Conducting the Caucasian war. Caucasian War (1817—1864) - Battles and engagements, campaigns - History - Catalog of articles - Native Dagestan
The Caucasian War in the history of Russia refers to the military actions of 1817 - 1864 associated with the annexation of Chechnya, Mountainous Dagestan and the Northwestern Caucasus to Russia.
At the same time as Russia, Turkey and Iran tried to enter this region, encouraged by England, France and other Western powers. After the signing of the manifesto on the annexation of Kartli and Kakheti (1800-1801), Russia became involved in collecting lands in the Caucasus. There was a consistent unification of Georgia (1801 - 1810) and Azerbaijan (1803 - 1813), but their territories turned out to be separated from Russia by the lands of Chechnya, mountainous Dagestan and the North-Western Caucasus, inhabited by militant mountain peoples who raided the Caucasian fortified lines , interfered with connections with Transcaucasia. Therefore, by the beginning of the 19th century, the annexation of these territories became one of the most important tasks for Russia.
Historiography Caucasian War
With all the diversity of literature written about the Caucasian War, several historiographical directions can be distinguished, coming directly from the positions of the participants in the Caucasian War and from the position of the “international community”. It was within the framework of these schools that assessments and traditions were formed that influence not only the development of historical science, but also the development of the modern political situation. Firstly, we can talk about the Russian imperial tradition, represented in the works of pre-revolutionary Russian and some modern historians. In these works, we often talk about the “pacification of the Caucasus”, about “colonization” according to Klyuchevsky, in the Russian sense of the development of territories, the emphasis is on the “predation” of the mountaineers, the religious-militant nature of their movement, the civilizing and reconciling role of Russia is emphasized, even taking into account errors and "excesses". Secondly, it is quite well represented in Lately The tradition of supporters of the highlander movement is developing again. The basis here is the antinomy “conquest-resistance” (in Western works - “conquest-resistance”). In Soviet times (with the exception of the period of the late 40s - mid-50s, when the hypertrophied imperial tradition dominated), “tsarism” was declared the conqueror, and “resistance” received the Marxist term “national liberation movement.” Currently, some supporters of this tradition transfer the 20th century term “genocide” (of mountain peoples) to the policy of the Russian Empire or interpret the concept of “colonization” in the Soviet way - as the violent seizure of economically profitable territories. However, even if we discard all these obviously ideological attempts at “periodization,” the number of opinions is very large. That is why many historians now say that in fact there were several Caucasian wars. They were conducted in different years, in different regions of the North Caucasus: in Chechnya, Dagestan, Kabarda, Adygea, etc. (2). They can hardly be called Russian-Caucasian, since the mountaineers participated on both sides. However, the traditional point of view on the period from 1817 (the beginning of an active aggressive policy in the North Caucasus sent there by General A.P. Ermolov) to 1864 (the capitulation of the mountain tribes of the North-West Caucasus) as a period of constant fighting that engulfed most of the North Caucasus. It was then that the question of the actual, and not just formal, entry of the North Caucasus into the Russian Empire was decided. Perhaps, for better mutual understanding, it is worth talking about this period as the Great Caucasian War.
Currently, there are 4 periods in the Caucasian War.
1st period: 1817 –1829–Ermolovsky associated with the activities of General Ermolov in the Caucasus.
2. period 1829-1840–Trans-Kuban after the annexation of the Black Sea coast to Russia, following the results of the Adrianople Peace Treaty, unrest among the Trans-Kuban Circassians intensified. The main arena of action is the Trans-Kuban region.
3rd period: 1840-1853-Muridiz, the unifying force of the mountaineers becomes the ideology of muridism.
4th period: 1854 –1859–European intervention during the Crimean War, increased foreign intervention.
5th period: 1859 – 1864:final.
Features of the Caucasian War.
The combination of different political actions and clashes under the auspices of one war, a combination of different goals. Thus, the peasants of the northern Caucasus opposed increased exploitation, the mountain nobility for maintaining their previous position and rights, the Muslim clergy against the strengthening of the position of Orthodoxy in the Caucasus.
No official date for the start of the war.
Lack of a single theater of military operations.
Lack of a peace treaty to end the war.
Controversial issues in the history of the Caucasian War.
Terminology.
Caucasian War is an extremely complex, multifaceted and contradictory phenomenon. The term itself is used in historical science in different ways; there are different options for determining the chronological framework of the war and its nature .
The term “Caucasian War” is used in historical science in different ways.
In the broad sense of the word, it includes all conflicts in the region of the 18th-19th centuries. with the participation of Russia. In a narrow sense, it is used in historical literature and journalism to refer to events in the North Caucasus associated with the establishment of the Russian administration in the region through the military suppression of the resistance of mountain peoples.
The term was introduced in pre-revolutionary historiography, but during the Soviet period it was either put in quotation marks or completely rejected by many researchers who believed that it created the appearance of an external war and did not fully reflect the essence of the phenomenon. Until the end of the 80s, the term “people's liberation struggle” of the highlanders of the North Caucasus seemed more adequate, but recently the concept of “Caucasian War” has been returned to scientific circulation and is widely used.
Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation
Federal state budget educational
institution of higher professional education
"Ufa State Oil
Technical University"
Branch of the Federal State Budgetary Educational Institution of Higher Professional Education USPTU in Salavat
"Caucasian War 1817-1864"
Russian history
Executor
student gr. BTPzs-11-21P. S. Ivanov
Supervisor
Art. teacher S. N. Didenko
Salavat 2011
1. Historiographical review
Terminological dictionary
Caucasian War 1817 - 1864
1 Causes of the war
2 Progress of hostilities
4 Results and consequences of the war
1.Historiographical review
IN historical development In Russia, territorial expansion has always played a big role. The annexation of the Caucasus in this case occupies an important place in the formation of the Russian multinational state.
The establishment of Russian power in the North Caucasus region was accompanied by a long military confrontation with the local population, which went down in history as the Caucasian War of 1817 - 1864.
According to the chronological principle, all domestic historiography about the Caucasian War of 1817 - 1864 can be divided into three periods: pre-Soviet, Soviet and modern.
In the pre-Soviet period, the history of the Caucasian War of 1817 - 1864 was, as a rule, dealt with by military historians who participated in hostilities in the Caucasus. Among them, N.F. should be noted. Dubrovina, A.L. Zisserman, V.A. Potto, D.I. Romanovsky, R.A. Fadeeva, S.S. Esadze. They sought to reveal the causes and factors of the outbreak of the war in the Caucasus, to identify key points in this historical process. Various archival materials were also put into circulation and the factual side of the issue was highlighted.
The determining factor for a certain internal unity of pre-revolutionary Russian historiography is the so-called “imperial tradition”. This tradition is based on the assertion that Russia was brought to the Caucasus by geopolitical necessity, and increased attention to the civilizing mission of the empire in this region. The war itself was seen as Russia’s struggle against Islamism and Muslim fanaticism that had established itself in the Caucasus. Accordingly, there was a certain justification for the conquest of the Caucasus, and the historical significance of this process was recognized.
At the same time, pre-revolutionary researchers raised in their works the problem of assessing this historical event by contemporaries. They paid main attention to the views of government officials and representatives of the military command in the Caucasus. Thus, historian V.A. Potto examined in some detail the activities of General A.P. Ermolov, showed his position on the issue of annexation of the North Caucasus. However, V.A. Potto, recognizing the merits of A.P. Ermolov in the Caucasus, did not show the consequences of his harsh actions against the local population and exaggerated the incompetence of his successors, in particular I.F. Paskevich, on the issue of conquering the Caucasus.
Among the works of pre-revolutionary researchers, the work of A.L. deserves great attention. Zisserman's "Field Marshal Prince Alexander Ivanovich Baryatinsky", which still remains the only full-fledged biography dedicated to one of the most prominent military leaders in the Caucasus. The historian paid attention to the assessment of the final period of the Caucasian War (II half of 1850 - early 1860s) by Russian state and military leaders, publishing their correspondence on Caucasian affairs as appendices in his monograph.
Among the works touching on the assessment of the Caucasian War by contemporaries, one can note the work of N.K. Schilder "Emperor Nicholas the First, his life and reign." In his book, he published the diary of A.Kh. as an appendix. Benckendorf, which records the memories of Emperor Nicholas I about his trip to the Caucasus in 1837. Here, Nicholas I assessed the actions of Russia during the war with the highlanders, which to a certain extent reveals his position on the issue of annexing the North Caucasus.
In the works of historians of the pre-Soviet period, attempts were made to show the points of view of contemporaries on the methods of conquering the Caucasus. For example, in the work of D.I. Romanovsky's notes were published as appendices by Admiral N.S. Mordvinov and General A.A. Velyaminov about methods of conquering the Caucasus. But it is worth noting that pre-revolutionary historians did not devote special research to the views of the participants in the events on the methods of integrating the Caucasus into the national structure of the Russian Empire. The priority task was to show directly the history of the Caucasian War. The same historians who turned to the assessment of this historical event by contemporaries concerned themselves mainly with the views of statesmen and military leaders of the Russian Empire, and only at a certain time stage of the war.
The formation of Soviet historiography of the Caucasian War was greatly influenced by statements about it by revolutionary democrats, for whom the conquest of the Caucasus was not so much scientific as political-ideological and moral problem. The role and authority of N.G. Chernyshevsky, N.A. Dobrolyubova, A.I. Herzen in the Russian social movement was not allowed to ignore their position. In this case, it is worth noting the work of V.G. Gadzhiev and A.M. Pickman, devoted to the consideration of the views on the problem of the Caucasian War by A.I. Herzen, N.A. Dobrolyubova, N.G. Chernyshevsky. The advantage of this work is that the authors were able to identify their assessments of the Caucasian War from the works of representatives of the democratic direction of socio-political thought in Russia. A certain drawback of the work is the desire to show the condemnation of the policies of tsarism in the Caucasus by the revolutionary democrats, hence a certain ideological stretch. If, A.I. Herzen really condemned the war in the Caucasus, then N.A. Dobrolyubov considered it expedient to annex the North Caucasus and advocated its integration into the national structure of the Russian Empire. But it can be noted that the work of V.G. Gadzhiev and A.M. Pickman is still of scientific interest in considering the problem of assessing the Caucasian War of 1817 - 1864 by representatives of revolutionary democratic thought, since it remains the only study of its kind in Russian historiography.
Soviet historiography also published works devoted to the views of representatives of Russian literature on the war between Russia and the mountaineers M.Yu. Lermontova, L.N. Tolstoy. These works were mainly an attempt to show that Russian writers condemned the war and sympathized with the mountaineers of the Caucasus, waging an unequal struggle against tsarism. For example, V.G. Gadzhiev only mentioned that P. Pestel could not understand the relationship between Russia and the mountain peoples, which explains his extremely harsh judgments about the mountain people of the Caucasus.
