arrived in Sevastopol from Nikolaev. From July 29, the entire battle fleet of 14 ships concentrated on the Sevastopol roadstead, ready to go to sea at any moment. Frigates, corvettes and brigs of the Black Sea Fleet, taking turns, continued monitoring the Turkish fleet in the western region of the Black Sea, off the Caucasian coast, near Sinop and near the Bosphorus.

In September 1853, three weeks before the start of the war, the Black Sea Fleet solved the important task of strengthening the Russian Caucasian army. The fleet command was instructed to urgently transport the 13th Infantry Division from Crimea to the Caucasian coast. This difficult task was completed under the leadership of Vice Admirals Kornilov and Nakhimov. In one voyage, the ships transported over 16 thousand troops, a large amount of artillery, ammunition and food, as well as more than 800 horses. The successful completion of this task clearly demonstrated the high maritime skills of the Black Sea sailors.

Thus, the summer campaign of the Black Sea Fleet in 1853 began in difficult situation, which determined the change in the nature of the fleet’s activities compared to previous campaigns. The transportation of troops to the Caucasus, which was distinguished by exemplary organization, played an important role in the deployment of the Russian army to the most last days before the start of the war.

From May 1853, throughout summer months, The Black Sea Fleet actively fought to create conditions that constrained the actions of the Turkish fleet in the Black Sea. Widely deployed reconnaissance and a system of constant and continuous surveillance, extended as far as possible towards the potential enemy, largely ensured the success of subsequent military operations of the Black Sea Fleet.

By the autumn of 1853, the Russian-Turkish conflict, deliberately inflated by Western European diplomacy, escalated even more. True to their policy of raking in the heat with the wrong hands, the ruling circles of England and France hoped that the Turkish armed forces would be able to conduct military operations against Russia in the initial period of the war without the direct participation of Anglo-French troops, but the strategic deployment of forces included not only the concentration of the Turkish army at the Russian borders on the Danube and the Caucasus, but also the concentration of the united Anglo-French fleet at the entrance to the Black Sea. In September 1853, the governments of England and France decided to take the final step, which was immediately followed by Turkey declaring war on Russia.

The London Straits Convention of July 13, 1841 stated that “passage through the Dardanelles and Bosporus straits remains permanently closed to foreign warships while the Porte is at peace.” However, despite international obligations, the governments of England and France decided not to limit themselves to the mooring of their squadrons at the Dardanelles, and admirals Dundas and Lasusse received orders to enter the Sea of ​​Marmara. In mid-September 1853, when Turkey had not yet declared war, the vanguard of the Anglo-French fleet, disregarding international agreements, passed the Dardanelles and headed for the Bosphorus. By thus tearing up the 1841 convention, England and France openly demonstrated their disrespect for international obligations. The Turkish government now had no shadow of a doubt that the Anglo-French were ready to act together with the Turks against Russia.

On September 27, a few days after the vanguard of the Anglo-French fleet entered the Sea of ​​Marmara, a Turkish ultimatum to Russia followed. The Turkish government demanded that Russian troops be withdrawn from the Danube principalities within 15 days. But even before the expiration of the deadline from the day the ultimatum was presented, the Turks unexpectedly began military operations.

On October 11, a detachment of ships of the Russian Danube Flotilla, consisting of 8 gunboats towed by two steamships, moved up the Danube.

Map of the Black and Azov Seas 1851

A few days later, the Turks opened hostilities in the Caucasus. On the night of October 15-16, Turkish troops suddenly attacked the Russian garrison of the St. post. Nicholas, located on the Black Sea coast of the Caucasus north of Batum. The small garrison of this fortification steadfastly resisted a detachment of thousands of Turkish troops for 9 hours, but as a result of the bloody battle they were forced to abandon the fortification. In the Caucasian theater, fighting also began between Turkish and Russian troops.

(1) K. Marx, F. Engels, Works, vol. IX, p. 440.

(2) Ibid., pp. 383-384.

(3) V.I. Lenin, Soch., vol. 28, p. 46.

(4) Mor. Sat., 1901, No. 11, unofficial. dept., pp. 47-48.

(5) Admiral V. A. Kornilov, “Materials on the history of the Russian fleet,” p. 178.

(6) A. Gendre, “Materials for the history of the defense of Sevastopol and for the biography of Vladimir Alekseevich Kornilov”, St. Petersburg, 1859, p. 44.

(7) Ibid., p. 41.

(8) A. Miller, A Brief History of Turkey, 1948, p. 73.

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Correlation of forces and sides
before the Crimean War

By the beginning of the Crimean War, the Russian military ground forces consisted of regular and irregular troops. The registered strength of all ground forces at the beginning of the war was 1,397,100 people, of which 1,151,300 people were in the regular army, 245,800 people were in the irregular forces. A significant part of the ground forces was intended for internal service, which is why, in fact, tsarism could deploy no more than 700 thousand soldiers and officers for combat operations with an external enemy.

The Russian army was armed with predominantly smooth-bore seven-line (17.78 mm) flintlock rifles of the 1828 model. Each battalion had rifled fittings (24 riflemen per battalion), however, the percentage of rifled weapons in the total number of small arms was very small (4 - 5 %). The field artillery was armed with smooth-bore guns.

The fortress artillery was of large calibers (24-, 36- and 68-pound, pood,).

The main content of combat training of ground forces on the eve Crimean War was a parade ground drill. For fire training in peacetime, only three rounds of ammunition per person were allocated per year. But even under these conditions, the advanced officers of the army sought to train the soldier in what might be required in war; individual formations of troops, such as the Caucasian Corps, had a high level of combat training.

