Test: Subject of social philosophy
1. Specifics of social cognition
The world - social and natural - is diverse and is the object of both natural and social sciences. But its study, first of all, assumes that it is adequately reflected by the subjects, otherwise it would be impossible to reveal its immanent logic and patterns of development. Therefore, we can say that the basis of any knowledge is the recognition of objectivity outside world and its reflection by the subject, the person. However, social cognition has a number of features determined by the specifics of the object of study itself.
Firstly, such an object is society, which is also a subject. The physicist deals with nature, that is, with an object that is opposed to him and always, so to speak, “submissively submits.” A social scientist deals with the activities of people who act consciously and create material and spiritual values.
An experimental physicist can repeat his experiments until he is finally convinced of the correctness of his results. A social scientist is deprived of such an opportunity, since, unlike nature, society changes faster, people change, living conditions, psychological atmosphere, etc. A physicist can hope for the “sincerity” of nature; the revelation of its secrets depends mainly on himself. A social scientist cannot be completely sure that people answer his questions sincerely. And if he examines history, then the question becomes even more complicated, since the past cannot be returned in any way. This is why the study of society is much more difficult than the study of natural processes and phenomena.
Secondly, social relations are more complex than natural processes and phenomena. At the macro level, they consist of material, political, social and spiritual relationships that are so intertwined that only in the abstract can they be separated from each other. In fact, let's take the political sphere of social life. It includes a variety of elements - power, state, political parties, political and social institutions etc. But there is no state without an economy, without social life, without spiritual production. Studying this entire complex of issues is a delicate and extremely complex matter. But, in addition to the macro level, there is also a micro level public life, where the connections and relationships of various elements of society are even more confusing and contradictory, their disclosure also presents many difficulties and difficulties.
Third, social reflection is not only direct, but also indirect. Some phenomena are reflected directly, while others are reflected indirectly. Thus, political consciousness reflects political life directly, that is, it fixes its attention only on the political sphere of society and, so to speak, follows from it. As for this form public consciousness, as philosophy, it indirectly reflects political life in the sense that politics is not an object of study for it, although it somehow affects certain aspects of it. Art and fiction are entirely concerned with the indirect reflection of social life.
Fourthly, social cognition can be carried out through a number of mediating links. This means that spiritual values in the form of certain forms of knowledge about society are passed on from generation to generation, and each generation uses them when studying and clarifying certain aspects of society. The physical knowledge of, say, the 17th century gives little to a modern physicist, but no historian of antiquity can ignore the historical works of Herodotus and Thucydides. And not only historical works, but also philosophical works of Plato, Aristotle and other luminaries of ancient Greek philosophy. We believe what ancient thinkers wrote about their era, about their state structure and economic life, about their moral principles, etc. And on the basis of studying their writings, we create our own idea of \u200b\u200btimes distant from us.
Fifthly, subjects of history do not live in isolation from each other. They create together and create material and spiritual benefits. They belong to certain groups, estates and classes. Therefore, they develop not only individual, but also estate, class, caste consciousness, etc., which also creates certain difficulties for the researcher. An individual may not be aware of his class (even the class is not always aware of them) interests. Therefore, a scientist needs to find such objective criteria that would allow him to clearly and clearly separate one class interests from others, one worldview from another.
At sixth, society changes and develops faster than nature, and our knowledge about it becomes outdated faster. Therefore, it is necessary to constantly update them and enrich them with new content. Otherwise, you can lag behind life and science and subsequently slide into dogmatism, which is extremely dangerous for science.
Seventh, social cognition is directly related to the practical activities of people who are interested in using the results of scientific research in life. A mathematician can study abstract formulas and theories that are not directly related to life. Perhaps his scientific research will receive practical implementation after some time, but that will happen later, for now he is dealing with mathematical abstractions. In the field of social cognition, the question is somewhat different. Sciences such as sociology, jurisprudence, and political science have direct practical significance. They serve society, offer various models and schemes for improving social and political institutions, legislative acts, increasing labor productivity, etc. Even such an abstract discipline as philosophy is connected with practice, but not in the sense that it helps, say, grow watermelons or build factories, but in the fact that it shapes the worldview a person, orients him in the complex network of social life, helps him overcome difficulties and find his place in society.
Social cognition is carried out at the empirical and theoretical levels. Empirical level is connected with immediate reality, with everyday life person. In the process of practical exploration of the world, he at the same time cognizes and studies it. A person at the empirical level understands well that it is necessary to take into account the laws of the objective world and build his life taking into account their actions. A peasant, for example, when selling his goods, understands perfectly well that he cannot sell them below their value, otherwise it will not be profitable for him to grow agricultural products. Empirical level knowledge is everyday knowledge, without which a person cannot navigate the complex labyrinth of life. They accumulate gradually over the years, thanks to them a person becomes wiser, more careful and more responsible in approaching life’s problems.
Theoretical level is a generalization of empirical observations, although a theory can go beyond the boundaries of empirics. Empirics is a phenomenon, and theory is an essence. It is thanks to theoretical knowledge that discoveries are made in the field of natural and social processes. Theory is a powerful factor in social progress. It penetrates into the essence of the phenomena being studied, reveals their driving springs and functioning mechanisms. Both levels are closely related to each other. A theory without empirical facts is transformed into speculation divorced from real life. But empirics cannot do without theoretical generalizations, since it is on the basis of such generalizations that it is possible to take a huge step towards mastering the objective world.
Social cognition heterogeneous. There are philosophical, sociological, legal, political science, historical and other types of social knowledge. Philosophical knowledge is the most abstract form of social knowledge. It deals with universal, objective, repeating, essential, necessary connections of reality. It is carried out in theoretical form with the help of categories (matter and consciousness, possibility and reality, essence and phenomenon, cause and effect, etc.) and a certain logical apparatus. Philosophical knowledge is not specific knowledge of a specific subject, and therefore it cannot be reduced to immediate reality, although, of course, it adequately reflects it.
Sociological knowledge has a specific character and directly concerns certain aspects of social life. It helps a person to deeply study social, political, spiritual and other processes at the micro level (collectives, groups, layers, etc.). It equips a person with the appropriate recipes for the recovery of society, makes diagnoses like medicine, and offers remedies for social ills.
As for legal knowledge, it is associated with the development of legal norms and principles, with their use in practical life. Having knowledge in the field of rights, a citizen is protected from the arbitrariness of authorities and bureaucrats.
Political science knowledge reflects the political life of society, theoretically formulates the patterns of political development of society, and studies the functioning of political institutions and institutions.
Methods of social cognition. Each social science has its own methods of knowledge. In sociology, for example, important have the collection and processing of data, surveys, observation, interviews, social experiments, questionnaires, etc. Political scientists also have their own methods for studying the analysis of the political sphere of society. As for the philosophy of history, methods that have universal significance are used here, that is, methods that; applicable to all spheres of public life. In this regard, in my opinion, first of all it should be called dialectical method , which was used by ancient philosophers. Hegel wrote that “dialectics is... the driving soul of every scientific development of thought and represents the only principle that brings into the content of science immanent connection and necessity, in which in general lies a genuine, and not external, elevation above the finite.” Hegel discovered the laws of dialectics (the law of unity and struggle of opposites, the law of the transition of quantity into quality and vice versa, the law of the negation of negation). But Hegel was an idealist and represented dialectics as the self-development of a concept, and not of the objective world. Marx transforms Hegelian dialectics both in form and content and creates a materialist dialectic that studies the most general laws of the development of society, nature and thinking (they were listed above).
The dialectical method involves the study of natural and social reality in development and change. “The great fundamental idea is that the world does not consist of ready-made, complete objects, a is a collection processes, in which objects that seem unchangeable, as well as mental pictures of them and concepts taken by the head, are in continuous change, now appearing, now destroyed, and progressive development, with all the seeming randomness and despite the ebb of time, ultimately makes its way - this great fundamental thought has entered the general consciousness to such an extent since the time of Hegel that hardly anyone will dispute it in a general form.” But development from the point of view of dialectics is carried out through the “struggle” of opposites. The objective world consists of opposite sides, and their constant “struggle” ultimately leads to the emergence of something new. Over time, this new becomes old, and in its place something new appears again. As a result of the collision between the new and the old, another new appears again. This process is endless. Therefore, as Lenin wrote, one of the main features of dialectics is the bifurcation of the whole and the knowledge of its contradictory parts. In addition, the dialectic method proceeds from the fact that all phenomena and processes are interconnected, and therefore they should be studied and investigated taking into account these connections and relationships.