The gap in Soviet historiography was that the problem of annexing the Caucasus was practically not considered by state and military leaders of the Russian Empire, with the exception of a few personalities - A.P. Ermolova, N.N. Raevsky, D.A. Milyutina. Soviet works on the Caucasian War only indicated that the government's position was subordinated to the desire for conquest. At the same time, no analysis of the views of government officials was carried out. True, some works noted that among the Caucasian administration there were thoughts for the peaceful conquest of the Caucasus. So, for example, in the work of V.K. Gardanov quoted the statement of Prince M.S. Vorontsov about the need to establish peaceful and trade relations with the mountaineers. But as already noted, Soviet historiography does not provide a sufficiently complete analysis of the views of government and military leaders on the problem of the Caucasian War.
Despite the above, until the beginning of the 1980s, the study of the Caucasian War of 1817 - 1864 was in a state of deep crisis. The dogmatic approach to the interpretation of historical sources predetermined the further development this issue: the process of the region’s entry into the Russian Empire turned out to be one of the least studied historical phenomena. As has already been noted, ideological restrictions affected primarily, and foreign researchers, naturally, did not have sufficient access to the necessary sources.
The Caucasian War turned out to be so complex and intractable for official historiography that for half a century of research, not even a factual history of this phenomenon has appeared, where the most important military events, the most influential figures, and so on would be presented in chronological order. Historians, having fallen under the ideological control of the party, were forced to develop the concept of the Caucasian War in relation to the class approach.
The establishment of a class-party approach to the study of history for the Caucasian War resulted in a shuffling of “anti-colonial” and “anti-feudal” accents in the 1930-1970s. The militant atheism of the 1920s-1930s had a noticeable influence on the historiography of the Caucasian War: historians had to look for an assessment option liberation movement mountaineers under the leadership of Shamil, in which the “anti-feudal” and “anti-colonial” components obscured the “reactionary-religious” one. The result was a thesis about the reactionary essence of muridism, softened by an indication of its role in mobilizing the masses to fight the oppressors.
The term “tsarist autocracy” was introduced into scientific circulation, which united everyone who was associated with the colonial policy of tsarist Russia. As a result, the “depersonalization of the Caucasian War” was characteristic. This trend was observed until the second half of the 1950s. After the 20th Congress of the CPSU in 1956 and the debunking of Stalin’s personality cult, Soviet historians were called upon to get rid of the dogmatism of the Stalin era. At the past scientific sessions of Soviet Caucasian historians in 1956 in Makhachkala and Moscow, the concept of the Caucasian War as a movement of the mountaineers of the North Caucasus against the colonialist policy of tsarism and the oppression of local feudal lords was finally accepted in Soviet historiography.8 At the same time, the class approach, of course, remained decisive in the consideration historical events.
The process of “incorporating” Shamil and the resistance of the mountaineers into big picture liberation movement in Russia. In the 1930s, Imam Shamil, a fighter against the colonial policies of tsarism, was included in the list of national heroes of the liberation movement along with S. Razin, E. Pugachev, S. Yulaev. After the Great Patriotic War, Shamil’s status looked strange against the backdrop of the deportation of Chechens, Ingush and Karachais, and he was gradually relegated to “second-class” historical figures.
When, in the early 1950s, the solemn march of the thesis about the “progressive significance” of the annexation of national borderlands began through the pages of scientific literature, Shamil was transferred to the category of enemies of both his own and the Russian people. The Cold War environment contributed to the transformation of the imam into a religious fanatic, a British, Iranian and Turkish mercenary. It came to the point that the thesis about the agent nature of the Caucasian War appeared (according to some authors, it began due to the machinations of “agents” of world and, first of all, British imperialism, as well as under the influence of supporters of pan-Turkism and pan-Islamism).
In 1956-1957 In the course of scientific discussions about the nature of the Caucasian War, two groups of historians emerged quite clearly. The first included those who considered the activities of Imam Shamil to be progressive, and the war itself to be anti-colonial, an integral part of the fight against autocracy. The second group was formed by scientists who called Shamil’s movement a reactionary phenomenon. The discussions themselves turned out to be unproductive, typical of the era of the “Khrushchev Thaw”, when it was already possible to raise questions, but it was not yet possible to offer answers. A well-known compromise was reached on the basis of Lenin’s thesis about “two Russias” - one represented by tsarism and oppressors of all kinds, and the other, with the face of advanced, progressive figures of science, culture and the liberation movement. The first was the source of oppression and enslavement of non-Russian peoples, the second brought them enlightenment, economic and cultural uplift.
One of the striking illustrations of the situation in the field of studying the Caucasian War that existed during the Soviet period is the fate of the monograph by N.I. Pokrovsky "Caucasian Wars and Shamil's Imamate". This book, written at the highest professional level and which has not lost its significance to this day, lay successively in three publishing houses from 1934 to 1950, and was published only in 2000. Publication seemed dangerous to publishing house employees - ideological attitudes changed dramatically, and participation in a publication that contained “erroneous views” could end tragically. Despite the real danger of repression and the need to carry out work in the appropriate methodological and ideological direction, the author was able to demonstrate the complexity of such a historical phenomenon as the Caucasian War. He considered hiking as his starting point late XVI - early XVII centuries and, recognizing great importance military-strategic factor in the development of events, spoke cautiously about the economic component of Russian expansion. N.I. Pokrovsky did not avoid mentioning the raids of the mountaineers, the cruelty shown by both sides, and even decided to show that a number of the actions of the mountaineers cannot be clearly defined as anti-colonial or anti-feudal. Extremely challenging task was an analysis of the struggle between supporters of Sharia - the code of Muslim law - and adats - codes of local customary law, since purely scientific text could be interpreted as promoting religious superstitions or survivals.
In the mid-1980s, the liberation of historians from ideological constraints seemed to create the conditions for a serious, balanced, academic approach to the problem. However, due to the aggravation of the situation in the North Caucasus and Transcaucasia, the history of the inclusion of these regions into the Russian Empire has become painfully relevant. Superficial interpretation of the significance thesis historical lessons transforms into attempts to use research results in political struggle. In this case, the parties resort to an openly biased interpretation of evidence and an arbitrary selection of the latter. Incorrect “transfers” of ideological, religious and political structures from the past to the present and vice versa are allowed. For example, both from a formational point of view and from the position of Eurocentrism Caucasian peoples were at a lower stage of social development, and this was an important justification for their conquest in the 19th century. However, in modern literature there are absurd accusations of historians of “justifying colonialism” if they appropriately explained the actions of the tsarist government. There has been a dangerous tendency to hush up tragic episodes and various “sensitive” topics. One of these topics is the raiding component of the life of many ethnic groups inhabiting the Caucasus, the other is the cruelty of both sides in waging war.
In general, there is a dangerous growth in “nationally colored” approaches to studying the history of the Caucasian War, the revival of non-scientific methods, the translation of scientific controversy into a moral and ethical channel, followed by an unconstructive “search for the culprit.”
The history of the Caucasian War was greatly deformed during the Soviet period, since the study of this phenomenon within the framework of formational teaching was unproductive. In 1983 M.M. Bliev published an article in the journal History of the USSR, which was the first attempt to break out of the framework of the “anti-colonial-anti-feudal concept”. It was published in a situation when ideological restrictions were still unshakable, and the delicacy of the topic required maximum caution in formulation and emphasized correctness in relation to those whose point of view the author disputed. First of all, M.M. Bliev expressed his disagreement with the prevailing historical literature the thesis that the Caucasian War was of a national liberation, anti-colonial character. He focused attention on the powerful military expansion of the mountaineers of the North Caucasus in relation to their neighbors, on the fact that the capture of prisoners and booty, extortion of tribute became commonplace in relations between mountain tribes and inhabitants of the plains. The researcher expressed doubts about the validity of the traditional chronological framework of the war, putting forward the thesis about the intersection of two expansionist lines - the imperial Russian and the raiding mountaineers.
Since the early 1990s, it can be noted new stage in domestic historiography in considering the issues of the Caucasian War of 1817 - 1864. The modern period is marked by pluralism of scientific positions and the absence of ideological pressure. In this regard, historians have the opportunity to write more objective scientific works on the history of the annexation of the North Caucasus and conduct independent historical analysis. Most modern domestic researchers strive to find a “golden mean” and, moving away from ideological and political emotions, engage in purely scientific research on Caucasian issues. If we ignore frankly opportunistic works, the range of studies on this problem that have been published recently will be quite small. It consists of monographs by N.I. Pokrovsky, M.M. Blieva, V.V. Degoeva, N.S. Kinyapina, Ya.A. Gordina. In addition, a whole group of young scientists is currently successfully working on this topic, as evidenced by the materials of conferences, round tables, etc.
Article by V.V. Degoev "The Problem of the Caucasian wars XIX century: historiographical results” became a kind of summing up the results of the study of the Caucasian War by the beginning of the 21st century. The author clearly identified the main flaw in most previous studies on the history of the Caucasus in the 19th century: “theoretical schemes and moral assessments prevailed over the system of evidence.” A significant part of the article is a demonstration of how domestic historians, who were in the grip of official methodology, who were constantly afraid that with the next change in the “course” they would find themselves under the gun of rabid and not at all scientific criticism, entailing tragic consequences for them, tried to construct something acceptable from the point of view of “the only true teaching” and from the point of view of professionalism. The thesis about refusing to recognize the anti-colonial and anti-feudal element as dominant in the Caucasian War looks very productive. The historian’s theses about the influence of geopolitical and natural-climatic factors on the development of events look important and very productive (the lot of all mountain tribes was constant war with each other, since geographical conditions and the peculiarities of the development of ethnic groups prevented their unification into a powerful proto-state.
From the east and west they were cut off from the rest of the world by the sea, in the south and north there were hostile ecosystems (steppe and arid highlands), as well as powerful states (Russia, Turkey, Persia), which turned the Caucasus into a zone of their rivalry).
In 2001, a collection of articles by V.V. was published. Degoev “The Great Game in the Caucasus: History and Modernity”, in three sections of which (“History”, “Historiography”, “Historical and Political Journalism”) the results of many years of scientific research and reflection of this scientist are presented. The article “Stepchildren of Glory: a man with a gun in the everyday life of the Caucasian War” is devoted to the everyday life of the long-term confrontation between the highlanders and the Russian army. What makes this work particularly valuable is that it is perhaps the first attempt in Russian historiography to analyze the life of a “colonial” type of war. The popular style of presentation of the material did not deprive another book by V.V. of scientific significance. Degoev "Imam Shamil: prophet, ruler, warrior."