The political and economic backwardness of the country was also reflected in the state of the strategy and tactics of the Russian army. The day before Crimean War the tsarist generals still proceeded from the possibility of achieving victory in the war through one general battle, although experience Patriotic War of 1812 showed the inconsistency of such calculations. The regulations and instructions were influenced by linear tactics. The battle in them was considered as a clash of lines of troops in columns or in deployed closed formations with a chain skirmishers ahead. Fire from the chain skirmishers and from the very lines was taken away minor role, the main importance was attached to the bayonet strike, which did not meet the requirements of combat when the enemy widely used rifled weapons.

In the fight against backward views in the field of military art, advanced ideas continued to develop. Thanks to theoretical work P. A. Yazykova, N. V. Medema, D. A. Milutina, A. Z. Telyakovsky, F. I. Goremykin advanced Russian military art by the middle of the 19th century. rose to a higher level compared to the previous period. In the works Russian military theorists the works of foreign military authorities were criticized - Lloyd, Bülow, Jomini, Clausewitz who preached the eternal and unchanging principles of the art of war. Russian military theorists emphasized the need to have trained reserves in the country, as well as to arm troops with rifled weapons, pointed out the exceptional importance of the loose formation, demanded a transition in command and control of troops during battle from a system of unified commands to a system of orders, came out with a demand for the mandatory use of troops on the ground, emphasized the importance of fire preparation.

In area military engineering art the most advanced ideas for that time were expressed in the work of A. Z. Telyakovsky “Fortification”. This outstanding military engineer came up with the idea defense in depth , demanded the abandonment of passive defense and the transition to active defense of fortresses, which would create “perfect ability to move from a defensive position to an offensive one under cover of strong crossfire” . The conclusion was of great importance Telyakovsky O the relationship between engineering and tactics . Advanced views A. 3. Telyakovsky and other military figures of Russia were confirmed by experience Crimean War and received further development in the second half of the 19th century.

At the beginning of the Crimean War, the Russian naval forces included the Baltic and Black Sea fleets, the Arkhangelsk (White Sea), Caspian and Kamchatka flotillas. In 1853, there were 90,985 people in the fleet, of whom about half were ashore.

By the beginning of the Crimean War, the ship composition of the Russian Navy was as follows:

Organizationally, the ships of the fleets were united into divisions, each of which consisted of three brigades. There were three such divisions in the Baltic Fleet, and two in the Black Sea Fleet. The brigade included three, various numbers of other small ships.

Domestic shipbuilders have achieved great success in the construction of sailing ships. The combat ships of the Russian fleet, built in Russian and from Russian materials, were stable and fast. Russian craftsmen improved the design of warships. They introduced a rounded, more streamlined shape, changed the angle of inclination, replaced hemp with leather ones, significantly improved the caulking of ships, introduced upholstery with lead sheets, improved them, etc. A great achievement of Russian shipbuilders was the construction of 120-gun battleships - giants of the sailing fleet, having a displacement of over 4,000 tons.

The disadvantage of the artillery weapons of Russian ships was their great diversity. Leading representatives of the Russian fleet understood that such a variety of calibers on ships could greatly affect the use of artillery in combat conditions, and therefore, long before the war, they paid great attention to eliminating this shortcoming and improving naval artillery.

In 1841, on the initiative V. A. Kornilova on the ship "Twelve Apostles" bomb 68-pounder guns were installed . By insistence M. P. Lazareva, V. A. Kornilova, P. S. Nakhimova was introduced on most ships of the Black Sea Fleet. By the beginning of the war, on some ships of the Black Sea Fleet ( “Paris”, “Brave”, “Vel. book Konstantin" ) the lower batteries consisted entirely of bomb cannons.

(Bomb guns, the prototype of which were the Russians late XV .1 IIc., could shoot not only cannonballs and buckshot, but also explosive shells (grenades or bombs). The firing range of bomb guns was shorter than that of other large-caliber ship guns; if the latter, at an elevation angle of 7°, could fire at a distancebefore15-16 cables, then bomb guns - up to 8-10 cables)

In general to the beginning Crimean War The ships of the Russian fleet had strong artillery armament: battleships - from 84 to 120 guns.

Thanks to the successes of advanced domestic scientific and technical thought, the Russian fleet before Crimean War received a new means of fighting at sea - . Back in 1807, the first bottom mine was designed and tested in Russia. Five years later, a mine was tested on the Neva, in which an electric fuse was used for the first time in the world. The day before Crimean War The Russian fleet was armed with mines designed by an outstanding Russian scientist B. S. Jacobi- creator of the world's first electric ship and electric motor.

Sailing fleet by the middle of the 19th century. reached a high degree of perfection, but the development of technology urgently required the transition to a steam fleet. The invention of the screw propulsion, as F. Engels emphasized, led to the complete revolutionization of naval warfare.

Leading figures in Russian science and technology, long before the Crimean War, understood the need for a transition from a sailing fleet to a steam fleet. It was in Russia that the steam engine was first used in the navy as a ship engine. Steamboat "Skory" , built in 1817 at the Izhora factories, it was the world's first steam military ship.

Officers of the Russian fleet and domestic shipbuilders showed great interest in the construction of steam and then iron steam ships. The idea of ​​building iron warships was expressed in 1824. builder of the first Russian steamships, mechanic Chistyakov. In 1834 Russian military engineer A. A. Shilder built a metal ship for the first time in history - . In 1838, on the initiative Admiral M.P. Lazarev was built the first iron warship "Inkerman" . In the 40s of the XIX century. Russian engineers and naval officers created a number of original works on thermal engineering. Works published Lieutenant Commander Skalovsky “Rules for employees on naval ships”, Ensign Semenov “Complete Guide for Steamship Mechanical Engineers” and others, was published in 1850

wonderful work of the Russian engineer, staff captain N. N. Bozheryanov, “The Theory of Steam Engines” , which was the first systematic course in thermal engineering. Russian scientists were far ahead of scientists in Western Europe and America in developing theoretical issues related to the construction of the fleet. In the USA, for example, until the 40s of the 19th century. the construction of steam ships was in its infancy. The US Secretary of the Navy, in his report to the Senate in 1839, wrote: “I will never allow our old (sailing) ships to be destroyed and the American fleet to become a bunch of steam-powered sea monsters.”