The dialectical method includes the principle of historicism. It is impossible to study this or that social phenomenon if you do not know how and why it arose, what stages it went through and what consequences it caused. IN historical science, for example, without the principle of historicism it is impossible to obtain any scientific results. A historian who tries to analyze certain historical facts and events from the point of view of his contemporary era cannot be called an objective researcher. Every phenomenon and every event should be considered in the context of the era in which it occurred. Let's say, it is absurd to criticize the military and political activities of Napoleon the First from the point of view of our time. Without observing the principle of historicism, there is not only historical science, but also other social sciences.
Another important means of social cognition is historical And logical methods. These methods in philosophy have existed since the time of Aristotle. But they were developed comprehensively by Hegel and Marx. The logical research method involves a theoretical reproduction of the object under study. At the same time, this method “is essentially nothing more than the same historical method, only freed from historical form and from interfering accidents. Where history begins, the train of thought must begin with the same, and its further movement will be nothing more than a reflection of the historical process in an abstract and theoretically consistent form; a corrected reflection, but corrected in accordance with the laws that the real one himself gives historical process, and each moment can be considered at the point of its development where the process reaches full maturity, its classical form."
Of course, this does not imply complete identity of logical and historical methods of research. In the philosophy of history, for example, the logical method is used since the philosophy of history theoretically, that is, logically reproduces the historical process. For example, in the philosophy of history, the problems of civilization are considered independently of specific civilizations in certain countries, because the philosopher of history examines the essential features of all civilizations, common reasons their genesis and death. Unlike the philosophy of history, historical science uses historical method research, since the historian’s task is to specifically reproduce the historical past, and in chronological order. It is impossible, say, when studying the history of Russia, to begin with modern era. In historical science, civilization is examined specifically, all its specific forms and characteristics are studied.
An important method is also the method ascent from the abstract to the concrete. It was used by many researchers, but found its most complete embodiment in the works of Hegel and Marx. Marx used it brilliantly in Capital. Marx himself expressed its essence as follows: “It seems correct to begin with the real and concrete, with actual preconditions, therefore, for example in political economy, with the population, which is the basis and subject of the entire social process of production. However, upon closer examination this turns out to be erroneous. A population is an abstraction, if I leave aside, for example, the classes of which it is composed. These classes are again an empty phrase if I do not know the foundations on which they rest, for example, wage labor, capital, etc. These latter presuppose exchange, division of labor, prices, etc. Capital, for example, is nothing without wages labor, without value, money, price, etc. Thus, if I started with population, it would be a chaotic idea of the whole, and only through closer definitions would I approach analytically more and more simple concepts: from the concrete, given in the idea, to more and more meager abstractions, until he came to the simplest definitions. From here I would have to go back and forth until I finally came to population again, but this time not as a chaotic idea of a whole, but as a rich totality, with numerous definitions and relationships. The first path is the one that political economy historically followed during its emergence. Economists of the 17th century, for example, always begin with a living whole, with a population, a nation, a state, several states, etc., but they always end by isolating by analysis some defining abstract universal relations, such as the division of labor, money, value. etc. As soon as these individual moments were more or less fixed and abstracted, economic systems began to emerge that ascend from the simplest - like labor, division of labor, need, exchange value - to the state, international exchange and the world market. The last method is obviously scientifically correct. The method of ascent from the abstract to the concrete is only a way by which thinking assimilates the concrete and reproduces it as spiritual concrete.” Marx's analysis of bourgeois society begins with the most abstract concept - the commodity - and ends with the most concrete concept - the concept of class.
Also used in social cognition hermeneutic method. The greatest modern French philosopher P. Ricoeur defines hermeneutics as “the theory of operations of understanding in their relationship with the interpretation of texts; the word "hermeneutics" means nothing more than the consistent implementation of interpretation." The origins of hermeneutics go back to the ancient era, when the need arose to interpret written texts, although interpretation concerns not only written sources, but also oral speech. Therefore, the founder of philosophical hermeneutics F. Schleiermacher was right when he wrote that the main thing in hermeneutics is language.
In social cognition we're talking about, of course, about written sources expressed in one language form or another. The interpretation of certain texts requires compliance, according to at least, the following minimum conditions: 1. It is necessary to know the language in which the text is written. It should always be remembered that a translation from this language to another is never similar to the original. “Any translation that takes its task seriously is clearer and more primitive than the original. Even if it is a masterful imitation of the original, some shades and halftones inevitably disappear from it.” 2. You need to be an expert in the field in which the author of a particular work worked. It is absurd, for example, for a non-specialist in the field of ancient philosophy to interpret the works of Plato. 3. You need to know the era of appearance of this or that interpreted written source. It is necessary to imagine why this text appeared, what its author wanted to say, what ideological positions he adhered to. 4. Do not interpret historical sources from the point of view of modernity, but consider them in the context of the era being studied. 5. Avoid an evaluative approach in every possible way and strive for the most objective interpretation of texts.
2. Historical knowledge is a type of social knowledge
Being a type of social knowledge, historical knowledge at the same time has its own specificity, expressed in the fact that the object under study belongs to the past, while it needs to be “translated” into the system modern concepts And linguistic means. But nevertheless, it does not at all follow from this that we need to abandon the study of the historical past. Modern means of cognition make it possible to reconstruct historical reality, create its theoretical picture and enable people to have a correct idea of it.
As already noted, any knowledge presupposes, first of all, the recognition of the objective world and the reflection of the first in the human head. However, reflection in historical knowledge has a slightly different character than reflection of the present, for the present is present, while the past is absent. True, the absence of the past does not mean that it is “reduced” to zero. The past has been preserved in the form of material and spiritual values inherited by subsequent generations. As Marx and Engels wrote, “history is nothing more than a successive succession of individual generations, each of which uses materials, capital, productive forces transferred to it by all previous generations; Because of this, this generation, on the one hand, continues the inherited activity under completely changed conditions, and on the other hand, modifies the old conditions through completely changed activity.” As a result, a single historical process is created, and inherited material and spiritual values testify to the existence of certain features of the era, the way of life, relationships between people, etc. Thus, thanks to architectural monuments, we can judge the achievements of the ancient Greeks in the field of urban planning. Political works Plato, Aristotle and other luminaries of ancient philosophy give us an idea of the class and state structure of Greece during the era of slavery. Thus, one cannot doubt the possibility of knowing the historical past.
But at present, this kind of doubt is increasingly heard from many researchers. Postmodernists especially stand out in this regard. They deny the objective nature of the historical past, presenting it as an artificial construction with the help of language. “...The postmodern paradigm, which first of all captured the dominant position in modern literary criticism, spreading its influence to all spheres of humanities, called into question the “sacred cows” of historiography: 1) the very concept of historical reality, and with it the historian’s own identity , his professional sovereignty (having erased the seemingly inviolable line between history and literature); 2) criteria for the reliability of the source (blurring the boundary between fact and fiction) and, finally, 3) faith in the possibilities of historical knowledge and the desire for objective truth...” These " sacred cows"are nothing more than the fundamental principles of historical science.
Postmodernists understand the difficulties of social, including historical, knowledge, associated primarily with the object of knowledge itself, that is, with society, which is a product of the interaction of people endowed with consciousness and acting consciously. In socio-historical knowledge, the worldview positions of the researcher who studies the activities of people who have their own interests, goals and intentions are most clearly manifested. Willy-nilly, social scientists, especially historians, bring their likes and dislikes into the study, which to some extent distorts the real social picture. But on this basis it is impossible to turn all the humanities into discourse, into linguistic schemes that have nothing to do with social reality. “The text of a historian,” postmodernists argue, “is a narrative discourse, a narrative, subject to the same rules of rhetoric that are found in fiction... But if a writer or poet freely plays with meanings, resorts to artistic collages, allows himself to arbitrarily bring together and displace different eras and texts, then the historian works with historical source, and his constructions cannot in any way completely abstract from some given fact, which was not invented by him, but obliges him to offer as accurate and deep an interpretation as possible.” Postmodernists destroy the above-mentioned fundamental principles of historical science, without which historical knowledge is unthinkable. But we must be optimistic and hope that the science of history, as before, will occupy an important place in social science and help people study their own history, draw appropriate conclusions and generalizations from it.