A notable phenomenon in the historiography of the Caucasian War in recent years was the publication of the book by Ya.A. Gordin “Caucasus, Land and Blood”, which shows how a certain imperial set of ideas was implemented in practice, how these imperial ideas were transformed in accordance with the situation and external “challenges”.
Summarizing the analysis scientific works On this topic, in general, we can say that domestic historiography is represented by a small number of works on this issue, and ideology has had a strong influence on the study of the issue.
royal war imam shamil
2.Terminological dictionary
Dubrovin Nikolai Fedorovich (1837 - 1904) - academician, military historian.
Zisserman Arnold Lvovich (1824 - 1897) - colonel, participant in the Caucasian War, military historian and writer.
Potto Vasily Alexandrovich (1836<#"justify">3.Caucasian War 1817 - 1864
3.1 Causes of the war
“Caucasian War 1817 - 1864.” - military actions related to the annexation of Chechnya, Mountainous Dagestan and the North-West Caucasus Tsarist Russia».
The Caucasian War is a collective concept. This armed conflict lacks internal unity, and for its productive study it is advisable to divide the Caucasian War into a number of fairly separate parts, separated from total flow events according to the principle of the most important component of a given specific episode (group of episodes) of military operations.
The resistance of free societies, the military activity of the local elite and the activities of Imam Shamil in Dagestan are three different “wars”. Thus, this historical phenomenon is devoid of internal unity and acquired modern contours solely due to its territorial localization.
An unbiased analysis of the chronicle of hostilities in this region allows us to consider the Persian campaign of Peter the Great in 1722-1723 as the beginning of the conquest of the Caucasus, and the suppression of the uprising in Chechnya and Dagestan in 1877 as its end. Earlier military enterprises of Russia XVI - early XVIII centuries can be attributed to the prehistory of events.
The main goal of the Russian Empire was not just to establish itself in this region, but to subordinate the peoples of the Caucasus to its influence.
The immediate impetus that provoked the war was the manifesto of Alexander I on the annexation of Kartli and Kakheti to Russia (1800-1801). The reaction of the states neighboring Georgia (Persia and Turkey) was not long in coming - a long-term war. Thus, in the 19th century. In the Caucasus, the political interests of several countries converged: Persia, Turkey, Russia and England.
Therefore, the speedy conquest of the Caucasus was considered an urgent task of the Russian Empire, but it turned into problems for more than one Russian emperor.
3.2. Progress of hostilities
To illuminate the course of the war, it would be advisable to highlight several stages:
· Ermolovsky period (1816-1827),
· The beginning of gazavat (1827-1835),
· Formation and functioning of the Imamate (1835-1859) Shamil,
· End of the war: the conquest of Circassia (1859-1864).
As already noted, after the transfer of Georgia (1801 - 1810) and Azerbaijan (1803 - 1813) to Russian citizenship, the annexation of the lands separating Transcaucasia from Russia and the establishment of control over the main communications was considered by the Russian government as the most important military-political task . However, the mountaineers did not agree with this state of events. The main opponents of the Russian troops were the Adyghes of the Black Sea coast and the Kuban region in the west, and the highlanders in the east, united in the military-theocratic Islamic state of the Imamate of Chechnya and Dagestan, headed by Shamil. At the first stage, the Caucasian War coincided with the Russian wars against Persia and Turkey, and therefore Russia was forced to conduct military operations against the highlanders with limited forces.
The reason for the war was the appearance of General Alexei Petrovich Ermolov in the Caucasus. He was appointed in 1816 commander-in-chief of the Russian troops in Georgia and on the Caucasian line. Ermolov, a European-educated man, a hero of the Patriotic War, carried out a lot of preparatory work in 1816-1817 and in 1818 suggested that Alexander I complete his policy program in the Caucasus. Ermolov set the task of changing the Caucasus, putting an end to the raiding system in the Caucasus, with what is called “predation.” He convinced Alexander I of the need to pacify the highlanders solely by force of arms. Soon the general moved from individual punitive expeditions to a systematic advance deep into Chechnya and Mountainous Dagestan by surrounding mountainous areas with a continuous ring of fortifications, cutting clearings in difficult forests, building roads and destroying “rebellious” villages.
His activities on the Caucasian line in 1817 - 1818. the general started from Chechnya, moving the left flank of the Caucasian line from the Terek to the river. Sunzha, where he strengthened the Nazran redoubt and founded the fortification of Pregradny Stan in its middle reaches (October 1817) and the Grozny fortress in the lower reaches (1818). This measure stopped the uprisings of the Chechens living between Sunzha and Terek. In Dagestan, the highlanders who threatened Shamkhal Tarkovsky, captured by Russia, were pacified; To keep them in submission, the Vnezapnaya fortress was built (1819). An attempt to attack it by the Avar Khan ended in complete failure.
In Chechnya, Russian troops destroyed auls, forcing the Chechens to move further and further from Sunzha into the depths of the mountains or move to a plane (plain) under the supervision of Russian garrisons; A clearing was cut through the dense forest to the village of Germenchuk, which served as one of the main defensive points of the Chechen army.
In 1820, the Black Sea Cossack Army (up to 40 thousand people) was included in the Separate Georgian Corps, renamed the Separate Caucasian Corps and also strengthened. In 1821, the Burnaya fortress was built, and the crowds of the Avar Khan Akhmet, who tried to interfere with Russian work, were defeated. The possessions of the Dagestan rulers, who united their forces against Russian troops on the Sunzhenskaya line and suffered a series of defeats in 1819-1821, were either transferred to Russian vassals with subordination to Russian commandants, or became dependent on Russia, or were liquidated. On the right flank of the line, the Trans-Kuban Circassians, with the help of the Turks, began to disturb the borders more than ever; but their army, which invaded the land of the Black Sea army in October 1821, was defeated.
In 1822, to completely pacify the Kabardians, a series of fortifications were built at the foot of the Black Mountains, from Vladikavkaz to the upper reaches of the Kuban. In 1823 - 1824 The actions of the Russian command were directed against the Trans-Kuban highlanders, who did not stop their raids. A number of punitive expeditions were carried out against them.
In Dagestan in the 1820s. A new Islamic movement began to spread - muridism (one of the directions in Sufism). Ermolov, having visited Cuba in 1824, ordered Aslankhan of Kazikumukh to stop the unrest caused by the followers of the new teaching. But he was distracted by other matters and could not monitor the execution of this order, as a result of which the main preachers of Muridism, Mulla-Mohammed, and then Kazi-Mulla, continued to inflame the minds of the mountaineers in Dagestan and Chechnya and proclaim the proximity of gazavat, that is, a holy war against the infidels . The movement of the mountain people under the flag of Muridism was the impetus for expanding the scope of the Caucasian War, although some mountain peoples (Kumyks, Ossetians, Ingush, Kabardians, etc.) did not join this movement.
In 1825, there was a general uprising of Chechnya, during which the highlanders managed to capture the Amiradzhiyurt post (July 8) and tried to take the Gerzel fortification, rescued by the detachment of Lieutenant General D.T. Lisanevich (July 15). The next day, Lisanevich and General Grekov, who was with him, were killed by the Chechens. The uprising was suppressed in 1826.
From the very beginning of 1825, the coasts of the Kuban again began to be subject to raids by large parties of Shapsugs and Abadzekhs; The Kabardians also became worried. In 1826, a number of expeditions were made to Chechnya, cutting down clearings in dense forests, laying new roads and restoring order in villages free from Russian troops. This was the end of the activities of Ermolov, who in 1827 was recalled by Nicholas I from the Caucasus and sent into retirement for associating with the Decembrists.
Period 1827-1835 associated with the beginning of the so-called gazavat - the sacred struggle against the infidels. The new Commander-in-Chief of the Caucasian Corps, Adjutant General I.F. Paskevich abandoned a systematic advance with the consolidation of the occupied territories and returned mainly to the tactics of individual punitive expeditions, especially since at first he was mainly occupied with wars with Persia and Turkey. The successes he achieved in these wars contributed to maintaining external calm in the country; but muridism spread more and more, and Kazi-Mulla, proclaimed imam in December 1828 and the first to call for ghazavat, sought to unite the hitherto scattered tribes of the Eastern Caucasus into one mass hostile to Russia. Only the Avar Khanate refused to recognize his power, and Kazi-Mulla's attempt (in 1830) to take control of Khunzakh ended in defeat. After this, the influence of Kazi-Mulla was greatly shaken, and the arrival of new troops sent to the Caucasus after the conclusion of peace with Turkey forced him to flee from his residence, the Dagestan village of Gimry, to the Belokan Lezgins.
In 1828, in connection with the construction of the Military-Sukhumi road, the Karachay region was annexed. In 1830, another defensive line was created - Lezginskaya. In April 1831, Count Paskevich-Erivansky was recalled to command the army in Poland; in his place were temporarily appointed commanders of the troops: in Transcaucasia - General N.P. Pankratiev, on the Caucasian line - General A.A. Velyaminov.
Kazi-Mulla transferred his activities to the Shamkhal possessions, where, having chosen the inaccessible Chumkesent tract (not far from Temir-Khan-Shura), he began to call all the mountaineers to fight the infidels. His attempts to take the fortresses of Burnaya and Vnezapnaya failed; but the movement of General G.A. was also unsuccessful. Emanuel to the Aukhov forests. The last failure, greatly exaggerated by the mountain messengers, increased the number of Kazi-Mulla’s followers, especially in central Dagestan, so that in 1831 Kazi-Mulla took and plundered Tarki and Kizlyar and attempted, but unsuccessfully, with the support of the rebel Tabasarans (one of the mountain peoples Dagestan) to capture Derbent. Significant territories (Chechnya and most of Dagestan) came under the authority of the imam. However, from the end of 1831 the uprising began to decline. The detachments of Kazi-Mulla were pushed back to Mountainous Dagestan. Attacked on December 1, 1831 by Colonel M.P. Miklashevsky, he was forced to leave Chumkesent and went to Gimry. Baron Rosen, appointed commander of the Caucasian Corps in September 1831, took Gimry on October 17, 1832; Kazi-Mulla died during the battle.
Gamzat-bek was proclaimed the second imam, who, thanks to military victories, rallied around himself almost all the peoples of Mountain Dagestan, including some of the Avars. In 1834, he invaded Avaria, treacherously took possession of Khunzakh, exterminated almost the entire khan’s family, which adhered to a pro-Russian orientation, and was already thinking about conquering all of Dagestan, but died at the hands of an assassin. Soon after his death and the proclamation of Shamil as the third imam, on October 18, 1834, the main stronghold of the Murids, the village of Gotsatl, was taken and destroyed by a detachment of Colonel Kluki von Klugenau. Shamil's troops retreated from Avaria.