Despite the insistent demands of leading figures of the Russian Navy about the need to build steam ships, in the pre-reform period, due to the weakness of the country's production and industrial base, their construction was not launched. Moreover, the tsarist dignitaries, who sought to preserve and strengthen serf relations in the country and hampered the development of domestic industry, deliberately fettered the initiative of innovative scientists and in every possible way prevented the implementation of their inventions, proposals and projects. By the beginning of the war there were only 15 in Russia. There were no propeller ships in the Russian fleet at all.

Steamship-frigates of the Crimean War period - the first combat ships of the Russian steam fleet - had a displacement of 1,300 to 1,900 tons, steam engines with a power of 260-400 hp. sec., speed 8.5-11 knots. The artillery armament of the steamship frigates was different, but the number of guns did not exceed 12; this number, as a rule, included two bomb cannons, six or eight 24-pound caliber cannon-carronades and two 12- or 18-pound caliber carronades. The personnel of each steamship-frigate numbered up to 250 people.

Small steamships of the Crimean War period (part of the fleet as auxiliary vessels) had an average displacement of 400-600 tons, engines with a power of 60-180 hp. s., speed up to nine knots, personnel from 70 to 100 people. Some of the small steamships were armed with two to seven cannon-carronades; Some ships before the war did not have artillery weapons.

In area Russian fleet tactics It should be noted that the main role in naval battle artillery was assigned. “The main condition for positive success,” stated the tactical manual of the 40s of the 19th century, “with the current image of a naval battle, lies in skillful artillery action.” Maneuver in battle was considered as the main means for creating conditions that ensured the successful use of ship artillery weapons. For this purpose, 15 fleet formations (orders) were identified. The choice of one formation or another was determined by the characteristics of each formation, the conditions of the situation and the tasks assigned to the fleet.

During the tactical exercises of the Russian fleet, much attention was paid to the rules for changing the fleet from one formation to another, for which special tables were developed that established the time of changeover at various speeds and intervals between ships. When sailing together, great importance was attached to the compactness of the formation, since it was believed that the more closely closed the battle formation was, the stronger it was. The distance between ships in a line, assigned for battle in general by one cable, can be reduced by as much as prudence and ease of maneuver allow. If the enemy wants to cut through the line, the ships are strictly prohibited from yielding.

Along with the parallel maneuvering of the two fleets in battle, other maneuvers were also used to determine the best use of artillery depending on the situation. Such maneuvers included: cutting through the enemy line, placing enemy ships “in two fires,” simultaneous passage of attacking ships between their corresponding ships of the enemy battle line for general boarding or demoralization of the enemy, concentration of forces against the enemy’s vanguard or rearguard.

According to the requirements of the charter, in battle, ship commanders had to ensure that their ships maintained their place in the ranks, but at the same time they had to remember “that if, under the pretext of maintaining the distance assigned from the front line, or taking bearings to the shown one, they remain in this position, which will not allow their ships to fight like those that are already under enemy fire, then they will act completely contrary to the admiral’s intentions,” that “... the real place of the ship during battle is in enemy fire, where the fire is stronger.”

The instructions also required that they provide mutual support to each other in battle and protect flagships from the enemy.

Issues related to landings were also very fully developed in the Russian fleet.

The conditions ensuring the success of the landing were considered:

- advance exploration of the landing site;

- choosing a place to anchor the fleet that would ensure the safety of ships in the event of increased wind and enemy attack and would have constant communication with the landed troops;

- suddenness of the landing;

- artillery preparation of the landing site;

- the short duration of the landing of troops and the unloading of artillery from ships to the shore.

As for the tactics of using the small number of steam ships available, there were only general indications of the importance of steamships, “which at present can be added to the operating fleets with the greatest benefit and participate no less than other ships in military operations.” The tactics of the steam fleet began to be developed only on the basis of experience Crimean War.

In general, the level of tactical art of the Russian sailing fleet on the eve Crimean War was higher than in foreign fleets.

State of combat training Baltic and Black Sea fleets was different. Russian Black Sea Fleet in terms of combat training was higher than Baltic. This was largely due to the fact that Black Sea Fleet in the 30s and 40s he often fought on the Caucasian coast,

In that During the period in the Caucasus there was a stubborn struggle between Russian troops and reactionary nationalist troops of Shamil , And Black Sea Fleet provided constant assistance to the ground forces. The ships of the fleet interacted with the coastal flank of the Russian Caucasian army, delivered reinforcements, ammunition, equipment, and took part in joint actions against the highlanders, suppressing their strongholds with naval artillery fire.

Leaders of the Russian fleet on the Black Sea - Lazarev, Kornilov, Nakhimov - managed to raise initiative, decisive and brave warriors from the sailors who skillfully wielded weapons. Ships of the Black Sea Fleet Every year they went on practical voyages, the main purpose of which was to improve the combat skills of sailors. Maneuvers, training, sailing, artillery, and boarding exercises were commonplace on ships and fleet squadrons.

Outstanding Russian admirals paid great attention to the training of not only sailors and officers, but also students of naval educational institutions. “It is very useful to accustom a midshipman to the duties of an officer,” Nakhimov wrote in 1851, “but it is even more necessary to acquaint them with sailor work, and for this it is necessary to make it the duty of the commander and senior officer to train midshipmen and cadets: to fasten and change sails, to lower and lift, throw and steer. This information is difficult to acquire in the officer rank, and even more difficult so that someone who does not have it does not subsequently feel this lack.” . Speaking about the need for strict discipline for students of naval educational institutions, Nakhimov emphasized: .

* * *

“It is necessary that these young people, for their own benefit, understand from an early age the severity of discipline at sea.” Royal Navy Crimean War consisted of 19 sailing battleships, 11 steam-powered battleships, 50 sailing frigates, 32 steam frigates, 67 small sailing ships and 71 small steam ships. The merchant fleet was a huge reserve of the English navy. The artillery armament of the British ships consisted mainly of 68-pound and 32-pound cannons.