Where does historical knowledge begin? What determines its relevance and what benefits does it bring? Let's start by answering the second question and first of all turn to Nietzsche's work “On the benefits and harms of history for life.” The German philosopher writes that man has history because he has memory, unlike animals. He remembers what happened yesterday, the day before yesterday, while the animal immediately forgets everything. The ability to forget is a non-historical feeling, and memory is a historical one. And it’s good that a person forgets a lot in his life, otherwise he simply would not be able to live. All activity requires oblivion, and “a person who would wish to experience everything only historically would be like one who is forced to abstain from sleep, or like an animal condemned to live only by chewing the same cud over and over again.” Thus, one can live quite calmly without memories, but it is absolutely unthinkable to live without the possibility of oblivion.
According to Nietzsche, there are certain boundaries beyond which the past must be forgotten, otherwise it, as the thinker puts it, can become the gravedigger of the present. He suggests not forgetting everything, but not remembering everything either: “...Historical and non-historical are equally necessary for the health of an individual, people and culture” . To a certain extent, the non-historical is more important for the people than the historical, for it is a kind of foundation for building a truly human society, although, on the other hand, only through the use of the experience of the past does a person become a person.
Nietzsche always insists that the boundaries of the historical and the non-historical must always be taken into account. A non-historical attitude to life, writes the German philosopher, allows events to occur that play an extremely important role in the life of human society. He calls historical people those who strive for the future and hope for a better life. “These historical people believe that the meaning of existence will be increasingly revealed over the course of process existence, they look back only in order, by studying the previous stages of the process, to understand its present and learn to more energetically desire the future; They do not know at all how unhistorically they think and act, despite all their historicism, and to what extent their studies of history are a service not to pure knowledge, but to life.”
Nietzsche introduces the concept of over- historical people, for which there is no process, but there is no absolute oblivion. For them, the world and every single moment seem complete and stopped; they never think about what the meaning of historical teaching is - either in happiness, or in virtue, or in repentance. From their point of view, the past and the present are one and the same, although there is subtle diversity. Nietzsche himself supports historical people and believes that history should be studied. And since it is directly related to life, it cannot be, like, say, mathematics, a pure science. “History belongs to the living in three respects: as an active and striving being, as a protecting and honoring being, and, finally, as a suffering being in need of liberation. This trinity of relations corresponds to the trinity of the kinds of history, since it is possible to distinguish monumental, antique and critical kind of history."
The essence monumental history, Nietzsche expresses this: “That great moments in the struggle of units form one chain, that these moments, united into one whole, mark the rise of humanity to the heights of development in the course of millennia, that for me such a long-past moment is preserved in all its liveliness, brightness and greatness - this is precisely where the main idea of that faith in humanity, which gives rise to the demand, finds its expression monumental stories" . Nietzsche means drawing certain lessons from the past. He who is constantly fighting for his ideals and principles needs teachers, whom he finds not among his contemporaries, but in history, rich in great historical events and personalities. The German philosopher calls such a person an active person, fighting, if not for his own happiness, then for the happiness of an entire people or all of humanity. What awaits such a person is not a reward, but perhaps glory and a place in history, where he will also be a teacher for future generations.
Nietzsche writes that there is a struggle against the monumental, because people want to live in the present, and not fight for the future and sacrifice themselves in the name of illusory happiness in this future. But no less, active people are appearing again who refer to the great exploits of past generations and call to follow their example. Great figures die, but their glory remains, which Nietzsche values very highly. He believes that the monumental view is very useful for modern man, for “he learns to understand that the great thing that once existed existed, in any case, at least once.” Maybe, and that therefore it may become possible again some day; he makes his way with great courage, because now doubts about the feasibility of his desires, which take possession of him in moments of weakness, are deprived of all basis.” Nevertheless, Nietzsche expresses doubt that it is possible to use monumental history and draw certain lessons from it. The fact is that history does not repeat itself, and you cannot return past events and replay them. And it is no coincidence that the monumental view of history is forced to coarse it, blur the differences and pay the main attention to the general.
Without denying the overall significance of the monumental view of history, Nietzsche at the same time warns against its absolutization. He writes that “monumental history misleads with the help of analogies: through seductive parallels it inspires the courageous to feats of desperate courage, and turns animation into fanaticism; when this kind of history gets into the heads of capable egoists and dreamy villains, then as a result kingdoms are destroyed, rulers are killed, wars and revolutions arise, and the number of historical effects in themselves, that is, effects without sufficient causes, increases again. Until now we have been talking about the troubles that monumental history can cause among powerful and active natures, it makes no difference whether these latter are good or evil; but one can imagine what its influence will be if powerless and inactive natures take possession of it and try to use it.”
Antique history. It “belongs to the one who guards and honors the past, who with fidelity and love turns his gaze to where he came from, where he became what he is; With this reverent attitude, he seems to repay the debt of gratitude for the very fact of his existence.” The antique dealer indulges in sweet memories of the past, strives to preserve the entire past intact for future generations. He absolutizes the past and lives by it, and not by the present, he idealizes it so much that he doesn’t want to redo anything, doesn’t want to change anything, and is very upset when such changes are made. Nietzsche emphasizes that if antiquarian life is not inspired by modernity, then it will ultimately degenerate. She is capable of preserving the old, but not giving birth to new life, and therefore she always resists the new, does not want it and hates it. In general, Nietzsche is critical of this kind of history, although he does not deny its necessity and even benefits.
Critical history. Its essence: “A person must possess and from time to time use the power to break and destroy the past in order to be able to live on; He achieves this goal by bringing the past to the court of history, subjecting the latter to the most thorough interrogation and, finally, passing judgment on it; but every past is worthy of being condemned - for such are all human affairs: human strength and power have always been powerfully reflected in them. human weakness". Criticism of the past does not mean that justice wins. Life simply requires a critical attitude towards history, otherwise it itself will suffocate. You need to build a new life, and not constantly look back, you need to forget what happened and start from what is. And the past must be mercilessly criticized when it is clear how much injustice, cruelty and lies it contained. Nietzsche warns against such an attitude towards the past. Ruthless and unfair criticism of the past, the German philosopher emphasizes, “is a very dangerous operation, dangerous precisely for life itself, and those people or eras that serve life in this way, that is, by bringing the past to judgment and destroying it, are dangerous and are themselves subject to dangers people and eras. For since we must certainly be products of previous generations, we are at the same time products of their delusions, passions and mistakes, and even crimes, and it is impossible to completely break away from this chain.” And no matter how we try to get rid of the mistakes of the past, we will not succeed, because we ourselves came from there.
Nietzsche’s general conclusion about the three kinds of history: “...every person and every people needs, depending on its goals, strengths and needs, a certain acquaintance with the past, in the form of either monumental, or antiquarian, or critical history, but it needs it not as a gathering of pure thinkers limiting themselves to the contemplation of life alone, and not even as individual units who, in their thirst for knowledge, can be satisfied only by knowledge and for whom the expansion of this latter is an end in itself, but always in view of life, and therefore always under the authority and supreme guidance this life."
One cannot but agree with this conclusion of the German thinker. Indeed, the study of the historical past is not arbitrary, but is determined primarily by the needs of society. People always turn to the past in order to make it easier to study the present, to retain in memory everything that is valuable and positive, and at the same time to learn certain lessons for the future. Of course, it does not follow from this that the past can fully explain the present, for, despite the inextricable connection between them, the present exists, so to speak, lives, but in different circumstances.
The historian does not simply satisfy his curiosity. He is obliged to show how the object of research (this or that historical event or historical fact) influences the course of all world history, what is the place of this event among others.