On the Black Sea coast, where the highlanders had many convenient points for communications with the Turks and trading in slaves (the Black Sea coastline did not yet exist), foreign agents, especially the British, distributed anti-Russian appeals among the local tribes and delivered military supplies. This forced Baron Rosen to instruct General A.A. Velyaminov (summer 1834) a new expedition to the Trans-Kuban region to establish a cordon line to Gelendzhik. It ended with the construction of fortifications of Abinsky and Nikolaevsky.
So, the third imam was the Avar Shamil, originally from the village. Gimry. It was he who managed to create the imamate - a united mountain state on the territory of Dagestan and Chechnya, which lasted until 1859.
The main functions of the imamate were the defense of territory, ideology, ensuring law and order, economic development, solving fiscal and social tasks. Shamil managed to unite the multi-ethnic region and form a coherent centralized system management. The head of state - the great imam, “father of the country and checkers” - was a spiritual, military and secular leader, had enormous authority and a decisive voice. All life in the mountain state was built on the basis of Sharia - the laws of Islam. Year after year, Shamil replaced the unwritten law of customs with laws based on Sharia. Among his most important acts was the abolition of serfdom. The Imamate had effectively operating armed forces, which included cavalry and foot militia. Each branch of the military had its own division.
The new commander-in-chief, Prince A.I. Baryatinsky, paid his main attention to Chechnya, the conquest of which he entrusted to the head of the left wing of the line, General N.I. Evdokimov - an old and experienced Caucasian; but in other parts of the Caucasus the troops did not remain inactive. In 1856 and 1857 Russian troops achieved the following results: the Adagum Valley was occupied on the right wing of the line and the Maikop fortification was built. On the left wing, the so-called “Russian road”, from Vladikavkaz, parallel to the ridge of the Black Mountains, to the fortification of Kurinsky on the Kumyk plane, is completely completed and strengthened by newly constructed fortifications; wide clearings have been cut in all directions; the mass of the hostile population of Chechnya has been reduced to the need to submit and move to open spaces, under state supervision; The Aukh district is occupied and a fortification has been erected in its center. In Dagestan, Salatavia is finally occupied. Several new Cossack villages were established along Laba, Urup and Sunzha. The troops are everywhere close to the front lines; the rear is secured; vast expanses of the best lands are cut off from the hostile population and, thus, a significant share of the resources for the fight are wrested from the hands of Shamil.
On the Lezgin line, as a result of deforestation, predatory raids gave way to petty theft. On the Black Sea coast, the secondary occupation of Gagra marked the beginning of securing Abkhazia from incursions by Circassian tribes and from hostile propaganda. The actions of 1858 in Chechnya began with the occupation of the Argun River gorge, which was considered impregnable, where N.I. Evdokimov ordered the foundation of a strong fortification, called Argunsky. Climbing up the river, he reached, at the end of July, the villages of the Shatoevsky society; in the upper reaches of the Argun he founded a new fortification - Evdokimovskoye. Shamil tried to divert attention by sabotage to Nazran, but was defeated by a detachment of General I.K. Mishchenko and barely managed to escape into the still unoccupied part of the Argun Gorge. Convinced that his power there had been completely undermined, he retired to Veden - his new residence. On March 17, 1859, the bombardment of this fortified village began, and on April 1 it was taken by storm.
Shamil fled beyond the Andean Koisu; all of Ichkeria declared its submission to us. After the capture of Veden, three detachments headed concentrically to the Andean Koisu valley: Chechen, Dagestan and Lezgin. Shamil, who temporarily settled in the village of Karata, fortified Mount Kilitl, and covered the right bank of the Andean Koisu, opposite Conkhidatl, with solid stone rubble, entrusting their defense to his son Kazi-Magoma. With any energetic resistance from the latter, forcing the crossing at this point would cost enormous sacrifices; but he was forced to leave his strong position as a result of the troops of the Dagestan detachment entering his flank, who made a remarkably brave crossing across the Andiyskoe Koisu at the Sagytlo tract. Shamil, seeing danger threatening from everywhere, fled to his last refuge on Mount Gunib, having with him only 332 people. the most fanatical murids from all over Dagestan. On August 25, Gunib was taken by storm, and Shamil himself was captured by Prince A.I. Baryatinsky.
Conquest of Circassia (1859-1864). The capture of Gunib and the capture of Shamil could be considered the last act of the war in the Eastern Caucasus; but there still remained the western part of the region, inhabited by warlike tribes hostile to Russia. It was decided to conduct actions in the Trans-Kuban region in accordance with what had been learned in last years system. The native tribes had to submit and move to the places indicated to them on the plane; otherwise, they were pushed further into the barren mountains, and the lands they left behind were populated by Cossack villages; finally, after pushing the natives from the mountains to the seashore, they could either move to the plain, under our closest supervision, or move to Turkey, in which it was supposed to provide them with possible assistance. To quickly implement this plan, I.A. Baryatinsky decided, at the beginning of 1860, to strengthen the troops of the right wing with very large reinforcements; but the uprising that broke out in the newly calmed Chechnya and partly in Dagestan forced us to temporarily abandon this. Actions against the small gangs there, led by stubborn fanatics, dragged on until the end of 1861, when all attempts at indignation were finally suppressed. Then only it was possible to begin decisive operations on the right wing, the leadership of which was entrusted to the conqueror of Chechnya, N.I. Evdokimov. His troops were divided into 2 detachments: one, Adagumsky, operated in the land of the Shapsugs, the other - from Laba and Belaya; a special detachment was sent to operate in the lower reaches of the river. Pshish. In autumn and winter, Cossack villages are established in the Natukhai district. The troops operating from the direction of Laba completed the construction of the villages between Laba and Belaya and cut through the entire foothill space between these rivers with clearings, which forced the local communities to partly move to the plane, partly to go beyond the pass of the Main Range.
At the end of February 1862, Evdokimov’s detachment moved to the river. Pshekh, to which, despite the stubborn resistance of the Abadzekhs, a clearing was cut and a convenient road was laid. All inhabitants living between the Khodz and Belaya rivers were ordered to immediately move to Kuban or Laba, and within 20 days (from March 8 to 29), up to 90 villages were resettled. At the end of April, N.I. Evdokimov, having crossed the Black Mountains, descended into the Dakhovskaya Valley along the road that the mountaineers considered inaccessible to us, and set up a new Cossack village there, closing the Belorechenskaya line. Our movement deep into the Trans-Kuban region was met everywhere by desperate resistance from the Abadzekhs, reinforced by the Ubykhs and other tribes; but the enemy’s attempts could not be crowned with serious success anywhere. The result of the summer and autumn actions of 1862 on the part of Belaya was the strong establishment of Russian troops in the space limited on the west by the rivers Pshish, Pshekha and Kurdzhips.
At the beginning of 1863, the only opponents of Russian rule throughout the Caucasus region were the mountain societies on the northern slope of the Main Range, from Adagum to Belaya, and the coastal tribes of Shapsugs, Ubykhs, etc., who lived in the narrow space between the sea coast and the southern slope Main Range, Aderby Valley and Abkhazia. The final conquest of the country fell to the lot of Grand Duke Mikhail Nikolaevich, who was appointed governor of the Caucasus. In 1863, the actions of the troops of the Kuban region. should have consisted of spreading Russian colonization of the region simultaneously from two sides, relying on the Belorechensk and Adagum lines. These actions were so successful that they put the mountaineers of the northwestern Caucasus in a hopeless situation. Already in the middle of the summer of 1863, many of them began to move to Turkey or to the southern slope of the ridge; most of them submitted, so that by the end of summer the number of immigrants settled on the plane in the Kuban and Laba reached 30 thousand people. At the beginning of October, the Abadzekh elders came to Evdokimov and signed an agreement according to which all their fellow tribesmen who wanted to accept Russian citizenship pledged no later than February 1, 1864 to begin moving to the places indicated by him; the rest were given 2 1/2 months to move to Turkey.
The conquest of the northern slope of the ridge was completed. All that remained was to move to the southwestern slope in order to, going down to the sea, clear the coastal strip and prepare it for settlement. On October 10, our troops climbed to the very pass and in the same month occupied the river gorge. Pshada and the mouth of the river. Dzhubgi. The beginning of 1864 was marked by unrest in Chechnya, stirred up by followers of the new Muslim sect of Zikr; but these unrest were soon pacified. In the western Caucasus, the remnants of the highlanders of the northern slope continued to move to Turkey or to the Kuban plane; from the end of February, actions began on the southern slope, which ended in May with the conquest of the Abkhaz tribe Akhchipsou, in the upper reaches of the river. Mzymty. The masses of native inhabitants were pushed back to the seashore and were taken to Turkey by arriving Turkish ships. On May 21, 1864, in the camp of the united Russian columns, in the presence of the Grand Duke Commander-in-Chief, a thanksgiving prayer service was served to mark the end of a long struggle that had cost Russia countless victims.
4 Results and consequences of the war
The process of integration of the North Caucasus was a unique event in its own way. Here were reflected both traditional schemes that corresponded national policy empire in the annexed lands, and its own specifics, determined by the relationship between the Russian authorities and the local population and politics Russian state in the process of asserting its influence in the Caucasus region.
The geopolitical position of the Caucasus determined its importance in expanding Russia's spheres of influence in Asia. Most assessments of contemporaries - participants in military operations in the Caucasus and representatives of Russian society show that they understood the meaning of Russia's struggle for the Caucasus.
In general, contemporaries’ understanding of the problem of establishing Russian power in the Caucasus shows that they sought to find the most optimal options for ending hostilities in the region. Most representatives of government authorities and Russian society were united by the understanding that the integration of the Caucasus and local peoples into the general socio-economic and cultural space The Russian Empire required a certain time.
The results of the Caucasian War were Russia’s conquest of the North Caucasus and its achievement of the following goals:
· strengthening the geopolitical position;
· strengthening influence on the states of the Near and Middle East through the North Caucasus as a military-strategic springboard;
· the acquisition of new markets for raw materials and sales on the outskirts of the country, which was the goal of the colonial policy of the Russian Empire.
The Caucasian War had enormous geopolitical consequences. Reliable communications were established between Russia and its Transcaucasian lands due to the fact that the barrier separating them, which was the territories not controlled by Russia, disappeared. After the end of the war, the situation in the region became much more stable. Raids and rebellions began to happen less frequently, largely because the indigenous population in the occupied territories became much smaller. The slave trade on the Black Sea, which had previously been supported by Turkey, completely ceased. For the indigenous peoples of the region, a special system of government, adapted to their political traditions, was established - the military-people's system. The population was given the opportunity to decide their internal affairs according to folk customs(adatam) and Sharia.