The industrial base of capitalist England made it possible to provide the fleet with numerous steam (including screw) ships, and this was the main advantage of the English navy. However, the combat training of the English fleet was at a low level. The English gunners had very little practice in artillery shooting. Cane discipline and poor combat training of the crews determined the low combat effectiveness of the English Navy.

French Navy back to the beginning Crimean War consisted of 25 battleships, 38 frigates, 108 steam ships. By this time, it, like the English fleet, included screw-driven battleships and frigates. The artillery armament of the ships of the French fleet was basically no different from the armament of the fleets of other countries.

The bomb guns introduced on the ships of the English and French fleets were actually a modified example of the Russian unicorn of the late 18th century, although they were called bombing guns of Peksan.

In terms of combat training and tactical use of weapons, the French armed forces were superior to the British. However, neither in France, nor in England, nor in other countries on the eve of the war were they completely developed issues of steam fleet tactics.

By the beginning of hostilities in the summer of 1853, the composition Turkish fleet there were six battleships, seven frigates, seven corvettes, 24 small ships and 17 steamships. Most Turkish ships were built in Western European shipyards. The drivers on the Turkish ships were exclusively British; all the machinery and equipment for the steam ships were delivered from England. Almost all the naval guns of the Turkish fleet were made in England.

The British not only supplied the Turkish fleet with guns, but also exercised constant leadership of the Turkish naval forces. The main adviser to the Turks on issues of weapons, combat training and combat use of the fleet was English captain A. Slad, who was directly under the chief commander of the Turkish fleet, Mahmud Pasha, and had the rank of admiral in the Turkish fleet.

In total, England, France, Turkey and Sardinia had a million-strong army, which was technically equipped and armed better than the Russian ground forces. United Anglo-Franco-Turkish Fleet significantly outnumbered all Russian naval forces . The steam fleet of the coalition states was many times larger than the Russian steam fleet. But the united fleet, like the armies of England, France, Turkey and Sardinia, was generally characterized by low combat effectiveness. The military and naval art of these countries did not correspond to the level of development of weapons and technology.

Before the Crimean War, the Russian armed forces lagged behind the armies in their development European countries. The desire of Emperor Nicholas I to manage all state affairs independently, his commitment to placing in power people blindly loyal to the crown and often incompetent had a detrimental effect on the formation of the senior officer corps, which was distinguished, for the most part, by lack of initiative and extreme indecisiveness.

The peasant question left unsolved and serfdom relations delayed the development of industry, industrial technology and, consequently, military technology. The Russian army had theoretical developments and prototypes of military equipment (right down to submarines firing missiles from under water!!!), but mass production faced great difficulties. Nicholas I placed an exorbitant burden on the treasury for the development of the country, from the construction of railways to the maintenance of a bloated bureaucratic apparatus. The treasury simply did not have enough money for rapid rearmament.

As a result, we can say that in terms of its weapons and control system, the Russian army did not meet the new conditions of warfare.

Acquisition

The Russian army was staffed with rank and file, as before, according to the recruiting system. In 1831, a recruiting charter was adopted, which declared military service compulsory for persons of the tax-paying classes: peasants, petty bourgeois, and children of soldiers. Nobles, merchants, honorary citizens and clergy were exempt from military service. Consequently, according to the regulations of 1831, military service was not compulsory; up to 20% of the population was exempt from it.

Up to 80 thousand people were drafted into the army annually (from 1835 to 1854). Men from 20 to 35 years old were recruited for service. The service life was determined from 22 to 25 years. However, in order to have a trained reserve, it was practiced to dismiss soldiers on indefinite leave after 15 years of impeccable service in the active (line) troops. The latter were collected annually for monthly gatherings.

The officer corps was still composed of nobles. Officers were promoted to persons who graduated from military educational institutions, cadet corps, schools and colleges, and from among the volunteer population.

To train officers of the General Staff, a military academy was created in 1832, the first higher military educational institution. In 1855, during the Crimean War, artillery and engineering academies were established.

Number

Russia, according to the report of the Minister of War as of January 1, 1853, had a trained regular and irregular land army of almost 1 million 400 thousand people, among them there were up to 31 thousand 400 generals and officers. The total number of regular troops was 1 million 151 thousand 408 people, of which 938 thousand 731 people were in active service and 212 thousand 677 people were on indefinite and annual leave. There were 245 thousand 850 people in the irregular troops (89 thousand 168 people in active service). In total, there were slightly more than 1 million people in active service of regular and irregular troops. According to the same data, infantry made up 2/3 of the total number of all troops, cavalry - 1/5, artillery - 1/3

The infantry was divided into linear, operating in close formations, and light. The light force consisted of rangers, carabinieri and riflemen, armed with rifles and united in rifle battalions. Riflemen armed with rifles represented a new type of infantry, differing from the existing light Jaeger infantry both in organization and armament. The Jaeger infantry continued to be used primarily in the rifle chain. During the Crimean War, infantry rifle battalions showed their enormous advantage over rangers. In the future, it is light, and after a few years all infantry becomes uniform in armament, having received a rifled gun.

By 1853, the entire infantry numbered 110 regiments (including 10 guards, 12 grenadiers, 4 carabiniers and 42 chasseurs), 9 rifle battalions, which at the beginning of the war reached a thousand strength (before the war they had 180 lower ranks per company) and 84 Georgian, Black Sea, Caucasian, Orenburg, Siberian and Finnish line battalions.

Cavalry

Before the Crimean War, cavalry was divided into heavy cavalry: cuirassiers and dragoons and light cavalry: lancers and hussars.