Of course, he must show a personal interest in the development of his chosen topic, since without this there can be no talk of any research. But, I repeat, the relevance of historical knowledge is dictated primarily by the practical needs of the present. In order to know the present better, it is necessary to study the past, which Kant wrote about long before Nietzsche: “Knowledge of natural things - what they are there is now- always makes one want to also know what they were before, as well as through what series of changes they went through in order to achieve their present state in each given place.”
Analysis of the past allows us to explore the patterns of the present and outline the paths for the development of the future. Without this, a scientific explanation of the historical process is unthinkable. At the same time, we must not forget that the logic of historical science itself requires constant reference to certain historical topics. Every science is creative in nature, that is, it develops and is enriched with new theoretical principles. The same applies to historical science. At each stage of her development, she faces new problems that she must solve. There is an objective connection between the practical needs of society and the logic of the development of science itself, and ultimately the degree of development of science depends on the level of development of society, on its culture and intellectual capabilities.
Answering the first question, it should be noted that historical knowledge includes three stages. First This stage is associated with the collection of material on the issue of interest to the researcher. The more sources, the more reason to hope that we will receive some new knowledge about the historical past. The source can be described as unity objective and subjective. By objective we mean the existence of a source independent of man, and it does not matter whether we are able to decipher it or not. It contains objective (but not necessarily truthful) information about historical events or phenomena. By subjective we mean that the source is a product, the result of labor, which combines the feelings and emotions of its creator. Based on the source, you can determine the style of its author, the degree of talent or the level of understanding of the events described. The source can be anything that relates to the topic and contains any information about the object under study (chronicles, military orders, historical, philosophical, fiction, etc. literature, data from archaeology, ethnography, etc., newsreels, video recordings, etc.).
Second The stage of historical knowledge is associated with the selection and classification of sources. It is extremely important to classify them correctly and select the most interesting and meaningful ones. Here, undoubtedly, the scientist himself plays a significant role. It is easy for an erudite researcher to determine which sources contain true information. Some sources, as M. Blok puts it, are simply false. Their authors deliberately mislead not only their contemporaries, but also future generations. Therefore, much depends on the qualifications, professionalism and erudition of the historian - in a word, on the general level of his culture. It is he who sorts the material and selects the most valuable, from his point of view, sources.
At first glance, the selection and classification of sources is purely arbitrary. But this is a misconception. This procedure is carried out by the researcher, but he lives in society, and, therefore, his views are formed under the influence of certain social conditions, and therefore he classifies sources depending on his ideological and social positions. He can absolutize the significance of some sources and belittle others.
On third At the stage of historical knowledge, the researcher sums up the results and makes theoretical generalizations of the material. First, he reconstructs the past, creates its theoretical model with the help of a logical apparatus and appropriate tools of cognition. Ultimately, he gains some new knowledge about the historical past, about how people lived and acted, how they mastered the natural world around them, and how they increased the social wealth of civilization.
3. Historical facts and their research
One of the central tasks of historical knowledge is to establish the authenticity of historical facts and events, the discovery of new, hitherto unknown facts. But what is a fact? Answering this question is not as easy as it might seem at first glance. In everyday language, we often use the term “fact”, but do not think about its content. Meanwhile, in science there are often heated discussions regarding this term.
It can be said that the concept of fact is used in at least two senses. In the first sense, it is used to designate the historical facts, events and phenomena themselves. In this sense, the Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945 is undoubtedly a historical fact, since it exists objectively, that is, independently of us. In the second sense, the concept of fact is used to designate sources reflecting historical facts. Thus, Thucydides’ work “The Peloponnesian War” is a fact reflecting this war, since it describes the military actions of Sparta and Athens.
Thus, one should strictly distinguish between the facts of objective reality and the facts that reflect this reality. The first exist objectively, the second are the product of our activities, since we compile various kinds of statistical data, information, write historical and philosophical works etc. All this represents a cognitive image that reflects the facts of historical reality. Of course, the reflection is approximate, because historical facts and events are so complex and multifaceted that it is impossible to give them an exhaustive description.
In the structure of historical facts, simple and complex facts can be distinguished. Simple facts include those facts that do not contain other facts or subfacts in themselves. For example, the fact of Napoleon's death on May 5, 1821 is a simple fact, since we are simply talking about stating the death of the former French emperor. Complex facts are those that contain many other facts within themselves. So, the war of 1941–1945 is such a complex fact.
Why is it necessary to study historical facts? Why do we need to know what happened in the ancient world, why they killed Julius Caesar? We study history not for the sake of pure curiosity, but in order to find out the patterns of its development. Analysis of historical facts and events allows us to present the entire world history as a single process and reveal the driving reasons for this process. And when we discover this or that historical fact, we thereby establish a certain natural connection in the forward movement of humanity. Here Julius Caesar, in his “Notes” about the Gallic War, told us about many facts that are important for the study of the history of modern Europe. After all, a fact does not exist in isolation, it is connected with other facts that make up a single chain of social development. And our task is to, by examining this or that historical fact, show its place among other facts, its role and functions.
Of course, we should not forget that the study of historical facts presents certain difficulties arising from the specifics of the object of study itself. Firstly, when studying facts and establishing their authenticity, the sources we need may be missing, especially if we are studying the distant historical past. Secondly, many sources may contain incorrect information about certain historical facts. That is why a thorough analysis of relevant sources is required: selection, comparison, comparison, etc. In addition, it is very important to remember that the problem under study is associated not with one fact, but with their totality, and therefore it is necessary to take into account many other facts - economic , social, political, etc. It is an integrated approach that makes it possible to create a correct idea of a particular social phenomenon.
But the totality of facts is also not something isolated from other facts and phenomena. History is not just a “novel of facts” (Helvetius), but an objective process in which facts are interconnected and interdependent. When studying them, three aspects can be distinguished: ontological, epistemological And axiological.
Ontological aspect presupposes the recognition of a historical fact as an element of objective reality associated with its other elements. The fact of history, as already noted, is not isolated from other facts, and if we want to study the existence of the historical process, we must connect all the facts with each other and reveal their immanent logic. And this can be achieved only on the condition that the existence of facts is considered in their unity with other facts, its place in the historical process and its influence on the further course of society are revealed.
A fact is one or another specific event that requires its explanation and comprehension in connection with the broad social context of the era. Anyone who, for example, studies the period of Caesar's reign will inevitably become interested in the reasons for his rise to power and, in this regard, will pay attention to such a fact as Caesar's crossing of the Rubicon. This is how Plutarch describes this event: “When he (Caesar. - I.G.) approached a river called Rubicon, which separates pre-Alpine Gaul from Italy proper, he was overcome by deep thought at the thought of the coming moment, and he hesitated before the greatness of his daring. Having stopped the cart, he again silently pondered his plan from all sides for a long time, making one or another decision. He then shared his doubts with his friends present, among whom was Asinius Pollio; he understood the beginning of what disasters would be for all people crossing this river and how posterity would evaluate this step. Finally, as if casting aside thoughts and boldly rushing towards the future, he uttered the words usual for people entering into a courageous undertaking, the outcome of which is doubtful: “Let the die be cast!” - and moved towards the passage."
If we take this historical fact in isolation from other facts (the social, economic and political situation of Rome), then we will not be able to reveal its content. After all, many people crossed the Rubicon before Caesar, including Roman statesmen, but Caesar’s crossing meant the beginning of the civil war in Italy, which led to the collapse of the republican system and the establishment of the principate. Caesar became the sole ruler of the Roman state. By the way, many historians highly valued Caesar as a statesman who contributed to the further development of Rome. Thus, the greatest German historian of the last century, T. Mommsen, wrote that “Caesar was a born statesman. He began his activities in a party that fought against the existing government, and therefore for a long time he crept up on his goal, then played a prominent role in Rome, then entered the military field and took a place among the greatest commanders - not only because he won brilliant victories. victory, but also because he was one of the first to be able to achieve success not by a huge superiority of strength, but by unusually intense activity, when it was necessary, by skillful concentration of all his forces and unprecedented speed of movements.”