However, Russia provided itself with problems for a long time by including “restless”, freedom-loving peoples - echoes of this can be heard to this day. The events and consequences of this war are still painfully perceived in historical memory many peoples of the region, significantly influence interethnic relations.
List of used literature
1.500 greatest people of Russia / author.-comp. L. Orlova. - Minsk, 2008.
.World history of wars: encyclopedia. - M., 2008.
.Degoev V.V. The problem of the Caucasian War of the 19th century: historiographical results // “Collection of Russian historical society", vol. 2. - 2000.
.Zuev M.N. Russian history. Textbook for universities. M., 2008.
.Isaev I.A. History of the Fatherland: Tutorial for those entering universities. M., 2007.
.Story Russia XIX- beginning of the twentieth century: Textbook for universities / Ed. V.A. Fedorov. M., 2002.
.History of Russia: Textbook for universities / Ed. M.N. Zueva, A.A. Chernobaeva. M., 2003.
.Sakharov A.N., Buganov V.I. History of Russia from ancient times to late XIX V. - M., 2000.
.Semenov L.S. Russia and international relations in the Middle East in the 20s of the 19th century. - L., 1983.
.Universal school encyclopedia. T.1. A - L/chap. Ed. E. Khlebalina, leading Ed. D. Volodikhin. - M., 2003.
.Encyclopedia for children. T. 5, part 2. History of Russia. From palace coups to the era of the Great Reforms. - M., 1997.
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The war of the Russian Empire against the Muslim peoples of the North Caucasus was with the goal of annexing this region. However, the imperial government failed to establish effective control over it for many decades. The mountain peoples of Chechnya and Dagestan have long lived largely by raiding the surrounding lowland territories, including Russian Cossack settlements and soldier garrisons. When the raids of the mountaineers on Russian villages became unbearable, the Russians responded with reprisals. After a series of punitive operations, during which Russian troops mercilessly burned down “offending” villages, the emperor in 1813 ordered General Rtishchev to change tactics again, “try to restore calm on the Caucasian line with friendliness and condescension.”
However, the peculiarities of the mentality of the mountaineers prevented a peaceful resolution of the situation. Peacefulness was seen as weakness, and the raids on the Russians only intensified. In the person of General A.P. Ermolova Russian government found the right person to implement these ideas: the general was firmly convinced that the entire Caucasus should become part of the Russian Empire.
The bright, original and controversial figure of Ermolov is probably still long years will cause controversy among researchers. And it is not surprising: the aura of a hero of the Patriotic War, the talent of a commander, diplomat, and administrator coexisted in him with the reputation of the formidable “proconsul of the Caucasus,” with whose name mountain mothers frightened their children. After the completion of the Foreign Campaign of the Russian Army, it was expected that Ermolov would head the War Ministry. But, in April 1816, a rescript from Alexander I followed on the appointment of Ermolov as commander of a separate Caucasian corps and manager of the civil affairs in the Caucasus and Astrakhan province. This appointment was accepted by Ermolov without much desire. The appointment of the militant and popular General Ermolov to the Caucasus was perceived by many as a disgrace. However, by appointing him governor of the Caucasus, Alexander I pursued far-reaching military-political goals. Firstly, he counted on the fact that Ermolov, a talented and energetic statesman and military leader, was the most suitable candidate capable of fulfilling the tasks of strengthening Russia’s position in the Caucasus and bringing the rebellious mountain peoples under the citizenship of the Russian emperor. The Caucasian troops learned with delight about the appointment as their leader Ermolov, a favorite of popular rumor, who had gained great fame for his qualities as an experienced and talented leader, the most popular among the troops, and for his incorruptible honesty, and his truly Russian soul.
Upon assuming the post of commander of a separate Georgian corps and governor-general of the Caucasus and Astrakhan province, Ermolov presented Alexander I with a plan for his military and administrative activities in the Caucasus, which he then strictly adhered to. Having familiarized himself with Ermolov’s plan, the tsar approved it, since it included bringing the mountain peoples of the North Caucasus into citizenship and completing the formation of the Russian administrative structure in the Caucasus. Emperor Alexander gave an order in which he seemed to summarize the essence of Yermolov’s plan: “Conquer the mountain peoples gradually, but urgently; occupy only what you can keep behind you, without expanding other than by becoming a firm foot and securing the occupied space from the attacks of hostiles.” Ermolov marked the beginning of his activities with an inspection trip, where he inspected fortresses and became acquainted with the peaceful and military life of the Cossacks and troops. To strengthen borders by order
Ermolov, the Khoper Cossacks founded new villages. In the fall of 1817, the Caucasian troops were reinforced by the occupation corps of Count Vorontsov, who arrived from France. With the arrival of these forces, Ermolov had a total of about 4 divisions, and he could move on to decisive action. The troops began to systematically advance towards the heart of the “Caucasian Fortress”. Ermolov began in the spring of 1818 the conquest of Chechnya and mountainous Dagestan. It was carried out using harsh military-colonial methods. Clearings were cut in impenetrable forests, roads were laid, and fortresses were founded.
In 1818, the Groznaya fortress was founded, in 1819 - Sudden, in 1821 - Burnaya, then a chain of other fortresses along the rivers Sunzha, Terek, Kuban, where tribes hostile to the Chechens, Cossacks were settled and regular troops were quartered, following the principle “divide and conquer.” Ermolov re-created the fortified Caucasian line as a support for a systematic offensive on the territory of the mountain peoples of the Caucasus. Caucasus Ermolov war imamat
However, General Ermolov not only passed through the lands of the highlanders with fire and sword, but also implemented a whole system of measures to improve the conquered region, develop self-government in it, and ensure normal peaceful life. His entire policy boiled down, in general, to a completely understandable rule: “be honest, respect legitimate authority - and you will live well, because great Russia will take care of you.”
Having curbed Chechnya and Dagestan, Ermolov in 1822 decided to finally curb Kabarda. Ermolov, wanting to immediately and forever stop the possibility of Kabardian unrest and raids, erected, as in Chechnya, a number of fortifications, placing them at the exits of mountain gorges formed by the valleys of the Malka, Baksan, Chegem, Urukh and Nalchik rivers.
Russian rule in the region was firmly established, and even the fateful year of 1825, when Chechnya and Kabarda tried to overthrow the barriers laid down for them by Ermolov with a bloody revolt, could no longer change anything in the fate of these Caucasian countries - pacification was quick and decisive.
Ermolov’s activities in the Caucasus were stopped in 1827, allegedly for connections with the Decembrists. On March 27, 1827, he was relieved of all positions.
Along with Yermolov, his associates (“Yermolovites”), recognized as “harmful,” were also dismissed. The general left the Caucasus, but the memory of him and the glorious “Ermolov era” lived there for a long time.
Background
According to the agreement concluded in Georgievsk on July 24, Tsar Irakli II was accepted under the protection of Russia; In Georgia, it was decided to maintain 2 Russian battalions with 4 guns. It was, however, impossible for such weak forces to protect the country from the continuously repeated raids of the Lezgins - and the Georgian militias were inactive. Only in the fall of the year was it decided to undertake an expedition to the village. Jary and Belokan, to punish the raiders, who were overtaken on October 14, near the Muganlu tract, and, having been defeated, fled across the river. Alazan. This victory did not bring significant fruit; Lezgin invasions continued, Turkish emissaries traveled throughout Transcaucasia, trying to incite the Muslim population against the Russians and Georgians. When Umma Khan of Avar (Omar Khan) began to threaten in Georgia, Heraclius turned to the commander of the Caucasian line, General. Potemkin with a request to send new reinforcements to Georgia; this request could not be respected, since the Russian troops were at that time busy suppressing the unrest caused on the northern slope of the Caucasus ridge by the preacher of the holy war, Mansur, who had appeared in Chechnya. A fairly strong detachment sent against him under the command of Colonel Pieri was surrounded by Chechens in the Zasunzha forests and almost exterminated, and Pieri himself was killed. This increased Mansur's authority among the mountaineers; the unrest spread from Chechnya to Kabarda and Kuban. Although Mansur’s attack on Kizlyar failed and soon after he was defeated in Malaya Kabarda by a detachment of Colonel Nagel, the Russian troops on the Caucasian line continued to remain in a tense state.
Meanwhile, Umma Khan, with Dagestan hordes, invaded Georgia and devastated it without meeting any resistance; on the other hand, the Akhaltsikhe Turks raided it. The Georgian troops, representing nothing more than a crowd of poorly armed peasants, turned out to be completely untenable; Colonel Vurnashev, who commanded the Russian battalions, was constrained in his actions by Irakli and his entourage. In the city, in view of the impending rupture between Russia and Turkey, our troops located in the Transcaucasus were recalled to the line, for the protection of which a number of fortifications were erected on the Kuban coast and 2 corps were formed: the Kuban Jaeger Corps, under the command of Chief General Tekelli, and the Caucasian Corps, under the command of Lieutenant General Potemkin. In addition, a settled or zemstvo army was established, consisting of Ossetians, Ingush and Kabardians. General Potemkin, and then General Tekelli undertook successful expeditions beyond the Kuban, but the situation on the line did not change significantly, and the raids of the mountaineers continued uninterruptedly. Communications between Russia and Transcaucasia almost ceased: Vladikavkaz and other fortified points on the way to Georgia were abandoned by Russian troops this year. Tekelli's campaign against Anapa (city) was unsuccessful. In the city, the Turks, together with the highlanders, moved to Kabarda, but were defeated by the general. Herman. In June 1791, Chief General Gudovich took Anapa, and Mansur was also captured. Under the terms of the Treaty of Yassi concluded in the same year, Anapa was returned to the Turks. With the end of the Turkish War, they began to strengthen the K. line with new fortifications and to establish new Cossack villages, and the coasts of the Terek and upper Kuban were populated mainly by Don people, and the right bank of the Kuban, from the Ust-Labinsk fortress to the shores of the Azov and Black seas, was designated for settlement Black Sea Cossacks. Georgia was at that time in the most deplorable state. Taking advantage of this, Aga Mohammed Khan of Persia, in the second half of the year, invaded Georgia and on September 11 took and ravaged Tiflis, from where the king, with a handful of entourage, fled to the mountains. Russia could not be indifferent to this, especially since the rulers of the regions neighboring Persia always leaned towards the stronger side. At the end of the year, Russian troops entered Georgia and Dagestan. The Dagestan rulers declared their submission, except for the Derbent Khan Sheikh Ali, who locked himself in his fortress. On May 10, the fortress was taken, after stubborn defense. Derbent, and in June it was occupied without resistance by Baku. The commander of the troops, Count Valerian Zubov, was appointed instead of Gudovich as the chief commander of the Caucasus region; but his activities there (see The Persian Wars) soon came to an end with the death of Empress Catherine. Paul I ordered Zubov to suspend military operations; Following this, Gudovich was again appointed commander of the Caucasian corps, and the Russian troops who were in Transcaucasia were ordered to return from there: it was only allowed to leave 2 battalions in Tiflis for a while, due to the increased requests of Heraclius.