There were 59 cavalry regiments: 23 heavy (12 cuirassiers and 11 dragoons) and 36 light (20 lancers and 16 hussars). The infantry regiment mostly consisted of 4 battalions, the battalion consisted of 4 companies, the company numbered 250 people, the cavalry regiments consisted of: cuirassier regiments of 8 squadrons, dragoon regiments of 10 squadrons, all Uhlan and hussar cavalry regiments had 8 squadrons each. A division was made up of two squadrons in combat terms. The squadron consisted of 133 cavalrymen (lower ranks) and had 15 or 16 ranks in a platoon. In a squadron, which according to the staff was supposed to have 15 rows, the platoon consisted of: non-commissioned officers - 13, trumpeters - 4, privates - 120, in a squadron of 16 rows in the platoon: non-commissioned officers - 16, trumpeters - 4, privates - 128.

Artillery

In peacetime, the field artillery numbered 1 thousand 134 guns (of which 232 were horse guns) and 1 thousand 446 in war time(with the same number of horsemen). Some of the guns were mothballed, and their servants were on indefinite leave. There were 135 batteries in the field artillery, including 29 horse batteries. Foot batteries mainly consisted of 12 guns in wartime, and 8 in peacetime. Batteries were organized into four-battery brigades, and brigades into divisions; the latter were administrative and organizational rather than tactical formations. When organizing artillery, the principle was that there should be one foot battery for one infantry regiment, and one horse battery for two cavalry regiments.

The adoption of long-range guns confronted the artillery with the need to change gun designs. With the maximum firing range of cannon shot (the main projectile) of 300 fathoms (640 m), it was impossible to effectively prepare an infantry attack, since the artillery servants, already while the guns were approaching the enemy to the distance of an aimed shot, lost up to half of the personnel and horses from the long-range rifle weapons. The artillery was faced with the task of increasing the range of fire compared to the fitting. The transformations of Russian artillery undertaken in 1838 (systems of 1838) greatly improved the guns of the 1805 model, but left the firing range almost unchanged.

With a grenade, the artillery fired aimed fire at a distance of 500-600 fathoms (1070-1280m), which was twice the firing range of buckshot. All the guns (cannons and unicorns) that were in service with the field army were copper, smooth-walled, and loaded from the muzzle.

Rocket batteries

The Russian army had a missile battery. In peacetime, it was located at the St. Petersburg rocket establishment; in wartime, it was at the disposal of the active army. The missile battery consisted of four firing platoons, each having eight tripod-mounted missile launchers. New missile units were formed directly at the front.

In the Crimean War, missile units operated in the Danube and Caucasus theaters, as well as in the defense of Sevastopol.

The rocket consisted of a cartridge case filled with a powder charge, a warhead (head projectile) and a tail. The firing range of some types of military missiles exceeded the firing range of conventional artillery pieces. A rocket (4-inch siege) with a 1/4-pound grenade had an average firing range of 4 thousand 150 m, and a mountain cannon (with the same projectile weight) - 1 thousand 810 m. The rate of fire of the rocket (4 rounds per minute) was higher than the rate of fire of artillery guns Combat missiles were used in field battles (field), during siege and defense of fortresses (siege, fortress).

The missiles were supplied with various projectiles: targeting missiles - grenades and grapeshot, siege or fortress missiles - grenades, incendiary caps, illumination cannonballs and landmines - shells with explosives. Machines for firing rockets were lightweight, easy to carry, and they were used on any terrain and in any conditions. Combat missiles constituted an essential auxiliary element in artillery. With the advent of rifled artillery in the Russian army in the 60s of the 19th century, work on combat missiles began to fade away.

The engineering troops were represented by 9 sapper battalions, consisting of 4 companies (250 people per company) and 2 cavalry pioneer divisions of two squadrons. In peacetime, engineer battalions were united into three engineer brigades.

Organization

The highest organizational unit was the corps, mostly consisting of 3 infantry divisions of four regiments (united in 2 brigades), 1 cavalry and 1 artillery divisions, 1 rifle and 1 engineer battalions. There were 14 corps in total, including 11 infantry (of which 1 guards and 1 grenadier) and 3 cavalry (guards, 1st and 2nd reserve), consisting of two-brigade cavalry divisions (2 regiments in a brigade). Armies were made up of corps and divisions.

Armament

The bulk of the infantry and cavalry were armed with smooth-bore, muzzle-loading flintlock and percussion rifles. There were only a small number of rifled rifles, also loaded from the muzzle, in the army. In the Russian army, by the beginning of the war, 1/23 of the active infantry was armed with rifles (1 thousand 810 rifles for 42 thousand 208 rifles in the corps). The war found the Russian army just as it was preparing to rearm.

The longest firing range with satisfactory accuracy for smoothbore rifles was 300 steps, but the most lethal distance in battle, according to calculations by N.V. Medema +2, equaled 150-100 steps. For rifled guns, the firing range reached 1 thousand 200 steps. Loading a gun was a difficult task, requiring great skill; it was done in 12 steps. The rate of fire (per minute) of percussion rifles reached 1.5 shots, the maximum rate of fire of flintlock rifles was 1 shot.

In the 40s, instead of flint ones, impact fittings were introduced into service, which were distinguished by a higher rate of fire. At the same time, the production of flintlock smoothbore guns ceased and their conversion into percussion guns began. The transition to shock weapons in Western European armies also dates back to the 40s of the 19th century.

Battle formations

The combat formation of a company and battalion was: deployed in three ranks, intended mainly for rifle fire, a column formation - for a bayonet attack, a square - against the enemy cavalry, and, finally, a scattered formation, or a rifle chain formation, firing in a dispersed manner. loose formation. With the advent of riflemen armed with rifles, changes occurred in the tactics of light infantry, caused by the range of their rifles. Since the 40s, new light infantry has been appearing everywhere and the old scattered formation is gradually taking on new forms, marking the emergence of new tactics for the entire infantry-rifle chain in its full understanding.

Before the Crimean War and during its course, columns were considered the main infantry formation. The battalion was formed into divisional, platoon, half-platoon and attack columns; company columns were also used.