Epistemological the aspect of considering facts involves analyzing them from the point of view of cognitive function. If the ontological aspect does not directly take into account the subjective moments in the historical process (although, of course, it is absolutely clear that the historical process does not exist without the activity of people), then the epistemological analysis of the fact takes these moments into account. When reconstructing the historical past, one cannot abstract from the actions of the subjects of history, from their general cultural level and ability to create their own history. The intensity of the fact is determined by the activity of people, their ability to quickly change the course of the historical process, perform revolutionary actions and accelerate social development.
The study of facts in the epistemological aspect helps to better understand a particular historical event, determine the place of the subjective factor in society, find out the psychological mood of people, their experiences, and emotional state. This aspect also involves taking into account all possible situations for a complete reproduction of the past and thus requires a differentiated approach. For example, when studying the Battle of Waterloo, we need to take into account various situations associated with it, including the morale of the troops, the state of Napoleon’s health, etc. This will help us better understand the reasons for the defeat of the French troops.
Axiological aspect, as is clear from the formulation of this term, is associated with the assessment of historical facts and events.
Of all the aspects, this is perhaps the most difficult and the most complex, because one must objectively evaluate historical facts, regardless of one’s own likes and dislikes. Weber, for example, reflecting on these problems, proposed strictly scientifically, without political bias, to evaluate any socio-political and other phenomena. He proceeded from the fact that “the establishment of facts, the establishment of a mathematical or logical state of affairs or internal structure cultural heritage, on the one hand, and on the other hand, the answer to questions about the value of culture and its individual formations and, accordingly, the answer to the question of how to act within the framework of a cultural community and political unions - two completely different things.” Therefore, a scientist must strictly scientifically and without any assessments present the facts and only the facts. And “where a man of science comes with his own value judgments, there is no longer room for a full understanding of the facts.”
One cannot but agree with Weber that the opportunistic scientist, based on opportunistic considerations, each time adapting to the political situation, interprets historical facts and events in his own way. It is absolutely clear that his interpretation of facts and the historical process in general is devoid of any objectivity and has nothing to do with scientific research. If, for example, yesterday one assessment of certain historical events was given, and today another, then such an approach has nothing in common with science, which must tell the truth and nothing but the truth.
But at the same time, it should be noted that every researcher has certain ideological positions. He lives in society, is surrounded by various social strata, classes, receives an appropriate education, in which the value approach plays a vital role, because any state understands perfectly well that the younger generation must be raised in a certain spirit, that it must appreciate the wealth created by its predecessors. In addition, in society, due to its class differentiation, as well as the fact that the source of its development is internal contradictions, there are different approaches to certain historical events. And although the researcher must be objective and impartial, nevertheless he is still a man and a citizen, and he is not at all indifferent to what happens in the society in which he lives. He sympathizes with some, despises others, and tries not to notice others. This is how a person is designed, and nothing can be done about it. He has emotions and feelings that cannot but affect his scientific activities. In short, he cannot help but be biased, that is, he cannot help but evaluate subjectively (not to be confused with subjectivism) certain historical facts and events.
The main task of science is to obtain results that should adequately reflect the essence of the object under study. In other words, they must be true. The painstaking work of a historian is also devoted to establishing the truth of historical facts and events. Based on his works, people form a real idea of their past, which helps them in practical activities and in mastering the values inherited from past generations.
Obtaining true knowledge is an extremely difficult process, but it is even more difficult to do this in historical science. It is not easy, for example, for those who explore the ancient world. On the one hand, there are not always enough relevant sources, and the deciphering of many of them sometimes faces insurmountable obstacles, although a modern researcher has at his disposal more powerful tools knowledge than his colleagues of past times. It is not easy for a specialist of modern, contemporary history, since the facts being studied have not yet gone into “pure” history, so to speak, and influence the course of current processes. Under these conditions, he has to adapt and often sacrifice the truth in the name of the situation. Nevertheless, we must search for truths, because science requires no less courage and bravery than on the battlefield.
It is not surprising, therefore, that a scientist can be mistaken, although, as Hegel wrote, delusion is characteristic of any person. And error is the opposite of truth. However, this is such an opposite that does not completely deny one side or another of the truth. In other words, the contradiction between error and truth is dialectical, not formal. And therefore, delusion is not something that needs to be discarded out of hand. After all, it is associated with finding the truth, with obtaining genuine knowledge.
Misconception is a step on the path to finding truth. It can, under certain conditions, stimulate scientific activity, encourage new searches. But it can also slow down scientific research and ultimately force a scientist to quit science. One should not confuse a delusion with an erroneous theoretical position, although they are close in content. A delusion is something that has a rational grain. Moreover, a misconception completely unexpectedly can lead to new scientific discoveries. It goes without saying that delusion is based on certain scientific principles and means of knowing the truth. And, as Hegel noted, from “error is born truth, and in this lies reconciliation with error and with finitude. Otherness, or error as sublated, is itself a necessary moment of truth, which exists only when it makes itself its own result.”
In classical philosophical traditions, truth is defined as an adequate reflection of objective reality. I think that there is no reason to refuse such a characterization of truth. There is no reason to abandon the concept of objective truth, which includes two aspects - absolute and relative truth. The presence of these two forms of truth is associated with the specifics of the process of cognition of the world. Knowledge is endless, and in the course of our research we gain knowledge that more or less adequately reflects historical reality. This kind of truth is usually called absolute. So, no one doubts that Alexander the Great was the founder Greek Empire. This, so to speak, is an absolute truth, which should be distinguished from the “banal” truth, which contains only some information that is not subject to any revision either in the present or in the future. Let's say a person cannot live without food. This is a banal truth, it is absolute, but there are no moments of relativity in it. Absolute truth contains such moments. Relative truths do not fully reflect objective reality.
Both forms of truth are in indissoluble unity. Only in one case does absolute truth prevail, and in the other – relative truth. Let's take the same example: Alexander the Great was the founder of the Greek Empire. This is an absolute truth, but at the same time it is relative in the sense that the statement that Alexander founded an empire does not reveal the complex processes that took place during the formation of this huge empire. Analysis of these processes shows that many of them require further research and more fundamental consideration. Discussions about the dialectic of absolute and relative truth fully relate to historical knowledge. When establishing the truth of historical facts, we receive some elements of absolute truth, but the process of knowledge does not end there, and in the course of our further searches, new knowledge is added to these truths.
The truth of scientific knowledge and theories must be confirmed by some indicators, otherwise they will not be recognized as scientific results. But finding the criterion of truth is a difficult and very complex matter. The search for such a criterion led to various concepts in science and philosophy. Some declared the criterion of truth to be the mutual agreement of scientists (conventionalism), i.e., to consider as a criterion of truth what everyone agrees with, others declared utility to be a criterion of truth, others - the activity of the researcher himself, etc.
Marx put forward practice as the main criterion. Already in his “Theses on Feuerbach” he wrote: “The question of whether human thinking has objective truth is not at all a question of theory, but a practical question. In practice, a person must prove the truth, that is, the reality and power, the this-worldliness of his thinking. The dispute about the validity or invalidity of thinking isolated from practice is a purely scholastic question.” It is practical activity that proves the truth or falsity of our knowledge.
The concept of practice cannot be limited to only material production, material activity, although this is the main thing, other types of activity should be included in it - political, state, spiritual, etc. So, for example, the relative identity of the content of sources about the same object is essentially a practical test of the truth of the results obtained .
Practice is not only criterion truth, but also the basis knowledge. Only in the process of practical activity to transform the world, to create material and spiritual values, does a person learn the natural and social reality around him. I think Hegel said that anyone who wants to learn to swim must jump into the water. No theoretical instructions will make a young man a football player until he plays football, and the criterion of his ability to play is practice. Hegel wrote that “the position of an unprejudiced person is simple and consists in the fact that he adheres with confidence and conviction to publicly recognized truth and builds on this solid foundation his course of action and a reliable position in life.”
As for historical knowledge, in this case practice serves as a criterion of truth, although there are certain difficulties associated with the subject of research. But here it is necessary to point out one feature of the criterion of truth in historical knowledge: the fact is that the selection of sources, their comparison and juxtaposition, their classification and scrupulous analysis - in short, scientific research, using all methods and means of knowing the world, should be considered as practical activities, confirming our theoretical conclusions. Further, we must proceed from the fact that various sources, documents, archaeological data, works of literature and art, works on philosophy and history more or less fully reflect the historical reality that we are studying. No matter how skeptical we may be about the historical works of Thucydides, his History of the Peloponnesian War is a good source for studying this war. Is it possible to neglect Aristotle's Politics when studying government structure Ancient Greece?