In the city, George XII ascended the Georgian throne, who persistently asked Emperor Paul to take Georgia under his protection and provide it with armed assistance. As a result of this, and in view of the clearly hostile intentions of Persia, Russian troops in Georgia were significantly strengthened. When Umma Khan Avar invaded Georgia in the city, General Lazarev with a Russian detachment (about 2 thousand) and part of the Georgian militia (extremely poorly armed), defeated him on November 7, on the banks of the Yora River. On December 22, 1800, a manifesto on the annexation of Georgia to Russia was signed in St. Petersburg; Following this, King George died. At the beginning of the reign of Alexander I, Russian administration was introduced in Georgia; Gen. was appointed commander-in-chief. Knorring, and the civil ruler of Georgia was Kovalensky. Neither one nor the other was well acquainted with the morals, customs and views of the people, and the officials who arrived with them indulged in various abuses. All this, combined with the machinations of the party who were dissatisfied with Georgia’s entry into Russian citizenship, led to the fact that unrest in the country did not stop, and its borders were still subject to raids by neighboring peoples.
At the end, Mr. Knorring and Kovalensky were recalled, and Lieutenant General was appointed commander-in-chief in the Caucasus. book Tsitsianov, well acquainted with the region. He sent most of the members of the former Georgian royal house to Russia, rightly considering them the main culprits of unrest and unrest. He spoke to the khans and owners of the Tatar and mountain regions in a menacing and commanding tone. Residents of the Dzharo-Belokan region, who did not stop their raids, were defeated by a detachment of the general. Gulyakov, and the region itself was annexed to Georgia. In the city of Mingrelia, and in 1804 Imereti and Guria entered into Russian citizenship; in 1803 the Ganja fortress and the entire Ganja Khanate were conquered. The attempt of the Persian ruler Baba Khan to invade Georgia ended in the complete defeat of his troops near Etchmiadzin (June). In the same year, the Khanate of Shirvan accepted Russian citizenship, and in the city - the khanates of Karabakh and Sheki, Jehan-Gir Khan of Shahagh and Budag Sultan of Shuragel. Baba Khan again opened offensive operations, but at the mere news of Tsitsianov’s approach, he fled beyond the Araks (see Persian Wars).
On February 8, 1805, Prince Tsitsianov, who approached the city of Baku with a detachment, was treacherously killed by the local khan. Count Gudovich, who was well acquainted with the state of affairs on the Caucasian line, but not in Transcaucasia, was again appointed in his place. The recently conquered rulers of various Tatar regions, having ceased to feel Tsitsianov’s firm hand over them, again became clearly hostile to the Russian administration. Although the actions against them were generally successful (Derbent, Baku, Nukha were taken), the situation was complicated by the invasions of the Persians and the break with Turkey that followed in 1806. In view of the war with Napoleon, all fighting forces were drawn to the western borders of the empire; Caucasian troops were left without strength. Under the new commander-in-chief, gen. Tormasov (from the city), it was necessary to intervene in the internal affairs of Abkhazia, where among the members of the ruling house that had quarreled among themselves, some turned to Russia for help, and others to Turkey; at the same time, the fortresses of Poti and Sukhum were taken. It was also necessary to pacify the uprisings in Imereti and Ossetia. Tormasov's successors were Gen. Marquis Pauducci and Rtishchev; at the latter, thanks to the victory of the gene. Kotlyarevsky near Aslanduz and the capture of Lankaran, the Treaty of Gulistan was concluded with Persia (). A new uprising that broke out in the fall of the year in Kakheti, instigated by the fugitive Georgian prince Alexander, was successfully suppressed. Since the Khevsurs and Kists (mountain Chechens) took an active part in this disturbance, Rtishchev decided to punish these tribes and in May undertook an expedition to Khevsuria, little known to the Russians. The troops sent there under the command of Major General Simonovich, despite incredible natural obstacles and the stubborn defense of the highlanders, reached the main Khevsur village of Shatil (in the upper reaches of the Arguni), captured it and destroyed all the enemy villages lying on their way. The raids into Chechnya undertaken by Russian troops around the same time were not approved by Emperor Alexander I, who ordered General Rtishchev to try to restore calm on the Caucasian line with friendliness and condescension.
Ermolovsky period (-)
“...Downstream the Terek live the Chechens, the worst of the robbers who attack the line. Their society is very sparsely populated, but has increased enormously in the last few years, for the villains of all other nations who leave their land due to some crime were received in a friendly manner. Here they found accomplices, immediately ready to either avenge them or participate in robberies, and they served as their faithful guides in lands unknown to them. Chechnya can rightly be called the nest of all robbers...” (from the notes of A.P. Ermolov during the administration of Georgia)
The new (from the city) commander of all the tsarist troops in Georgia and on the Caucasian line, A.P. Ermolov, however, convinced the sovereign of the need to subdue the highlanders solely by force of arms. It was decided to carry out the conquest of the mountain peoples gradually, but urgently, occupying only those places that could be retained and not going further until what had been acquired was strengthened.
Ermolov, in the city, began his activities on the line from Chechnya, strengthening the Nazranovsky redoubt located on the Sunzha and establishing the Grozny fortress on the lower reaches of this river. This measure stopped the uprisings of the Chechens living between Sunzha and Terek.
In Dagestan, the highlanders who threatened Shamkhal Tarkovsky, captured by Russia, were pacified; To keep them in bondage, the Sudden fortress was built. The attempt against her by the Avar Khan ended in complete failure. In Chechnya, Russian troops destroyed villages and forced the indigenous inhabitants of these lands (Chechens) to move further and further from Sunzha; A clearing was cut through the dense forest to the village of Germenchuk, which served as one of the main defensive points of the Chechen army. In the city, the Black Sea Cossack army was assigned to a separate Georgian corps, renamed a separate Caucasian corps. The Burnaya fortress was built in the city, and the crowds of the Avar Khan Akhmet, who tried to interfere with Russian work, were broken up. On the right flank of the line, the Trans-Kuban Circassians, with the help of the Turks, began to disturb the borders more than ever; but their army, which invaded the land of the Black Sea army in October, suffered a severe defeat from the Russian army. In Abkhazia, the book. Gorchakov defeated the rebellious crowds near Cape Kodor and brought the prince into possession of the country. Dmitry Shervashidze. In the city, in order to completely pacify the Kabardians, a number of fortifications were built at the foot of the Black Mountains, from Vladikavkaz to the upper reaches of the Kuban. In and years The actions of the Russian command were directed against the Trans-Kuban highlanders, who did not stop their raids. In the city, the Abkhazians, who rebelled against the successor of the prince, were forced to submit. Dmitry Shervashidze, book. Mikhail. In Dagestan, in the 20s, a new Mohammedan teaching, muridism, began to spread, which subsequently created a lot of difficulties and dangers. Ermolov, having visited the city of Kuba, ordered Aslankhan of Kazikumukh to stop the unrest excited by the followers of the new teaching, but, distracted by other matters, could not monitor the execution of this order, as a result of which the main preachers of Muridism, Mulla-Mohammed, and then Kazi-Mulla, continued to inflame the minds of the mountaineers in Dagestan and Chechnya and proclaim the proximity of gazavat, that is, a holy war against the infidels. In 1825, there was a general uprising of Chechnya, during which the highlanders managed to capture the post of Amir-Adzhi-Yurt (July 8) and tried to take the fortification of Gerzel-aul, rescued by a detachment of Lieutenant General. Lisanevich (July 15). The next day Lisanevich and the gene who was with him. The Greeks were killed by one Chechen intelligence officer. From the very beginning of the city, the coast of the Kuban again began to be subject to raids by large parties of Shapsugs and Abadzekhs; The Kabardians also became worried. A number of expeditions to Chechnya were carried out in the city, cutting down clearings in dense forests, laying new roads and destroying villages free from Russian troops. This ended the activities of Ermolov, who left the Caucasus in the city.
The Yermolov period (1816-27) is considered one of the bloodiest for the Russian army. Its results were: on the northern side of the Caucasus ridge - the strengthening of Russian power in Kabarda and the Kumyk lands; the capture of many societies that lived in the foothills and plains against the lion. flank line; For the first time, the idea of the need for gradual, systematic action in a country similar, according to the correct remark of Ermolov’s associate, Gen. Velyaminov, to a huge natural fortress, where it was necessary to seize each redoubt sequentially and, only having firmly established itself in it, conduct further approaches. In Dagestan, Russian power was supported by the betrayal of the local rulers.
The beginning of gazavat (-)
The new commander-in-chief of the Caucasian corps, adjutant general. Paskevich, at first, was busy with wars with Persia and Turkey. The successes he achieved in these wars contributed to maintaining external calm in the country; but Muridism spread more and more, and Kazi-Mulla sought to unite the hitherto scattered tribes of the east. The Caucasus into one mass hostile to Russia. Only Avaria did not succumb to his power, and his attempt (in the city) to take control of Khunzakh ended in defeat. After this, the influence of Kazi-Mulla was greatly shaken, and the arrival of new troops sent to the Caucasus after the conclusion of peace with Turkey forced him to flee from his residence, the Dagestan village of Gimry, to the Belokan Lezgins. In April, Count Paskevich-Erivansky was recalled to command the army in Poland; In his place, they were temporarily appointed commanders of the troops: in Transcaucasia - General. Pankratiev, on the line - Gen. Velyaminov. Kazi-Mulla transferred his activities to the Shamkhal possessions, where, having chosen as his residence the inaccessible tract Chumkesent (in the 13th century, to the 10th from Temir-Khan-Shura), he began to call all the mountaineers to fight the infidels. His attempts to take the fortresses of Burnaya and Vnezapnaya failed; but General Emanuel’s movement into the Aukhov forests was also unsuccessful. The last failure, greatly exaggerated by the mountain messengers, increased the number of Kazi-Mulla's followers, especially in central Dagestan, so that he plundered Kizlyar and attempted, but unsuccessfully, to take possession of Derbent. Attacked, December 1, regiment. Miklashevsky, he had to leave Chumkesent and went to Gimry. New boss Caucasian Corps, Baron Rosen, took Gimry on October 17, 1832; Kazi-Mulla died during the battle. His successor was Gamzat-bek (q.v.), who invaded Avaria in the city, treacherously took possession of Khunzakh, exterminated almost the entire khan’s family and was already thinking about conquering all of Dagestan, but died at the hands of a murderer. Soon after his death, on October 18, 1834, the main hangout of the murids, the village of Gotsatl (see the corresponding article), was taken and destroyed by a detachment of Colonel Kluki-von Klugenau. On the Black Sea coast, where the highlanders had many convenient points for communication with the Turks and trading in slaves (the Black Sea coastline did not yet exist), foreign agents, especially the British, distributed proclamations hostile to us among the local tribes and delivered military supplies. This forced the bar. Rosen to entrust the gene. Velyaminov (summer 1834) a new expedition to the Trans-Kuban region, to establish a cordon line to Gelendzhik. It ended with the construction of the Nikolaevsky fortification.