The company was divided into two platoons, and a platoon into two half-platoons.

When positioned on the spot and when moving, the battalion was usually built in a half-platoon column from the middle (the 4th and 5th platoons stood at the head of the column, and behind them: behind the 5th (on the left) were the 6th, 7th, 8th platoons and behind the 4th (on the right) - 3, 2 and 1st platoons). The front of the half-platoon column from the middle was 25 steps, and the depth was 32 steps.

The battalion went on the attack in a column to the attack (platoon from the middle), occupying 50 steps along the front and 40 steps in depth.

The basis for building the column was a three-rank formation. The battalion's combat formation for the attack consisted of compact three-rank lines that followed the attack at short distances from one another (12 ranks in total).

Company columns were more suitable for combat than battalion columns. A battalion in company columns - these are companies built in a platoon dense column (the front of which is equal in depth) and located one from another at a distance of 100-150 steps, was more effective in a bayonet attack and suffered fewer losses from enemy fire.

The scattered formation of the rifle chain, operating in front of the front, was considered as an auxiliary formation intended for light infantry-jaegers and rifle infantry; The huntsmen were located in pairs, at a distance of one pair from the other from 3 to 15 steps. The scattered formation consisted of a “skirmisher” chain, moving forward on level ground no further than 200 steps, and a reserve. 48 skirmishers and 6 riflemen, available in each company, were allocated to the scattered formation. The fittings were located between the skirmishers.

The deployed formation of the battalion consisted of deployed companies, built in one three-ranked line, and occupied 180-200 steps along the front; The battalion fired in volleys and in rows (alternately).

In general, the infantry battle formation consisted of two lines and a reserve. The battalions that made up the first line stood in attack columns, at intervals of 100 to 300 steps, or in deployed formation, less often in company columns. Battalions second line-in columns to attack, in the third reserve line the battalions were located in half-platoon columns from the middle. The second line from the first line was located at a distance of 100-300 steps, and the reserve line was 400-500 steps from the second line. Up to half of all troops were allocated to the reserve. In battle, in the event of a breakdown in front of the line in front, the battle lines replaced one another, for which purpose various orders for changing lines were established, which sometimes made it difficult to conduct the battle and often caused troops to move forward for battle in parts.

The cavalry lined up for an attack in a deployed formation, for a scattered attack - in a scattered formation, for maneuvering - in columns. The flanking formation used in cavalry was intended for fire combat: the half-squadrons sent forward scattered into a chain; Small support groups were left behind 100 steps from each platoon; all other half-squadrons moved 100 paces behind the support groups in close formation.

Training and supply

In the training of Russian troops, preference was given to actions in close formation and marching. Troops received little training in conducting aimed fire, the role of which increased significantly with the adoption of rifled weapons (except for light infantry). Military theoretical thought continued, in general, to assess the role of the bayonet and fire in battle as before. This can partly explain the delay in the entry into service of the army of fittings.

During the war, the troops received their allowances from supplies - permanent, mobile and obtained at the theater of war itself, including through requisitions that were made in special cases.

Russian Navy

In terms of the number of warships, it firmly occupied third place after England and France. Warships and their weapons generally met the requirements of military affairs. In the first half of the 19th century, due to the technical and economic backwardness of the country and the inertia of the tsarist government, which belittled the importance of the naval forces. At the beginning of the Crimean War, Russia had very few steam ships. But in terms of organization and combat training, the Black Sea Fleet, thanks to the activities of admirals M.P. Lazarev and P.S. Nakhimova, V.A. Kornilov and V.I. Istomin was superior to the English and French fleets.

Steam ships, wheeled with open wheels and screw ships with a propeller, were driven by a steam engine with a power of about 800-1000 hp. The propeller ship sailed in calm conditions with the help of steam, in windy conditions - under sails of +3, or with the help of steam and sails. Unlike a paddle steamer, a screw steamer could have stronger artillery. All ships were made of wood, and only their underwater part was lined with copper sheets.

Before the Crimean War, the Baltic and Black Sea fleets and the Arkhangelsk, Caspian and Kamchatka flotillas numbered slightly more than 90 thousand people. The Baltic Fleet had 26 battleships, 9 frigates, 8 corvettes and brigs, 9 steam-frigates, 10 transports, 143 small vessels, and the Black Sea Fleet had 14 battleships, 6 frigates, 16 corvettes and brigs, 6 steam-frigates, 32 transports and 82 small ships.

On the eve of the Crimean War, Russia did not have a single screw ship, although in 1851-1852 the construction of two screw frigates and the conversion of three sailing ships into screw ships began.

Bomb cannons that fired explosive spherical bombs began to be used on ships. Their flight range reached 2 km.

The level of combat training in the Black Sea Fleet was higher than in the Baltic Fleet. In the Baltic Fleet, the entire emphasis in training was on the external side, on preparing the fleet for the annual royal reviews. In the Black Sea Fleet, whose command had greater independence due to its distance from St. Petersburg, the Tsar and his dignitaries, military sailors were trained in the art of war; In combat training, the Black Sea soldiers adhered to the Suvorov-Ushakov principles.

The tactics of the sailing fleet remained characterized by maneuvering in order to occupy the most advantageous windward position in relation to the enemy. Ships for battle were built in two wake columns. The distance between enemy formations was determined by the effectiveness of artillery fire, which was the main tactical factor. Steam ships for combat were placed on the flanks between the columns, and they were also responsible for towing disabled (damaged) ships.

After Spiridov and Ushakov, Russian admirals Senyavin, Lazarev, Kornilov and Nakhimov made a great contribution to the construction of the Russian sailing fleet and to the development of methods for training sailors.