We should not forget that the historical process is unified and continuous, everything in it is interconnected. There is no present without the past, just as there is no future without the present. Present history is inextricably linked with the past, which influences it. For example, the consequences of the conquests carried out by the Roman Empire did not disappear without a trace. They are still inextricably present in the life of many countries that once found themselves within the Roman Empire. A researcher of the history of Rome can easily confirm his theoretical conclusions with today's practice. Thus, it is not difficult to prove that the high level of civilization in Western countries is largely explained by the fact that Western Europe inherited the achievements of the Greco-Roman civilization, which through the mouth of Protagoras put forward the famous aphorism: “Man is the measure of all things.” And without this aphorism, the theory of natural law would not have appeared, according to which all people have the same rights to own things. Without Roman law, there would be no universal law in Western countries to which all citizens of the state are obliged to obey. Without strong Chinese traditions, there would not have been a smooth, evolutionary transition to market relations in China.
Practice as a criterion of truth must be viewed dialectically. On the one hand, this criterion is absolute, and on the other hand, it is relative. The criterion of practice is absolute in the sense that there is simply no other criterion of an objective nature. After all, conventionalism, utility, etc. are clearly subjective in nature. Some may agree and others may not. Some may find truth useful, while others may not. The criterion must be objective and not depend on anyone. Practice meets these requirements. On the other hand, the practice itself, which covers the activities of people to create material and spiritual values, is changing. Therefore, its criterion is relative, and if we do not want to turn theoretical knowledge into dogma, then we must change it depending on changing circumstances, and not cling to it.
Currently, many social scientists ignore the dialectical method of cognition. But so much the worse for them: because someone ignores, say, the law of value, this law does not disappear. One may not recognize dialectics as a doctrine of development, but this will not stop the development and change of the objective world.
As Vader B. and Hapgood D. write, long time Napoleon was poisoned with arsenic. The consequences of this were particularly severe during the Battle of Waterloo. “But then a series of mistakes begins. Exhausted, with symptoms of arsenic poisoning, Napoleon falls asleep for an hour, waiting until the mud dries and Grouchy comes up” // Vendor B. Brilliant Napoleon. Vader B., Hapgood D. Who killed Napoleon? M., 1992. P. 127.
Lecture course
in "Social Philosophy"
All rights reserved by law
Commercial use
2006
Topic No. 8
Society as an object of knowledge
Topic No. 8. Society as an object of knowledge
1. Social cognition and its features
Cognition (in general)– is the process of acquiring knowledge about existence (about nature, society, man).
It includes: 1) process reflections reality in the human brain and 2) its further explanation.
The concept of object and subject in epistemology (in cognition):
Subject of knowledge- That, Who cognizes (person), researcher.
Object of knowledge- That, What is known.
Object of human knowledge : the world as a whole, society, man, knowledge itself.
Sources and methods of knowledge: human feelings, reason, intuition.
(see types of knowledge in Spinoza! – empiricism, rationalism, intuition)
A close, dialectical connection between the sensory (empirical) and the rational and reason.
Presenter the role of reason, rational knowledge (conceptual reflection, abstractions, theoretical thinking).
However, the human mind is not omnipotent in knowledge.
Because outside of him and in addition to him, there are forces that are beyond his control.
See Kant: Critique of Pure Reason (rationalism).
Irrationalism - criticism of rationalism, an indication oflimitation human mind in knowledge. The presence in the world of an irrational factor and reasons (intuition, instinct, will, mystical insight, etc.), which play an important role in the life of society andin cognition .
Irrationalists: Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Hartmann, Bergson, Heidegger, etc.
Social Cognition – acquisition and system of knowledge about society (society).
Social knowledge is one of varieties knowledge (in general).
Features of social cognition:
1. Complexity and difficulty social cognition compared to other types of cognition (for example, nature) due to different quality society, actions in it conscious forces (people endowed with will, passions, desire, etc.).
2. Personal factor the subject of knowledge (the individuality of the researcher - his experience, intelligence, interests, passions, etc.).
3. Historical conditions social cognition – a certain level of development of society, social structure, dominant interests.
The object is:
- activitythe subjects themselves knowledge (of people);
- interaction between the object and the subject of cognition (i.e., its subject is initially present in the object itself).
Availability and a combination of all of these factors (features) determines diversity of points of view and theories, explaining the development and functioning of social life.
All this determines special specifics and difficulties in social cognition.
This specificity of social cognition largely determines the nature and characteristics of various parties social cognition.
Aspects of social cognition:
(ontological, epistemological, value)
1. Ontological side –(ontos – being) – concerns the explanation being (existence) of society, patterns and trends of its functioning and development, as well as person as a member of society.
The complexity and dynamism of social life (people act here, endowed with will, reason, and their own interests) - objective the basis of the complexity of this knowledge about the essence of people’s social existence and, accordingly, the presence of many different points of view and theories.
For example: What was considered basis the existence of society in the history of philosophical thought:
Plato: idea of justice;
Augustine the Blessed - divine plan;
Hegel – absolute reason;
Marx is an economic factor;
Freud – the struggle between the life instinct and the death instinct;
Geographical environment – Montesquieu, Chaadaev. And etc.
The task of social science is to find objective patterns, trends in the functioning and development of social life.
Question: do they exist? If there are no objective laws in society, then there cannot be scientific knowledge about society, because science deals with laws. There is no clear answer to this question today.
For example:
1. Neo-Kantians (W. Windelband, G. Rickert): there are and cannot be any objective laws in society, since all phenomena here are of a unique and individual nature.
2. Followers of neo-Kantians: society itself exists only as our idea of it, as a “world of concepts,” not as an objective reality.
However, there are still (?)
Objective foundations of the existence of human society:
1. Natural basis - society arises and develops objectively, regardless of the subject of knowledge, whether anyone knows it or not.
2. The level and nature of economic development of society, material interests and needs of people.
It is also possible that a variety of factors may interact, for example, the geographic environment or subjective ideas about the world.
2. Epistemological side of social cognition
Associated with features of social cognition itself:
The role of public practices in social cognition
Personal experience of the knowing subject; (age and experience. But: Lermontov - at the age of 15 he wrote the prophetic poem “Prediction” - “The year will come, a terrible year for Russia...”)
Role with sociological research and social experiments in social cognition;
Possibilities human mind in the knowledge of society and man (Limitations. Bad and good, because we don’t know our future).
Recognition by a scientist of the objective existence of society and the presence of objective laws in it (or denial of this), that is, his position on the ontological problem of social cognition;
How is cognition of social phenomena carried out?
What are the possibilities of their knowledge and what are the limits of knowledge;
3. Value (axiological) side of social cognition
(gr. Axios - valuable)
Any social cognition is associated with certain values researcher. These value priorities determine the choice of the object of knowledge, its methods, specifics
interpretation of the research results. Will it true knowledge gained in this way? Most likely - yes, because... value priorities determine only the research itself, and not the existence, functioning and development of the object of research.
Conclusions:
All three sides (aspects) of social cognition (ontological, epistemological and value) closely interconnected between each other and form an integral structure human cognitive activity.
1. The subject and object of knowledge coincide. Social life is permeated by the consciousness and will of man; it is essentially subject-objective and represents, on the whole, a subjective reality. It turns out that the subject here cognizes the subject (cognition turns out to be self-knowledge).
2. The resulting social knowledge is always associated with the interests of individual subjects of knowledge. Social cognition directly affects people's interests.
3. Social knowledge is always loaded with evaluation; it is value knowledge. Natural science is instrumental through and through, while social science is the service of truth as a value, as truth; natural sciences are “truths of the mind,” social sciences are “truths of the heart.”
4. The complexity of the object of knowledge - society, which has diversity various structures and is in constant development. Therefore, the establishment of social laws is difficult, and open social laws are probabilistic in nature. Unlike natural science, social science makes predictions impossible (or very limited).