Imam Shamil
Imam Shamil
In the eastern Caucasus, after the death of Gamzat-bek, Shamil became the head of the murids. The new imam, gifted with outstanding administrative and military abilities, soon turned out to be an extremely dangerous enemy, uniting all the hitherto scattered tribes of the Eastern Caucasus under his despotic power. Already at the beginning of the year, his forces increased so much that he set out to punish the Khunzakhs for killing his predecessor. Aslan Khan-Kazikumukhsky, who was temporarily appointed by us as the ruler of Avaria, asked to occupy Khunzakh with Russian troops, and Baron Rosen agreed to his request, in view of the strategic importance of the named point; but this entailed the need to occupy many other points to ensure communications with Khunzakh through inaccessible mountains. Home reference point On the route of communication between Khunzakh and the Caspian coast, the Temir-Khan-Shura fortress, newly built on the Tarkov plane, was chosen, and the Nizovoye fortification was built to provide a pier to which ships approached from Astrakhan. Shura's communication with Khunzakh was covered by the fortification of Zirani, near the river. Avar Koisu, and the Burunduk-kale tower. For direct message Shura with the Vnezapnaya fortress, the Miatlinskaya crossing over Sulak was built and covered with towers; the road from Shura to Kizlyar was secured by the fortification of Kazi-Yurt.
Shamil, more and more consolidating his power, chose the Koisubu district as his stay, where, on the banks of the Andean Koisu, he began to build a fortification, which he called Akhulgo. In 1837, General Fezi occupied Khunzakh, took the village of Ashilty and the fortification of Old Akhulgo and besieged the village of Tilitl, where Shamil had taken refuge. When, on July 3, we took possession of part of this village, Shamil entered into negotiations and promised submission. We had to accept his offer, since our detachment, which had suffered heavy losses, was severely short of food and, in addition, news was received of an uprising in Cuba. The expedition of General Fezi, despite its external success, brought more benefit to Shamil than to us: the retreat of the Russians from Tilitl gave him a pretext for spreading the belief in the mountains about the clear protection of Allah. In the western Caucasus, a detachment of General Velyaminov, in the summer of the year, penetrated to the mouths of the Pshad and Vulana rivers and founded the Novotroitskoye and Mikhailovskoye fortifications there.
In September of the same 1837, Emperor Nicholas I visited the Caucasus for the first time and was dissatisfied with the fact that, despite many years of efforts and major sacrifices, we were still far from lasting results in the pacification of the region. General Golovin was appointed to replace Baron Rosen. In the city, on the Black Sea coast, the fortifications of Navaginskoye, Velyaminovskoye and Tenginskoye were built and the construction of the Novorossiysk fortress, with a military harbor, began.
In the city, actions were carried out in various areas by three detachments. The first landing detachment of General Raevsky erected new fortifications on the Black Sea coast (forts Golovinsky, Lazarev, Raevsky). The second, Dagestan detachment, under the command of the corps commander himself, captured, on May 31, a very strong position of the highlanders on the Adzhiakhur heights, and on June 3 occupied the village. Akhty, near which a fortification was erected. The third detachment, Chechen, under the command of General Grabbe, moved against the main forces of Shamil, fortified near the village. Argvani, on the descent to the Andian Kois. Despite the strength of this position, Grabbe took possession of it, and Shamil with several hundred murids took refuge in Akhulgo, which he had renewed. It fell on August 22, but Shamil himself managed to escape.
The mountaineers apparently submitted, but in fact they were preparing an uprising, which kept us in the most tense state for 3 years. Military operations began on the Black Sea coast, where our hastily built forts were in a dilapidated state, and the garrisons were extremely weakened by fevers and other diseases. On February 7, the highlanders captured Fort Lazarev and destroyed all its defenders; On February 29, the same fate befell the Velyaminovskoye fortification; On March 23, after a fierce battle, the enemy penetrated the Mikhailovskoye fortification, the rest of the garrison of which exploded into the air, along with the enemy crowds. In addition, the highlanders captured (April 2) the Nikolaev fort; but their enterprises against the Navaginsky fort and the Abinsky fortification were unsuccessful.
On the left flank, a premature attempt to disarm the Chechens caused extreme anger among them, taking advantage of which Shamil raised the Ichkerians, Aukhovites and other Chechen societies against us. Russian troops under the command of General Galafeev limited themselves to searching the forests of Chechnya, which cost many people. It was especially bloody on the river. Valerik (July 11). While gen. Galafeev walked around M. Chechnya, Shamil subjugated Salatavia to his power and at the beginning of August invaded Avaria, where he conquered several villages. With the addition of the elder of the mountain societies in the Andean Koisu, the famous Kibit-Magoma, his strength and enterprise increased enormously. By the fall, all of Chechnya was already on Shamil’s side, and the means of the K. line were insufficient to successfully fight him. The Chechens extended their raids to the Terek and almost captured Mozdok. On the right flank, towards autumn, new line along the Labe was provided with forts Zassovsky, Makhoshevsky and Temirgoevsky. The Velyaminovskoye and Lazarevskoye fortifications were restored on the Black Sea coastline. In 1841, riots broke out in Avaria, instigated by Hadji Murad. A battalion with 2 mountain guns was sent to pacify them, under the command of General. Bakunin, failed at the village of Tselmes, and Colonel Passek, who took command after the mortally wounded Bakunin, only with difficulty managed to withdraw the remnants of the detachment to Khunza. The Chechens raided the Georgian Military Road and captured the military settlement of Aleksandrovskoye, and Shamil himself approached Nazran and attacked the detachment of Colonel Nesterov located there, but had no success and took refuge in the forests of Chechnya. On May 15, generals Golovin and Grabbe attacked and took the position of the imam near the village of Chirkey, after which the village itself was occupied and the Evgenievskoye fortification was founded near it. Nevertheless, Shamil managed to extend his power to the mountain societies of the right bank of the river. Avarsky-Koisu and reappeared in Chechnya; the murids again captured the village of Gergebil, which blocked the entrance to Mekhtulin’s possessions; our communications with Avaria were temporarily interrupted.
In the spring of the year, the expedition of Gen. Fezi improved our affairs in Avaria and Koisubu. Shamil tried to agitate southern Dagestan, but to no avail. General Grabbe moved through the dense forests of Ichkeria, with the goal of capturing Shamil’s residence, the village of Dargo. However, already on the 4th day of movement, our detachment had to stop and then begin a retreat (always the most difficult part of operations in the Caucasus), during which it lost 60 officers, about 1,700 lower ranks, one gun and almost the entire convoy. The unfortunate outcome of this expedition greatly raised the spirit of the enemy, and Shamil began to recruit troops, intending to invade Avaria. Although Grabbe, having learned about this, moved there with a new, strong detachment and captured the village of Igali from the battle, but then withdrew from Avaria, where our garrison remained in Khunzakh alone. The overall result of the actions of 1842 was far from satisfactory; in October, Adjutant General Neidgardt was appointed to replace Golovin. The failures of our weapons have spread in the highest spheres of government the conviction that offensive actions are futile and even harmful. The then Minister of War, Prince, especially rebelled against this kind of action. Chernyshev, who had visited the Caucasus the previous summer and witnessed the return of Grabbe’s detachment from the Ichkerin forests. Impressed by this catastrophe, he requested the Highest Command, which prohibited all expeditions to the city and ordered that the city be limited to defense.
This forced inaction emboldened the opponents, and raids on the line became more frequent again. On August 31, 1843, Imam Shamil captured the fort at the village. Untsukul, destroying the detachment that went to the rescue of the besieged. In the following days, several more fortifications fell, and on September 11, Gotsatl was taken, which interrupted communication with Temir Khan-Shura. From August 28 to September 21, the losses of Russian troops amounted to 55 officers, more than 1,500 lower ranks, 12 guns and significant warehouses: the fruits of many years of effort were lost, long-submissive mountain societies were torn from our power and our moral charm was shaken. On October 28, Shamil surrounded the Gergebil fortification, which he managed to take only on November 8, when only 50 defenders remained. Gangs of mountaineers, scattering in all directions, interrupted almost all communications with Derbent, Kizlyar and Lev. flank of the line; our troops in Temir Khan-Shura withstood the blockade that lasted from November 8 to December 24. The Nizovoye fortification, defended by only 400 people, withstood attacks by a crowd of thousands of highlanders for 10 days, until it was rescued by a detachment of the general. Freytag. In mid-April, Shamil's forces, led by Hadji Murat and Naib Kibit-Magom, approached Kumykh, but on the 22nd they were completely defeated by Prince Argutinsky, near the village. Margi. Around this time, Shamil himself was defeated near the village. Andreeva, where Colonel Kozlovsky’s detachment met him, and near the village. Gilli Highlanders were defeated by Passek's detachment. On the Lezgin line, the Elisu Khan Daniel Bek, who had been loyal to us until then, was indignant. A detachment of General Schwartz was sent against him, who scattered the rebels and captured the village of Elisu, but the khan himself managed to escape. The actions of the main Russian forces were quite successful and ended with the capture of the Dargeli district (Akusha and Tsudahar); then the construction of the forward Chechen line began, the first link of which was the Vozdvizhenskoye fortification, on the river. Arguni. On the right flank, the highlanders’ assault on the Golovinskoye fortification was brilliantly repulsed on the night of July 16.