Bibliography

To prepare this work, materials were used from the site http://www.grandwar.kulichki.net/

The fleets entered the Bosphorus, thereby violating the convention of 1841, which declared the Bosphorus closed to military ships of all powers. On October 23, the Sultan declared war on Russia. Chapter 2. Eastern (Crimean) War 1853 - 1856 The reason for the outbreak of the war was the discord between the Catholic and Greek Orthodox (Orthodox clergy), which broke out due to the possession of religious shrines of Christians in Palestine. ...

Unprotected and open to military attack. The security interests of the state, as well as economic and political ones, required the abolition of the neutral status of the Black Sea. Conclusion Crimean War 1853-1856 originally fought between the Russian and Ottoman empires for dominance in the Middle East. On the eve of the war, Nicholas I misjudged the international situation (regarding England, ...

This subjugation took place over a long period of time, under the conditions of the national liberation movement. 1.7. The beginning of the war and the peoples of the Caucasus. The fighting on the Caucasian front of the Crimean War covered 3 periods: the first - from October 27 to November 24, 1853, the second - from May 20 to the end of November 1854, the third - from May 24 to the end of November 1855. Each of these periods is full of major military operations...

II continues the war, it is under him that the surrender of Sevastopol takes place. By the end of 1855, hostilities practically ceased, and at the beginning of 1856 a truce was concluded. 3. END AND MAIN RESULTS OF THE CRIMINAL WAR 3.1. Signing and terms of the peace treaty The peace treaty was signed on March 30, 1856 in Paris at an international congress with the participation of all those who fought...

ON THE EVE OF THE CRIMEA WAR

The Treaty of Adrianople of 1829 between the Russian and Ottoman Empires stipulated the freedom of passage of the Black Sea Straits by merchant ships of all countries. The result of the war was the proclamation first of autonomy and then of independence of Greece. Autonomy within Ottoman state Serbia also received. The autonomous rights of Wallachia and Moldavia were expanded. Thus, Nicholas I restored Russia’s position in the south, undermined in the second half of the reign of Alexander I.

In 1833, Nicholas I managed to develop his success with a treaty in the town of Unkyar-Iskelesi. The Russian navy received the right of free passage through the Straits under any circumstances. Thus, Russia practically took control of the Straits. This was a tremendous success for Russian diplomacy, an achievement that Russia had been striving for for decades. Moreover, unlike the agreement of 1798, now the validity period of Russia’s rights was not specified. Neither before nor after 1833 has our country been able to resolve the issue of the status of the Black Sea Straits in such a favorable manner. It is no coincidence that the Unkyar-Iskelesi Treaty is called the culmination of Russia’s diplomatic successes.

The terms of the Unkyar-Iskeles Treaty caused an explosion of indignation in England. Russia was beginning to really threaten its interests in the Ottoman Empire. For a long time there has been an active penetration of English capital into this country, which became increasingly dependent on the “queen of the seas” and the “workshop of the world.” Thus, the Anglo-Turkish Trade Convention of 1838 completely opened the Turkish market to British goods.

Relations between Russia and England sharply deteriorated. The situation turned out to be especially alarming after the incident with the schooner "Vixen", which occurred in 1837. Incited by the English government, the captain of this schooner, J. Bell, brought salt, gunpowder and weapons to the shores of Circassia to sell them to the highlanders waging war with Russia. Bell violated customs quarantine rules imposed by Russia on the eastern Black Sea coast. However, the Black Sea Fleet reliably guarded the Caucasian shores. The Vixen was detained, the cargo was confiscated, and the captain and crew were arrested. This caused a storm of indignation in England; opposition deputies from the Tory (Conservative) party in parliament demanded to immediately start a war with Russia. However, the liberals who then ruled in Great Britain understood the adventurism of such actions and were able to regulate relations with Russia.

Nevertheless, Nicholas I could not help but understand that in England he had a serious adversary, who would ultimately intervene in the Eastern Question in his own interests. Other leading powers could join England. And then the king decided to come to an agreement with England. Soon he agreed to revise the terms of the Russian-Turkish treaty concluded in Unkar-Iskelesi, which so alarmed the whole of Europe. Moreover, the Russian emperor agreed quite easily.

Of course, Russia could not remain in complete isolation: Nicholas understood that the terms of the Unkyar-Iskeles Treaty did not correspond to the real balance of forces. Russia was unable to compete with England, a powerful industrial power, especially if it had allies. And if so, then you need to go a different way.

The emperor had a new plan for resolving the Eastern Question, in which England was to become an ally of Russia. To do this, he voluntarily agreed to significant concessions to a possible ally, hoping for reciprocal gratitude. In 1841 the London Convention was signed. Now not only Russia, but all the countries that signed this convention (England, France, Russia, Austria and Prussia) took upon themselves the responsibility to ensure the integrity of the Ottoman state in exchange for the consent of its government to establish a special procedure for the passage of ships through the Bosporus and Dardanelles.

The convention stated: “as long as the Porte is at peace,” the Straits are closed to warships of all European powers. Thus, the Russian Black Sea Fleet again found itself locked in waters internal to Russia. At the same time, the clause about the “peaceful state of the Porte” implied the possibility of allowing warships of any country into the Black Sea in the event of war. This sharply reduced Russia's security in the south.

After such concessions on such fundamental issues, Nicholas I hoped to implement his new plan for resolving the Eastern Question in an alliance with England. It was about dividing the “inheritance of a sick person.” This is what the king called the Ottoman Empire.

In general terms, the plan, the possibility of which Nikolai had no doubt, was as follows. Egypt, Syria, and the island of Crete should go to England. Russia did not lay claim to Turkish lands. (“It would be unreasonable for me to desire more territory or power than I possess,” these are the words of Nicholas I.) The Russian Empire counted (but did not insist on it) only on small territories in the area of ​​​​the Black Sea Straits. Independent states are being created in the Balkans local peoples. “All Christian regions of Turkey, of necessity, will become independent, will again become what they were, principalities, Christian states, and, as such, return to the family of Christian countries of Europe,” the emperor said in a conversation with the British ambassador to Russia. The new Balkan states will be favorably disposed towards Russia and will ensure a favorable regime for the Black Sea Straits.