5. Since social life changes very quickly, in the process of social cognition we can talk about establishing only relative truths.
6. The possibility of using this method is limited scientific knowledge like an experiment. The most common method social research is a scientific abstraction, the role of thinking in social cognition is exceptionally great.
The correct approach to them allows us to describe and understand social phenomena. This means that social cognition must be based on the following principles.
– consider social reality in development;
– study social phenomena in their diverse connections and interdependence;
– identify the general (historical patterns) and the specific in social phenomena.
Every human knowledge of society begins with perception real facts economic, social, political, spiritual life - the basis of knowledge about society and people’s activities.
Science distinguishes the following types of social facts.
For a fact to become scientific, it must be interpret(Latin interpretatio – interpretation, explanation). First of all, the fact is brought under some kind of scientific concept. Next, all the essential facts that make up the event are studied, as well as the situation (setting) in which it occurred, and the diverse connections of the fact being studied with other facts are traced.
So the interpretation social fact is a complex multi-stage procedure for its interpretation, generalization, and explanation. Only an interpreted fact is truly scientific fact. A fact presented only in the description of its characteristics is just raw material for scientific conclusions.
Associated with the scientific explanation of the fact is its grade, which depends on the following factors:
– properties of the object being studied (event, fact);
– correlation of the object being studied with others, one ordinal, or with an ideal;
– cognitive tasks set by the researcher;
– personal position of the researcher (or just a person);
– interests of the social group to which the researcher belongs.
Sample assignments
Read the text and complete the tasks C1‑C4.
"Specificity of cognition social phenomena, the specifics of social science are determined by many factors. And, perhaps, the main one among them is society itself (man) as an object of knowledge. Strictly speaking, this is not an object (in the natural scientific sense of the word). The fact is that social life is thoroughly permeated with the consciousness and will of man; it is essentially subject-objective and represents, on the whole, a subjective reality. It turns out that the subject here cognizes the subject (cognition turns out to be self-knowledge). However, this cannot be done using natural scientific methods. Natural science embraces and can master the world only in an objective (as an object-thing) way. It really deals with situations where the object and the subject are, as it were, in different sides barricades and therefore so distinguishable. Natural science turns the subject into an object. But what does it mean to turn a subject (a person, after all, in the final analysis) into an object? This means killing the most important thing in him - his soul, making him into some kind of lifeless scheme, a lifeless structure.<…>The subject cannot become an object without ceasing to be itself. The subject can only be known in a subjective way - through understanding (and not an abstract general explanation), feeling, survival, empathy, as if from the inside (and not detachedly, from the outside, as in the case of an object).<…>
What is specific in social science is not only the object (subject-object), but also the subject. Everywhere, in any science, passions boil; without passions, emotions and feelings there is no and cannot be human search truth. But in social studies their intensity is perhaps the highest” (Grechko P.K. Social studies: for those entering universities. Part I. Society. History. Civilization. M., 1997. pp. 80–81.).
C1. Based on the text, indicate the main factor that determines the specifics of cognition of social phenomena. What, according to the author, are the features of this factor?
Answer: The main factor that determines the specifics of cognition of social phenomena is its object – society itself. The features of the object of knowledge are associated with the uniqueness of society, which is permeated with the consciousness and will of man, which makes it a subjective reality: the subject knows the subject, i.e. knowledge turns out to be self-knowledge.
Answer: According to the author, the difference between social science and natural science lies in the difference in the objects of knowledge and its methods. Thus, in social science, the object and subject of knowledge coincide, but in natural science they are either divorced or significantly different; natural science is a monological form of knowledge: the intellect contemplates a thing and speaks about it; social science is a dialogical form of knowledge: the subject as such cannot be perceived and studied as a thing, because as a subject he cannot, while remaining a subject, become voiceless; in social science, knowledge is carried out as if from within, in natural science - from the outside, detached, with the help of abstract general explanations.
C3. Why does the author believe that in social science the intensity of passions, emotions and feelings is the highest? Give your explanation and, based on knowledge of a social science course and the facts of social life, give three examples of the “emotionality” of cognition of social phenomena.
Answer: The author believes that in social science the intensity of passions, emotions and feelings is the highest, since here there is always a personal attitude of the subject to the object, a vital interest in what is being learned. As examples of the “emotionality” of cognition of social phenomena, the following can be cited: supporters of the republic, studying the forms of the state, will seek confirmation of the advantages of the republican system over the monarchical one; monarchists will pay special attention to proving the shortcomings of the republican form of government and the merits of the monarchical one; The world-historical process has been considered in our country for a long time from the point of view of the class approach, etc.
C4. The specificity of social cognition, as the author notes, is characterized by a number of features, two of which are revealed in the text. Based on your knowledge of the social science course, indicate any three features of social cognition that are not reflected in the fragment.
Answer: As examples of the features of social cognition, the following can be cited: the object of cognition, which is society, is complex in its structure and is in constant development, which makes it difficult to establish social laws, and open social laws are probabilistic in nature; in social cognition the possibility of using such a method of scientific research as experiment is limited; in social cognition the role of thinking, its principles and methods (for example, scientific abstraction) is extremely important; Since social life changes quite quickly, in the process of social cognition we can talk about establishing only relative truths, etc.
Human cognition is subject to general laws. However, the characteristics of the object of knowledge determine its specificity. We have our own character traits and in social cognition, which is inherent in social philosophy. It should, of course, be borne in mind that in the strict sense of the word, all knowledge has a social, social character. However, in in this context We are talking about social cognition itself, in the narrow sense of the word, when it is expressed in a system of knowledge about society at its various levels and in various aspects.
The specificity of this type of cognition lies primarily in the fact that the object here is the activity of the subjects of cognition themselves. That is, people themselves are both subjects of knowledge and real actors. In addition, the object of cognition also becomes the interaction between the object and the subject of cognition. In other words, in contrast to the natural sciences, technical and other sciences, in the very object of social cognition, its subject is initially present.
Further, society and man, on the one hand, act as part of nature. On the other hand, these are the creations of both society itself and man himself, the materialized results of their activities. In society there are both social and individual forces, both material and ideal, objective and subjective factors; in it both feelings, passions, and reason matter; both conscious and unconscious, rational and irrational aspects of human life. Within society itself, its various structures and elements strive to satisfy their own needs, interests and goals. This complexity of social life, its diversity and different qualities determine the complexity and difficulty of social cognition and its specificity in relation to other types of cognition.
To the difficulties of social cognition explained by objective reasons, that is, reasons that have grounds in the specifics of the object, are added the difficulties associated with the subject of cognition. Such a subject is ultimately the person himself, although involved in public relations and scientific communities, but having their own individual experience and intelligence, interests and values, needs and passions, etc. Thus, when characterizing social cognition, one should also keep in mind its personal factor
Finally, it is necessary to note the socio-historical conditionality of social cognition, including the level of development of the material and spiritual life of society, its social structure and the interests that dominate it.
The specific combination of all these factors and aspects of the specificity of social cognition determines the diversity of points of view and theories that explain the development and functioning of social life. At the same time, this specificity largely determines the nature and characteristics of various aspects of social cognition: ontological, epistemological and value (axiological).
1. The ontological (from the Greek on (ontos) - existing) side of social cognition concerns the explanation of the existence of society, the patterns and trends of its functioning and development. At the same time, it also affects such a subject of social life as a person, to the extent that he is included in the system of social relations. In the aspect under consideration, the above-mentioned complexity of social life, as well as its dynamism, combined with the personal element of social cognition, are the objective basis for the diversity of points of view on the issue of the essence of people’s social existence.
That this is indeed the case is evidenced by the very history of social cognition and its current state. It is enough to note that various authors take such diverse factors as the basis of the existence of society and human activity, such as the idea of justice (Plato), divine plan (Augustine the Blessed), absolute reason (Hegel), economic factor(K. Marx), the struggle of the “life instinct” and the “death instinct” (eros and thanatos) among themselves and with civilization (3. Freud), “relics” (V. Pareto), “social character” (E. Fromm) , “national spirit” (M. Lazarius, X. Steinthal), geographical environment (C. Montesquieu, P. Chaadaev).