At the end of the year, a new commander-in-chief, Count M. S. Vorontsov, was appointed to the Caucasus. He has arrived early spring g., and in June he moved with a large detachment to Andia and then to Shamil’s residence - Dargo (see). This expedition ended with the destruction of the said village and delivered Vorontsov princely title, but it cost us huge losses. On the Black Sea coastline, in the summer of 1845, the highlanders attempted to capture forts Raevsky (May 24) and Golovinsky (July 1), but were repulsed. From the city on the left flank, we began to strengthen our power in the already occupied lands, erecting new fortifications and Cossack villages, and preparing further movement deep into the Chechen forests, by cutting down wide clearings. Victory of the book Bebutov, who wrested the difficult-to-reach village of Kutishi (in central Dagestan) from the hands of Shamil, which had just been occupied by him, resulted in the complete calming of the Kumyk plane and the foothills. On the Black Sea coastline, the Ubykhs (up to 6 thousand people) launched a new desperate attack on the Golovinsky fort on November 28, but were repelled with great damage.
In the city, Prince Vorontsov besieged Gergebil, but due to the spread of cholera among the troops, he had to retreat. At the end of July, he undertook a siege of the fortified village of Salta, which, despite the significance of our siege weapons, held out until September 14, when it was cleared by the highlanders. Both of these enterprises cost us about 150 officers and more than 2 1/2 tons of lower ranks who were out of action. The forces of Daniel Bek invaded the Jaro-Belokan district, but on May 13 they were completely defeated at the village of Chardakhly. In mid-November, crowds of Dagestan highlanders invaded Kazikumukh and managed to take possession, but not for long, of several auls.
An outstanding event in the city is the capture of Gergebil (July 7) by Prince Argutinsky. In general, for a long time there has not been such calm in the Caucasus as this year; Only on the Lezgin line were frequent alarms repeated. In September, Shamil tried to capture the fortification of Akhty, on Samur, but he failed. In the city, the siege of the village of Chokha, undertaken by Prince. Argutinsky, cost us great losses, but was not successful. From the Lezgin line, General Chilyaev carried out a successful expedition into the mountains, which ended in the defeat of the enemy near the village of Khupro.
In the year, systematic deforestation in Chechnya continued with the same persistence and was accompanied by more or less heated affairs. This course of action, putting societies hostile to us in a hopeless situation, forced many of them to declare unconditional submission. It was decided to adhere to the same system in the city. On the right flank, an offensive was launched to the Belaya River, with the goal of moving our front line there and taking it away from the hostile Abadzekhs fertile lands between this river and Laba; in addition, the offensive in this direction was caused by the appearance in the western Caucasus of Shamil’s agent, Mohammed-Emin, who collected large parties for raids on our Labin settlements, but was defeated on May 14.
G. was marked by brilliant actions in Chechnya, under the leadership of the head of the left flank, Prince. Baryatinsky, who penetrated hitherto inaccessible forest shelters and destroyed many hostile villages. These successes were overshadowed only by the unsuccessful expedition of Colonel Baklanov to the village of Gurdali.
In the city, rumors about an upcoming break with Turkey aroused new hopes among the mountaineers. Shamil and Mohammed-Emin, having gathered the mountain elders, announced to them the firmans received from the Sultan, commanding all Muslims to rebel against the common enemy; they talked about the imminent arrival of Turkish troops in Georgia and Kabarda and about the need to act decisively against the Russians, who were allegedly weakened by the sending of most of their military forces to the Turkish borders. However, the spirit of the mass of the mountaineers had already fallen so low, due to a series of failures and extreme impoverishment, that Shamil could only subjugate them to his will through cruel punishments. The raid he planned on the Lezgin line ended in complete failure, and Mohammed-Emin, with a crowd of Trans-Kuban highlanders, was defeated by a detachment of General Kozlovsky. When the final break with Turkey followed, at all points in the Caucasus it was decided to maintain a predominantly defensive course of action on our part; however, the clearing of forests and the destruction of the enemy's food supplies continued, although to a more limited extent. In the city, the head of the Turkish Anatolian army entered into communication with Shamil, inviting him to move to join him from Dagestan. At the end of June, Shamil invaded Kakheti; The mountaineers managed to ravage the rich village of Tsinondal, capture the family of its ruler and plunder several churches, but upon learning of the approach of Russian troops, they fled. Shamil's attempt to take possession of the peaceful village of Istisu (q.v.) was unsuccessful. On the right flank, we left the space between Anapa, Novorossiysk and the mouths of the Kuban; The garrisons of the Black Sea coastline were taken to Crimea at the beginning of the year, and forts and other buildings were blown up (see Eastern War of 1853-56). Book Vorontsov left the Caucasus back in March, transferring control to the general. Read, and at the beginning of the year General was appointed commander-in-chief in the Caucasus. N. I. Muravyov. The landing of the Turks in Abkhazia, despite the betrayal of its ruler, Prince. Shervashidze, had no harmful consequences for us. At the conclusion of the Paris Peace, in the spring of 1856, it was decided to take advantage of those operating in Az. Turkey with troops and, having strengthened the K. Corps with them, began the final conquest of the Caucasus.
Baryatinsky
The new commander-in-chief, Prince Baryatinsky, turned his main attention to Chechnya, the conquest of which he entrusted to the head of the left wing of the line, General Evdokimov, an old and experienced Caucasian; but in other parts of the Caucasus the troops did not remain inactive. In and years Russian troops achieved the following results: the Adagum Valley was occupied on the right wing of the line and the Maykop fortification was built. On the left wing, the so-called “Russian road”, from Vladikavkaz, parallel to the ridge of the Black Mountains, to the fortification of Kurinsky on the Kumyk plane, is completely completed and strengthened by newly constructed fortifications; wide clearings have been cut in all directions; the mass of the hostile population of Chechnya has been driven to the point of having to submit and move to open areas, under state supervision; The Aukh district is occupied and a fortification has been erected in its center. In Dagestan, Salatavia is finally occupied. Several new Cossack villages were established along Laba, Urup and Sunzha. The troops are everywhere close to the front lines; the rear is secured; vast expanses of the best lands are cut off from the hostile population and, thus, a significant share of the resources for the fight are wrested from the hands of Shamil.
On the Lezgin line, as a result of deforestation, predatory raids gave way to petty theft. On the Black Sea coast, the secondary occupation of Gagra marked the beginning of securing Abkhazia from incursions by Circassian tribes and from hostile propaganda. The city's actions in Chechnya began with the occupation of the Argun River gorge, which was considered impregnable, where Evdokimov ordered the construction of a strong fortification, called Argunsky. Climbing up the river, he reached, at the end of July, the villages of the Shatoevsky society; in the upper reaches of the Argun he founded a new fortification - Evdokimovskoye. Shamil tried to divert attention by sabotage to Nazran, but was defeated by a detachment of General Mishchenko and barely managed to escape into the still unoccupied part of the Argun Gorge. Convinced that his power there had been completely undermined, he retired to Veden - his new residence. On March 17, the bombardment of this fortified village began, and on April 1 it was taken by storm.
Shamil fled beyond the Andean Koisu; all of Ichkeria declared its submission to us. After the capture of Veden, three detachments headed concentrically to the Andean Koisu valley: Chechen, Dagestan and Lezgin. Shamil, who temporarily settled in the village of Karata, fortified Mount Kilitl, and covered the right bank of the Andean Koisu, opposite Conkhidatl, with solid stone rubble, entrusting their defense to his son Kazi-Magoma. With any energetic resistance from the latter, forcing the crossing at this point would cost enormous sacrifices; but he was forced to leave his strong position as a result of the troops of the Dagestan detachment entering his flank, who made a remarkably brave crossing across the Andiyskoe Koisu at the Sagytlo tract. Shamil, seeing danger threatening from everywhere, fled to his last refuge on Mount Gunib, having only 332 people with him. the most fanatical murids from all over Dagestan. On August 25, Gunib was taken by storm, and Shamil himself was captured by Prince Baryatinsky.
End of the War: Conquest of Circassia (1859-1864)
The capture of Gunib and the capture of Shamil could be considered the last act of the war in the Eastern Caucasus; but there still remained the western part of the region, inhabited by warlike tribes hostile to Russia. It was decided to conduct actions in the Trans-Kuban region in accordance with the system adopted in recent years. The native tribes had to submit and move to the places indicated to them on the plane; otherwise, they were pushed further into the barren mountains, and the lands they left behind were populated by Cossack villages; finally, after pushing the natives from the mountains to the seashore, they could either move to the plain, under our closest supervision, or move to Turkey, in which it was supposed to provide them with possible assistance. To quickly implement this plan, Prince. Baryatinsky decided, at the beginning of the year, to strengthen the troops of the right wing with very large reinforcements; but the uprising that broke out in the newly calmed Chechnya and partly in Dagestan forced us to temporarily abandon this. Actions against the small gangs there, led by stubborn fanatics, dragged on until the end of the year, when all attempts at indignation were finally suppressed. Only then was it possible to begin decisive operations on the right wing, the leadership of which was entrusted to the conqueror of Chechnya,
In 1817, the Caucasian War began for the Russian Empire, which lasted 50 years. The Caucasus has long been a region into which Russia wanted to expand its influence, and Alexander 1 decided on this war. This war saw three Russian Emperor: Alexander 1, Nikolai 1 and Alexander 2. As a result, Russia emerged victorious.
The Caucasian War of 1817-1864 is a huge event; it is divided into 6 main stages, which are discussed in the table below.
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Main reasons |
Russia's attempts to establish itself in the Caucasus and introduce Russian laws there; It is not the desire of some peoples of the Caucasus to join Russia Russia's desire to protect its borders from raids by mountaineers. |
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The predominance of guerrilla warfare among the highlanders. The beginning of the tough policy of the governor in the Caucasus, General A.P. Ermolov to pacify the mountain peoples through the creation of fortresses and the forcible relocation of the mountain people to the plain under the supervision of Russian garrisons |
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The unification of the rulers of Dagestan against the tsarist troops. The beginning of organized military action on both sides |
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The uprising of B. Taymazov in Chechnya (1824). The emergence of muridism. Separate punitive operations of Russian troops against the highlanders. Replacement of the commander of the Caucasian corps. Instead of General A.P. Ermolov (1816-1827) was appointed General I.F. Paskevich (1827-1831) |
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Creation of a mountain Muslim state - imamate. Gazi-Muhammad is the first imam to successfully fight against Russian troops. In 1829 he declared gazavat to the Russians. Died in 1832 in the battle for his native village of Gimry |
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“Brilliant” era” of Imam Shamil (1799-1871). Military operations with varying success on both sides. Shamil’s creation of an imamate, which included the lands of Chechnya and Dagestan. Active hostilities between warring parties. August 25, 1859 - capture of Shamil in the village of Gunib by the troops of General A.I. Baryatinsky |
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The final suppression of the resistance of the mountaineers |
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Results of the war: |
Establishment of Russian power in the Caucasus; Settlement of conquered territories by Slavic peoples; Expanding Russian influence in the East. |