It would seem that Nicholas I’s plan should have suited everyone. England will be satisfied with the new rich colonies, and Austria and France will not interfere due to their internal problems associated with the revolutions of 1848–1849. English diplomats skillfully maintained the Tsar's illusion that his project could be realized. They hinted that the issue of the division of Turkey was being discussed and was about to be resolved in the spirit of the ideas of Nicholas I. In fact, Great Britain was “playing for time.” Her plans were completely different.

England did not intend to “divide” Turkey. In the depths of her cabinet of ministers by the beginning of the 50s. XIX century plans finally matured, soon formulated by Foreign Minister Lord G. Palmerston: “My cherished goal in the war starting against Russia is this: to give the Aland Islands and Finland to Sweden; part of the Baltic provinces of Russia Baltic Sea transfer to Prussia; restore the independent Kingdom of Poland as a barrier between Germany and Russia. Wallachia, Moldavia and the mouth of the Danube should be given to Austria... Crimea, Circassia and Georgia should be torn away from Russia; Crimea and Georgia should be given to Turkey, and Circassia either made independent or transferred under the sovereignty of the Sultan.”

So the division was planned by the British, but of another power - Russia. Having the entire Ottoman Empire under its de facto control, England was not going to sacrifice the whole for the sake of a few, albeit tempting, pieces. Britain intended, if necessary, to acquire Egypt, Syria and Crete, proposed by the Tsar, in the future, and so, without the kind help of Russia.

Later, when the plans of the English prime minister became known in Russia, ironic poems that were very popular in their time appeared there (published anonymously in the newspaper “Northern Bee”):

Here in warlike excitement is Governor Palmerston

Striking Rus' on the map with his index finger...

Got in this immortal creation of the little-known poet V.P. Alferyev and the allies of the British:

Inspired by his courage, the Frenchman followed him there,

He waves his uncle’s sword and shouts: “Allons, courage!”

However, Russia very soon had no time for irony...

Militant Russophobic sentiments, widely preached by most politicians, publicists, and the press, have spread to wide sections of English society. At the same time, arguments about the military weakness of Russia and the multiple military superiority of Great Britain were exaggerated in every possible way. In St. Petersburg they received information about these sentiments, but for the time being they did not attach much importance to them. The Tsar believed that the British government would not be led by public opinion. But it was a mistake.

They were also mistaken with France - the new French emperor Napoleon III needed a small, victorious war far from his borders, which would raise the spirit of the nation, diverting its attention from internal affairs, and would allow him to gain the love of the army, as Napoleon III rightly believed, his main guarantor board. Only war could put an end to the threat of the opponents of the coup d'etat driven underground on December 2, 1852 (“18 Brumaire of Louis Napoleon”), only it could firmly strengthen the power of the new dynasty in the country. In addition, it was important for the newly-crowned emperor to take revenge for the defeat of his uncle Napoleon I in Russia in 1812 and thereby significantly increase his prestige among his compatriots and subjects. The newly-crowned emperor also had enormous support from the public opinion of his country, imbued with the ideas of Russophobia and revenge.

For the sake of fighting Russia, Napoleon III was ready to temporarily make friends with anyone. For example, with England, with which, as Nicholas I sincerely believed, Napoleon III, in memory of Napoleon I, would never be able to come to an agreement. But France, having stepped over itself in this matter, was able to do so. Napoleon III's calculation was simple: he must win the war; the war will be victorious for him only if England is his ally, and England wants to fight only with Russia. Hence the inevitability of the Anglo-French alliance. True, this agreement turned out to be fragile - already during the war, old contradictions and misunderstandings began to be recalled. But the job was done - the two main states in Europe formed a coalition, concluding a secret treaty against Russia in 1853.

Austria was also not enthusiastic about a strong Russia dominating European politics, especially in the Balkans. Russia's influence after the Treaty of Adrianople in 1829 in Moldavia and Wallachia caused significant damage to Austrian trade, reducing the eastern market for its goods. In addition, if Nicholas I’s dreams of dividing Turkey had come true, Russian lands and the Russian sphere of influence would have covered Austria-Hungary from the east, southeast, south and north, essentially depriving it of political independence and knocking it out of the circle of leading European powers .

Yes and Slavic peoples Austria - Czechs, Slovaks, Croats, Rusyns, Poles - with a similar development of events (the emergence of new independent Slavic states) would receive an additional incentive to remember their common roots with Russia and their right to free existence. Which already led to the collapse of the Austrian Empire. And Austria also made its choice. Without entering the war, it will constantly hang like a sword of Damocles over the Russian armies. Considerations about the “gratitude” that Austria should have felt towards Russia, as at all times, were quickly discarded. One could be indignant, as F.I. did. Tyutchev in one of his political poems:

And how can it not burst from everywhere?

One universal cry of anguish:

Away, away from the Austrian Judas...

Away them with a treacherous kiss,

And their entire apostolic race

Be branded with one nickname:

Iscariot, Iscariot!

However, gratitude is not a characteristic of politics.

Of course, the Ottoman Empire also had its own goals that made them want war with Russia. She planned to return what was lost in clashes with her northern neighbor in the 18th - early 19th centuries. - Crimea and the rest of the Northern Black Sea region, the Caucasian coast, Georgia, establish their power over the entire Caucasus, and there, which does not happen, think about the Volga region... Such sentiments made the Ottomans also very warlike.

Thus, all the foreign policy calculations of Nicholas I turned out to be completely groundless. However, this became clear a little later. Russia's European opponents acted secretly, pushing the Tsar to be the first to enter the game.

And Nicholas I decided with one blow to cut through the centuries-old knot of contradictions in the East and West, firmly placing his power in first place in the European and Asian houses.

War, when desired, begins quickly and easily. But even with such simplicity, a reason is needed. Even if almost insignificant. One was found.