Each of these points of view, and many more could be named, reflects one or another aspect of the existence of society. However, the task social science, which is what social philosophy is, lies not in simply fixing various kinds of factors of social existence, but in discovering objective patterns and trends in its functioning and development. But here we are faced with the main question when it comes to social cognition: do these objective laws and trends exist in society?
From the answer to this follows the answer about the possibility of social science itself. If objective laws of social life exist, then, therefore, social science is possible. If there are no such laws in society, then there can be no scientific knowledge about society, because science deals with laws. There is no clear answer to this question today.
Pointing to the complexity of social cognition and its object, for example, such followers of I. Kant as W. Windelband and G. Rickert argued that there are and cannot be any objective laws in society, because here all phenomena are of an individual, unique nature, and, consequently, in society there are no objective laws that fix only stable, necessary and repeating connections between phenomena and processes. The followers of the neo-Kantians went even further and declared that that society itself exists only as our idea of it, as a “world of concepts,” and not as an objective reality. Representatives of this point of view essentially identify the object (in this case, society and social phenomena in general) and the results of social cognition.
In fact, human society (like man himself) has an objective, primarily natural, basis. It also arises and develops objectively, that is, regardless of who knows it and how, regardless of the specific subject of knowledge. Otherwise, there would be no general line of development in history at all.
The above, of course, does not mean that the development of social knowledge does not affect the development of society at all. However, when considering this issue, it is important to see the dialectical interaction between the object and subject of knowledge, the leading role of the main objective factors in the development of society. It is also necessary to highlight the patterns that arise as a result of the action of these factors.
Such basic objective social factors underlying any society include, first of all, the level and nature of economic development of society, the material interests and needs of people. Not only an individual person, but all of humanity, before engaging in knowledge and satisfying their spiritual needs, must satisfy their primary, material needs. Certain social, political and ideological structures also arise only on a certain economic basis. For example, the modern political structure of society could not have arisen in a primitive economy. Although, of course, one cannot deny the mutual influence of a variety of factors on social development, ranging from the geographical environment to subjective ideas about the world.
2. The epistemological (from the Greek gnosis - knowledge) side of social cognition is associated with the characteristics of this cognition itself, primarily with the question of whether it is capable of formulating its own laws and categories and whether it has them at all. In other words, we are talking about whether social cognition can lay claim to truth and have the status of science? The answer to this question largely depends on the scientist’s position on the ontological problem of social cognition, that is, on whether the objective existence of society and the presence of objective laws in it are recognized. As in cognition in general, in social cognition ontology largely determines epistemology.
The epistemological side of social cognition also includes the solution of such problems:
How is cognition of social phenomena carried out?
What are the possibilities of their knowledge and what are the limits of knowledge;
The role of social practice in social cognition and the significance in this personal experience cognizing subject;
Role of different kinds sociological research and social experiments in social cognition.
Of no small importance is the question of the capabilities of the human mind in understanding the spiritual world of man and society, the culture of certain peoples. In this regard, problems arise regarding the possibilities of logical and intuitive knowledge of the phenomena of social life, including psychological states large groups of people as manifestations of their mass consciousness. The problems of the so-called “common sense” and mythological thinking in relation to the analysis of the phenomena of social life and their understanding are not without meaning.
3. In addition to the ontological and epistemological sides of social cognition, there is also a value - axiological side (from the Greek axios - valuable), which plays an important role in understanding its specifics, since any cognition, and especially social, is associated with certain value patterns and biases and the interests of various cognitive subjects. The value approach manifests itself from the very beginning of cognition - from the choice of the object of research. This choice is made by a specific subject with his life and cognitive experience, individual goals and objectives. In addition, value prerequisites and priorities largely determine not only the choice of the object of cognition, but also its forms and methods, as well as the specifics of interpretation of the results of social cognition.
How the researcher sees the object, what he comprehends in it and how he evaluates it follows from the value preconditions of cognition. The difference in value positions determines the difference in the results and conclusions of knowledge.
In connection with the above, the question arises: what then to do with objective truth? After all, values are, after all, personified and have a personal character. The answer to this question is ambiguous among different authors. Some believe that the presence of a value element in social cognition is incompatible with the recognition of social sciences. Others take the opposite point of view. It seems that the latter are right.
Indeed, the value approach itself is inherent not only in social cognition, the “sciences of culture,” but also in all cognition, including the “sciences of nature.” However, on this basis no one denies the existence of the latter. The factual side, which shows the compatibility of the value aspect of social cognition with social science, is that this science primarily studies objective laws and trends in the development of society. And in this regard, value prerequisites will not determine the development and functioning of the object of study of various social phenomena, but only the nature and specificity of the study itself. The object itself remains the same regardless of how we know it or whether we know it at all.
Thus, the value side of social cognition does not at all deny the possibility of scientific knowledge of society and the existence of social sciences. Moreover, it contributes to the consideration of society and individual social phenomena in different aspects and from different positions.
Knowledge of the laws of society has certain specifics compared to knowledge of natural phenomena. In society there are people endowed with consciousness and will; a complete repetition of events is impossible here. The results of cognition are influenced by the actions of political parties, all kinds of economic, political and military blocs and alliances. Social experiments have enormous consequences for the destinies of people, human communities and states, and, under certain conditions, all of humanity.
One of the features of social development is its multivariate. The course of social processes is influenced by various natural and especially social factors, and the conscious activity of people.
Very briefly, the specifics of social cognition can be defined as follows:
In social cognition, the absolutization of the natural or the social, the reduction of the social to the natural and vice versa is unacceptable. At the same time, one should always remember that society is an integral part of nature and they cannot be opposed.
Social cognition, dealing not with things but with relationships, is inextricably linked with the values, attitudes, interests and needs of people.
Social development has alternatives, different options for its deployment. At the same time, there are many ideological approaches to their analysis.
In social cognition, the role of methods and techniques for studying social processes and phenomena is increasing. Their characteristic feature is a high level of abstraction.
The main goal of social cognition is to identify patterns of social development and, on their basis, predict the paths for further development of society. The social laws operating in social life, in fact, as in nature, represent a repeating connection of phenomena and processes of objective reality.
The laws of society, like the laws of nature, are objective in nature. The laws of society, first of all, differ in the extent to which they cover spheres of public life ( social space) and the degree of duration of operation. There are three main groups of laws. This the most general laws, general laws and specific (particular laws). The most general laws cover all major spheres of social life and function throughout human history (for example, the law of interaction between the economic base and superstructure). General laws function in one or more areas and over a number of historical stages (law of value). Specific or private laws manifest themselves in certain spheres of social life and operate within the framework of a historically determined stage of development of society (the law of surplus value).
Nature and society can be defined as follows: nature is matter that is not aware of its existence; society is matter developing to the realization of its existence. This part of the material world, isolated from nature, is the result of human interaction. The inextricable, natural connection of society with nature determines the unity and difference of the laws of their development.
The unity of the laws of nature and the laws of society lies in the fact that they act objectively and, given the appropriate conditions, manifest themselves with necessity; changing conditions changes the operation of both natural and social laws. The laws of nature and society are implemented regardless of whether we know about them or not, whether they are known or not. Man cannot abolish either the laws of nature or the laws of social development.
There is also a well-known difference between the laws of social development and the laws of nature. Nature is infinite in space and time. Among the laws of nature there are eternal(for example, the law of gravity), and long-term (laws of development of flora and fauna). The laws of society are not eternal: they arose with the formation of society, and will cease to operate with its disappearance.
The laws of nature are manifested in the action of spontaneous, unconscious forces; nature does not know what it is doing. Social laws are implemented through the conscious activity of people. The laws of society cannot function “by themselves”, without human participation.
The laws of social development differ from the laws of nature in their complexity. These are the laws of a higher form of motion of matter. Although the laws of lower forms of movement of matter can influence the laws of society, they do not determine the essence of social phenomena; man obeys the laws of mechanics, the laws of physics, the laws of chemistry, and the laws of biology, but they do not determine the essence of man as a social being. Man is not only a natural, but also a social being. The essence of its development is change biological species, but its social nature, which may lag behind or may advance the course of history.
